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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the formation of Japanese foreign policy through the case study of 
relations with India. The study concentrates on three streams of Japanese diplomacy; 
namely economic relations, nuclear policy and security issues through the theoretical 
framework of neoclassical realism (NCR). This approach, considered the ‘third 
generation’ of the mainstream paradigm, utilises neo-realism’s focus on structural 
factors and ultimately places primacy on systemic forces. Yet NCR seeks a more 
nuanced appraisal of foreign policy and incorporates internal structures into analysis.  
 
The dissertation argues that structural factors including India’s economic growth, the 
rise of China and facilitation provided by the US, initiated interest in India and 
continues to shape the development of policy. ‘China-hedging’ does not provide the 
only rationale. Furthermore, whilst structure is vital, with differing influential weight 
dependent on policy, it is unable alone to explain the exact nature and timing of policy 
decisions. In order to achieve this, the domestic ‘black box’ needs to be explored 
through analysis of unit-level variables such as policymakers’ perceptions, business 
interests, public opinion and norms. Elites in Japan have been particularly slow to 
appreciate India’s strategic worth despite favourable environmental conditions. The 
business community is noted as an important influence but whilst public opinion plays a 
minimal role overall, the prevalence of norms is able to dictate how policy is framed. 
 
The scope of the research project is confined to approximately the past two decades, 
though attention is given to historical relations to place contemporary analysis in 
context. Empirical data was sourced from academic, government and media outlets in 
addition to extensive interview fieldwork in Tokyo, Delhi, London and Washington DC. 
 
This thesis contributes to a nascent literature on an increasingly important area of not 
only Japan’s diplomacy but the regional dynamics of region no scholar of international 
relations can ignore.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Japan’s strategic direction has perplexed analysts for decades. Is Japan retreating into its 
shell or projecting ever-greater power abroad and even remilitarising? The devastating 
events in March 2011, following the Tohoku earthquake further raised the question of 
Japan’s position and purpose.   
 
Asia is today at the centre of global attention. The changes brought to the international 
system following the demise of the Soviet Union, contributed to the emergence, or ‘re-
emergence’ of China, Japan and India as powers with great ambitions for influence and 
stature.1 Goldman Sachs once predicted that by 2020 China would rank second to the 
US in GDP terms, followed by Japan then India. 2  In fact by early 2011 this first 
achievement was reached when Japan’s economy was recorded to be worth $5.47 
trillion whilst that of China was approximately $5.8 trillion.3 In 2009 Asia accounted 
for 25% of global GDP and is projected to represent 40% by 2030. As Mahbubani 
notes, there is an ‘irresistible shift of global power to the East’.4 Despite the financial 
and economic crisis since 2007, Asia has fared relatively well and continues to be 
widely considered the power-centre of the future.  
 
                                                            
1 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, (Atlantic Books: London, 2008) p. 36 
2 Goldman Sachs, ‘The N-11: More Than An Acronym’, BRICS and Beyond, (November 2007) 
3 ‘China overtakes Japan as world's second-biggest economy’, BBC News, 14 February, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321 (Accessed on 14/02/11) Previously China had claimed 
this overtaking would occur earlier than Western economists foresaw, only to be rebuked on the grounds 
that Chinese statistics were unreliable. It is estimated that on current growth rates, China will surpass the 
US in a decade. Ibid. 
4 Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the East, (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2008) 
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What are Japan’s twenty-first century aspirations in this new Asian era? Are they as 
simple as the choice between being an introvert or extrovert nation? Through critiquing 
Japan’s policy towards India, this study contributes to the debate over what kind of 
international actor Japan is and aspires to be.  
 
Two decades ago, following the breakdown of bipolarity in which Japan’s economy had 
benefited and security been assured, Tokyo was forced to reassess its global and 
regional role. For the majority of the post-war period, Japan’s external relations were 
designed through economic rather than political considerations. With the US as a 
constant ally, Tokyo had little need to forge other security relationships. Subsequently 
Japan hesitated to take a leadership role in the region, considering its wartime behaviour 
a further barrier. Scholars have since contested whether Japan’s policy has been 
selfishly neo-mercantilistic5 or beneficial to the region’s economy. Recently however, 
Japan has made greater moves towards developing its diplomacy through adjustments in 
the role of its military and participation in the plethora of new regional institutions.6  
 
This thesis sets out to analyse the formation and implementation of Japanese foreign 
policy through the case study of relations with India. This objective is achieved through 
the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism (hereafter NCR) and extensive 
interview fieldwork. Following the context of the study above, this introductory chapter 
defines the research objective and status of existing literature. The chapter then 
identifies the contributions, which the thesis sets out to make and explanation of 
                                                            
5 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,’ 
International Security 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171–203 
6 Japan’s role in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 for example, demonstrated 
Japan’s realisation that a new approach was needed. 
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research methods. To conclude, the organisation of the remainder of the thesis is 
provided with justification for the chosen case studies. 
 
I. Research Objective 
 
At first glance, Japan and India seem natural partners. Located on the periphery of Asia, 
they have both looked to the West for social, political and economic models.7 Politically 
they are both established democracies with until recently, dominant, unchallenged 
political parties. 8  As Pant recognises, both states are ‘examples of how economic 
growth can be pursued in consonance with democratic values’.9 Moreover, Japan and 
India share no territorial disputes, which for many bilateral relations represent a 
substantial obstacle.  
 
Yet warm ties have been absent for the majority of the post-war era for primarily two 
reasons. As this thesis will demonstrate, in previous decades the structural environment 
of the international system has not facilitated close relations. The second reason has 
been economic. India has not been a major purchaser of Japanese exports or attracted 
much Japanese investment, particularly in the 1980s during Japan’s ‘investment boom’. 
Tokyo’s contact with Delhi, during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, has been 
largely confined to foreign aid.  
 
                                                            
7 Satu Limaye, ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, in Yochiro Sato and Satu Limaye eds., Japan in a 
Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges, (Lanham; Lexington Books, 2006), p. 225 
8 The DPJ took power in August 2009 and the ruling Congress Party in India have experienced depleting 
popularity following several corruption scandals. 
9 Harsh Pant, ‘India Looks East and discovers Tokyo’, Rediff News, 21 October, 2008, 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/21guest.htm, (Accessed on 03/01/09) 
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Economic diplomacy remains Tokyo’s main foreign policy tool but as post-Cold War 
and post-9/11 pragmatic considerations develop, Japan has sought to elevate ties with 
India to the strategic level. This study explores the reasons behind Japan’s hesitant and 
recently active stance towards India in order to draw conclusions as to what Tokyo’s 
India policy suggests about Japan’s wider foreign policy.  
 
Japan’s India diplomacy is a particularly useful case for analysing Japanese policy due 
to its dramatic changes in recent decades. Japan’s approach to India has spun from 
severe condemnation and sanctions to one where India is seen as a key regional and 
global partner. Consensus considers Japan to have been ‘behind the curve’ in noticing 
India and subsequently ‘playing catch up’. The reasons behind the paucity of 
scholarship are therefore understandable. The acceleration in activity over the previous 
decade, however, demands academic attention. 
 
The analytical objective guiding this study is to identify what factors, at both the 
systemic and domestic-level have induced Japan’s formulation and implementation of 
policy towards India over the period of investigation and to elucidate how various 
pushes and pulls have interacted. The influence of both levels on policymaking is 
generally accepted; however, what requires analysis is the extent to which one 
supercedes the other. The central questions this study therefore sets out to analyse are: 
 
1) What attracts Japan to improving relations with India? 
2) To what extent have structural forces determined the formulation of policy? 
3) How have unit-level factors interacted with structural imperatives? 
5 
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4) Specifically, which actors/determinants have proved decisive in bringing 
relations to their expanding ‘strategic partnership’; does this differ according to 
the policy in question? 
5) What can analysis of Japan’s economic, nuclear and security strategy towards 
India identify about the nature of Japanese diplomacy? 
6) Does NCR offer a viable framework for this question? 
 
Due to the breadth of potential topics, it is essential to define the scope of the current 
research endeavour. Previous studies have combined India with its neighbours; with the 
regional term ‘South Asia’ but the focus of the present study is Japan and the Republic 
of India (hereafter ‘India’). More specifically, this study’s focus lies with Japanese 
foreign policy not that of India, or Japan-India relations, which would require separate 
investigation. Whilst the author has given consideration to India’s reception of Japan’s 
policy, the majority of attention remains with Tokyo and its policymaking elite. 
 
The timeframe will concentrate on the contemporary period, roughly between 1998 and 
early 2011, with some reference to earlier decades for context. Despite India’s 1991 
economic liberalisation reforms, these were slow to show results so it was the Pokhran 
Nuclear Tests in May 1998 which decisively brought India to the attention of Japan. 
Relations that had remained cordial suddenly entered a dark era, only partially lifted in 
August 2000 when Prime Minister Mori visited India sparking a new chapter in India-
Japan relations. Annual meetings between prime ministers and VIP visits followed, 
before in October 2008, a ‘Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and 
Global Partnership between Japan and India’ and a ‘Joint Declaration on Security 
Cooperation between Japan and India’ were signed. This marked only the third time 
6 
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Japan confirmed a security pact following those with the US and Australia. Additional 
significant agreements have been concluded since then, including the launch of 
negotiations into the trade of nuclear technology (June 2010) and signing of a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in February 2011. The 
empirical investigation will thus terminate in mid-2011. This allows scope to 
incorporate the influence of Japan’s ‘new’ political administration under the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), and immediate aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami 
and nuclear disaster.  
 
II. Why does this research problem matter? 
 
This case study represents a timely yet under-researched example of Japan’s post-Cold 
War diplomacy. Despite the post-Cold War optimism of Fukuyama’s ‘The End of 
History’, great power politics continue to dominate the international system, with Asia 
in particular a region of vying interests. No government in the region wants open 
conflict with another so how each deals with competing interests is an important area 
for students and practitioners of international relations. Japan is the world’s third largest 
economy, a leading industrial power, contributor to international institutions and mature 
democracy; how it interacts with the region is of vital significance. The topic therefore 
sheds light on how Japan is dealing with fast-changing power dynamics, including 
evolving levels of US activity, a growing presence of China and on the domestic-level a 
new political climate under the DPJ. 
 
The repercussions of Japanese policy also have influence wider afield given the 
importance of the US-Japan alliance for regional stability, the response of Beijing to 
7 
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Tokyo’s diplomacy and what can be ascertained regarding US interests in the region. 
This research explains an aspect of Asian regional dynamics often neglected by both 
scholarly and media literature, despite the importance of its trajectory. It is clear that 
Japan is broadening the scope of its diplomacy, whilst adhering to traditional streams 
such as reliance on the US-Japan alliance and interest in economic development.  
 
III. Literature Review 
 
A survey of the current literature shows that the majority which address both India and 
Japan’s foreign policy refers to each state’s bilateral relations with the US, Russia 
(former Soviet Union), China, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.10  South 
Asia is a new and overlooked aspect of Japan’s post-Cold War policy but one no less 
worthy of analytical attention.  
 
Studies which have included both Japan and India, even under the umbrella of ‘South 
Asia’ have predominantly focused on religious and cultural comparisons related to the 
introduction of Buddhism to Japan.11 The shared existence of democratic parliamentary 
systems and frequent coalition governments has also produced some research.12 Literary 
exchange has been an additional topic, as have comparisons of Indian and Japanese 
societies13 and the role of women.14  
                                                            
10 See Chris Alden and Katsumi Hirano (eds.), Japan and South Africa in a Globalising World: A Distant 
Mirror, (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003) 
11 Bhushan Verma, Indo-Japanese Relations: Challenges and Opportunities, (Kanishka; Delhi, 2004) p. 
208  
12 In 1994, Takako Hirose wrote a comparative study of the single predominant party systems of India 
and Japan. The work shed light on some interesting similarities between the two systems, for example 
how they have both managed to maintain parliamentary democracy, an exception within Asia, whilst 
maintaining distinct culture and modernising. Kesavan has also addressed similarities in political systems 
in order to ‘foster closer understanding between the two countries’.  
13 Ghosh cited in Rajaram Panda and Kazuo Ando eds., India-Japan: Multidimensional Perspectives, 
(New Delhi: Japan Foundation, 1997) 
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During the post-war period publications were interested in primarily economic relations. 
A number of studies looked at Japan’s relations with Bangladesh from the perspective 
of Japanese aid contributions 15 and Mali made a valuable addition with a study of 
Pakistan-Japan relations. 16  However, in stark comparison, very few have explored 
relations with Bangladesh’s immense neighbour, India. Stockwin believes this dearth is 
‘largely because the substance of relations has been comparatively thin.’17  
 
A significant contribution was made by Purnendra Jain with Distant Asian Neighbours, 
Japan and South Asia in 1996. In this study, Jain concludes that Japan’s policy towards 
India is designed to balance against the rise of China. Increases in China’s defence 
spending and continuing tensions between Japan and China encouraged Japan to look 
for other potential friends. Whilst Jain’s work provides a useful starting point, the 
influence of China is overstated. The thesis will depart from such a narrow focus by 
pointing to other potential influences on Tokyo. In Jain’s book for example, little 
attention is paid to the internal dynamics within Japan or to other structural factors like 
the role of US policy. The publication is also not a single-authored book but a collection 
of essays, not all authored by Japan specialists. Furthermore, the value of this study for 
contemporary understanding is limited due to its publication date. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, particularly in Chapter 7, the nuclear tests which India conducted in 1998 
disrupted the minor progress witnessed by 1996. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
14 Lalima Varma in Ibid. 
15 Japan-Bangladesh relations have received far greater attention. Early in 1972, before even than the US, 
Japan formally recognised Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. Since then, Japan has been the 
single largest donor of aid, resulting in Japan being deemed an ‘aid great power’.  
16 Through an empirical and historical approach, Malik reflects on the evolution of Pakistan-Japan 
relations from one purely economic, to increasingly strategic under US leadership during the Cold War 
and since. Malik finds a similar lacuna in the literature with the majority focusing on the historical, 
religious and economic aspect of Japan’s relations with South Asia..   
17 J.A.A. Stockwin quoted in Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours, Foreword  
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As relations between Japan and India widened, somewhat surprisingly little appeared on 
the subject.  Studies were compiled, which assessed the bilateral relationship from 
economic, social, cultural and political angles but these were often produced with Indian 
contributors and focus.18  
 
An exception to the above can be found in Limaye, which as part of a newly created 
‘South Asia’ section of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, contributed by 
assessing Tokyo’s reactive and unforeseen dynamism following the 1998 tests.19 More 
recently, Pant has addressed the ‘newfound intimacy’ between Japan and India. 20  
Pant’s analysis approaches the subject from a different angle, based on his specialism in 
Indian foreign policy and nuclear proliferation. For Pant, Indo-Japan relations are 
inextricably connected to the balance of power in Asia and the rise of China. His 
analysis therefore adheres to Jain’s hypothesis, recognising the primacy of China in 
Japan’s strategic thinking. Pant adds however, an additional factor; ‘the US attempt to 
build India into a major “balancer” in the region’. Indeed, the extent to which Japan’s 
recent interest in India is due to the Bush administration’s flirtations with India is a key 
question addressed in this study (see Chapter 3a). 
 
Pant’s work is also valuable for the analytical structure employed. In addition to being 
few in number, the majority of works are also descriptive, even prescriptive and shy 
                                                            
18The Japan Foundation in Delhi has produced regular assessments of relations between India and Japan 
(1997, 2004 and 2007). These studies concentrate on economic and cultural relations with only ephemeral 
regard to the political perspective and are mainly Indian authored. The Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses (IDSA), where the author was also affiliated during the research process, has also produced 
regular commentaries and analysis on Japan and occasionally Japan-India relations. Rajaram Panda has 
been mainly responsible for this brief.  
19 Satu Limaye, ‘Tokyo's Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 322-339 
20 Harsh V. Pant, 'The Emerging Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific', The RUSI Journal, 152:3, (2007) 
pp. 48 - 53 
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away from associating with a specific theoretical approach. Incorporating theory into a 
study not only improves understanding of the subject but also frames the analysis within 
wider discussion. Pant’s work, whilst not explicitly stated, shows signs of following 
NCR; the approach of this study. Rather than concentrating on India’s perspective, 
however, this study is rooted in Japan’s attitudes and the lessons for policymaking. 
Furthermore, the role and perceptions of Japanese policymakers has been neglected by 
existing studies, which concentrate on states as individual actors.  
 
An additional stream of relevant literature refers to great-power dynamics. A growing 
body of work has emerged assessing the significance of the ‘rise of Asia’. 21  The 
common theme throughout these books points to the fact that Asian dominance is not a 
new phenomenon but rather that the ascendency of China, India and Japan at the same 
time is what makes the contemporary period unique and a challenge to Western 
dominance. In a similar vein, the revival in discussions of ‘pan-Asianism’, most likely 
due to recent attempts to create an ‘East Asian community’ through such forums as 
ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (EAS), has brought relations between China, 
India and Japan back to the fore of IR scholarship.22  
                                                            
21 There are several possible reasons why 2008 encouraged this literature, among them being China’s 
hosting of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, seen by many including the Chinese government as China’s 
‘coming out party’, the end of the Bush administration in the US and reassessment of America’s 
international role and the eventual signing of the US-India nuclear which marked a significant turning 
point in America’s relations with Asia. Kagan, Robert, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, 
(Atlantic Books: London, 2008); Emmott, Bill, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India 
and Japan will Shape Out Next Decade, (London: Allen Lane, 2008); Mahbubani, Kishore, The New 
Asian Hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the East, (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); 
Brahma Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut : The Rise of China, India and Japan,  (New York; Harper Collins; 
2010); Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World, (New York; W.W. Norton & Co. 2008) 
22 For some examples see Davie Capie, ‘Rival Regions? East Asian Regionalism and its Challenge to the 
Asia-Pacific,’ in James Rolfe ed. Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, Honolulu, Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, (2004) pp. 149–65, Shulong Chu, ‘The East Asia Summit: Looking for an Identity’, 
Northeast Asia Commentary, The Brookings Institution, No. 6 (February 2007), Mohan Malik, 'The East 
Asia Summit', Australian Journal of International Affairs,60:2, (2006), pp. 207-211, Takashi Terada, 
‘Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power Struggles’, Japanese Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 1 (May 2006), Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, ‘Strengthening Cooperation in East Asia: Towards an 
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IV. Contributions of the study 
 
Of the previous studies, none have broadened their scope to examine (in significant 
depth), the implications of Japan’s India policy for the wider question of Japan’s foreign 
policy. As will be discussed in the following chapter, Japan’s post-war diplomacy has 
presented commentators with a complex puzzle that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. 
By critiquing Japan’s policy towards India, this analysis will provide a valuable addition 
to the lively debate over the true nature of Japanese diplomacy.  
 
Within a fast-changing Asia, the US and India have made remarkable steps to 
strengthen their relationship and the US-Japan alliance, despite some tension in 2009, 
has continued to represent a ‘pillar’ of regional security. Both of these developments 
have been widely documented. Yet the development of what could be termed the third 
prong of an emerging strategic triangle is under-researched. In 1996, Arthur Stockwin 
predicted in the Foreword to Distant Asian Neighbours, that ‘the topic will grow in 
importance in the years ahead’ and that ‘the world may be well advised to sit up and 
take notice’. 23  In 2011 at the time of writing, the necessity of understanding the 
dynamics of this relationship is being realised. 
  
The objective therefore is to provide a theoretically-informed empirical and thematic 
analysis of Japan’s policy towards India from 1998 to 2011 in order to draw conclusions 
as to the nature of Japan’s foreign policymaking process and diplomatic strategy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
East Asian Community’, Paper presented at the 1st Korea-ASEAN Cooperation Forum held in Jakarta on 
10-12 November 2006 
23 Stockwin quoted in Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours, Foreword 
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The research will contribute to the nascent literature in five distinct ways;  
1) through the collection of contemporary data in the form of interviews, statistics 
and official statements,  
2) conducting research into the Japanese policymaking process  
3) synthesising and revising arguments in the secondary literature with current 
trends  
4) supplement the growing body of NCR work and  
5) integrate study of Japan’s foreign policy and the Indo-Japanese relationship 
thereby bringing a new and under-developed perspective to the study of Japan’s 
international goals.  
 
This study should be of interest to those interested in Japanese foreign policy, 
contemporary Asian relations, NCR and IR scholarship and policymaking. 
 
V. Argument 
 
No one, coherent policy line currently exists in Tokyo as to how to approach India. As 
the case studies demonstrate, influences on policymakers and each actor's weight differs 
depending on both the policy and time in question. Japan's diplomacy is more active 
than often given credit whilst also complex. Tokyo’s strategy involves several 
objectives including trade aspirations, security cooperation and a strategic partnerships.  
 
Structural influences have overwhelmed policy-decisions. For example the economic 
potential and growth of the Indian economy has shaped Japan’s interest in trade and 
investment, as has the realisation that diversification from the Chinese market is 
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necessary and that South Korea has made head-way in the market. In nuclear policy, 
Japan has been influenced by the internationalisation of the nuclear industry, Japan’s 
limited sources of domestic energy and the potential provided by the US-India nuclear 
deal for a similar bilateral agreement. In security affairs, China’s increasingly assertive 
behaviour draws India into Tokyo’s regional agenda, as does concern that the US-Japan 
alliance will not forever be sufficient for security.   
 
Timing is also a factor. During the early period of post-1998 rapprochement, the US 
provided the major external impetus, to be followed in the mid-2000s by China’s ever-
growing presence in the region. This has been followed by increasing awareness among 
Japanese policymakers to the economic potential of India.  
 
Japan’s response to these structural parameters has also depended on unit-level factors 
such as elite perceptions. The influential weight of such domestic actors differs, with the 
business community proving a greater pressure on government than public opinion. 
Such forces have often constrained policy from purely structural influence and shaped 
the speed or nature of eventual policy. Despite the intervening role of internal factors 
nevertheless, structure overrides.  
 
VI. Research Method 
 
Sources utilised for this study were a combination of qualitative research; divided 
between primary print sources, extensive ‘key-informant’ interviews and supportive 
secondary texts. This mix incorporated the reality of the situation with academic and 
theoretical analysis. NCR (explained in Chapter 2) encourages analysts to begin at the 
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systemic level but crucially also to analyse how readings of relative power are translated 
into the behaviour of state actors. Furthermore, rather than assuming actors will behave 
rationally, analysts must look to how these influences are perceived to understand how 
they are acted upon.  
 
i. Primary data 
 
Interviews were chosen as a major source of qualitative research for their ability to 
cover factual data and perceptions. 24 Interviews provided a vital resource to get behind 
official rhetoric and track the determinants of policy decisions. By utilising this method, 
the author was able to uncover insights not disclosed in official public statements. The 
author conducted structured, semi-structured and open-ended interviews with current 
and retired officials and diplomats involved in the strategising and implementation of 
policy as well as non-government academic experts, journalists and security experts 
from Japan, India, the US and UK.25  
 
Interviews were structured around the main themes of the study, including but not 
exclusively the historical origins of Japan’s interest in India, the economic dimension, 
development of nuclear policy and defence/maritime cooperation. Following an 
introduction to respondents’ career history, interviewees were asked about the role of 
the US and China. In addition the author allowed interviewees to deviate from these 
                                                            
24 Contacts were established through a number of means, including attending relevant seminars and talks 
by potential participants, referrals from previous interviewees and direct email contact. As the ‘List of 
Interviewees’ demonstrates, the author spoke with scholarly experts in the field of Japan-India relations, 
Japanese foreign strategy, diplomats, politicians, journalists and members of the business community in 
Tokyo, Delhi, Kolkata, Washington DC and London.  
25 In June 2009, the author was a visiting researcher at the Organisation of Asian Studies at Waseda 
University Tokyo, hosted by Professor Takeshi Terada. Waseda University holds a research exchange 
agreement with Warwick University where the candidate is based. The author was also attached to the 
Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) Tokyo, a quasi-independent think tank.  
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topics should their experience, scholarship or expertise requires further examination of a 
particular angle. The wording of questions also differed depending on the timing of the 
interview to take account of recent developments, for example before and after the 
signing of CEPA and launch of civil nuclear technology transfer negotiations. All 
interviews concluded with predictions as to the future of the relationship and 
information was verified after the interview. The overwhelming majority were 
conducted in an official setting whilst a few were taken from informal conversations at 
business/political events and social gatherings. Due to this study’s attention to 
perceptions, the author ensured respondents resisted presenting a purely fact-based 
portrayal of Japan’s India policy. Instead, the author attempted to steer conversation 
towards also discussing perceptions of situations and the success or otherwise of policy 
decisions. An open-ended question format often resulted in several previously 
unconsidered topics entering the research agenda.  
 
Academics were chosen based on their expertise of Japan’s specific policy towards 
India (a rarity), Japanese international relations or Indian external politics. Several also 
previously worked in government and continue to participate in official dialogues. 
Those in the academic community are independent of the scrutiny which bureaucrats 
might face so their comments were more subjective, but also less informed. In order to 
present a full picture, both were accessed. 
 
It was thus imperative that opinions of bureaucrats and officials were taken into 
consideration. By including a mixture of academic and government sources, a balanced 
analysis of policy-drivers could be taken. Retired ambassadors to both India and Japan 
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provided another useful resource, able to disclose more information than those currently 
in office. They have often also contributed academic works to the subject.26  
 
The importance attributed to Japanese bureaucrats emanates from the tendency in Japan 
for politicians to hold relatively little influence or interest over foreign policy. As 
Yuzawa notes, the majority of Diet members that have taken initiative in security policy 
have focused their attention on strengthening the Japan-US defence alliance27 rather 
than seeking to enhance Japan’s relations with other governments like India. The ‘rigid 
civilian control system’ in Japan leaves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) the 
greatest authority in security, more so than the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self 
Defense Forces (SDF). Traditionally the Prime Minister also plays a marginal role in 
policy formation.28 As this research will explore, however, there have been occasional 
exceptions, most evidently under Abe Shinzo (2006-07) when executive leadership 
shaped Japan’s policy towards India. The focus of the study is therefore on MOFA and 
Ministry for Economy, Trade and Investment (METI) officials and to a limited extent, 
defence officials, with some attention to inter-ministry rivalries, particularly between 
MOFA and MOFA.29 The author recognises that responses from officials were limited 
due to fears of reputation, official guidelines and the Japanese social phenomena of 
tatemae30 but considers that with the addition of subjective academic accounts this does 
not diminish the value of testimonies.  
                                                            
26 Examples include Eijiro Noda, ‘Resurgence of Hope’ in Kamlendra Kanwar ed., India-Japan, Towards 
a New Era, (Delhi: USBPD, 1992) pp. 63-69; A. Madhavan, ‘The Post-Cold War Equations’ in 
Kamlendra Kanwar ed., India-Japan, Towards a New Era, (Delhi: USBPD, 1992) pp. 36-54 
27 Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for 
Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific, (London; Routledge, 2007), p. 11 
28 Yuzawa attributed this to ‘bureaucrats’ control of information needed for policy formulation, a shortage 
of staff, and even a lack of interest in security policy issues’. Ibid.  p. 11 
29 Reference to ‘attitudes’ in this study will refer to the policymaking elite, unless otherwise clarified. 
30 This cultural trend related to the difference between ‘honne’ (real intention) and ‘tatemae’ (façade). It 
is likely in Japanese culture that people express ‘tatemae’ in order to fit in with society’s expectations or 
the position of their employer/government, rather than express what could be a contrary opinion.  
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Interviews conducted with practitioners of earlier Japanese policy, allow for 
participant’s reflection, which cannot be expected by those currently involved. The 
issue of discretion was also a constraint. Since little has been written on this subject, the 
inferences from interviews were therefore liable to the author’s own interpretation. On 
the whole honest opinions were shared but concerns over confidentiality are likely to 
have led to some hesitation in responses, particularly on such sensitive subjects as 
nuclear technology transfer. 
 
Interviews were spread out over the research period with four conducted in Tokyo in 
June 2009, eight in London between August 2009 and July 2011 and the majority; 
seventy-three in Tokyo from May to June 2010. A further thirty-four were made in 
Delhi and Kolkata between February and March 2010,31 followed by a final visit to 
Washington DC in June 2011 where a further seven were completed to clarify 
arguments and deepen understanding of the US dimension.  In total, 131 interviews 
were collected. By carrying out such a number of interviews, the research aimed to 
‘cover all bases’ and provide a richness and inclusiveness to subsequent conclusions. By 
taking a relatively large sample of opinions, this verified the position of the Japanese 
and Indian governments and identified exceptions. All were conducted in English.32 
                                                            
31 From February to March 2011, the author was affiliated with The Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses (IDSA) as a Visiting International Fellow. This organisation specialises in defence and security 
with several former military personnel and civil services among its scholarly staff. IDSA was established 
in 1965 following the initiative of the then Defence Minister Chavan. The IDSA is funded by the Indian 
Ministry of Defence but functions autonomously. Here, the author interviewed a further 34 key-
informants, including several Japanese diplomats, former Indian Ambassadors to Tokyo, strategists and 
journalists. I also participated in the operations of the think tank, including an Asian Security Conference 
which brought together scholars from across the region and world as well as regular seminars and debates 
held at the Institute.  
32 The primary reason for this is the limited Japanese capability of the author. Fortunately the diplomatic 
and business language employed by Japan and India in their relations is English. The only interview in 
which the participant responded in Japanese was with former Prime Minister Abe. During this meeting, 
Mr Taniguchi (former MOFA Press Secretary) acted as translator. Press Statements, speeches and 
government elite statements are available in English on both the Japanese and Indian embassy websites. 
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Other primary data sources included official statements, speeches, think tank reports 
and press releases related to Japan’s policy in India as well as efforts from the US to 
incorporate India into a trilateral dialogue with Japan. Economic data for the most part 
was sourced from Japan, particularly the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and METI. Due to 
the contemporary nature of this study, primacy was placed on articles and opinion 
pieces from the quality press to demonstrate how opinion-formers have viewed the 
success of Japanese initiatives. The Japanese perspective was sourced from Kyodo 
News, Nikkei, The Asahi, Mainichi and Yomuiri Shimbun and The Japan Times. The 
supplementary Indian perspective included Times of India, Hindu and Telegraph. In 
addition, reports from the international news agencies; Reuters, The Associated Press 
and The Economist, which maintain an India bureau, were analysed. An increasing 
number of journalistic pieces have been written on contemporary developments between 
the two states, particularly in the days surrounding a prime ministerial or ministerial 
visit but media interest, as will be noted, often frames Japan’s India policy within the 
context of China.  
 
ii. Secondary data 
 
For secondary data, the author relied on respected scholarly work on trends in Japanese 
diplomacy, theoretical IR analysis, including works utilising NCR and examinations of 
the contemporary policies of the US, China and India as well as Japan to provide a 
suitable framework for the research puzzle. Comparative studies of Japan’s behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                                              
The author recognises the limitation from being unable to access Japanese academic texts and media 
reports in Japanese but attempted to overcome this obstacle by collecting a substantial number of 
interviews to support the analysis. 
19 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
towards other states were also used for contextualisation and alternative theoretical 
approaches were studied before concluding that NCR best-suited the research problem.  
 
VII. Organisation of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to lay 
out the study’s research puzzle, context, selection of case studies and method of 
analysis. The contribution the research offers is also included with an assessment of the 
current status of the literature. The following chapter is divided into two parts, 
beginning with a discussion of the dominant theoretical approaches adopted regarding 
Japan’s foreign policy. The second section argues for the application of NCR, 
explaining the method and its applicability to the case of Japan’s India policy.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at the major structural forces which influence Japanese policymaking, 
namely (a) the US and the US-Japan Security Alliance and (b) China, often considered 
the primary rationale for Japan’s interest in India. In light of this thesis’ adherence to 
NCR, Chapter 4 provides an overview of key actors involved in policymaking at a 
domestic-level. In order to provide a frame of reference, Chapter 5 traces the evolution 
of Japan’s interactions with India from early contact in the sixth century to 1998, from 
where this study’s timeframe begins.  
 
The remainder of the thesis uses detailed thematic case studies to shed light on Japan’s 
policymaking process, the role of particular actors and overall strategy by utilising 
NCR. The concluding chapter returns to the original questions posed in the Introduction 
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and reiterates the analysis of the thesis. In addition, Chapter 9 points to auxiliary 
research avenues.  
 
VIII. Selection of case studies 
 
Rather than adopt a historical narrative approach, this study is organised thematically. 
As Van Evera argues, this form of analysis allows for evidence-based study to explore 
‘whether events unfold in the manner predicted and (if the subject involves human 
behaviour) whether actors speak and act as the theory predicts’.33 Within discussions on 
these themes, a chronological method is used to trace the sequence of events.  
 
Initially relations between Japan and India encompassed only limited economic 
interaction. By 2011 the relationship includes a wide gamut of policy areas which itself 
demonstrates notable change. In order to look in detail at what caused this change, three 
specific fields of policy are analysed; economic relations, nuclear policy and 
defence/security cooperation.  Economic diplomacy has long-been central to Japan’s 
external relations. This focus has served the state’s interests well and continues to 
represent the most substantive area of Japan’s engagement with India, highlighted by 
CEPA of 2011. This area, however, remains one of unfulfilled potential.  
 
Japan’s nuclear stance has also been a constant defining characteristic of Japanese 
diplomacy. Yet despite Japan’s unique experience of nuclear weapons, Japan somewhat 
ironically has become a leading producer and consumer of nuclear energy, relying on 
the energy source for 30% of electricity. In Japan-India relations, differing nuclear 
                                                            
33 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods of Students of Political Science, (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University 
Press, 1997), p. 23 
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positions has served as an obstacle to deeper understanding but as the following thesis 
will demonstrate, a hurdle of declining salience.  
 
Maritime cooperation is an additional field where the two states’ interests show 
complementarities. Both Japan and India are strong maritime nations where 
considerable progress has been made in recent years to deepen trust. Discussion on this 
subject and how Japan’s has sought India’s hand in wider security policy dialogues will 
provide the focus of the final case study. By choosing case studies which encompass 
such radically different objectives and involve a variety of actors within Japan’s 
policymaking elite, this study avoids the danger of over-concentration on a particular 
policy field whilst recognising the limiting scope of a doctoral dissertation on such a 
broad topic as Japanese policy towards India.  
 
This case-study research approach suits the thesis’ theoretical framework. As 
proponents of NCR stress, the role of independent and intervening variables necessitates 
a distinct methodological technique – ‘theoretically-informed narratives’34 and content-
rich analysis. NCR research favours looking at the systemic level before then tracing the 
specific and often complex causal chain, which results in foreign policy decisions.35 
NCR studies are often case studies, which analyse how great powers respond to relative 
material rise or decline.36 For this study, the overarching case study is Japan’s foreign 
policy towards India. 
 
                                                            
34 Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Timothy Dunne (eds.) Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 93 
35 Ibid. p.93 
36 This is considered natural, due to NCR’s realist assumption of the world as made up of great power 
politics and due to the fact that most NCR scholars are American, studying US foreign policy and grand 
strategy. This can be seen in practice in William Curtis Wohlforth’s study on the Soviet Union, Thomas J. 
Christensen’s on the US and China, Randall L. Schweller’s research on the belligerents of World War II 
and Fareed Zakaria’s study on US history. 
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2. Key Debates on Japanese Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, 
Constructivism and Neoclassical Realism 
 
This study utilises the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism. Through the 
empirical investigation, the applicability of NCR to the study of Japan’s policymaking 
will also be verified.  
 
I. Theories of Japanese foreign policy 
 
Theorists of international relations (IR) have employed a variety of approaches to 
explain the complexities of the international system.1 Yet despite the vast quantity of 
material, international relations theory has suffered from its incommensurability. 2 
Regarding East Asian security, mainstream IR paradigms have struggled to adequately 
explain the dynamics of the region.3 As a result, a number of paradigms have emerged. 
The fundamental disparity between relates to the unit of analysis or variable 
championed over alternatives. Simply put, whilst some theorists advocate analysis 
based on external factors like the international system, others concentrate on internal, 
domestic variables.  
                                                            
1 Alternative approaches to IR not considered in great depth here include analysis the world system 
according to Marxist theory, which true to Marx’s deterministic tradition believe the constraints of 
structure to limit the ability of human agency to bring change. Similarly the realism of EH Carr within 
classical realism taking a left-leaning approach believed that whilst states are currently the centre of 
power structures this might change. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to 
the Study of International Relations, (London and New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 224-235. 
Carr was also known for his critique of idealism or ‘utopianism’ in which he opposed the idea that actors 
could change the system but that the system was a result of historical consequence and could be used 
prescriptively. Neither ‘realist’ approach is favoured in this study which as will be seen below, pays 
attention to both structure and agency (though to different degrees) in formulating IR.  
2 Colin Wight, ‘Incommensurability and Cross Paradigm Communication in International Relations 
Theory: What’s the Frequency Kenneth?’ Millennium 25, (1996) pp. 291-319 
3 Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford, CA, 
Stanford University Press, 1999) 
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The realist paradigm has been increasingly criticised for only providing ‘post hoc’ 
explanations for events with little predictive power.4 Scholars attempted to overcome 
this dilemma by forming what was termed a ‘neo-neo partnership’ between neo-realists 
and neo-liberals from the other principal theoretical approach but no grand theory has 
yet been established. Constructivism, associated with the work of Wendt,5 introduced 
the analytical tools of identities and norms 6  to explain the actions of states. 7 
Dependence on the role of ideational factors, however, also encouraged criticism even 
among those who fall into the ‘constructivist’ camp. Constructivism has proven popular 
among political scientists but eclecticism has characterised the approach as proponents 
differ in their adoption of unit-level variables.8  
 
Japan’s foreign policy, like that of the discipline as a whole, has proven unable to secure 
academic consensus. In the following section, the key arguments put forward are 
discussed and critiqued before the suitability of an alternative interpretation, NCR is 
considered to understand Japan’s diplomatic strategy towards India.  
 
 
                                                            
4 Brian Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary 
Extension of Structural Realism’, Security Studies, 17:2, (April, 2008), p. 295 
5 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
International Organization (46:2, Spring 1992), pp.399-403  
6 Norms differ from ideas or beliefs since norms are held collectively at a societal level, whereas the latter 
can be held by both individuals and groups. Keiko Hirata, Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese 
Foreign Policy, (London, Palgrave Macmillan; 2008), p. 235 
7 A. Bjorkdahl, ‘Norms in international relations: some conceptual and methodological reflections’ 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, Issue 1, (2002), pp. 9-23. For additional guides to 
how norms influence state behaviour, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and World 
Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, International Organization, 50:2 (1996), pp. 325–47 
8 One of the primary divides among constructivists is between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ as identified by Hay, 
Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 206. 
Both see relations between the material and ideational as logical but those on the ‘thick’ side prioritise 
ideational whereas ‘thin’ constructivists see material as of greater influence. 
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i. Japan as a ‘realist-military’ state 
 
Realism is not a unified theory of international relations. Rather, the paradigm 
represents an amalgamation of approaches, which follows basic assumptions. 9 
Predominant among these is the belief in an anarchic world10 where sovereign states as 
primary actors prioritise defending their security.11 This leads states to seek power and 
resources which ultimately results in conflict.  In addition, relative gains are deemed 
significantly more important than absolute gains. Realism places considerable emphasis 
on a state’s geopolitical position believing the balance of power is the major 
determinant for state behaviour. The methods states employ are identified as either 
alliances and/or military build-up since no other state is considered by itself reliable to 
defend another’s interests. When states are unable to balance, their only option is to 
‘bandwagon’ or defer to a greater power. 
 
When applied to Japan, the realist approach has faced considerable criticism. In the 
years immediately following defeat in the Pacific War, the reasons for Japan’s 
international inertia were broadly accepted. Japan’s approach was considered the result 
of a rational calculation of national interest, known as the ‘strategic state’ thesis or 
‘Yoshida Doctrine’. This strategy, designed by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-
47, 1948-54), was premised on the belief that Japan had previously ‘mismanaged 
                                                            
9 NCR itself is similarly not monolithic but a diversity of neoclassical realist ‘theories’. In fact, several 
neoclassical realists resist the branding of their approach as a theory. Adherents appear even to be 
satisfied with their approach being deemed ‘midrange theorising’. According to Rose, the fact that NCR 
is unable to ‘provide tidy answers or precise predictions should perhaps be seen not as a defect but rather 
as a virtue’. As Rose has further accepted, perhaps this is often the best social science can hope to 
achieve. Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and theories of foreign policy’, p. 172 
10 Randall L Schweller, ‘The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism’, Elman and Elman eds., Progress 
in International Relations Theory, Appraising the Field, (Cambridge: MIT, 2003), p. 311 
11 Yukiko Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases, (London: Routledge, 2008), 
p. 5 
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Japan’s sources of national strength’ and needed to seek an alternative. 12 With the 
assumption that the Cold War would necessitate US military support to protect its key 
Asian ally from Soviet Union invasion, Japan benefited from a ‘free ride’, or more 
accurately, a ‘cheap ride’ in security spending. This then left space to concentrate on 
economic recovery and growth; ‘strong economy, weak army’.13 Japan was criticised 
for lacking a strategy and taking a ‘go-with-the-flow’ style to diplomacy but for much 
of the Cold War period this approach served Japan well.14  
 
As the Cold War developed, neorealist scholars predicted that Japan would shake off its 
passivity in favour of a more active international role. 15  According to realist 
assumptions, the international state of anarchy16 prescribes states to seek to maximise 
their power as far as their economies will allow. Yet Japan’s behaviour deviated 
significantly from these prescriptions. Japan is a highly industrialised, modern society 
with the third largest economy in the world. Despite holding one of the world’s most 
modern militaries, however, defence spending has continued to be restrained by the US-
imposed cap at 1% of national wealth.17 As Miyagi identifies, Japan’s diplomacy has 
                                                            
12 Michael J. Green, ‘Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo’s New Assertiveness Is Good for Washington’, Foreign 
Affairs, (March/April 2007). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-green/japan-is-back-
why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto (Accessed on 06/07/09) 
13 According to Green, Yoshida was particularly keen for Japan to trade freely with China, which he 
believed would soon end its alliance with the Soviet Union. 
14 Michael Blaker, ‘Evaluating Japan’s diplomatic performance’, in Gerald L. Curtis ed., Japan’s Foreign 
Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1993) 
15 The collapse of Japan’s mercantile political economy in the 1980s and early 1990s also raised questions 
as to the durability of this model. Hirata, Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 2   
16 Here, anarchy refers to the absence of world government rather than the popular understanding of 
disorder and chaos. As Hagerty defines, ‘No appeal can be made to a higher entity clothed with the 
authority and equipped with the ability to act on its own initiative.’ Devin T Hagerty, ‘India and the 
Global Balance of Power: A Neorealist Snapshot’ in Harsh Pant (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Indian 
Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates its Rise in the International System, (London, Palgrave 
Macmillan; 2008) 
17 Richard Samuels, ‘Japan’s Grand Strategy’, LSE Public Lecture, London (13 October 2008), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/events/2008/20080819t1316z001.htm; 
26 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
reflected a ‘lopsided power profile, in which its economic capabilities are highly 
developed compared to its political stature and military power’.18 
 
The rationale behind this puzzle has consumed scholarship on Japanese foreign policy. 
In order to explain Japan’s behaviour, a significant number of scholars have adopted 
realist interpretations, differing in the casual weight they ascribe to the above 
assumptions.  
 
ii. The role of ‘gaiatsu’ 
 
It cannot be denied that Japan’s diplomacy is influenced by the wishes of Washington 
(see Chapter 3a). The extent to which this structural variable dictates Japanese policy, 
however, is disputed. Calder most derogatively defined Japan as a ‘reactive state’, 
where gaiatsu (external pressure) from predominantly the US dictated policy. Hirose 
concurs, believing the ‘Please US policy’ to prevail, shaped ‘in terms of responses to 
the external environment, rather than a policy formulated on its own initiative’.19 Hirose 
classifies Japanese foreign policy as ‘characterised by vagueness and indecisiveness’ 
where ‘not much imagination or initiative can be observed’.20 Calder also claims that 
the fragmented and pluralistic nature of Japan’s political system has caused so much 
infighting and ‘bureaucratic rivalries’21 that no grand strategy is even possible. Van 
Wolferen has gone further claiming Japan is not even a sovereign state as defined as an 
                                                            
 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 43 
19 Takako Hirose, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Self-Defence Forces’ in N.S. Sisodia and G.V.C. Naidu 
eds., Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia: Focus on Japan, (Delhi: Promilla, 2007), p. 281 
20 Takako Hirose, ‘Japan in a Dilemma – The search for a horizontal Japan-South Asia Relationship,’ 
Purnendra Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia, (New York: Sterling Publishers; 1996), 
p.28 
21 Thomas U. Berger, ‘The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State’ in Berger, Thomas U., Mike M. 
Mochizuki, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive 
State, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2007) , p. 265 
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entity ‘with central organs of government which can both recognise what is good for the 
country and bear ultimate responsibility for national decision-making’. Study of the 
occasionally influential role of Japan’s internal dynamics through this thesis will argue 
against such an analysis. 
 
An opposing view considers Japanese policy to contain practical and well-considered 
tactics. According to Pyle and Samuels, Japan is not ‘irrational, passive or lacking in 
strategic thought’ but rational and increasingly active. 22  Samuels and Heginbotham 
have rejected the interpretation of Calder et al. claiming policymakers are not ‘doves 
nor hawks but pragmatists,’ 23  working through clever diplomacy and an effective 
bureaucratic structure to secure Japan’s national economic and political interests. 
Through a ‘dual hedge’ strategy, Samuels believes Japan will continue to rely on the US 
for military balance whilst seeking additional commercial opportunities in the region.24  
 
The past two decades have witnessed increased debate on whether Japan has or indeed 
should become ‘normal’. The concept was originally articulated by DPJ politician, 
Ichiro Ozawa in his influential publication, ‘Blueprint for a New Japan’ in 1993. 25 
Ozawa called for Japan to assume a role more commensurate with its economic and 
potential military power and has indeed edged towards a more military-realist status 
from its previous ‘overlapping, yet somewhat conflicting paradigms…as both a 
democratic pacifist state and an elite-guided mercantile state’.26 Japan has distanced 
                                                            
22 T.J. Pempel, ‘The Pendulum Swings toward a Rising Sun’, Book Review Roundtable, Asia policy, No. 
4 (July 2007), p. 188 
23 Eric Heginbothan and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Japan’s Dual Hedge’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5, 
(September/October 2002), p. 113 
24 Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘Change in Japan’s Grand Strategy: Why and How Much?’ Book Review 
Roundtable, p. 195 
25 Ozama was former chief secretary of the LDP, then president of the DPJ until his resignation in May 
2009 over a funding scandal.  
26 Sato and Hirata, Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 1 
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itself slightly from its dependence on the US, towards a multilateral collection of 
regional alliances. Pyle and Green agree that Japan is poised to play a larger role on the 
international stage and view such a development as positive for both the US and the 
region.27 Even though Japan depends highly on oil from the region, as Miyagi identifies 
in her study of Japan’s Middle East strategy for example, by siding with US policy 
following 9/11, Japan favoured political goals over its economic security. This has been 
recognised by a number of scholars who term this shift in various ways as becoming a 
‘normal country’ or the onset of ‘creeping realism,’ 28  ‘transitional realism’ and 
‘mercantile realism.’29  
 
Green also looks at the structural level, viewing Japanese foreign policy as 
‘increasingly...shaped by strategic considerations about the balance of power and 
influence in Northeast Asia, particularly vis-à-vis China’. Relations with East Asia have 
developed from economic interests to ‘reflect a self-conscious competition with China 
for strategic influence in the region.’30 Green differs from some analyses by arguing that 
Japan was pushed towards a realist approach by international circumstances rather than 
proactively seeking a more political regional role. Green’s analysis has been adopted by 
observers who also recognise the need to ‘check’ China as a major determinant of 
Japanese policy and is largely agreed with by this study. Japan remains, however, 
withheld by traditional dependence on the US-Japan alliance and domestic norms. 
 
                                                            
27 Green, ‘Japan Is Back’ 
28 Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9-11 World, Embracing a New Realpolitik, 
(Westport, CT; Praeger Publishers, 2006), p. 62 
29 Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy’ 
30 Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 6 
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Hughes agrees with Green to the extent that increased military spending by China and a 
consistently belligerent North Korea have encouraged Japan to strengthen its alliance 
with the US. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent ‘war on terror’ served to hasten 
this policy, but Hughes recognises efforts by Japan’s elite to ‘maximise autonomy and 
the great skill and ingenuity with which these leaders have sought to maintain hedging 
options.’31 
 
iii. Japan’s ‘liberal’ economic policy 
 
On the opposing end of the theoretical spectrum, neo-liberalism has sought to 
incorporate the role of economic cooperation and international institutions into IR 
analysis. Questioning the realist assumption that power dictates behaviour, Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye (arguably founders of neo-liberalism) posited an alternative 
interpretation coined ‘complex interdependence’.32 In this neo-liberal rebuttal, relations 
between states on the economic level are recognised as having increasing leverage as 
the use of military force and power-balancing declines. Rosecrance contends that power 
is now measured in economic and technological strength rather than political or 
military. Both neo-realists and neoliberals focus on the anarchic structure and 
assumption of unified state actors in their analysis. However contemporary liberalism 
takes a more positive attitude towards the international system believing that states seek 
cooperation through trade and institutions to overcome international disputes. Japan’s 
participation and faith in multilateral institutions such as the UN can be seen in this 
light. Realists, however, argue that Japan is employing the UN as a means to gain great 
power status and ultimately a permanent seat at the Security Council. 
                                                            
31 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine’, Book Review Roundtable, p. 200 
32 Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company; 1977) 
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For neo-liberals, Japan’s non-militarist policy is a clever, pragmatic calculation of the 
national interests which can be sought when acting as ‘a trading state’. The thriving 
economic relations and interdependence between Japan and China for example have 
been recognised as an important restraint to open political hostility.33 With regards to 
Tokyo’s strategy towards India, Chapter 6 will demonstrate the strong economic 
incentives, tempered with other political goals. 
 
iv. The ‘constructivist turn’ 
 
In response to the above debate, some scholars took a ‘constructivist turn’ towards 
alternative analytical units. Rather than criticising neo-realism and neo-liberalism for 
what they include in their analysis, constructivists sought to highlight what has 
previously been overlooked.34  
 
Constructivists depart from centring analysis on structure, preferring to concentrate on 
ideational factors. Various definitions of norms have been identified 35  but as 
Katzenstein and Sil articulate, constructivism is ‘based on the fundamental view that 
ideational structures mediate how actors perceive, construct and reproduce the 
                                                            
33 Tomohiko Taniguchi, ‘A Cold Peace: The Changing Security Equation in Northeast Asia,’ Orbis, 
Volume 49, Number 3, (Summer, 2005), pp. 445-457 
34 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The constructivist turn in international relations theory’, World Politics, Volume 
50, Number 2, (January 1998), p. 324 
35Miyagi highlights some of different conceptions of ‘norms’, identifying the term as ‘inter-subjectively 
understood standards of behaviour that, if not lived up to, can result in some kind of punishment’ 
(Dobson and Axelrod), ‘“guidance devices” that can be used to criticise and justify action’ (Kratochiwill), 
‘a “sense of ought” is found in the statements and actions of policy-making agents’ (Bjorkdahl). For 
some, norms ‘emerge out of a watershed experience and may be championed by “political entrepreneurs” 
if they win over key publics, they may become widely accepted and associated with a state’s very 
identity.’ ‘National norms may become a source of legitimacy for a regime that constrains the behaviour 
of subsequent generations of decision-makers long after the conditions that inspired them have changed.’ 
Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 11 
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institutional and material structures they inhabit as well as their own roles and identities 
within them’.36 In contrast to realists and liberals who believe agents (the state) create 
structures like norms and institutions, constructivists believe the norms themselves 
influence actors. 37  By focusing on the domestic, unit-level variables of norms and 
customs, this approach to IR has covered some of the gaps, which more traditional lines 
of enquiry left exposed. Constructivists borrow aspects of sociological literature, which 
look at the agent-structure relationship through interactions between individuals and the 
state. 38  For constructivists, domestic-level analysis; culture, identity and other non-
material factors 39  are of equal significance. 40  In the field of Japanese security, 
constructivism has found a welcome reception.41   
 
Norms are indeed essential to understand the actions of Japanese policymakers. The 
norm of anti-militarism in particular continues to permeate Japanese decision-making as 
identified by Katzenstein and Berger.42 The Peace Constitution of 1947 capped defence 
spending at 1% of GDP, preventing Japan from building a military commensurate with 
                                                            
36 Peter J Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, ‘Rethinking Asian Security, A Case for Analytical Eclectism,’ 
Rethinking Security in East Asia, (Singapore; NUS Press, 2008), p. 9 
37 Checkel, ‘The constructivist turn in international relations theory’, p. 327 
38 Takashi Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6: Japan’s Initiatives and the Agent-Structure Framework’, 
Working Paper, Waseda University Global COE Program Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration 
(GIARI), (August 2009) 
39 An interesting example of the difference between social and material interests as identified by Checkel 
relates to nuclear weapons. Checkel notes that for constructivists, the physical reality of a nuclear arsenal 
is not what is feared by the US since similar concerns are not felt with regards Britain’s hold. The issue 
arises rather from in whose possession they are in, for example Iran and North Korea. 
40 Wendt own particular constructivist approach takes a more international perspective, identifying an 
international society of norms. Wendt considers the anarchy which realist use as the basis of their 
analysis, not to be unchanging but rather ‘what states make it’. According to Checkel regarding Japanese 
foreign policy this could be seen in Japan’s favour towards United Nations multilateralism when the 
‘norm of great power military rivalry’ was discredited in favour of international cooperation.  
41 For a discussion on how and which other international norms have been accepted by Japanese 
policymakers, see Keiko Hirata, Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, (London, 
Palgrave Macmillan; 2008). Hirata notes how whilst the pacifist norm has had a significant impact on 
Japanese policy, others like aid conditionality and anti-global warming have at times only been partially 
accepted whilst others like anti-whaling have been rejected. p. 235 
42 See Peter J., Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New 
York; Columbia University Press, 1996); Thomas U. Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's 
Culture of Anti-militarism’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 119-150 
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its economic capacity. According to Katzenstein, this ‘evolved into a cultural norm’ 
affecting foreign policy decisions; policymakers have to justify any departure.43  
 
In order to analyse these norms, scholars have adopted aspects of an ‘area studies’ 
approach by looking at the unique attributes of a particular culture. Constructivists also 
place emphasis on the significance of history and historical memory. Unique 
experiences shape how states perceive subsequent threats, for example previous 
hostility between Japan and China influences present-day relations. Such a focus on 
cultural qualities, however, shares the drawbacks of the area-studies approach, which 
‘privileges amassing empirical data but [is] usually devoid of theoretical value’ and fails 
to appreciate the influences of the international system, which this thesis considers 
central.44 
 
Furthermore, norms are not fixed since they must be interpreted by decision-makers 
who dictate policy. Constructivism assumes that norms can be relatively easily 
identified but leaders may well be misguided in their judgement of domestic opinion 
and the environment within which they operate. Elites may also manipulate norms to 
further their own political goals. Alternatively, leaders may be aware of their material 
capability but be restrained by normative constraints or personal and political concerns. 
 
Constructivism’s focus on the domestic-level, often at the expense of general trends, 
limits the approach’s utility. Furthermore, it has been argued that constructivism lacks a 
‘theory of agency’ by overlooking those who ultimately implement policy. The origins 
of norms are also neglected, as are explanations as to how norms might develop over 
                                                            
43 Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9-11 World, p. 17 
44 Brecher cited in Caroline Rose, Interpreting Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political 
Decision-Making, (London: Routledge, 1998) 
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time. Constructivism has benefitted discourse by highlighting the role of social factors 
in decision-making but falls short of constituting a theory,45 remaining more a method 
or approach to an empirical problem.  
 
v. An alternative paradigm 
 
What can be seen therefore is that whilst mainstream IR theories offer some valuable 
lenses through which to view Japanese foreign policy, they are unable to provide a 
universally applicable framework. As a result, an ‘eclectic’ or ‘hybrid’ approach has 
become in vogue amongst scholars keen to bridge the divide between macro and micro-
level analysis.  
 
Waltz's formulation of a neorealist theory had a profound influence on security studies. 
Waltz’s analysis developed classical realism from its concentration on human nature to 
the international system. This approach has been criticised, however, as ‘reductionist’ 
since it fails to explain how states internally decide on policy by solely looking at broad 
systematic outcomes.46 As Snyder argues ‘exponents of realism in IR have been wrong 
in looking exclusively to states as the irreducible atoms whose power and interests are 
to be assessed.’47  
 
By drawing upon aspects of Waltzian neo-realism (the belief in the relative distribution 
of material power as a shaper of state behaviour) whilst infusing these forces through 
neo-liberalism’s recognition of shared interests and constructivism’s critique of elite 
                                                            
45 According to Checkel, after earlier confusion, Wendt now also argues that constructivism is not a 
theory. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, chapters 1 and 2 
46 Schweller, ‘The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism’ 
47 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), p. 19 
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perceptions,48 such a modification is possible. This study aims to provide fresh insights 
into how Japan’s foreign policy can be understood through adopting such a strategy 
when analysing specific case studies in Japan’s policy towards India.  
 
II. Neoclassical Realism (NCR) – a viable middle approach 
 
NCR49 represents a progression within the broad research programme of realism. NCR 
seeks to extend Waltz’s theory by explaining how and why states deviate from the 
neorealist balance of power logic.50 The approach calls for Waltz’s ‘ultra-parsimonious 
theory [to] be cross-fertilized with other theories before it will make determinate 
predictions at the foreign policy level.’ 51   Auxiliary assumptions believe that the 
international system limits but does not dictate foreign policy decisions. Instead, ‘unit-
                                                            
48 Jeffrey W Taliaferro, ‘Neoclassical Realism: The Psychology of Great Power Intervention’, Making 
Sense of International Relations Theory, (Boulder; Lynne Rienner, 2006) p. 50 
49 The term itself was first coined in 1998 in an article in World Politics by Gideon Rose, considered the 
‘father’ of the approach. Other terms used to occasionally to describe the approach include neo-traditional 
realism or neo-traditionalism, motivational realism, modified version of classical realism, modified neo-
realism, fine grain realism and postclassical realism. Rose himself, asks why the approach needs ‘yet 
another bit of jargon to an already burgeoning lexicon’ but agrees that since classical realism lacks a clear 
definition, a new term is required. NCR as defined by Rose will be the term adopted by this study. The 
best current overview of NCR is Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M Ripsman, 
Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Examples of neoclassical realist works include Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand 
Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958, Princeton Studies in 
International History and Politics. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Colin Dueck, 
Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 
to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 2006); Randall L. Schweller, Deadly 
Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York; Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 1998); William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the 
Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual 
Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton Studies in International  History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
50 Jason Davidson, America’s Allies and War; Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq,  (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2011) 
51 Waltz himself, defends his model as merely an explanation political outcomes and the ‘broad patterns 
of systemic outcomes’, rather than the policies behind them. 
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level intervening variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state 
structure’ play this role.52 
 
NCR fuses and builds on classical and neorealist interpretations by combining the 
relationship between state and society found in classical realism with neorealist 
adherence to balance of power theory. According to Lobell et al., ‘proponents of NCR 
draw upon the rigor and theoretical insights of the neorealism (or structural realism) of 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and others without sacrificing the practical insights 
about foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in the classical realism of 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Arnold Wolfers, and others.’ 53 For Rathbun, 
NCR is a ‘logical extension and necessary part of advancing neo-realism’.54 It could 
therefore be considered the third generation of realism.  
 
Rose’s identification of this new stream within realism in 1998 was a result of work 
published earlier in the decade by Christensen, Schweller, Wohlforth, and Zakaria. Rose 
argued that their contributions deserved classification as an individual school of foreign 
policy since they provided a single independent variable; relative power in the 
international system, common intervening variables; state structure, statesmen’s 
perceptions of their relative power and domestic incentives, and a dependent variable; 
the foreign policy decision. The approach rejects the ‘ultra-parsimonious privileging of 
systemic variables’55 by incorporating cultural and institutional factors. Neoclassical 
                                                            
52 The term ‘intervening variable’ is taken to mean interpretation of observed facts rather than facts 
themselves. Examples include knowledge, intention and attitude.  
53 ‘The Statesman, the State, and the Balance of Power: Neoclassical Realism and the Politics of Grand 
Strategic Adjustment’, in Lobell et al. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy¸p. 3-4 
54 Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension 
of Structural Realism’, p. 294 
55 Ariel Ilan Roth, ‘A Bold Move Forward for Neoclassical Realism’, International Studies Review, 
Number 8 (2006), p.287 
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realists, thus argue they are better able to explain the variation in states’ reaction to 
changes in the international system. 
 
i. Balance of power 
 
Where NCR corresponds most closely with its neorealist sibling is in the presumption of 
international anarchy. Schweller claims that whilst the term ‘balance of power’ is 
‘arguably the most frequently used term in the field of international relations’ it remains 
an ‘ambiguous concept’. 56  He attributes this to the fact that balance of power is 
‘traditionally treated as a law of nature, where the whole universe is pictured as a 
gigantic mechanism, a machine or a clockwork created and kept in motion by the divine 
watchmaker.’57 For NCR, balance of power theory is flawed since it assumes ‘constant 
mobilization capacity’. 58  Whilst states may have similar resources, their ability to 
mobilize them will depend on domestic variables.  
 
Furthermore, ‘perceptions of prestige’ add an additional variable. NCR recognises the 
importance of international hierarchy, or rather where states and their competitors 
subjectively perceive of themselves. States are assumed to seek to further their power 
and status within the system.59 For example, whilst Japan’s repositioning to third-largest 
economy does not necessarily diminish Japan’s power, the perceptive difference may 
                                                            
56 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats, A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, 
International Security, Vol. 29, Issue 2 (Fall 2004), p. 170 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. p. 198 
59 In Taliaferro’s NCR analysis it is the ‘prospective loss of relative prestige and status’ which is the 
focus. In order to make his case for NCR, Taliaferro employs the example of President Clinton’s 
intervention in Kosovo to suggest that the policy decision was taken to avoid any further perceived 
weakening of the US presence in NATO. President Bush’s response to 9/11 with the invasion of Iraq is a 
further case where Taliaferro believes NCR could be utilised. Jeffrey W Taliaferro, ‘Neoclassical 
Realism: The Psychology of Great Power Intervention’, Making Sense of International Relations Theory, 
(Boulder; Lynne Rienner, 2006) 
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have adjusted how decisions are made. In this respect, NCR relates to classical realism’s 
appreciation of status rivalries in the work of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and 
Rousseau. 60 In the case of the present study, the rise of China’s relative power in 
tandem with a comparative decline in US influence has encouraged Japan to ‘guard 
their security by forming loose coalitions to balance the rising hegemon, thus hoping to 
deter aggression’.61 Japan’s flirtations with India can therefore be viewed with this in 
mind. 
 
ii. Domestic variables 
 
NCR deviates from neo-realism in its attention to unit-level variables. Whilst classical 
realism referred to domestic politics, the recently dominant variety largely ignores the 
variable. According to Sterling-Folker, the assumption that liberalism is ‘more 
accommodating of domestic-level variables’ than realism is flawed.62 In fact systemic 
realist theory provides greater space for the potential causal impact of domestic factors. 
Zakaria also puts forward a case for including ‘systemic, domestic and other 
influences’63 when explaining ‘events, trends and policies that are too specific to be 
addressed by a grand theory of international politics.’64 Domestic politics for example 
can affect the timing of policies and nature of responses. Attention must be paid for 
                                                            
60 As Morgenthau writes, ‘whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, its prestige – its 
reputation for power – is always an important and sometimes the decisive factor in determining the 
success or failure of its foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York; Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1965), p. 95. ‘What others think about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the 
mirror of our fellow’s mind (that is, our prestige), rather than the original, of which the image in the 
mirror may be but the distorted reflection, determines what we are as members of society’. Ibid. p. 73 
61 Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 
(October, 1998), p.149 
62 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, ‘Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March, 1997), pp. 1-26 
63 Fareed Zakaria, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’ on Myths of Empire: Domestic 
Politics and International Ambition by Jack Snyder, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer, 
1992), p. 177 
64 Ibid. 
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example to the fact that unlike the international system which is considered relatively 
fixed, public opinion can change dramatically as a result of external or internal shocks. 
Revived anti-nuclearism in Japan following the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant 
could be seen as one example. 
 
Other unit-level factors considered by NCR include bureaucratic politics, public 
opinion, media and details of state institutions, each of which are addressed in the 
following chapter. In Japanese IR scholarship, the salience of domestic factors has 
gained significant ground in explaining Japan’s behaviour which conflicts with 
Waltzian analysis. Domestic politics does not address the ‘whether’ according to Dueck, 
but the ‘when’ and ‘how’.65 
 
Yet NCR departs from the theoreies of Innenpolitik and liberalism, which are 
considered ‘often oversimplified and inaccurate’.66 The key distinction is that whilst 
attention is paid to domestic variables these are intervening rather than dominant. It is 
the international system and relative material power which determines the parameters of 
foreign policy. Unlike liberalism the environment not the process is primary.  
 
iii. Norms and NCR 
 
NCR also incorporates the constructivist penchant for norms. As Kowert and Legro 
point out, by doing so NCR highlight ‘analytical blind spots and gaps in existing 
                                                            
65 Sten Rynning, ‘The High Cost of Theory in Neoclassical Realism’, H-Diplo, (July, 2009) 
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24339  
66 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and theories of foreign policy’, p. 150 
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accounts’.67 This also ‘not only casts light into the shadows of existing theory but raises 
new questions (and offers new explanations) as well.’68  
 
Katzenstein is a particularly strong proponent. Katzenstein insists of the importance of 
norms, identity and institutions, not just international structure, to understand state 
behaviour. In his highly respected analysis Katzenstein took a ‘sociological turn’ 
challenging existing theories with consideration of domestic structures and cultures to 
explain Japan and Germany’s post-war development.69 
 
Yet studying norms in isolation provides an inadequate picture of Japan’s policy 
decisions. Norms are often difficult to identify and predict. The aftermath of 9/11 for 
example does not comply with what would be expected from a purely norms-based 
analysis. As Kliman points out, the deployment of the SDF ‘should have generated 
significant public debate’. 70  The international power structure and influence of the 
relationship between Koizumi and Bush were however, influential factors. 
 
Of the norms existent in Japan today four ‘elite’ and ‘domestic’ norms will be seen as 
particularly significant for this study. These are ‘anti-militarism’ or ‘pacifism’, ‘anti-
nuclearism’, ‘US bilateralism’ and among elites, ‘vulnerability at sea’ (discussed in 
Chapter 8). 71  The US-Japan alliance has held considerable sway over Japanese 
                                                            
67 Kowert and Legro, ‘Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise’ in J.J. Suh, Peter J. 
Katzenstein and Allen Carlson eds. Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 452 
68 Ibid. p. 451 
69Gourevitch, Keohane, Krasner, Laitin, Pempel, Streech, Tarrow, ‘The Political Science of Peter J 
Katzenstein’, Political Science and Politics, (October, 2008), pp. 893-899 
70 Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9-11 World, p. 15 
71 Midford has recently argued, however, that rather than ‘pacifism’, Japan holds deep-rooted ‘anti-
militarist’ feeling which might be more accommodating to an increased military role should certain 
conditions be met both externally and internally. For further explanation of Japanese public opinion of the 
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policymakers, hesitant to please their partners; even if this compromises their own 
interests (Chapter 3a). Anti-militarism is one of the most striking features of 
contemporary Japanese politics and is often considered the prime reason for Japan not 
militarising, rather than structural issues. This norm, whilst externally-imposed has 
enjoyed consistent support from the majority of the population. Anti-nuclearism, 
especially important for this study has also found widespread support. The extent to 
which this norm has proven an obstructing factor in Japan’s policy towards India will be 
discussed in Chapter 7 but following the Fukushima crisis of March 2011 is an evolving 
issue.  
 
Norms are no doubt important but their influence on policy is considered in NCR 
dependent on how they are read and perceived by elites. When they are supported by 
structural realities they are believed able to constrain or empower decision-makers72 yet 
when structure challenges a domestic norm, elites are challenged as to whether or not to 
ignore the norm. The decisions to send Japanese troops into UNPKO missions in the 
early 1990s and more recently into Iraq and Afghanistan for example demonstrate a 
willingness to accept an albeit limited role for Japan’s military and supports the 
argument of revisionists that the salience of the anti-militarism norm is declining. Yet 
whilst the initial deployment to Iraq in 2004 encouraged such a view, the limit of non-
combat operations was only sustained until summer 2009. Japan’s public continues to 
support strongly non-military instruments of foreign policy. In the Asahi Shimbun 
Constitution Day poll in April 2009 two-thirds voted, 73 as they did in 2008 to not 
wanting Article 9 to be revised. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
military, see Chapter 8. Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism 
to Realism? (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)  
72 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 59 
73 ‘Public Opinion Poll on the Constitution’, Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 2009 
41 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
iv. The role of policymakers74 
 
NCR adheres to the neorealist belief that foreign policy is dictated principally by a 
state’s ‘relative material power capabilities’. NCR argues, however, that foreign policy 
decisions, whilst reliant on material power, are mitigated by how that power is 
perceived by those who orchestrate it: statesmen. Since policy decisions are made by 
political leaders and elites, this human factor is as significant as genuine capabilities.75 
A ‘state’s self-reflection of its international position rather than the material geopolitical 
reality lies at the base of its policy’.76 According to Rose the anarchic system provides 
states with only ‘murky’ signals77 on how to act since ‘there is no immediate or perfect 
transmission belt linking to foreign policy behaviour’. 78  There is therefore a ‘lag 
between structural change and alterations in state behaviour’.79 Governments in addition 
to other foreign policy actors are therefore required to translate messages into policy 
outputs through a system of ‘filtering’.  
 
Despite similar structural conditions, states respond differently since policy is formed 
by those with different beliefs. Since the state is not a single unit (as neo-realism 
                                                            
74 Balance of threat realism also includes the perceptions of leaders but it is NCR which addresses both 
the centrality of the system with leaders’ assessment of this system and how they are able to shape 
domestic public opinion around these views.  
75 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, ‘Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise’, in 
Katzenstein, Peter J., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1996). A detailed analysis of the role of individuals in international relations 
and the circumstances in which their power has particular significance can be found in Daniel L. Byman 
and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Brining the Statesman Back In’, International 
Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-146. Byman and Pollack argue that individuals have been 
ignored by other theorists and use five case studies to demonstrate the crucial role of state leaders in 
shaping events and policy.   
76 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 12 
77 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ p. 152 
78 Ibid. p. 146-7 
79 Michael Desch, ‘Culture-Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International 
Security, 23, (1), p. 166 
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believes), this process involves internal debate until ‘consensus within an often 
decentralised and competitive political process’ is found.80 NCR is also able to account 
for rare changes in policy when there is no systemic shift due to internal events such as 
‘shifts in personnel, institutional power, or the popularity of particular ideas’. 81 In this 
thesis the cases of Abe advocating an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ and the election 
of the DPJ will be seen as two such examples. NCR posits that eventually, however, the 
system will triumph. 
 
Detecting the influences on statesmen’s behaviour is complex. For one, NCR 
appreciates the pressure on governments to stay in office and thus satisfy public 
opinion. As Davidson points out, re-election is a ‘prerequisite to all other goals’. 82 In 
most cases, however, disagreements over foreign policy do not have electoral 
consequences. Furthermore NCR argues that public opinion only impacts foreign policy 
when the opposition sides with the public. 83  Should such an issue arise, however, 
‘public opinion trumps the other factors’.84 Elites usually have their way eventually but 
some concessions are required. In democracies this point is particularly prevalent and 
since both India and Japan are democratically governed, (a rarity still in Asia) NCR’s 
appreciation is significant.85 
 
                                                            
80 Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats, A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, p. 164 
81 Nicholas Kitchen, ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand 
strategy formation,’ Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pp. 117–143  
82 Davidson, America’s Allies and War; Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
83 In most cases, domestic preferences serve only to shape governmental responses rather than dictate 
them. For example, Colin Dueck shows that domestic preferences did not drive American intervention in 
Korea or Vietnam. International pressures were the dominant factor, whilst public and legislative opinion 
helped determine the parameters of intervention and its timing. Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: 
Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 
84 Jason Davidson, ‘From Harmony to Hard Times: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Transatlantic 
Burden-sharing in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Paper presented at ISA 50th Annual Convention 'Exploring the 
Past, Anticipating the Future, New York, (February 2009), p. 18 
85 For more discussion of the role of public opinion on Japanese policymaking, see Chapter 4. 
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Secondly, leaders may be misguided when making a policy decision based on errors in 
their judgement of domestic opinion. Even if policymakers believe they appreciate their 
relative power and public opinion this might not correspond with perceptions among the 
general citizenry.86 Indeed the ‘public’ is generally considered to be a pluralist entity 
consisting of several, often conflicting interest groups. In order to satisfy the majority 
therefore, elites may well have to compromise. Domestic groups such as those 
motivated by commercial interests for example might oppose a foreign policy with 
negative economic implications whilst rights-groups might be in favour. A further 
challenge for policymakers is appreciating in a timely manner when public opinion 
changes. Moreover a leader’s perceptions of a situation may move quicker than the 
change in capabilities. For the current subject of study, Leobell et al. believe Japan’s 
bureaucracy holds different conceptions of defence priorities to the general public.87 
 
Finally as Schweller points out, states ‘must reach consensus within an often 
decentralised and competitive political process’.88 In this further respect, adherents of 
NCR differ from structuralists by viewing states as not unitary actors but often 
divergent groups with at times different objectives and influence. As Goldstein and 
Keohane recognise, individuals within these groups frequently have ‘fundamental 
differences in normative beliefs about policies among themselves’.89 Within Japan’s 
political system, this latter point will be examined in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                            
86 Just as NCR does not however conceive of the state like neo-realists as an autonomous concept, NCR 
differs from theories like Marxism which see the state as representing only the interests of a certain class 
or social group.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats, A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing’, p.164 
89 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 16 
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Pant, in his analysis of the ‘transformation’ of relations between Japan and India 
explicitly addresses the roles of leadership which has ‘played a major role in facilitating 
enhanced India-Japan ties in recent years’.90 Pant explores the roles of Prime Ministers 
Mori, Abe, Rao and Vajpayee. Terada’s analysis of Japan’s favour of an ASEAN+6 
initiatives also looks at the role of Japanese ministries and leadership.91 In NCR the 
perceptions92 of decision-makers act as the supreme intervening variable over systemic 
pressures. For Wohlforth, ‘Decision-makers’ assessments of power are what matter’, 
echoed by Zakaria who argues that ‘statesmen, not states, are the primary actors in 
international affairs.’ 93  NCR therefore gives greater emphasis to agency than neo-
realism and explains why certain structural changes result in agents responding 
differently. China’s rise for example has resulted in different responses across the 
region, stretching from adversarial, benevolent or indifferent.94 China is seen as a threat 
by many but also a market.  
 
For some scholars, detailed analysis of the foreign executive’s identity95 and world 
beliefs is required to draw valid conclusions. In order to grasp the true impact of elite 
perceptions on Japan’s policy towards India, it is therefore necessary to look inside the 
policy process and identify the various actors involved. This task will be undertaken in 
Chapter 4. 
 
                                                            
90 Harsh Pant, ‘India-Japan Relations: A Slow, But Steady, Transformation,’ in Sumit Ganguly ed., 
Indian Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
91 Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6: Japan’s Initiatives and the Agent-Structure Framework’ 
92 Perception is generally, understood as one’s intersubjective understandings of an object, or situation 
that derive from his/her particular cognitive lenses. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976) 
93 Zakaria, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’ p. 42 
94 Author’s interview with Mutiah Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, 
Washington DC, 20 June, 2011 
95 This is understood to include the head of government and key ministers and officials in charge of 
foreign or regional policy 
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III. NCR and East Asia 
 
Other analysts of East Asian international relations within the framework of NCR 
include Cha, Davidson, Nau, Kliman, Stirling-Folker and Terada. Perhaps the earliest 
example, however, of this approach being utilised for Japan can be seen in Edwin 
Reischauer’s observation in 1977; ‘Whatever the mechanism for formulating foreign 
policy, the chief determinants are inevitably the actual international realities and the 
national perception of these.’96 
 
Cha’s analysis of the relationship between Korea and Japan during the Cold War in the 
‘spirit’ 97  of NCR, privileges unit-level perceptions of external threats rather than 
tangible conditions. Alignment choices are not a direct result of external threats but 
‘refracted through perceptions of of patron commitment’. In addition, Cha develops a 
‘quasi-alliance’ model defined as ‘the relationship between two states that are un-allied 
but share a threat great-power patron as a common ally’.98 Japan and South Korea not 
only share a common ally in the US but also common threats from their neighbours.  
 
Cha proposes that his quasi-alliance model would be enhanced by testing its 
applicability to other international relationships but it is questionable how suitable it 
would be for India-Japan relations. The rise of India as an independent power suggests 
that this model will not translate despite having the US as a ‘common patron’. Cha 
claims that the model ‘appears most relevant to regional security situations where small 
                                                            
96 Subhash Kapila, ‘Japan-India Strategic Cooperation – a perspective anslysis’, South Asia Analysis, 
(June, 2000), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers2%5Cpaper126.html (Accessed on 07/07/09) 
97 Victor D. Cha, ‘Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism  in Asia: The US, Japan, and 
Korea’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June, 2000), p. 263 
98 Ibid. 
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geographically proximate powers need the support of a common great power 
protector’,99 which does not correlate with India’s predicted future.  
 
Davidson employs a NCR angle to his study of China’s revisionist aspirations arguing 
that ‘state preferences may have domestic sources, but also notes firmly that power is at 
the heart of international politics’. 100 For Davidson, a government (in this case China’s) 
attitude towards revisionism is shaped by domestic pressures, accompanied by what he 
terms the ‘balance of allied resolve’. 
 
Nau’s approach, whilst not classified as NCR combines realist and constructivist 
variables of power and identity to what he calls Asia’s ‘democratic security 
community’.101 Nau rejects both realism for its dependence on ‘situations of anarchy’ 
and constructivism, which he claims does not ‘deal adequately with performance or 
outcomes’ when considering ‘self-images…irrespective of external power positions.’102 
Although not explicitly stated, Kliman’s claim to not be ‘a proponent of any mainstream 
theoretical school, but instead favours an eclectic approach that incorporates elements of 
realism and cultural norms’103 suggests he adheres to a form of NCR. He balances 
relative power considerations with the ‘powerful idealism of Japanese pacifism’.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
99 Ibid., p. 290 
100 Jason Davidson, ‘The China Puzzle: A Neoclassical-Realist Solution’, Paper prepared for presentation 
at the 2002 International Studies Association Annual Conference in New Orleans, (March 14, 2002) 
101 Henry Nau, ‘Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia,’ in G. J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds.) 
International Relations Theory and the Asia- Pacific, (New York; Columbia University Press, 2003) p. 
213 
102 Ibid. p. 214 
103 Ibid. p. 213 
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IV. Additional ‘hybrid’ departures from mainstream theories 
 
NCR has of course not been the only modification to traditional realist theory. Most 
closely associated to NCR are postclassical realism and analytical eclecticism but as the 
below critique will demonstrate, neither holds the explanatory rigour of NCR.  
 
i. Postclassical realism 
 
‘Postclassical realism’, coined by Stephen Brooks in 1997104 notably prior to Rose’s 
recognition of the NCR model shares NCR’s rejection of neo-realists like Waltz who 
have failed to argue convincingly Japan’s post-war behaviour. Both assume that the 
behaviour of states is shaped by the international system thereby also discarding 
constructivists like Berger and Katzenstein who have even claimed that ‘Japan’s policy 
of external security is largely shaped by factors that realist theory excludes from 
analysis.’105  
 
This approach, however, differs from NCR by placing more explicit attention to 
economic power and the security dilemma. Postclassical realists explain Japan’s basic 
policy as one that seeks to ‘reduce the intensity of the security dilemma’ by maintaining 
the US alliance and modest military defences. Decreasing military expenditure would 
create a power vacuum whilst increasing would ‘ignite an arms race in the region’ with 
huge financial implications. The approach is more ‘cost-sensitive’ than neo-realists 
                                                            
104 Stephen Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms,’ International Organization, Vol.  51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 
445-477 
105 Katzenstein cited in Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, ‘Postclassical realism and Japanese Security Policy,’ Pacific 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001) emphasis added by Kawasaki, p. 225 
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consider but less so than mercantile realism which places greater attention on economic 
considerations. 
 
Furthermore as Rose censures, postclassical realism only pays ephemeral interest in 
unit-level factors. ‘Its first-order systemic argument does not account for much of the 
actual behaviour, thus forcing its adherents to contract out the bulk of their explanatory 
work to domestic-level variables introduced on an ad-hoc basis.’106  
 
ii. Analytical eclecticism 
 
Analytical eclecticism shares a greater number of characteristics with NCR than 
postclassical realism. Katzenstein adopts an approach favouring ‘problem-driven 
research’ rather than ‘approach-driven analysis’, to avoid unnecessary paradigmatic 
debate in the hope of creating more ‘intellectually interesting or policy relevant’ 
research. Katzenstein rejects what he calls the ‘privileging of parsimony’ in IR for 
‘sacrificing explanatory power in the interest of analytical purity’. Attention to suiting 
research traditions has failed to ‘generate better solutions to existing problems’ with 
how to explain the international system.  
 
This involves adopting an ‘eclectic approach, not as a substitute but as a complement to 
well-established styles of analysis’ 107  through combining realist, liberal and 
constructivist modes of explanation. Katzenstein claims pure realism falters due to its 
                                                            
106 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ p. 150-151. Others that argue that 
constructivism is not incompatible with realism such as Barkin consider an approach known as ‘realist 
constructivism’ to be a valid form of theoretical enquiry. Samuel Barkin, ‘Realist Constructivism’ 
International Studies Review 5( 2003) and Robert S Synder, ‘Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: 
the Case of the Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War’ Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Vol. 1, Issue 1., (March 2005), pp. 55-71 
107 Katzenstein, ‘Japanese security in perspective’ p. 2 
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reliability on constructivist assumptions such as interest, threat or prestige whilst 
liberalism falls short due to its underlying assumption that identities are unchanging. 
This pragmatic approach ‘avoids rigid commitments to working only within existing 
research traditions108 whilst also fostering dialogue between research traditions.  
 
The tool has gained credence due its applicability in certain cases of Japan’s 
international diplomacy, which have mystified dominant research traditions. Given the 
complex combination of power, identity and norms in Asia-Pacific and particularly 
Japanese security,109 Katzenstein’s model has gained some ground. 
 
Yet whilst both ‘analytical eclecticism’ and NCR seek to utilise analytical tools from 
more than one paradigm, key differences remain. Firstly, ‘analytical eclecticism’ does 
not privilege one tool over another.110 ‘Analytical eclecticism’ is willing to ‘borrow 
selectively’ from any combination of variables. NCR differs fundamentally in 
unashamedly placing emphasis on the balance of power and primacy of structure.  
 
Katzenstein appreciates that ‘analytical eclecticism’ risks being ‘too eclectic…too 
accommodating to too many potential variables and/or being too analytic, 
problematizing everything in sight’ as Khong too criticises. 111 Indeed Katzenstein has 
not created a new theoretical approach since in order to achieve this, key variables 
would need to be identified and a suitable methodology put forward. ‘Analytical 
eclecticism’ therefore stands as an important contributor to an approach to Asia-Pacific 
                                                            
108 Ibid p. 266 
109 Ibid. p. 274 
110 Katzenstein also argues, ‘Analytical eclecticism does not privilege any one type of combinatorial 
formula or seek to build a unified theory encompassing each and every variable identified in competing 
research traditions.’ Katzenstein and Sil, ‘Rethinking Japanese Security: A Case for Analytical Eclectism’ 
(2004) http://www.arts.cornell.edu/tmpphp/publications/Katzenstein-ch1.pdf p. 16 
111 Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia Pacific?’ Pacific Review 10, 2, (1997) 
pp. 289-300.  
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security which does not favour one variable over all others but fails to provide a 
concrete approach in itself.  
 
The primacy of the international balance of power in Asia, remains the independent 
variable through which other factors should be filtered thus differentiating NCR from 
‘analytical eclecticism’ whilst appreciating the latter’s theoretical contribution. 
 
V. Criticisms 
  
NCR is not without its critics. Legro and Moravcsik are among the fiercest who in a 
scathing attack directly criticise NCR for among things, its inclusion of domestic 
variables. They claim these theories ‘inevitably import consideration of exogenous 
variation in the societal and cultural sources of state preferences, thereby sacrificing 
both the coherence of realism and appropriating midrange theories of interstate conflict 
based on liberal assumptions’.112 They argue that NCR scholars are really liberals with 
an identity crisis.  
 
NCR is also chided for the constructivist elements of their approach. Legro and 
Moravcsik condemn what they see as the current trend in IR theory which has resulted 
in a contemporary ‘minimal realism’ that ‘now encompasses nearly the entire universe 
of international relations theory…and excludes only a few intellectual scarecrows’. For 
Legro and Moravcsik, paradigms must demonstrate distinctiveness and coherence. A 
‘post hoc effort to explain away the anomalies of neo-realism, making use of whatever 
                                                            
112 Legro and Moravcsik in Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. 
Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Brother Can You Spare a 
Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)’ International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000) 
p.182 
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tools are necessary to plug the holes of a sinking ship’113 is another charge laid at the 
door of NCR.114 
 
NCR responds arguing that incorporating aspects of other IR theories benefits their 
approach and reject a ‘monocausal formulation of the paradigm.’115 As Rathbun argues, 
domestic politics and ideas cannot be possessed by one paradigm and not another. 
Constructivism does not ‘own ideas’, nor does liberalism ‘own domestic politics’. In 
fact both are ‘fair game for realism and neoclassical realists have taken up this 
mantle’.116 As Nye argues, ‘liberal theory should not be seen as an antithesis to realist 
analysis but as a supplement to it. International relations theory is unnecessarily 
impoverished by exclusivist claims’. 117 In fact, NCR does not believe that cultural 
factors can supplant realism’s basic tenets. As Desch argues, cultural theories can only 
supplement security studies by filling a gap between structural change and differences 
in state behaviour and explain state irrationality.118 Whilst NCR considers domestic 
factors they crucially do not believe them to be the primary determinants of foreign 
policy. NCR shares with neo-realists the core assumption of the importance of structure 
but have taken a ‘progressive next step’119 by incorporating domestic units into their 
analysis. 
 
                                                            
113 Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name,’ p. 295 
114 Rose appreciates this potential criticism in his 1998 article, foreseeing critics who see the emphasis on 
perceptions as a ‘giant fudge factor, useful for explaining away instances where foreign policy and 
material power realities diverge.’ Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ p. 168 
115 Legro and Moravcsik in Feaver et al., ‘Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm?’ p. 175 
116 Ibid.  
117 Joseph Nye cited in Feaver et al., ‘Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a 
Realist?)’ p. 174 
118 Desch identifies three contributions of cultural theories; ‘First, cultural variables may explain the lag 
between structural change and alterations in state behaviour. Second, they may account for why some 
states behave irrationally and suffer the consequences of failing to adapt to the constraints of the 
international system. Finally, in struturally indeterminate situations, domestic variables such as culture 
may have a more independent impace.’ Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in 
Security Studies’, p. 166 
119 Rathbun, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name’, p. 311 
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The framework is continuing to grow in strength. A number of recent articles explicitly 
cite NCR as its theoretical underpinning. As with all theories, modifications to its 
central assumptions will improve its effectiveness but it can be argued with conviction 
that NCR represents a welcome addition to IR scholarship.120 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
NCR provides a practical, balanced and policy-relevant construct from which to base 
this thesis. NCR is now a major research field in the realist tradition and one 
increasingly adopted by scholars. Changes to the international structure, for example the 
surge of economic growth in China and relative weakening of US presence in Asia has 
undoubtedly altered the environment in which elites operate but it is how these changes 
are perceived that dictates which policy is adopted. Whilst outcomes might not always 
be neat, incorporating NCR’s attention to domestic factors is essential. Cultural factors, 
internal politics and the executive leadership have all influenced Japan’s evolving 
relations with India. 
 
With consideration for the above therefore, the dependent variable of this study is 
Japan’s foreign policy towards India, whilst the international structure/relative power 
distribution is considered the independent variable.121 The intervening variables of elite 
                                                            
120 Coalition burden sharing and the influence of domestic factors in state decision making have been 
particularly popular. Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, ‘Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the War in 
Iraq’, Storming Media: Pentagon Reports, http://www.stormingmedia.us/14/1416/A141684.html, 
(Accessed on 02/04/09); Davidson, ‘From Harmony to Hard Times: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation 
of Transatlantic Burden-sharing in Afghanistan and Iraq’ 
121 Here the term ‘dependent variable’ is understood to mean those details liable to change, which are 
influenced by other variables. ‘Independent variables’ act upon or explain change in a dependent variable 
and represent the ‘cause’. In NCR the additional ‘intervening’ or ‘control variable’ intersects the 
dependent and independent. As McNabb defines, ‘a change in the intervening variable must be ‘caused’ 
by the independent variable; this change then ‘causes’ the change in the dependent variable. David E. 
McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 2nd edition, 
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perceptions and domestic constraints and policy-making are incorporated to provide an 
inclusive analysis.122 A diagram demonstrating how this works for any foreign policy 
question is given below, in addition to another specifically on Japan’s decision-making 
towards India. 
 
Figure 1 
The NCR Model for Explaining Foreign Policy Decisions 
Independent Variable 
 
 
 
Intervening Variables 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2009), p. 86. International structure is taken as the anarchical system 
espoused by Waltz, including the distribution of power capabilities between states.  
122 The intervening variables employed by proponents of NCR differ according to the scholars preference; 
Wohlforth, Taliaferro, and Friedberg emphasise misperception; Christensen focuses on the mobilization 
of domestic political forces; Ripsman and Zakaria on domestic politics; Snyder and Layne on ideology; 
and Dueck on both domestic politics and strategic culture.  
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Figure 2 
Using NCR to Explain Japan’s Policy Towards India 
Independent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intervening Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Dependent Variable 
 
 
To begin utilising NCR, this thesis will now turn to what are considered the primary 
structural factors which have shaped Japanese policy; the US and rise of China. The 
following section will look at domestic-level factors which intervene before three case 
studies are introduced.  
           
           
           
           
           
      
Anarchical International System 
Japan’s relative economic stagnation 
Rise of China 
India’s economic growth 
US endorsement of India 
Policymakers’ Perceptions 
 
Perceptions 
Ideology 
Objectives 
Domestic Factors 
 
Strength of Govt Institutions 
Business community interests 
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Foreign Policy Decision 
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3. The Dominance of Structure: the US and China in Japanese 
Policymaking 
 
Prior to analysing in detail the nature of Japan’s policy towards India, it is necessary to 
consider the international structure within which these relations operate. Asia and the 
global order are rapidly changing but for Japanese policymakers the key structural 
issues remain the US-Japan alliance and rise of China. Other structural influences exist 
but the below are considered of central importance.1 
 
A) The Role of the United States 
 
Scholars for many years have argued that the US determines the majority of Japan’s 
foreign relations.2 Examples cited are the decision to recognise the PRC in 1972, pro-
Pakistan slant during the Cold War and more recently Japan’s acquiescence to India’s 
NSG exemption. The US’ presence is undoubtedly a key structural factor which 
contributes to Japanese policymaking. Indeed despite being geographically distant, the 
US plays an integral role in Asian politics. Washington has long considered itself a 
‘resident power’3 and vital member of the regional security community, a ‘central force 
in constituting regional stability and order’.4  
 
                                                            
1 These two factors are also those most associated with Japanese foreign policy in the majority of 
scholarship.  
2 The main proponent of this thesis is Kent Calder, see Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy 
Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,’ World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4, (July 1988), pp. 517-541 
3 Ralph Cossa, ‘Northeast Asian Regionalism: A (Possible) Means to an End for Washington’, Council on 
Foreign Relations, (December 2009), p. 1 
4 ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the US in the East Asian Security Order’, International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific 8:3, September 2008, p. 353 
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To what extent, however, has the US shaped Japan’s policy towards India? In contrast 
to the role of the Middle East, China and Southeast Asia, the subcontinent has only 
recently been discussed within the framework of the US-Japan alliance but does this 
suggest the US plays a negligible role or merely one only recently created? In order to 
answer these questions, the following section will outline the US’ role in Japan’s 
foreign policy before defining US interests in India and how this has translated into 
support for Japan’s India policy. 
 
The US plays three discernible functions: 1) To support closer bilateral ties in order to 
balance China’s influence in the region and through US parenting ensure a role for the 
US in changing power dynamics. This is achieved through the promotion of trilateral or 
quadrilateral dialogues. 2) Involves the perception among Japanese policymakers of the 
US’ relative decline and Tokyo’s subsequent need to diversify its security partners. 
Finally 3), Washington’s presence acts encourages the belief that Japanese policy 
mirrors that of the US and is therefore not autonomous.  
 
The influence of each of these roles is not linear and each has differed over time. The 
independent structural factor of the US, as NCR argues, also waivers dependent on 
policy and the extent to which domestic factors intervene. In economic relations, 
including the provision of ODA, the US plays a minor or even insignificant role in 
Japan’s strategic outlook. On nuclear matters Japan retains some autonomy and reacts to 
domestic-level factors such as commercial incentives. In military/security affairs, 
however, the US is a critical factor.  
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I. The US-Japan alliance 
 
Following the devastation of World War Two, Japan was occupied by US forces and 
compelled to sign a US-drafted Constitution. Japan was obliged among other 
conditions, to discount war as a tool of foreign policy, drastically reduce its military 
arsenal and cede territorial conquests. In 1960 among much domestic opposition, the 
Japanese government signed a Security Treaty which clarified in greater detail the terms 
of the alliance and brought the ‘semblance of equality’ to relations. Japan has never 
committed to the defence of the US but with closely shared security interests and 
policies, the alliance has become a key regional stabiliser. Throughout the Cold War, 
Japan’s partnership with the US played an essential role in Washington’s Pacific policy 
which gradually encouraged Japan’s ‘normalisation’ and development from ‘protégé to 
partner’.5  
 
By 2000 the first ‘Armitage-Nye Report’ labelled Japan the ‘keystone of the US 
involvement in Asia’.6 Japan was called to revise its Peace Constitution, remove its ban 
on collective defence and embrace the idea that China posed a strategic threat, first 
articulated in the December 2004 NDPG. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz further 
urged Japan to contribute ‘boots on the ground’ in Iraq if it wished to gain permanent 
membership to the UN Security Council. 7  Despite these pressures positive opinion 
towards America in Japan was preserved.8 The transformation of the alliance from a 
                                                            
5 Wu Xinbo, ‘The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US-Japanese Alliance’, The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), p. 119 
6 Carin Zissis, ‘Crafting a US Policy on Asia’, Council on Foreign Relations, April 10, 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13022/ (Accessed on 07/09/09) 
7 Gavan McCormack, ‘Koizumi’s Japan in Bush’s World: After 9/11’, Japan Focus, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/2111 (Accessed on 06/09/09) 
8 Angela Stephens, ‘Public Opinion in India and America’, March 1, 2006, p. 1, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/176.php?nid=&id=&pnt=176&lb=bras 
(Accessed on 14/05/10) 
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bilateral or regional, to a global framework was well-received9 so that Bush’s tenure in 
particular has been widely considered a ‘honeymoon period’ for relations. 10 
 
i. President Obama 
 
The election in November 2008 of Barack Obama signalled a change in the direction of 
US foreign policy, confirmed in May 2011 with the release of a new National Security 
Strategy. In this document a shift away from pre-emption was a major theme.11 The 
other, was an altered estimation of US power. According to the Strategy, ‘No one nation 
— no matter how powerful — can meet global challenges alone’.12  
 
In Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2009 tour of Asia this move was tangible. The 
US showed itself keen to remain relevant to the region whilst acknowledging the 
development of regional integration efforts. Many in Asia had considered US policy to 
have stalled during Bush’s second term when focus was realigned towards the Middle 
East. Clinton’s symbolic visit to Asia as her first foreign trip,13 indicated the centrality 
                                                            
9 Kazuo Ogoura, ‘Obama and the alliance’, Japan Times, January 20, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090120ko.html (Accessed on 20/01/09) 
10 Jun Hongo, ‘Japan aims to be seated when Obama resets diplomatic table’, Japan Times, January 22, 
2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090122a6.html (Accessed on 22/01/09) Positive feelings 
towards Bush’s tenure were not absolute. Many Japanese conservatives were alarmed at America’s ‘soft’ 
stance on disarming nuclear North Korea, especially when the US took North Korea off its blacklist of 
state sponsors of terror. For many in Japan the move was perceived as a ‘betrayal’. ‘Envoy confident US-
Japan ties will remain strong under Obama’, Japan Times, January 27, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090127f3.html (Accessed on 27/01/09) 
11 Paul Reynolds, ‘Obama modifies Bush doctrine of pre-emption’, BBC News, 27 May 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10178193 (Accessed on 27/05/10) 
12 ‘The National Security Strategy: Realpolitik returns - The National Security Strategy reveals a 
narrower view of what force can accomplish’, The Economist, 27 May 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16243791 (Accessed on 28/05/10) 
13 The last time a new US Secretary of State had visited Asia first was in 1961. ‘Hillary says hello to 
Asia: American diplomacy in Asia’, The Economist, 19 February, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13145069 (Accessed on 19/02/09) 
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of US-Asia ties. 14  She spoke of the region as ‘indispensable’ to address global 
challenges and the centrepiece of the administration’s foreign policy strategy.15 The 
administration also signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, opening the potential 
for American membership to the East Asia Summit.16  
 
The countries within ‘Asia’ which the US initially chose to concentrate on differed, 
however, from Bush causing particular concern in Tokyo and Delhi. For Japan the most 
troubling aspect was the shift from Bush’s policy of viewing China as a ‘strategic 
competitor’ to engaging directly with Beijing.17 Prior to taking office many in Japan 
suspected such an alignment following Clinton’s focus on China in a 2007 Foreign 
Affairs article. Japan also feared economic policies similar to those of fellow Democrat 
Bill Clinton, which pushed for Japan to open its markets, resulting in a sharp 
appreciation of the yen.18 In addition there was concern that the economic downturn 
would encourage Obama to impose protectionist tariffs on trade. 19  Commentators 
analysed minute details of Obama’s early days in office speculating for instance that 
greater attention was given to the appointment of Ambassador in Beijing than Tokyo or 
Delhi.20  
                                                            
14 Hillary Clinton, ‘US-Asia Relations: Indispensable to Our Future’, Remarks at the Asia Society, New 
York, 13 February, 2009, Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm (Accessed 
on 19/02/09) According to Clinton, ‘Asia is…a region of vital importance to the US today and into our 
future.’ 
15  ‘Clinton seeks stronger Asia ties’, BBC News, February 16, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7891511.stm (Accessed on 14/09/09) 
16 Nina Hachigian, ‘Obama’s first steps in Asia’, East Asia Forum, 27 December, 2009, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/27/obamas-first-steps-in-asia/ (Accessed on 28/12/09) 
17  ‘Ms Clinton and US strategy’, Editorial, Japan Times, 25 February, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090225a2.html (Accessed on 25/02/09) 
18 Hiroshi Nakanishi, ‘Will Obama's promise of change include US-Japan relations?’ Japan Times, 1 
January, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090101a1.html (Accessed on 02/01/09) 
19 Hiroko Nakata and Takahiro Fukada, ‘Japan to Obama: Stay far away from trade issues’, Japan Times, 
22 January, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20090122a1.html (Accessed on 22/01/09) 
20 Robert Dujarric and Weston S. Konishi, ‘Incoming ambassador Roos is right for the job’, Japan Times, 
17 June, 2009 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090617a1.html (Accessed on 17/06/09) 
Dujarric and Konishi claim, ‘Joseph Nye was considered a more ‘heavyweight ambassador’ for Tokyo 
than John Roos’, with Brahma Chellaney adding that ‘While Obama named John Huntsman — the Utah 
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Gradually the centrality of Sino-US relations became increasingly clear. Clinton plainly 
spoke of building a strong relationship with China as her ‘central goal’,21 further stating 
that the US wished to broaden its strategic dialogue with Beijing to include security and 
economic interests.22  
 
Through 2009 onwards, however, the relationship between China and the US stumbled 
over trade disputes, arms sales to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama and human rights. China’s 
military modernisation and lack of transparency were also causes of tension. As a result 
the Obama administration began to reassess suggestions of forming a ‘G2’ partnership 
and reverted to traditional alliances such as that with Tokyo.  
 
Relations between Tokyo and Washington were damaged, but not fatally in 2009, 
however, when the DPJ took power from the LDP who had long cultivated close 
relations with the US. In a bid to demonstrate Japan’s autonomy, Prime Minister 
Hatoyama pledged to remove the unpopular US Marine bases from Okinawa and forge 
a more equal partnership. The ensuing frosty reception ultimately led to Hatoyama’s 
resignation. The issue had already caused tension in 2005 when a stalemate in 
negotiations led US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to leave Japan off his travel 
                                                                                                                                                                              
state governor and a rising Republican star seen even as a potential 2012 rival to the president — as his 
ambassador to China, he picked obscure former Congressman Timothy Roemer as envoy to India and a 
low-profile Internet and biotechnology lawyer, John Roos, as ambassador to Japan. Obama underlined 
China's centrality in his foreign policy by personally announcing his choice of Huntsman. In contrast, 
Roemer and Roos were among a slew of ambassadors named in an official news release’. Brahma 
Chellaney, ‘Dancing with the dragon’, Japan Times, 25 June, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/eo20090625bc.html (Accessed on 26/06/09) 
21  ‘Clinton stresses key China goals’, BBC News, September 11, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8249824.stm (Accessed on 11/09/09) 
22 Philip Stephens, ‘Diplomatic feint that looks to leave Japan in the cold’, Financial Times, February 26, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2124278c-0437-11de-845b-000077b07658.html (Accessed on 
27/02/09) 
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itinerary. 23  The difference in 2009/10, however, was due not only to Hatoyama’s 
ineptitude when articulating his position but changing power dynamics. In the face an 
increasingly belligerent China and uncertainty around the succession in North Korea, 
Japan questioned the value of riling their alliance partners.  As Foreign Minister Okada 
argued, ‘The Japanese people have tended to take peace for granted’, 24 the dispute 
provided an opportunity to appreciate the importance of the US-Japan alliance.25  
 
Following the bases-dispute, some scholars believed the US no longer trusted Japan. 
However, US-Japan relations were soon on track. The 2011 earthquake served as an 
example of alliance-solidarity as the US deployed the USS Ronald Reagan, 140 
airplanes and 10 naval ships to conduct the first ever Japan-US joint operations.26 The 
2+2 talks in Washington, in June 2011 also signalled resumption to the norm.  
 
II. US conceptions of India 
 
The US considers India of crucial strategic significance. In a dramatic turnaround from 
the Cold War, recent US administrations have moved from classifying India a Soviet 
‘satellite’ and hyphenated partner in the ‘Indo-Pakistan’ problem to an independent 
global player. 
 
 
                                                            
23  ‘Japan off Rumsfeld itinerary due to base impasse’, Japan Times, 7 October, 2005, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20051007a1.html (Accessed on 15/09/09) 
24 ‘Base drubbing: A deal over a marine base mends a rift between the two allies–but opens a new one 
within Japan’, The Economist, 28 May 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16248757?story_id=E1_TGNQRSVS (Accessed on 28/05/10) 
25 Author’s interview with Koji Murata, Professor of Political Science, Doshisha University 1 June 2010 
26 Masahi Nishihara, ‘How the earthquake strengthened the Japan-US alliance’, East Asia Forum, 29 June 
2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/29/how-the-earthquake-strengthened-the-japan-us-alliance/ 
(Accessed on 30/06/11) 
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i. President Clinton 
 
The US rapprochement with India is often accredited to President Bush and 9/11 but 
genuine reconciliation began under the Clinton administration. With the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the US was given the opportunity to engage with a region previously 
‘off limits’.  Clinton, as the first post-Cold War President, showed signs of rebuilding 
partnerships lost during bipolarity, including former Soviet states and those 
‘nonaligned’. India was a particular priority. 27  As the US diplomat Strobe Talbott 
argues, ‘the global rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union was a crucial factor in 
determining American relations with both India and Pakistan’.28 The very birth of the 
two nations came at a time when bipolarity was becoming established. India accepted 
Soviet aid in the form of finance for steel mills, public works and air force weaponry 
and often voted in Moscow’s favour in the UN. Meanwhile the US fostered relations 
with Indian adversaries such as Pakistan from 1954 and China from 1971. India felt 
further aggrieved by the US perceived hostility to India’s security when China and not 
India was granted membership to the UN Security Council.  
 
Despite hoping to launch new diplomatic initiatives early in Clinton’s administration 
when approval ratings were high, reconciliation was slow to develop. In part this was 
due to domestic distractions but events on the subcontinent were also influential. India’s 
1998 nuclear tests (discussed in Chapter 7) temporarily shattered hopes of bringing 
India quickly into America’s collection of allies. Perceptual differences over the issue of 
                                                            
27 For a fascinating account of the US’ efforts at rapprochement with India in the late 1990s, see Strobe 
Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004) According to Talbott’s report, both Bill and Hillary Clinton had long held a ‘fascination’ 
with India as a ‘laboratory for experiments in grass-roots democratisation and social entrepreneurship,’ p. 
20 
28 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 9 
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nuclear tests were stark. For Delhi the issue was simply one of ‘sovereignty, security 
and equity’ but for Washington, the stability of the global nuclear order was at risk.29 
India knew the tests would provoke American condemnation but also hoped this 
attention would provide positive dividends. Estrangement continued despite diplomatic 
efforts and a 1998 Pentagon report which labelled India a ‘defence-industrial centre of 
strength’ which the US should explore. 30 Gradually opinions in Washington began to 
realise the need to rethink nuclear policy towards India, especially in light of the Kargil 
crisis of 1999. 
 
By the end of the Clinton administration some headway had been made through the 
Jaswant-Talbott dialogues. Clinton’s March 2000 visit was described as a ‘love fest’ by 
one senior diplomat and marked a watershed in relations, over thirty years since the last 
presidential visit.31 The fact that Clinton spent close to five days in India and only five 
hours in Pakistan was not lost on India’s elite.  
 
ii. President Bush 
 
By the beginning of Bush’s term, an additional structural factor had presented itself; 
China. Bush also came to office with a starkly different view of the value of institutions 
and international treaties, welcomed by India. Even more so were criticisms of 
Clinton’s amicable position towards Beijing, which neglected to clarify China as a 
‘competitor’ rather a ‘strategic partner’. 32 Whilst Clinton’s conception of India was 
                                                            
29 Ibid. p. 4 
30 Daniel Twining, ‘America’s Grand Design in Asia’, Washington Quarterly, 31 May, 2007, 
http://www.twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer_twining.pdf, p. 82 (Accessed on 16/05/11)  
31 Clinton had hoped to visit India earlier, in November 1998 according to Talbott but due to the nuclear 
tests was forced to postpone. 
32 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 208 
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shaped primarily by concerns with the nuclear order, Bush was occupied by the 
emerging power-balance and subsequently the ‘war on terror’ fought on India’s 
periphery.   
 
Throughout the Bush presidency the US grew increasingly wary of China’s growth. In 
2001 a RAND study concluded that, ‘The US must begin to formulate a strategy aimed 
at a pivotal long-term objective: preventing the worsening of the security situation in 
Asia. Central to this objective is the need to preclude the rise of a regional and 
continental hegemon.’33 Washington officials recognised that political liberalism was 
unlikely in China and that within years Beijing would become a competitor.34 
 
Rather than explicitly ‘contain’ China, however, US policy sought to strengthen its 
current allies in the region and seek new potential partners. This approach, it was hoped, 
would defend US interests in the region without overtly antagonising Beijing. As early 
as Bush’s presidential campaign in 2000, the goal to ‘work toward the day when the 
fellowship of free Pacific nations is as strong and united as our Atlantic partnership’ 
was voiced. US partners were expected to fulfil their global security responsibilities as 
‘democratic security providers’. As the 2002 National Security Strategy stated, the goal 
was to ‘develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this 
dynamic region.’35 The US began to explore the ‘spokes’ of the hub-and-spoke system 
of bilateral alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, named Thailand 
                                                            
33 Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The US and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), p. 43 
34 Zissis, ‘Crafting a US Policy on Asia’ 
35 Daniel Twining, ‘The New Great Game: Why the Bush administration has embraced India’, The 
Weekly Standard, Vol. 12, Issue 15, 25 December, 2006, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/094gntoy.asp?pg=1 (Accessed on 
02/09/09) 
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and the Philippines as major non-NATO allies and signed a strategic cooperation 
agreement with Singapore.36  
 
Bush hence sought to build ‘strong democratic alliances’ in Asia that would leave China 
‘unthreatened, but not unchecked.’37 By 2005 the CIA reportedly labelled India as the 
important ‘swing’ state in international politics, shifting the paradigm within which 
India was viewed from a purely sub-continental to a regional or even global context. 
The Bush administration announced its objective to accelerate India’s rise by playing 
‘midwife to the birth of a new great power’.38 As one senior US official stated, ‘China is 
a central element in our effort to encourage India’s emergence as a world power…But 
we don’t need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India 
rises.’39  
 
The Bush presidency was also dominated by the aftermath of 9/11.  As Ganguly and 
Kapur noted, whilst the US was awoken to the dangers of Islamic terrorism in 2001, 
India had experienced such militancy in Kashmir since the 1980s.40 The US was keen to 
capitalise on this experience and use India’s maturity as a rising power to fulfil 
American security concerns in the region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
36 Twining, ‘America’s Grand Design in Asia’ 
37 The US also hopes India will have some balancing influence against Russia in Central Asia 
38 Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (London: Little and Brown, 
2006), p. 281 quoted in Twining, ‘America’s Grand Design in Asia’, p. 82 
39 Senior US official interview quoted in Ibid. p. 83 
40 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, ‘The End of the Affair? Washington’s Cooling Passion for Delhi’, 
Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65141/sumit-ganguly-and-s-paul-
kapur/the-end-of-the-affair (Accessed on 16/06/09) 
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iii. President Obama 
 
One of the most striking variations between the Bush and early months of the Obama 
administrations was their respective perceptions of India. Commentators predicted that a 
McCain presidency would have adopted the ‘Armitage’ approach of ‘managing’ the rise 
of China through working with current allies and new partners.41 During the presidential 
campaign Obama left little doubt that South Asia would be a foreign policy priority.42 
Crucially, however, this did not concern India as much as the newly termed ‘AfPak’ 
(Afghanistan and Pakistan) and swift withdrawal of US troops from the theatre.43 In 
India, concerns that previous developments would be stalled or even worse, reversed 
were acute. India also feared being left sole responsibility for the troublesome 
neighbouring region.  
 
Whilst it was hoped Hillary Clinton would support US-India ties, it was soon made 
clear that US-China relations were the priority. Within days many concerns were 
realised through a number of perceived snubs on India. 44  India became deeply 
concerned that the US considered China to have a strategic role in South Asia 
(Washington claimed reference was intended for Afghanistan)45 and that the US would 
                                                            
41 McCain also called for a ‘concert of democracies’ as a similar vision to Japan’s ‘arc of freedom’ but 
this idea was widely critiqued during the campaign trail. John McCain and Joseph Liberman, ‘Renewing 
America's Asia Policy’, Wall Street Journal Asia, 27 May, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121183670827020887.html (Accessed on 14/07/09)  
42 Harsh V. Pant, ‘Obama magic unlikely to work with India’, Japan Times, 1 February, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090201a2.html (Accessed on 01/02/09) 
43 Paul Kapur interview with Kamla Bhatt, ‘Obama’s South Asian Policy’, Kamla Show, 17 June, 2009, 
http://kamlashow.com/podcast/2009/06/17/prof-paul-kapur-obamas-south-asian-policy/ (Accessed on 
14/07/09) 
44 Among the slights identified by observers in India was the omission of India from Obama’s inaugural 
list of foreign policy partners and absence of an introductory phone call from Obama to Prime Minister 
Singh whilst both the President of Pakistan and China were included.  The suggestion by Obama to send 
Bill Clinton as special envoy and mediator for Kashmir only disturbed India further.  
45 David Brewster, ‘The US-India strategic partnership: a fair weather friendship?’, East Asia Forum, 12 
December 2009, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/12/the-us-india-strategic-partnership-a-fair-
weather-friendship/ (Accessed on 12/12/09) 
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choose relations with Beijing over Delhi. However, the greatest rebuff was Clinton’s 
decision to skip India on her first tour of Asia.46 This ‘India passing’ was reminiscent of 
a similar slight given to Japan by Clinton’s husband who, as President in 1998, 
neglected to visit Japan as a part of a visit to Asia. Clinton eventually toured India six 
months after the inauguration.  
 
High-level contacts became much less frequent. Whilst President Obama and Prime 
Minister Singh met on the sidelines of the G20 London Summit in April 2009 and 
Copenhagen Climate Change conference in December 2009, a summit was not held 
until November 2009.47 The diplomatic discourse between Washington and Delhi was 
also downgraded. Mention of a ‘strategic partnership’, voiced by Bush was replaced by 
references to India as a ‘provider of security’, crucially omitting mention of any 
strategic element.48 Obama’s administration appeared to consider India as ‘not just a 
regional but global power’49 but deemed India’s utility as emanating from a contribution 
to Afghanistan.50 
 
Relations in mid-2011 fell into deeper ‘funk’. In March, Twining argued that the 21st 
century would not be a ‘Chinese century, but an Indo-American one’ but soon after 
                                                            
46 According to some reports, Clinton initially planned to visit India on this tour but this was not followed 
through. Harsh V. Pant, ‘India’s newfound irrelevance to Washington’, Japan Times, 20 March, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090320a1.html (Accessed on 20/03/09) Former Secretary of 
State Rice had also urged Clinton to include India on the itinerary.  
47 Ambassador Rajiv Sikri, ‘Foreign Policy Challenges Facing India’s New Government’, Chatham 
House Lecture, 1 July, 2009 
48 US Defense Secretary Robert Gates cited from a speech at the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore; 
‘In the coming years, we look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and 
beyond’, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/may-2009/us-looking-at-india-as-provider-of-
security-in-indian-ocean/ (Accessed on 08/08/09) 
49 During her visit Clinton made continued efforts to affirm her view of India as an emerging power: ‘[I] 
consider India not just a regional but global power,’ she told an Indian news channel on 18 July. Madhur 
Singh, ‘Clinton’s Trip to India: What’s the Takeaway?’ Time Magazine, 21 July, 2009 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1911878,00.html (Accessed on 22/07/09) 
50 For example during Gates’ speech to 2009 Shangri-La dialogue he praised India’s role in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan through development donations, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/may-
2009/us-looking-at-india-as-provider-of-security-in-indian-ocean/ (Accessed on 08/08/09) 
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cracks emerged. The first shock came when India abstained from the UNSC 1973 vote 
against Libya and supported Syria’s candidature for the UN Human Rights Council. 
Washington had already grown uneasy with the delays enacting liability legislation 
which delayed implementation of the US-India nuclear deal and was frustrated with 
Delhi’s position on climate change and Myanmar. The biggest rebuff came when, 
despite heavy lobbying from the US military-industrial complex, Delhi chose alternative 
suppliers for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). 51  Such moves 
confirmed India’s ‘nonaligned’ status and pleased left-leaning portions of India’s 
political class. For many observers, however, India’s actions threw the whole US-India 
‘strategic partnership’ into question.52 
 
Others such as Latif consider the aircraft deal to have been ‘overhyped’.53 The decision 
was reportedly based on technical merits, though many question this rationale 
considering India’s historically political procurement approach.54 On a more practical 
level Latif also notes some of the similar problems which Chapter 4 will identify in 
Japan’s policymaking apparatus. The US-India relationship has suffered from 
                                                            
51 India is however buying some C-17s from America, seen as some ‘compensation.’ Author’s interview 
with Alagappa.  
52 For many years, an important stream of US policy was to encourage India to ‘buy American’. A leaked 
cable from 2006 showed how the US was most interested in military cooperation, particularly maritime 
infrastructure such as port-building for both security and commercial reasons. Sarah Hiddleston, ‘How the 
“stars aligned” for closer trilateral relations’, The Hindu, 23 April 2011, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1718474.ece. (Accessed on 25/04/11) This cable 
suggested that bilateral training exercises would ‘serve as an excellent conduit for demonstrating the 
superiority of F-16 and F-18 fighters’. ‘India plans to upgrade every major defense system it has over the 
next 15 years, and for the first time in nearly half a century is looking at the US as a defense supplier.’ 
India-US naval cooperation is indeed not always well published according to Alagappa, but personnel 
links are strong and more joint military exercises are held between the two than with any other country. 
53 Author’s interview with Amer Latif, Visiting Fellow, US-India Policy Studies, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington DC, formerly South Asia Director for Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy, 21 June 2011   
54 As Joshi argues, ‘India's decision to buy weapons from the Soviet Union during the Cold War and its 
attempts to diversify its arm supplies after the Cold War were both motivated by politics and what suited 
India's national interests, and not particularly the requirements of its defence forces in that particular 
global context.’ Yogesh Joshi, ‘The Bandwagoning-Balancing Game: Contradictions of the India-US 
Partnership’, IDSA Comment, 5 August, 2011, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheBandwagoningBalancingGameContradictionsoftheIndiaUSPartners
hip_yjoshi_050811 (Accessed on 06/08/11) 
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manpower issues given the minute size of India’s MEA.55 US understanding of India’s 
bureaucracy is also low. Therefore the US is now working to make India more 
‘predictable’ and stress ‘cooperation’ rather than ‘interoperability’. The ‘trust deficit’ 
which also affects Japan’s relations with India is also to be addressed. 
 
After eighteen months of efforts to engage with Beijing, Washington is keen to 
capitalise on India’ popularity as was evident during Obama’s India visit in November 
2010 (a busy period for India when all P5 members came to India). Obama emphasised 
the exceptionalism of US-India ties56 calling them ‘the most defining and indispensable 
relationship of the 21st century’. He also indicated for the first time his endorsement of 
India’s bid for a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council.57 In the 2010 
National Security Strategy paper, India was mentioned a total of nine times, compared 
to only twice for Japan.58  
 
The overall refrain in Washington believes the Bush administration oversold the 
potential of US-India ties. Washington also increasingly realised the contradictions in 
relations as India attempts to leverage US influence for its own ends (band-wagoning) 
whilst simultaneously seeking autonomy (balancing). Gupta believes the ‘US had too 
many unsigned goals’ and for Bronson, ‘needs to pull the romance out of it’. Each 
government is also distracted at home with foreign wars, debt crises and corruption 
                                                            
55 For example, whilst there are estimates of over 30 working groups in operation, India is unable to 
appoint more diplomats with poverty-reduction a priority 
56 Daniel Twining, ‘Not a Chinese Century, An Indo-American One’, Global Asia, March 2011, 
http://www.globalasia.org/V6N1_Spring_2011/Daniel_Twining.html (Accessed on 01/04/11)  
57 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India moving to pole position for Security Council challenge’, Japan Times, 6 
December 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101206a1.html (Accessed on 06/12/10) When 
India last competed for a permanent council seat, incidentally against Japan in 1996, the defeat with only 
a quarter of UN votes was a humiliation to India’s ‘great power’ aspirations. In 2010 India was granted 
non-permanent member status after a concerted effort by External Affairs Minister Krishna. 
58 ‘National Security Strategy’, US White House, May 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (Accessed on 
02/04/11) 
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scandals ‘eating the Indian government alive’.59 In some ways therefore, US-India ties 
are echoing those this thesis will show Japan experienced. Delhi is now seeking greater 
autonomy and demonstrating the limitations of relations whilst economic ties continue 
to grow.  
 
III.  US Role in Japan’s India policy 
 
Japan-India relations have long been constrained by external powers. During the early 
decades of the twentieth century, London strongly disapproved of Japanese sympathy 
for India’s independence. The US’ Cold War vision proved another substantial obstacle. 
Today, in a three-fold manner, the US plays a central role. Washington’s relatively 
recent revival of US-India ties has induced Japan to follow suit. Yet Tokyo has also 
detected a weakening in America’s presence in Asia so sought alternative partnerships, 
providing a second facet of US influence. The final means is through the indirect 
perception among India’s elite that Japan lacks autonomy, weakening the weight of 
Japanese initiatives.  
 
i. Awakening Japan to India’s strategic benefit 
 
The primary role which the US has played in Japan’s India policy has been to signal 
India’s strategic importance. Unsurprisingly, most Japanese bureaucrats are reticent 
about admitting external influences on their operations. The majority appreciate the 
importance of the alliance but stress Japan’s other bilateral relations are independent of 
Washington.60 Indeed Japan and the US have not always seen eye-to-eye in foreign 
                                                            
59 Author’s interview with Latif 
60 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010  
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policy. As Green notes, ‘the two nations’ preferences for world order are not now – and 
never have been – entirely congruent’. 61  Economic objectives have differed and 
relations with Iran, Cuba and Vietnam and the unification of the Korean Peninsula are 
but a few examples. As one official commented to the author, Japan ‘doesn’t need to be 
told’.62  
 
However, even senior diplomats admit that the US has been ‘immensely important’ in 
Japan’s India policy, with one claiming the US ‘led the pack’.63 Another states that 
whilst Japan was interested in India, it was only after the US took the ‘dramatic 
initiative’ could others follow.64 Before America’s re-engagement, India was barely on 
the radar of Japan.65 
 
ii. Japan-India relations as a US-led trilateral 
 
Once India had appeared on the strategic ‘radar’ of policymakers, the US played an 
important role in shaping policy through endorsement of US-led trilateral or 
quadrilateral groups. There has been an evolution from a ‘hub and spoke’ system of 
alliances to one where those in policy-circles talk of ‘networks’. The idea of forming a 
quasi-alliance between democratic states was first suggested following the 2004 Asian 
tsunami which saw the coordination of efforts between India, Japan, the US, Singapore 
and Australia among others. Unease over China’s reaching out to ASEAN and South 
Asian nations also encouraged efforts to balance regional influence by ‘pushing our 
                                                            
61 Richard Samuels quoted in ‘Japan-US Relations, 2008 and After: Policy Implications for Security, 
Economy and Politics After the 2008 US Presidential Election and Beyond’, WOJUSS International 
Symposium Report, 26 June 2008, 
http://www.kikou.waseda.ac.jp/wojuss/achievement/sympo/report/2008symposium_090126.pdf  
62 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
63 Scholars also differ on the extent to which the US drives policy  
64 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, Delhi, 28 February 2011 
65 Author’s interview with senior official, Climate Change Division, MOFA 2 June 2010 
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sphere of close friends past the Pacific Rim and through East Asia’.66 By 2006, as one 
leaked diplomatic cable demonstrates, the US foresaw leveraging Japan’s ties with India 
as a ‘dazzling’ opportunity. According to US Deputy Chief of Mission Geoffrey Pyatt, 
‘The stars have aligned in innumerable and historic ways’. 67 In 2006, the US was 
unprepared to ‘immediately move India into the inner circle’ but was cautious not to 
‘leave it behind’. By encouraging Japan, its closest ally to bring India in from the 
international cold, the US envisaged achievable long-term benefits.  
 
By early 2007, Vice President Cheney proposed the idea that India, the US, Japan and 
Australia form a quadrilateral group of like-minded democratic states and leaders met 
on the margins of an ARF meeting. 68  There had previously been little policy 
coordination between the US and Japan on South Asia, especially compared to that 
conducted on ROK and China policy.69 But during the Bush administration diplomats 
recall India appearing as a priority subject for discussions.70 
 
For a time Bush’s Asia strategy was attractive to both Japanese and Indian elites. The 
formation of a loose consortium of states gave them the necessary autonomy to defend 
their actions domestically, the opportunity to extend their foothold in the region, whilst 
also receiving economic and military support from the US. Delhi and Tokyo were keen 
to use US hegemony to their advantage. All three furthermore shared several security 
                                                            
66 Hiddleston, ‘How the “stars aligned” for closer trilateral relations’ 
67 Ibid.   
68 Emma Chanlett-Avery, ‘Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and 
Multilateral Ties Among the US, Japan, Australia and India’, CRS Report for Congress, 7 January 2008, 
p. 3 
69 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
70 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 and another senior official with experience in the Delhi Embassy, currently posted abroad 
Embassy via email, June 2010. This official also worked on including India into the East Asia Summit in 
the Regional Policy Division from 2004-06. 
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and policy interests, such as energy interests in the stability of the Middle East, strong 
cultural and diplomatic ties with the Arab world, economic and technological 
‘complementarity’ including space equipment71 and shared democratic principles.  
 
The ‘Quad’ initiative (discussed further in Chapter 8) espoused by the US and strongly 
supported by Prime Minister Abe was, however, a short-lived idea. Not only did 
regional leaders, most notably Rudd in Australia, Fukuda in Japan (who assumed the 
premiership following Abe’s resignation) and Singh in India grow uneasy with China’s 
explicit objections, the concept also fell out of favour in the US. With the onset of the 
global economic downturn and reappraisal of China’s economic importance to US 
finances and election of Obama, trilateral musings were shelved. The US began a 
review of Asia policy placing greater emphasis on Sino-US relations and concluding 
military activity in Afghanistan. The US also grew wary of sidelining other Asian allies 
such as ROK, Thailand and the Philippines who might resent their exclusion. 
 
The idea of coordination did not disappear but efforts between Japan, India and the US 
henceforward took a more subtle approach. 72 An example was evident in July 2009 
when the US and Japan supported India’s bid for $2.9bn from the ADB.73 China had 
lobbied hard to oppose the grant, highlighting the $60m allocated to development 
                                                            
71 As threats from North Korea have grown, Japan has hastened development of its space capabilities, 
particularly in intelligence. In October 2005, representatives from Japan and India signed an agreement 
on ‘the Consideration of Potential Future Cooperation in the Field of Outer Space, including Satellite 
Remote Sensing, Satellite Communications and Space Science’ between the Indian Space Research 
Organisations (ISROC) and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). Japan has long been the 
forerunner in space technology but other Asian powers have increased their expertise. China, Japan and 
India all have voiced interest in sending manned spacecraft in the next decade or so. Peter J Brown, 
‘China Looks Beyond India-Japan Space Alliance to the US Connection,’ The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 
48-1-08, November 24, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-peter_j_-brown/2959 (Accessed on 05/12/08) 
72  ‘US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue: February 27 –March 1, 2009’, Japan Institute for International 
Affairs, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Confederation of Indian Industries, 
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/report/090301e-us-j-india_strategic_dialogue.pdf (Accessed on 07/06/09) 
73 Pranab Dhal Samanta, ‘China says no but US, Japan help ADB clear India’s plan’, Indian Express, 
June 16, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-says-no-but-us-japan-help-adb-clear-indias-
plan/477252/ (Accessed on 18/06/09) 
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projects in Arunachal Pradesh, a long-disputed border region. The US and Japan (with 
ROK) was able to apply their large voting shares in support for India at the evident 
expense of China.74 An emerging informal trilateral dialogue is assessed as another 
example in Chapter 8. 
 
How the US views Asia therefore affects the level of US influence over Japan’s India 
policy. For example, when the global nuclear order or fears of China are of concern, 
India’s strategic importance grows, which in turn leads the US to encourage greater 
Japan-India interaction. When US policy shifted focus towards the Afghanistan 
situation, Japan has become keener to create a more self-directed policy towards India, 
as the following section will demonstrate. 
 
iii. India - an alternative security partner 
 
The positive mood for coalitions faded by 2008 in the wake of the financial crisis and 
domestic unease with neo-conservative ideology. As the experiment of a ‘Quad’ 
demonstrated, India was keen to avoid a grouping with any semblance of an alliance. In 
addition, growing attention to ‘emerging powers’ highlighted the relative decline of US 
supremacy. Once again pointing to NCR’s appreciation for structural conditions, as 
anticipation for a multi-polar global order in which states such as China and India vie 
for influence against the US, other states are adjusting their policies to suit. Japan is no 
different and though the realisation has been hesitant, senior MOFA officials recognise 
the shift.75 The US Security Strategy of 2010 articulated therefore what America’s allies 
                                                            
74 Interestingly, Australia joined China in attempting to block the vote whilst later claiming it did not 
question the region’s belonging to India.  
75 Author’s interview with senior official, Policy Planning and International Security Division, 18 May 
2010  
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had already been considering; the US’ continued hegemony can no longer be assured. 
Tokyo is not averse to working closely with the US as well since as one senior 
policymaker noted, the greater number of actors involved, the greater legitimacy of 
actions. However should strengthening ties with India provide Japan greater autonomy, 
this is welcomed. India is foreseen as an ‘insurance policy’ in security matters in the 
face of growing Chinese might and unease with America’s ability to balance Beijing 
alone. 
 
Some in the US itself would take issue with the assumption that they are coordinating 
Japan’s India policy. As one Wikileaks diplomatic cable discussed above noted in 2006, 
Washington should ‘pounce on this moment of opportunity to shape the direction 
diplomacy in this region takes in the coming decades.’ India is ‘a nation that is on its 
own actively seeking closer ties with Japan’. According to Cable 88132 therefore, rather 
than defining Japan’s policy towards India, the US is keen to capitalise on the 
‘blossoming’ progress.  
 
In December 2009 Foreign Minister Maehara commented, ‘There were only two 
countries who enjoyed watching what was currently happening to the US-Japan alliance 
– China and the DPRK.’76 Indeed, India’s relationship with Japan is separate from US-
Japan relations. The US bases issue for example had little impact on Japan’s policy 
towards India except to indirectly emphasise the importance of the alliance.77  Of far 
greater significance is how US-India relations develop.  
                                                            
76 ‘US Warned Japan about Hatoyama’s Foreign Policies: NYT,’ Japan Times, 6 May, 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20110506a6.html (Accessed on 06/05/11) 
77 The dispute centred over plans to relocate the U.S marine base, Futenma from Ginowan in Okinawa to 
Henoko, also on the island and move a number of marines and their families to Guam. However, 
Hatoyama promised to move the base off the whole island. A leaked cable later revealed that Hatoyama 
and the DPJ never intended to relocate the Futenma base outside of Okinawa. According to documents, 
76 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
   
iv. Japan as America’s ‘puppy’ 
 
The third means through which the US influences Japan’s India policy is to compromise 
Tokyo’s ability to appear autonomous. Both Japan and India agree on a wide range of 
policies. However, India is seeking strong independent partners and wary of engaging in 
balancing blocs or alliances led by the US. Washington has thus acted as a complicating 
factor to Japan’s India policy.  
 
Widespread opinion in India attributes Japanese attention in US efforts to re-engage. 
According to Gupta, Japan has ‘literally trailed in the slip stream’ of US interests and as 
Seth states, Tokyo simply ‘follows the leader’.78 Indian diplomats are wary of Japan’s 
ability to pursue truly sovereign decisions, weakening Tokyo’s diplomatic hand. In 
recent years this has been seen in Japan’s opposition then quick acceptance of India 
joining the ARF and agreement to the nuclear deal in 2008 despite domestic 
opposition. 79  For India, a state which fiercely defends its strategic autonomy, this 
perceived limitation is significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the Japanese government agreed not to move the US Marine Corps Air Station should the alternative not 
suit the US and honour the 2006 agreement. Rajaram Panda, ‘DPJ’s Duplicity on Futenma Base 
Relocation in 2009’, IDSA Comment, 9 May, 2011, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DPJsDuplicityonFutenmaBaseRelocationin2009_rpanda_090511 
(Accessed on 10/05/11)  
78 Author’s interview with Aftab Seth, Former Ambassador to Japan 2000-04, 21 June 2010  
79 Author’s interview with Kulip Sahdev, Ambassador to Japan, 1995-97, New Delhi, 9 March 2011 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Widespread belief holds that Japan’s strategy follows Washington’s lead yet whilst the 
rapprochement was undoubtedly important in getting relations started; 80  subsequent 
policies have been more autonomous. This has been in part due to weaker support for 
trilateral initiatives from Washington as well as additional structural factors such as 
China and intervening domestic factors. Without Washington’s efforts with India 
nonetheless, Japan would have faced considerable difficulty. As will be demonstrated in 
the case studies below, US influence has differed depending on the policy in question. 
The Japan-India partnership must be viewed through a wider web of alliances and 
relationships in the region which interact as structural factors with unit-level factors to 
dictate the nature of policy.  
 
The ‘China factor’, yet to be addressed, cannot be omitted from analysis of 
Washington’s influence on Japanese policy as well as how China independently impacts 
Tokyo’s approach. Indeed China inhabits much of the land between India and Japan and 
has unnerved policymakers in both Delhi and Tokyo. The prevalence of this factor is 
discussed in greater length below. 
 
B) The Role of China 
 
The international order has experienced fundamental change in the past decade, in large 
part due to the economic growth of so-called ‘emerging powers’.81 The most successful 
                                                            
80 This point was made by several interviewees though the author found journalists the most cynical about 
the extent of US dependence in Japanese policymaking. 
81 This term was coined in the 1980s by the World Bank economist Antoine van Agtmael 
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of these has been China, which has become a dominant power in Asia82 after more than 
quadrupling the size of its economy between 2001 and 2010.83 Whilst there have been 
several positive benefits to China’s growth, conventional wisdom holds that China 
provides the major impetus behind Japan’s interest in India. This thesis concurs with the 
assumption that China has played a significant role, particularly by encouraging Japan 
to seek additional security partners, diversify markets for its goods and work in line 
with US objectives. However, in consideration of this thesis’ NCR framework, the 
existence of China is taken as only providing some reasoning behind Japan’s India 
policy. Subsequent analysis will delve deeper into the additional unit-level factors 
which explain the shape of Tokyo’s approach.  
 
Washington acted as an important initiator but the other more dominant structural force 
providing the suitable environment has been the presence and behaviour of China. The 
problem for Japan, however, is that whilst towing the Washington line has long been 
Tokyo’s policy preference, openly framing policy with a state in the context of a third 
has proven contentious.  
 
During much of the 1990s, China was less of an issue for both India and Japan.84 
China’s military arsenal was a fraction of its current form and Japan felt comfortable 
relying on Washington to ensure its security. Around the turn of the century, China’s 
diplomatic activities were less conspicuous, in part due to the continued fall-out 
                                                            
82 Commentators often point to the fact that throughout history such a position has been the norm rather 
than an exception 
83 Frank Ching, ‘Why China Needed Bin Laden’, The Diplomat, May 26, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/05/26/why-china-needed-bin-laden/ (Accessed on 26/05/11) 
84 Author’s interview with Sahdev 
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following the Tiananmen Square incident and steady but not yet monumental growth.85 
By midway through the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, China had 
become a vital element of strategy-formation. 
 
The trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations cannot be fully accounted for within this 
thesis. However, what will be provided is an overview of Japan’s relations from 1945 to 
the present, followed by an assessment of US-China relations since Japanese policy 
derives considerable influence from Washington.  
 
Present day tensions cover many policy issues but among the most important for India 
policy are 1) rapid military modernisation, 2) naval capability and 3) territorial claims. 
In each of these areas the rise and significantly, the manner in which China’s influence 
has been exercised has influenced Japan’s policymaking process. An additional factor is 
how India views China. As will be evidenced, reticence to employ balancing rhetoric 
limits the acceptance of Japanese initiatives. To conclude, some initial ways in which 
China has stimulated Japanese policymaking towards India are identified before this 
factor is considered during subsequent chapters.  
 
I. Sino-Japanese relations – an overview 
 
For centuries, if not millennia, Japan has been influenced by the developments of its 
western neighbour. Recent tension has largely emanated from historical memory 
following two Sino-Japanese wars, but since relations were normalised in 1972, trust 
and respect between the two has been proved lacking among government and the public. 
                                                            
85 Author’s interview with Yukio Satoh, Vice Chairman of the Japan Institute of International Affairs 29 
June 2010 
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Relations have witnessed a ‘rollercoaster trajectory’ as exchanges have continued to be 
impeded by each side’s unwillingness to accept the other’s superiority.86 
 
As twentieth-century hostilities came to an end, the two former adversaries found 
themselves on opposing sides of the new world order. Much of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s legitimacy rested on anti-Japanese sentiment, which in addition to China’s 
alignment with the Soviet Union from 1950 onwards brought the two countries into 
direct ideological confrontation. Relations whilst not formalised, maintained some 
minimal economic interaction and in the early 1960s, when incidentally Sino-Indian 
relations faced a nadir over a border dispute, the JDA refused to admit China 
represented a threat. Under Sato Eisaku (1964-1972), however, relations suffered due to 
a perceived pro-Taiwan thus ‘anti-China’ stance following China’s nuclear test in 1964 
and participation in the Vietnam War. The onset of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 
further damaged ties as China placed severe restrictions on trade and increased levels of 
anti-Japanese rhetoric.87 
 
China began its rapprochement with the outside world in 1971 with the secret trips of 
Secretary of State Kissinger in preparation for President Nixon’s visit in February 
1972.88 Despite some unease in Tokyo, Japan established its own diplomatic ties in 
September 1972. The success of this warming of relations was not only due to Japan’s 
willingness to follow Washington’s lead, however, but a congruent acceptance 
according to Yahuda, that the US-Japan alliance was a useful means to restrain Soviet 
                                                            
86 Yoichi Funabashi, ‘The Future of the Sino-Japanese Relationship’, Seminar at The Daiwa Anglo-
Japanese Foundation, London, June 1, 2011  
87 Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations, p. 47 
88 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (London; Routledge, 
1996), p. 80 
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influence in the region. 89  A positive approach to China from the Tanaka Kakuei 
administration followed. Tanaka maintained some trade relations with Taiwan whilst 
supporting Beijing’s ‘One-China’ policy 90  and decided to shelve disputes over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.91 By 1978 both states were able to sign a Peace and Friendship 
Treaty. 
 
This treaty coincided with China’s economic modernization which encouraged Japanese 
firms to enter the Chinese market. Some teething problems tempered the initial 
enthusiasm felt by the zaikai92 but by the end of the 1980s interest resumed as the 
Japanese yen rose and attractiveness of China’s market grew. When China opened its 
coastal provinces to trade, Japan was one of the chief beneficiaries resulting in total 
trade surpassing $19bn in 1988, up from $5bn ten years earlier.93  
 
Bilateral trade jumped several folds within the first few years of normalisation, with 
Japan emerging as China’s largest trading partner.94 Indeed much of the success of 
China’s economy in recent decades can be attributed to the considerable sums of 
investment provided by the Japanese government and private corporations. Japanese 
ODA to China began in December 1979 95  and by 1987 stood as China’s largest 
contributor, a trend which continued into the next decade.  
                                                            
89 Subsequently whilst China officially labels the US-Japan alliance a relic of the Cold War, its utility as a 
balancer in the region and restraint on Japanese militarism is welcomed. Ibid. p. 84 
90 Qingxin Ken Wang, ‘Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the US after the Cold War’, Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), p. 355 
91 Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, p.84 
92 ‘Business community’, given full explanation in the subsequent chapter. 
93 Robert Taylor, Greater China and Japan: Prospect for an Economic Partnership in East Asia, London 
& New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 124 
94 This position was taken over from the Soviet Union. ‘Japan’s role in China’s economic reforms’, 
Xinhua, 20 October, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/20/content_10224098.htm 
(Accessed on 04/04/11) 
95 For more details on Japan’s ODA to China see Masayuki Masuda, ‘Japan’s Changing ODA Policy 
Towards China’, China Perspectives, 47 (May-June 2003) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/  
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The 1980s were perhaps the strongest period of relations, facilitated not only by 
hospitable structural conditions which saw the gradual end of the Cold War bipolar 
order but also a succession of leaders keen to support strong ties. In May 1982 Chinese 
Premier Zhao Ziyang marked the 10th anniversary of normalization with a visit, 
reciprocated later the same year by Prime Minister Suzuki. Several other visits 
followed.96 
 
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union greatly benefited China, opening strategic 
space and allowing for greater economic opportunities. The period also witnessed the 
emergence of a generation of elites without wartime memories. Japan soon became 
China’s largest trading partner as China’s economic profile developed, assisted by 
Japanese efforts to integrate its former adversary into the international community. 97 
Japan assisted securing China’s status as a ‘developing country’ in the OECD98 and 
membership to the WB, WTO and APEC.99 According to Whiting, Japan also played an 
important role persuading other G7 countries not to continue with economic sanctions 
following the Tiananmen incident in 1989 and was the first to remove sanctions.100 
 
Japan’s decision not to castigate China resulted in little diplomatic fall-out between the 
two states (particularly noteworthy considering the distance created after India’s nuclear 
                                                            
96 For a list of VIP visits, see ‘Japan-China Relations’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index.html  
97 Murata contends that China’s rise is in fact a foreign policy success of the US and Japan, which has 
brought millions out of poverty. Author’s interview with Murata 
98 This status China continues to employ when beneficial to their interests despite considerable advances 
in China’s economic profile 
99 Yong Deng, ‘Chinese Relations with Japan: Implications for Asia-Pacific Regionalism’, Pacific Affairs, 
70, 3 (1997), p.375 
100 Chellaney also points to the significance of industrial states discontinuing sanctions for China’s 
subsequent development. Japan was also wary of chastising China considering Japan’s own record on 
human rights during the war. Whiting, ‘China and Japan: Politics versus Economics’ 
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tests in 1998). With relations in a reasonable state, Emperor Akihito visited China in 
1992 embarking on some fairly successful ‘emperor diplomacy’. 101  Japanese elites 
provided China with apologies for wartime behaviour, including a statement of ‘deep 
remorse’.102 ODA to China also increased even as Japan adjusted the terms of its overall 
ODA policy.103  
 
China was, however, unsatisfied with the levels of remorse offered by Japan and 
incessantly demanded greater efforts in line with those received by ROK. This issue 
surfaced particularly during the Obuchi administration (1998-2000) when China placed 
considerable pressure on Tokyo during the state-visit of Jiang Zemin in 1998. Two 
years earlier in 1996, the Taiwan Strait crisis had alerted Japan to the potential 
belligerency of China and their reliance on US defence forces, 104  which with the 
perceived gradual expansion of Japan’s military capabilities encouraged further 
mistrust.   
 
The administration of Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) heralded one of the frostiest 
periods in bilateral relations. Koizumi’s incessant visits to the Yasukuni shrine, 
considered a monument to Japanese militarism, stirred anti-Japanese riots in Chinese 
cities, most notably Shanghai. The perception grew that Japan had not fully atoned for 
its wartime behaviour and when Japan’s Defense Agency (later a Ministry following 
                                                            
101 Glenn D. Hook , Hugo Dobson, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes eds. Japan’s International 
Relations: Politics, economics and security, (London: Routledge, 2001) p. 170 
102 Between 1972 and 2005 Japanese emperors and prime ministers issued seventeen apologies to China.  
103 For details of Kaifu’s ODA reforms, announced in 1991 and enacted in the 1992 ODA Charter, see 
‘The ODA Charter clarifies the philosophies of Japan's ODA, 1992-2002’, MOFA, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/cooperation/anniv50/pamphlet/progress3.html  
104 The Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-1996, often also referred to as the ‘Third Taiwan Strait Crisis’ 
surrounded a series of missile tests by China around Taiwan to send the strong message of intent to 
Taiwan and the US who appeared to be moving away from the traditionally held ‘One-China policy’. 
Tensions erupted when President Lee of Taiwan attempted to visit the US to speak on Taiwan’s 
democratisation progress, angering the mainland and resulting in the US being forced to clarify further 
their commitments to Taiwan.  
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2007 reforms) identified China as a potential security concern in their 2005 National 
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) apprehensions continued. Chinese elites also 
noted with concern Koizumi’s decision to surround himself with ‘hard-line, anti-
Chinese, pro-Taiwanese politicians’. 105  Within this atmosphere there were riots 
surrounding China’s defeat to Japan in the 2004 Asian Cup Football Final and 
continued blocking to Japan’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat. As 
relations reached a new low, Tokyo was encouraged to look outward for potential 
security partners. 
 
China-Japan relations recovered slightly during the premierships of Abe Shinzo and 
Fukuda Yasuo, particularly the latter who prioritised mending fences with Beijing.106 
Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit in May 2008 was largely seen as a success, 107 
reciprocated by Aso Taro visiting to mark the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship. Yet tensions never completely disappeared, for example during Aso’s 
premiership when he portrayed China as a nuclear threat, this was interpreted in the 
Chinese media as an excuse for Japanese militarisation.108 
  
Despite some unease in Beijing with the arrival of a new DPJ administration, improved 
relations with China and Asia as a whole were promised in addition to distancing Japan 
from the US alliance. Promises were made not to visit Yasukuni. Nevertheless, barely a 
year into a ‘honeymoon’ period characterised by tensions between Washington and 
                                                            
105 Chalmers Johnson, ‘The real “China threat”’, Asia Times, March 19, 2005, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC19Ad05.html (Accessed on 22/05/11) 
106 Prime Minister Fukuda‘s father, Fukuda Takeo was instrumental in concluding a Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship with China. 
107 As well as being considered quite a domestic political risk on his part. Funabashi, ‘The Future of the 
Sino-Japanese Relationship’  
108 ‘Beijing hits Aso for threat rhetoric,’ The Japan Times, May 8, 2009,  
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090508a5.html (Accessed on 08/05/09) 
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Tokyo over military bases in Futenma, an incident involving a trawler ship in disputed 
waters brought relations to a new low. This episode is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
II. Sino-US Relations 
 
Sino-US ties have also progressed significantly from the dark early years of the Cold 
War. Yet even after the Nixon visit in 1972 and an increase in dialogue between the two 
states, suspicion remains.  
 
The collision between a Chinese fighter and US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft which 
resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot on April 1 2001 brought Sino-US relations to a 
new low. Soon after, Bush offered Taiwan a multi-billion-dollar arms deal. But events 
on September 11th resulted in a dramatic turnaround in the relationship’s fortunes. 
Following the terrorist attacks, China’s President was among the first to express his 
condolences. As Washington became embroiled in the affairs of the Middle East and 
Afghanistan, relations with China moved away from diplomatic antagonism and 
focused on positive efforts such as economic development.109  
 
Barack Obama, elected in 2009, was initially expected to place relations with China as 
his highest priority in Asia, amid rumours of a ‘G2’ world order. Figures such as Jeff 
Bader, Senior Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council encouraged 
Obama to build such ties with China and Secretary Clinton’s February 2009 visit to 
China was widely considered a success. Sino-American relations however experienced 
a difficult year. China reacted strongly to arms sales to Taiwan, protectionist moves on 
                                                            
109 Ching goes so far as to suggest that without the attacks of 9/11 and Bin Laden, China would not be 
where it is today. Ibid. 
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Chinese car tyres and policy towards the Dalai Lama. As The Economist noted in 2011; 
‘Whereas a single incident sparked the spy-plane crisis [2001], today’s tensions are the 
culmination of lots of different things.’110  
 
Economic links between China and the US remain substantial, with commentators often 
describing the two as ‘interdependent’. As of April 2011, China held $1152.2bn of US 
public debt. In addition to China’s military might, the US is also now concerned by 
China’s economic arsenal. In 2010 US Defense Secretary Gates had expected to visit 
China before the annual Shangri-La Dialogue but such an offer was not received.111 
Later when Gates visited Beijing in early 2011, China chose the moment to test a new 
jet.112 When China’s top military commander, General Chen met with Admiral Mullen 
in May 2011, the first in seven years, the mood was frosty. Despite assurances that 
China did not want to ‘match’ US military power,113 joint exercises with other nations 
and arms sales to Taiwan were again raised as areas of discontent.  
 
After the US acknowledged a less aggressive stance by China in the region, 114 other 
states began to protest against their China’s behaviour. States previously favourably 
disposed to China following a campaign of ‘smile diplomacy’ began to turn back to the 
US for support. For example whilst ROK has stood with China when demanding 
apologies from Japan, the aftermath of the Cheonan incident and disputes over the 
Goguryeo region brought ROK closer to Tokyo and Washington than Beijing.  
                                                            
110 ‘Chinese foreign policy: Discord’, The Economist, 13 January, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17902953 (Accessed on 13/01/11) 
111 This spurred speculation that China was protesting the continued arms sales to Taiwan or simply 
asserting greater muscle over the waters. ‘Asian security co-operation: Lost horizon’, The Economist, 10 
June, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16321702 (Accessed on 10/06/10) 
112 ‘Chinese foreign policy: Discord’ 
113 ‘China “will not match” US military power – general’, BBC News, 19 May, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13450316, (Accessed on 19/05/11) 
114  ‘US says China's navy has been less aggressive in 2011’, BBC News, 13 April, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13059006 (Accessed on 13/04/11) 
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III. Increased Chinese assertiveness 
 
The cause of China’s greater confidence has been attributed to various sources. Initially 
China’s strong economic profile during the financial crisis placed the CCP’s economic 
model in a favourable light.115 For some Chinese officials the downturn marked the 
demise of Anglo-American-style capitalism. Other reasons include unease over a 
pending leadership transition in 2012 which will replace the fourth generation rule of 
Wen and Hu and increased insecurity following the ‘Arab Spring’ and fears of a 
possible ‘Jasmine Revolution’. In reality, all reasons have played a role in the latest era 
of Chinese power projection. As identified in the opening of this chapter, this has 
contributed to how Japan views China and subsequent moves towards India. In the 
following section, military modernisation, territorial claims and maritime confidence are 
assessed as reasons for Japan’s interest in India.  
 
i. China’s military modernisation 
 
Among the most pressing aspects of China’s rise for Japanese policymakers, has been 
the speed and scale of Beijing’s military modernisation (see Figure 3). The expansion of 
China’s economy has brought several benefits to Japan but the parallel growth in 
capabilities and size of the armed forces has sent shudders through Japan’s elite. 
China’s allocation of funds has consistently increased by double digits, slowing only 
                                                            
115 Similarly China fared relatively well from the 1997 Asian economic crisis was Beijing took a regional 
leadership role by ensuring the stability of the RNB.  
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slightly in 2010 to 7.5%. 116  This move was interpreted as both an effort to quell 
international fears of Chinese aggressiveness and signal domestically that government 
funds were being channelled to social needs.117 The following year, however, China 
resumed its large-scale modernisation programme with an increase of 12.7%. Spending 
now exceeds that of all the EU members combined.118 According to some estimates, 
China’s defence spending has increased from $17bn in 1990 to $114bn in 2010, 
representing 2.2% of GDP.119 China is acquiring anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), 
submarines and surface ships whilst improving education and the structure of the armed 
forces.120 China is also believed to be soon able to deploy the world’s first ‘carrier-
killer’ ballistic missile.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
116 Kathrin Hille and Mure Dickie, ‘China’s military budget rise alarms Tokyo’, Financial Times, 4 
March 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6525224c-462f-11e0-aebf-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1KL7QBPWH (Accessed on 04/04/11) 
117 Harsh V. Pant, ‘China's Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry,’ The Asia-
Pacific Journal, 18-4-10, 3 May, 2010 
118 Brahma Chellaney, ‘Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia – Prospects of Japan-India 
Cooperation’, Proceedings from Observer Research Foundation, Chennai India Symposium, August 
2008. According to SIPRI whilst in 2000, China spent £31bn, this more than tripled to $99bn in 2009. 
‘SIPRI Yearbook 2010 – Military Expenditure’, 
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2010/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex, p. 10 
119 In the US, the proportion is 4.7%. Belinda Helmke, ‘China’s Military Spending’, The Diplomat, June 
8, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/06/08/chinas-military-spending/ (Accessed on 
08/06/11) 
120 Ronald O’Rourke, ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities—Background 
and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 22 April, 2011, p. 7 
121 ‘China’s first aircraft carrier “starts sea trials”, BBC News, 10 August, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14470882 (Accessed on 10/08/11) 
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Figure 3 122 
 
Accompanying this is the belief that official statistics lack transparency and often 
downgrade the full cost of modernisation by omitting among others, the cost of research 
and development.  In the US there exists a widespread conviction that ‘China’s official 
defence budget greatly under-represents actual military expenditure by a factor of two to 
three’.123 Following China’s most recent report in 2009 a Pentagon study for Congress 
accused China of developing ‘disruptive’ technologies which would allow China to 
‘project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories.’124 
 
                                                            
122 Sourced from ‘China says it will boost its defence spending in 2011’, BBC News, 4 March, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12631357 (Accessed on 08/06/11) 
123 Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘A Paper Tiger No More?: The US Debate over China’s Military Modernization’ 
in Satu Limaye (ed.) Special Assessment: Asia’s China Debate, (Honolulu:Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, 2003) p. 1 
124 ‘China fury at US military report’, BBC News, 26 March, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/7965084.stm (Accessed on 26/04/09) 
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China responded to calls for transparency in 1998 by issuing its first Defence White 
Paper but the biannual reports have done little to placate fears. 125 In China’s 2008 
release, the Navy was singled out for the first time as a priority. Suspicions had grown 
in earlier years, particularly around the building of aircraft carriers and by June 2011 
China’s ‘worst-kept secret’, was formally announced as under construction. 126  In 
August the carrier began sea-trials.127 Analysts question why China needs such a carrier 
if its intentions are merely peaceful but according to Chinese officials, this capability is 
necessary for ‘safeguarding territory, development of national economy and overseas 
interests.’ Beijing previously purchased carriers from the Soviet Union and Australia 
and according to Kotani, has been training pilots at the Guangzhou Naval Academy 
since 1987.128 By holding such a carrier China is sending the signal of a navy able to 
project power over long distances. Power projections are often of greater significance 
than actual capacity.  
 
The nature of China’s modernisation thus causes alarm, particularly investments into 
cyber warfare, sea-skimming missiles, long-range rockets and near-silent diesel 
submarines. China is shifting from reliance on Russian technologies to indigenous 
defence capability. The added perception that China’s military and foreign ministry are 
divided, feeds unease among outside states. China’s Foreign Ministry is often noted as 
                                                            
125 ‘China's ambitious defence plan’, The Japan Times, 28 January, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090128a1.html (Accessed on 28/01/09) 
126 ‘China aircraft carrier confirmed by general’, BBC News, 8 June, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13692558 (Accessed on 08/06/11) 
127 Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China bought the Varyag from Ukraine claiming to 
intend to convert the vessel into a floating casino. According to reports, the carrier was expected to be 
named Shi Lang after the Qing dynasty admiral who conquered present day Taiwan in 1681. ‘Chinese 
Navy urged to go from coastal waters to the oceans,’ Xinhua, 3 March 2009, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/07/content_10963412.htm (Accessed on 05/03/09); ‘China’s 
first aircraft carrier “starts sea trials” 
128 Tetsuo Kotani, ‘Let China launch its flattop’ The Japan Times, 9 May, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090509a1.html (Accessed on 09/05/09) 
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having decreasing influence, 129  evidenced by the fact that he does not sit in the 
Politburo or Standing Committee where the CCP’s power is said to originate.130  
 
Southeast Asian nations and Australia have also increased their military spending131 
since as early as 2040 some fear China taking over from the US as the dominant power 
in the region.132 As Abe noted in an interview with the author, the increases in China’s 
military – approximately twenty times over twenty years has made the China 
relationship Japan’s biggest challenge.133  
 
China has responded to criticisms by pointing to ‘Cold War thinking’ in Washington, 
which overlooks the defensive purpose of spending and that compared to the US, 
China’s military budget is small (see Figure 4 below).134 Indeed China’s figure is said to 
be an eighth of the Pentagon’s and focused on modernising antiquated materials and 
improving pay and conditions for the estimated 2.25m active soldiers.135 However, the 
issue has turned out not only to be a crystal-ball exercise. China has already begun to 
assert its presence with greater force, in a manner which has unsettled its neighbours. 
                                                            
129 Funabashi, ‘The Future of the Sino-Japanese Relationship’ 
130 ‘Rocky relations between China and Japan’, The Economist, 4 November, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17416850  
131 According to a report released in March 2010 by SIPRI, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have 
expanded budgets by 84%, 146% and 722% respectively, between 2005 and 2009, compared with the 
previous five years. Karishma Vaswani, 'Arms drive' in South East Asia’, BBC News, 15 March, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8567750.stm Vietnam ordered six Kilo-class submarines 
from Russia and in 2009 Australia released a White Paper, openly suggesting doubling its submarine fleet 
due to concerns with China. Graeme Dobell, ‘White Paper: China nightmare, Indonesian dream’, Lowy 
Interpreter, May 4, 2009, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/05/04/Defence-White-Paper-China-
nightmare-Indonesian-dream.aspx 
132 Author’s interview with Shamshad A. Khan, Researcher, IDSA, 7 March 2011 
133 Author’s interview with Abe Shinzo, Former Prime Minister of Japan 2006-07, 2 June 2010 (via 
interpreter) 
134 ‘China fury at US military report’ 
135 According to a 2010 report by SIPRI, the US contributes 43% of global military expenditure, whilst 
China holds the second position with 6.6% of spending. ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2010 – Military Expenditure’, 
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2010/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex, p. 8 
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Concerns by policymakers are not just therefore perceptual fears but structural 
adjustments to shifting balance of power. 
 
Figure 4136 
 
 
ii. Maritime confidence 
 
For Kang, among other observers, China’s rise based on historical trends will provide 
stability for the region. 137  However, several of China’s neighbours have reason to 
suspect otherwise based on recent behaviour. Whilst conflict between major powers 
remains unlikely, the arena in which China’s rise has become most apparent is the 
maritime, particularly in the South and East China Seas. Regarding Japan and India’s 
                                                            
136 Sourced from ‘Viewpoint: A new Sino-US high-tech arms race?’ BBC News, 11 January 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12154991 (Accessed on 11/01/11) 
137 David C. Kang, ‘Why China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asian 
Region’, Perspectives on Politics, 3, (2005), pp. 551-554 
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concerns, the chances of China launching an amphibious attack on either state remains 
extremely unlikely (despite the fact that such an effort was made in the border regions 
of India in 1962). In today’s global climate, the threat felt by both governments instead 
relates to maritime disputes, particularly claims to areas of the South China Sea.138  
 
IV. Significance of the seas 
 
The significance of the seas for Asia cannot be understated. Post-war economic growth 
has been largely facilitated by sea-borne exports from states such as Japan, ROK, Hong 
Kong and Singapore and as both China and India grow, so too does their naval 
presence.139 China is particularly keen to expand into the maritime domain as a nation 
with 18 000km of coastline, 6 500 islands and a long tradition of sea-faring.140 The 
South China Sea has been considered of particular strategic import should suspected oil 
and gas reserves be discovered. Some estimates predict as much as 30bn barrels of oil 
and over 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.141 One observer has described the area as 
the ‘next Persian Gulf’.142  
 
During the Cold War Japan witnessed with concern, incidents of Chinese force in the 
Paracel Islands, Vietnam, Spratly Islands and Taiwan Strait but in the last decade or so 
                                                            
138 Author’s interview with Akihiko Tanaka, Professor of International Politics and Executive Vice 
President, University of Tokyo 24 June 2010 
139 ‘New Silk Roads’ The Economist,, 8 April, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15872888 
(Accessed on 08/04/10)  
140 Funabashi, ‘The Future of the Sino-Japanese Relationship’ 
141 Michael Auslin, ‘Billiards in the South China Sea’, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450604576417500592116010.html?KEYWORDS=a
uslin (Accessed on 30/06/11) 
142 ‘China delays gas talks over collision’, The Japan Times, 12 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100912a1.html (Accessed on 12/09/10) 
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has seen an acceleration of perceived belligerence.143 In particular China’s Navy has 
shown through words and deeds, an intention to assert its presence and reshape the 
balance of power. Intrusions into Japanese territorial waters for ‘military data’ has 
unnerved Tokyo,144 as has the declaration in July 2010 that the South China Sea stood 
as a ‘core’ interest of China, akin to Taiwan and Tibet. 145  China’s Navy has also 
announced plans to build a full-scale ‘blue-water navy’.  
 
Direct antagonism became apparent in late 2010 when Japan and China experienced one 
of their coolest diplomatic periods. The confrontation erupted on September 7, 2010 
when a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese coastguard patrol boats near the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.146 Japan responded by seizing the crew for alleged 
unlawful fishing and arrested the captain. Beijing called on Tokyo to issue a formal 
apology and provide compensation.147 Japan refused, releasing the captain after two 
weeks, igniting anti-Japanese protests across several Chinese cities. Even though the 
                                                            
143 ‘China's assertiveness at sea: Choppy waters’, The Economist, 21 January 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15331153 (Accessed on 21/01/10) In 2009 China seized 33 Vietnamese 
fishing boats and 433 crew 
144 A Japanese Defence White Paper from September 2010 claimed that six Chinese vessels had passed 
through Japanese waters on their way into the Pacific Ocean in March and in April ten ships followed the 
same route before conducting exercises near Okinawa. ‘China and Japan: Getting their goat’, The 
Economist, 17 September, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17049121?story_id=17049121  
(Accessed on 17/09/10) 
145 Daniel Ten Kate and Nicole Gaouette, ‘Clinton Signals US Role in China Territorial Disputes After 
ASEAN Talks’, Bloomberg, 23 July, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/u-s-says-
settling-south-china-sea-disputes-leading-diplomatic-priority-.html (Accessed on 27/07/11) 
146 ‘Rocky relations between China and Japan.’ The disputed islands, known in the nineteenth century by 
the English name, the Pinnacle Islands constitutes five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks 
approximately 120 nautical miles south-west of Okinawa (Drifte, 2008, p. 3). The islands came under the 
control of Japan in 1895 but have also been claimed by China and Taiwan. China claims that Japan had 
agreed to return the islands following WWII and that historically they belonged to China. Japan in 
contrast sees the area as part of national territory which prior to their 1895 acquisition, were unclaimed. 
The Japanese also contend that China has only become interested in the islands once energy resources 
were discovered in the vicinity. Arguments have gone back and forth with little progress up to the modern 
era but in 1992 Beijing passed a law which made explicit claim to the Pinnacle Islands, sparking anger in 
Tokyo and reigniting the issue between governments. For more information on this dispute, see Reinhard 
Drifte, Japanese-Chinese territorial disputes in the East China Sea – between military confrontation and 
economic cooperation. Working paper, Asia Research Centre, (London: London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 2008), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20881/1/Japanese-
Chinese_territorial_disputes_in_the_East_China_Sea_%28LSERO%29.pdf (Accessed on 04/07/11) 
147 Japan’s weak domestic government was also considered a factor in China’s assertive stance.  
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Chinese Ministry of Commerce denied the allegation, media and elite opinion both 
within and outside Japan associated China’s retention of rare earths exports as a ‘de 
facto’ trade embargo implemented against Japan (see Chapter 8). China also postponed 
talks over joint gas field development in the East China Sea.148 
  
Prior to this episode the South China Sea had become an area of strategic posturing, or 
at least perceived posturing, due to the interplay between structure and intervening 
forces when in 2009 the US accused China of harassing the USNS Impeccable.149 The 
following year the Philippines and Vietnam also felt disquiet as Chinese ships sailed 
provocatively close to or through disputed regions of the Sea.150 In August 2010 the US 
sent the USS George Washington to the coast of Vietnam as a sign of reconciliation 
between the two former adversaries but Beijing interpreted the visit as a ‘provocation’ 
in keeping with other snubs such as the continuation of double-standards in nuclear 
policy by extending talks with Vietnam over technology cooperation.151  
 
At the ARF in July 2010 China felt the effects of its increased assertiveness when 
Clinton declared the South China Sea a US ‘national interest’ and several participating 
states voiced concern over China’s conduct. The US also strengthened relations with 
ROK when the USS George Washington took part in joint exercises following the 
                                                            
148 ‘China delays gas talks over collision.’ Disagreement over gas exploration rights had been seemingly 
alleviated in 2008 with the decision to jointly explore potential resources. The timing of this agreement, 
however, should be noted as during the run up to the Beijing Olympics when China made several 
attempts to appease neighbours to ensure smooth relations and the success of the Games. ‘China and 
Japan agree on joint gas exploration of East China Sea’, Guardian, 18 June, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/18/china.japan (Accessed on 12/09/10)  
149  ‘China hits out at US on navy row’, BBC News, 10 March 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7934138.stm (Accessed on 10/03/09) 
150 Rory Medcalf & Raoul Heinrichs, ‘Asia’s Maritime Confidence Crisis’, The Diplomat, 27 June, 2011,  
http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/27/asia%E2%80%99s-maritime-confidence-crisis/ (Accessed on 
27/06/11) 
151 ‘They have returned’, The Economist, 12 August, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16791842 
(Accessed on 12/08/10) 
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sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010. 152 The attack not only brought widespread 
condemnation of North Korea accused of conducting the attack, but China who did little 
to chastise their diplomatic ‘friend’.  
 
V. The influence of China on Japan’s policy towards India 
 
If the US has acted as an initiator and facilitator, China’s role can be described as an 
accelerator to Japanese interests in India. In many ways including economic, political 
and security, Japan and India are ‘natural partners’ but with growing perceived and real 
aggression from their neighbour, the speed at which efforts have developed has 
increased. In the seventh trilateral strategic dialogue between the US, Japan and India 
held in 2010, ‘concern about China’s assertive diplomatic and military stance over the 
past year’ stood out in discussions.153 China represents a common link between India 
and Japan, 154 which within traditional structuralist balancing theory sheds light on 
Japan’s interest in India. If Japan (A), India (B) and China (C) are considered three 
prongs of a power triangle in the region, A and B together, outsize C. 
 
Japan’s foreign policy undoubtedly contains elements of hedging. Japan’s elite has 
bluntly stated the role of China in Japan’s India strategy. According to a senior diplomat 
stationed in Delhi, ‘the relationship with India is important, partly because of the factor 
of emerging China. We are not confronting against China, but we have to manage the 
relationship with China carefully. And in that process, our relationship with India 
                                                            
152 The US has thus far not conducted exercises in the Yellow Sea in case this upsets China but the 
Pentagon has said they will do ‘in the near future’. ‘They have returned’ 
153 US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue, CSIS, September 22-24, 2010, Washington, D.C., 
http://csis.org/publication/us-japan-india-strategic-dialogue-1 (Accessed on 26/09/10) 
154Author’s interview with Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research, 
New Delhi, 8 March 2011  
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becomes more meaningful.’ Even PM Aso during his tenure as Foreign Minister 
admitted that India served a useful function in balancing against China.155  
 
i. Divergent opinions 
 
The strength of the China-rationale does not find unanimous agreement within Japan. 
Whilst ring-wing politicians have found the concept palatable and the media often 
frames India policy as a hedging strategy, business elites and MOFA officials are more 
cautious about the link. The strength of these actors in the policymaking process, as 
intervening factors, therefore also impacts their influence. 
 
China’s presence and its salience regarding wider foreign policy in Japan, was 
encouraged by the concurrent rise of ‘hawkish’ politicians in Japan. Koizumi was 
notable for his desire to overtly antagonise Chinese sensitivities but Abe was 
particularly keen to incorporate India into Japan’s broader strategy as a means to check 
China. Even though Abe decided to make China his first overseas visit, his views on 
China demonstrate a specific strategy vis-à-vis India. As Abe told the author, ‘China is 
a cunning player of the diplomatic game’ which always hopes their opponent will give 
in before tensions rise too high. When Japan devoted greater attention to India from 
2005 onwards, China was surprised by Japan’s initiative, especially since according to 
Abe this was the first time Japan conducted a foreign policy which would impact Sino-
Japanese relations in a global context. Beijing response for Abe and his allies proved the 
success of the policy.156  
                                                            
155 Takako Hirose, ‘Japanese Emerging Nationalism and Its New Asia Policy’, in V.R. Raghavan ed., 
Asian Security Dynamic: US, Japan & the Rising Powers (Delhi and Chicago: Promilla & Co. Publishers, 
2008), p. 59 
156 Author’s interview with Abe 
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Yachi Shotaro, one of Abe’s most trusted advisors also emphasised the need for Japan 
to be more direct in its foreign policy position. The view was that whilst Beijing might 
be offended by Japanese efforts this ‘might be a price worth paying’ for more equal 
relations. The US seemingly concurred with this analysis, as one leaked diplomatic 
cable stated; ‘a more visible US-Japan-India friendship would signal that free and 
democratic nations, too, pursue their interests, along with partners who share our values. 
We will be offering other hopeful emerging nations on the continent a distinctly 
alternative model to China's.’157 
 
The Japanese media favours placing Japan-India relations within a China-balancing 
framework. For example following the flaring of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in late 
2010, China seemingly held back rare earth exports to Japan.158 Prior to a visit to Japan 
in October, Prime Minister Singh suggested that cooperation with India in this field was 
‘a promising area’. Singh said ‘he wants Japan’s help in expanding production of rare-
earth metals in his country’, which are considered largely underdeveloped. 159  The 
addition was only made in the eleventh hour of negotiations but was quickly picked up 
by both the Mainichi and Nikkei newspapers. As one correspondent noted, it was 
interesting ‘because of the link with China’. The Indian MEA was reportedly unhappy 
with the reference. In Japan in contrast, Singh’s comments were considered a logical 
                                                            
157 Hiddleston, ‘How the “stars aligned” for closer trilateral relations’  
158 China reportedly holds 90% of the world’s rare earths. ‘China cuts rare earth exports for 2011’, 
Economic Times, 28 December, 2010, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-12-
28/news/27577746_1_rare-earth-exports-yao-jian (Accessed on 03/01/11) 
159 According to the US Geological Survey, India is the fifth-largest rare-earth producer in the world, 
holding 3% of global reserves, equivalent to 3.1 million tons. ‘India PM Seeks Japan Help In Rare 
Earths’, Nikkei, 24 October, 2010, http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20101023D23JFF02.htm (Accessed on 
05/05/11)  
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response to China’s ‘erratic behaviour’ which only served to highlight the need for 
Japan to diversify its suppliers.160 
 
Practitioners actively engaged in Japan’s policy towards India appreciate (and are keen 
to emphasise) that overtly factoring in the strengths or weaknesses of a separate bilateral 
relationship is unwise. Indeed policymakers are often uneasy pointing to structural 
forces as influences on their strategy. As one MOFA official notes, the situation in Asia 
today is not akin to nineteenth century Europe.161 However undoubtedly there exists ‘a 
certain level of competition’. As noted elsewhere, whilst the official structure of a 
‘Quad’ or assembly of democracies has been discarded, the idea of bringing together 
states with a similar international outlook and which excludes China is ‘still alive and 
well’. Perceptions are vital so whilst Japan does not want to explicitly hedge, Japan is 
not averse to sending the message to China that they have powerful friends in the 
region. Following Abe and Aso’s tenure and overt efforts to challenge China’s rise, 
Japan retreated from identifying China as a factor. Since 2010, however, and increased 
muscle-flexing by Beijing, Tokyo has begun again to mention China in their 
negotiations. 162   At the same time, Indian elites have become more vocal about 
incorporating China into their strategic planning.  
 
ii. Instances of Chinese influence 
 
The tangible ways in which China can and has influenced Japan’s India policy are 
difficult to identify. Nevertheless the most evident example of China encouraging Japan 
                                                            
160 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, Delhi, 28 February 2011 
161 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
162 Author’s interview with Aftab Seth and N.S. Sisodia, Ambassador to Japan, 2000-2003 and Director 
General, IDSA, Former Secretary in Ministry of Finance and Defence respectively, Delhi, 16 March 2011  
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to formulate stronger relations with India came in 2005 when Sino-Japanese relations 
reached a new nadir. The realisation observed by one senior Indian diplomat that ‘Japan 
had placed all her eggs in the Chinese basket’163 brought Japan and India closer.164 
Tokyo was awakened to the reality that efforts to bring China into the fold were 
faltering and that over-dependence on the Chinese market represented a risk both 
politically and economically.165 For much of the 1990s Japan believed that through 
cultivating a strong economy in China they would equally foster a Japan-friendly 
nation, a hope that was dashed by the 2005 riots.166 Japan had also hoped to gently 
persuade Japan that it was in their interests to work effectively with others.167 Elites in 
both Japan and India recognize this moment as marking a shift in Japanese strategy. 
China was also articulated for the first time as a security threat in Japan’s NDPG in 
2004, a year before Japan-India relations made a significant leap forward under 
Koizumi.  
 
2005 also marked sixty years since the end of the Second World War. According to 
Ambassador Enoki there was a ‘fatigue’ with making apologies and sentiment behind 
refocusing attention on those nations with whom Japan did not have to apologise.168 In 
essence, ‘there are three billion people in Asia and Japan’s previous aggression was 
only against half so the other half was an untapped resource’. As a result of Koizumi’s 
                                                            
163 Author’s interview with Seth 
164 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
165 According to Chellaney, around this time Japanese firms began pushing millions into the Indian stock 
exchange. Author’s interview with Chellaney 
166 Several diplomats recalled whilst interviewed, a palpable shift in the mindset of people in Japan 
following these protests. 
167 Author’s interview with Murata 
168 Murata also notes this point in ‘Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China’, Peng-Er Lam 
(ed.) Japan’s Relations with China, (Oxon & London: Routledge, 2006), p. 43 
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April 2005 visit to India, an ambitious ‘Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-
India Global Partnership’ was agreed.169 
 
VI. The China factor in Indian policymaking  
 
The structural existence of China not only plays a role in Japan’s foreign policy - India 
too sees its neighbour as a key variable. Whilst Pakistan may remain the immediate 
concern for Indian policymakers, China is increasingly becoming the ‘number one 
priority’.170 Indeed, concern with China has even been described as part of the ‘national 
psyche’.171  
  
Whilst official rhetoric from the MEA emphasises a complementarity in relations, in 
reality there is much competition. In an oft-cited interview for example one senior 
Indian official explained, ‘both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can’t both 
be right.’ 172  Security relations differ fundamentally with economic matters. 173  The 
growth of the Chinese market has served several economies well but with increased 
economic clout, how China utilises its influence has unsettled India. 
 
During the Cold War, despite each sharing some tentative affiliation with the Soviet 
Union, mutual respect was rare. Relations were among their weakest in 1962 following 
                                                            
169 Among the steps announced by the Japanese and Indian governments were 1) enhanced dialogue and 
exchanges, 2) comprehensive economic engagement, 3) enhanced security dialogue and cooperation, 4) 
science and technology initiative, 5) cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-
people contacts, 6) cooperation in ushering a new Asian era, 7) cooperation in UN and other international 
organisations and 8) responding to international challenges. ‘Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: 
Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership’, MOFA, April 2005, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html#eight (Accessed on 10/11/10) 
170 Author’s interview with Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow, IDSA, 11th March and Rahul Mishra, 
Researcher, IDSA, Delhi, 14th March 2011  
171 Author’s interview with Mishra 
172 Quoted from Bill Emmott, Rivals in ‘In the balance: A special report on China’s place in the world’ 
173 Ibid.  
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India’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian Border War, igniting unease over China’s 
military prowess. Concerns were validated when a secret memorandum by a Director in 
the PLA stated that ‘We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only for the 
Indians.’174 China’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon in 1964 and subsequent admission 
to the NPT as a ‘nuclear state’ continues to frustrate.  
 
In addition to unease with China’s naval sea-power, disputes have surfaced over the 
Himalayan border, the state of Arunachal Pradesh, Tibetan exiles and energy 
competition. The development of ‘vertical strategic corridors, one to the west and 
another to the east of India’ has also caused tension.175 India perceives China as posing 
a potential if not actual threat to Indian interests through an apparent ‘string of pearls’ 
encirclement.176  To the west, the channel leading to the Gwadar port in southwest 
Pakistan (with 80% funding from China)177 is seen as a tactical means to gain access to 
the Arabian Sea.178 This port’s position at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz has been 
described as a ‘listening post’ to ‘monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian 
activity in the Arabian Sea and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian 
Ocean.’179 On the east the Irrawaddy Corridor from Yunnan province to the Bay of 
Bengal unnerves strategists, as do closer relations with the Maldives and Sri Lanka, the 
                                                            
174 Youssef Bodansky, ‘The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the 
US,’ Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, (Washington, DC, September 30, 1995) pp. 6-13 
quoted in Pant, ‘China's Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry,’ 
175 Chellaney and Horimoto, ‘Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability’, Gaiko 
Forum, Fall 2007, Volume 7, Number 2, http://chellaney.net/2007/11/10/japans-leading-foreign-affairs-
journal-interviews-brahma-chellaney/ (Accessed on 02/02/09)  
176 Hagerty, ‘India and the Global Balance of Power: A Neorealist Snapshot’ in Pant, (ed.), Indian 
Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, p. 38 
177 James R. Holmes, ‘How to Track China’s Naval Dreams’, The Diplomat, 31 May, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/05/31/how-to-track-china%e2%80%99s-naval-dreams/ (Accessed on 31/05/11) 
178 Chellaney and Horimoto, ‘Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability’ 
179 Pant, ‘China's Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry.’ Fears rose even higher 
in May 2011 when Pakistani Defence Minister Mukhtar reported that management of the Gwadar port 
would be shifted from Pakistani to Chinese hands. This announcement, quickly renounced by Beijing 
stoked fears that China was planning on building military bases around India. Holmes, ‘How to Track 
China’s Naval Dreams’ 
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latter to whom China provided substantial military equipment to conclude the civil war 
with the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in 2010.180 India is also concerned 
by China’s intentions to become a full member of SAARC.181 As one analyst notes, 
‘China’s frontiers are moving even if its boundaries are not’. For Richardson, Beijing is 
seen to be ‘seeking to do in the Indian Ocean what the US military has done in 
Southeast Asia since the 1990s - establish a network of "places not bases" by 
negotiating country-by-country agreements allowing naval ships and, in some cases 
military aircraft as well as service personnel, to use base facilities that remain under the 
control of the host government.’ 182  China also opposed India’s application for 
Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council and the ‘all-weather friendship’ 
China maintains with Pakistan particularly irks Delhi 183  as do disagreements over 
Kashmir. This was palpable in July 2010 when defence exchanges were suspended after 
the Head of Northern Command was refused a visa to visit Kashmir.184  
 
Economics ties are nonetheless strong, with China now India’s largest trading partner 
and an ally in the face of international pressure at the WTO and on the issue of climate 
change. India and China share a controversial border, which India does not want to 
                                                            
180 China has also invested heavily, for example, in a commercial port at Hambantota in southern Sri 
Lanka.  
181 Author’s interview with J. Panda. Since 2005 China has been an ‘observer’ at SAARC, the regional 
organisation where India dominates and has shown signs of membership ambitions. Rahul Karmakar, 
‘China seeks bigger role in SAARC’, Hindustan Times, 23 May, 2008, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-seeks-bigger-role-in-Saarc/Article1-312557.aspx (Accessed on 
04/06/11) 
182 Michael Richardson, ‘Another “pearl” in Beijing’s string of ports’, The Japan Times, 19 August, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100819mr.html (Accessed on 19/08/10) 
183 India’s heightened cooperation with the US has also not helped quell distrust. Richardson, ‘Another 
“pearl” in Beijing’s string of ports’ 
184 Ananth Krishnan, ‘India, China ironing out problems: Beijing’, The Hindu, 29 June, 2011, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2145099.ece (Accessed on 29/06/11)  
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destabilise.185 For this reason India has been adamant to separate China from India-
Japan ties at least rhetorically. 
 
This reticence was particularly evident as the ‘Quad’ initiative dispersed in early 2008 
when India decided to retreat.186 China became more aggressive over border patrols and 
placing increased pressure on India over the Dalai Lama. The signing of the US-India 
Nuclear Agreement was also coming into effect. On several other occasions since, Delhi 
has bristled at the suggestion that China factors into Japan-India ties,187 for example 
when a security declaration was signed PM Singh was at pains to emphasise the 
agreement was not ‘at the cost of any third country, least of all China.’188 
 
For Indian elites the China factor is prescient. Yet Delhi considers it premature to 
commit to any one configuration of states whilst the equilibrium of power is still being 
established. 189  Indian policymakers appreciate the potential dangers of formulating 
relations with a third party based on those with another.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The existence of China as a structural reality is of central importance when analysing 
Japanese policymaking and in keeping with NCR theorising. More than any other 
structural factor including the US alliance, concerns over how best to deal with China 
                                                            
185 According to Seth and Sisodia, India’s wants a cooperative relationship with China and to avoid 
provocations. Author’s interview with Seth and Sisodia 
186 Author’s correspondence with Sourabh Gupta Senior Research Associate, Samuels International Inc. 
June 2010 
187 This was also noted by the author in fieldwork interviews, although following further discussion the 
role of China became evident in Indian thinking. 
188 Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China’, The Hindu, 23 
October, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/10/23/stories/2008102355661200.htm (Accessed on 
27/11/08) 
189 Author’s correspondence with Gupta 
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dominates policymaking. The US has been able to act as an initiator but cannot create 
issues on which the two states can cooperate. For this the question of China acts as the 
greater structural force. Both Tokyo and Delhi appreciate that neither had ‘handle’ 
China alone.  
 
Whilst for Japan the ‘India card’ is considered of central importance when dealing with 
China, India is collecting an increasing number of hands to bring to the table. Neither 
Japan nor India is willing to place China as the driving factor behind their interest yet 
the importance of China is impossible to overlook.  A congruence of concern has 
existed for many years in both state’s mindset. Even though India has been cautious, as 
one senior Indian diplomat notes, ‘the rise of China has definitely assisted closer 
relations – there is no doubt about that.’190 
 
 
In line with this thesis’ adherence to NCR, despite the primacy of structure (namely 
China and the US) in dictating policy-options available to Japan, these conditions are 
unable to fully explain the exact nature and timing of policy decisions taken by a state. 
In order to understand this process it is necessary to ‘open the black box’ and integrate 
knowledge of the external environment with unit-level factors. Policy decisions cannot 
be narrowed to just one actor. Indeed as Chapter 8 in particular will argue, shaping 
policy as ‘bookends’ around China has not provided sufficient substance. Domestic 
factors must also be considered. 
                                                            
190 Author’s interview with senior official, East Asia, Ministry of External Affairs, Delhi, 15 March 2011  
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4. The Policymaking Process: Domestic Institutions and Actors 
 
This chapter will identify the additional actors which contribute to the complex web of 
interests which ultimately dictate policy and summarise how each has influenced 
Japan’s approach towards India. The body of this thesis will look in greater detail at 
how these intervening variables have contributed and the influential weight each has 
been able to wield. Following Chapter 3’s focus on structural influences, the following 
‘opens the black box’ of Japan’s unit-level actors. In line with NCR theorising, a state’s 
internal decision-making organisations are important to the creation of foreign policy 
since it is through these mechanisms that relative power and structural realities are read.  
 
The question of where power rests in Japan is open to debate. This is primarily between 
those who argue that Japan operates an ‘elitist’ as opposed to ‘pluralist’ system of 
governance. As Pempel notes, there is plenty of evidence for either argument.1 The 
‘elitist’ camp characterise Japan as ‘Japan Inc.’2 run by a small group of influential 
individuals, often with strong interests in Japan’s economy. Pluralists recognise a 
number of actors without necessarily emphasising one. Pluralists appreciate that 
dependent on the issue the influence of groups differs. For other observers as Hagstrom 
identifies, such a division between elitists and pluralists, implicitly assumes that 
                                                            
1 For example the workings of the US-Japan Security Treaty appears strongly within the control of elites 
within the LDP but the influence of Japan’s rice farmers on trade policy suggests power among a broader 
section of society. T.J. Pempel, ed., Policymaking in Contemporary Japan, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), p. 320 
2 Linus Hagström, ‘Diverging Accounts of Japanese Policymaking’, The European Institute of Japanese 
Studies, Working paper No. 102, (September 2000), p. 4 
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identifying actors is even possible. Karel van Wolferen rejects such a notion, believing 
instead that the process is ‘enigmatic’ like a ‘truncated pyramid’.3  
 
I. Policymaking Models 
 
During Japan’s post-war industrial boom, opinion on Japanese foreign policy was 
relegated to ‘essentially a means of removing obstacles, or defusing possible mine-
fields, in the path of Japan's economic interests.’4 The assumption was that Japan had an 
‘economic strategy’ rooted in the work of the bureaucracy. 5 Analysis by Chalmers 
Johnson with the concept of the ‘developmental state’ dominated scholarship on where 
power was concentrated.6 Through tracing the origins and cause of Japan’s twentieth-
century ‘economic miracle’, Johnson identified the bureaucracy, particularly MITI (now 
METI) as being at the helm of policymaking. 7 For Johnson, ‘Japan is a system of 
bureaucratic rule’ where the primary function of politicians is to act as a ‘safety valve’ 
for officials. Johnson later retracted some elements of his original argument as political 
parties like the LDP grew in influence in the late 1970s but continued to maintain that 
the ‘most important policies still originate within a ministry or agency, not within the 
political or private sectors’.8 
 
                                                            
3 Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, (New 
York; Vintage Books, 1987, 1992), p. 7 
4 Bill Emmott, ‘The Economic Sources of Japan’s Foreign Policy,’ Survival, The IISS Quarterly, Vol. 34, 
No. 2, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (1992), p. 52 
5 For further works on the subject of bureaucracy-ruling party dynamics see Scalapino, The Foreign 
Policy of Modern Japan (1977), Gertis, Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War  (1993), Robert J. Art 
‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique’ Policy Sciences 4, No. 4 (Dec 1973) and 
Stephen D Krasner ‘Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)’ Foreign Policy, no. 7 
(Summer 1972) 
6 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975, 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1982) 
7 Johnson appreciated that bureaucracies often faced internal disagreements and pressure from other 
parties but considered their influence to ‘exert the greatest positive influence’. 
8 Chalmers Johnson, D’A Tyson and J. Zysman eds., Politics and Productivity: How Japan’s 
Development Strategy Work, (New York; Ballinger, 1989), p. 182 
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This bottom-up approach was long-considered the most suitable model. Aurelia George 
Mulgan described Japan as the ‘Un-Westminster’ system,9 where in contrast to the UK; 
Japanese bureaucrats play a central role whilst politicians merely negotiate the terms. 
For Mulgan, Japan’s bureaucracy has ‘formidable control over the function of policy 
advice, initiation, formulation and implementation’. 
 
A subsequent generation of scholars have challenged Johnson and Mulgan’s 
assumptions. Haley for example believes that ‘the dominance of the Japanese 
bureaucracy in the political process has been grossly exaggerated. Not only has 
bureaucratic influence rarely been as significant as generally perceived, but also what 
powers the bureaucracy has exercised have declined steadily’.10 Other scholars claim 
that policy is directed solely by the LDP. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth adopt a ‘rational 
choice’ approach, viewing politicians and bureaucrats as principals and agents who 
balance against one another.11 Officials who are aware of the influence politicians hold 
over their career futures, provide policies simply which they believe politicians will 
implement.  
 
i. ‘Kantei diplomacy’ 
 
A recent addition to the debate has been made by Shinoda.12 Despite the title ‘Koizumi 
Diplomacy,’ his volume chronicles the extension of the Prime Minister’s Official 
                                                            
9 Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Japan’s Un-Westminster’ System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis 
Economy’ Government and Opposition 38, no. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 73-91 
10 Maurice Wright, ‘Who Governs Japan? Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Policy-Making Processes’, 
Political Studies, XLVII (1999) p. 945 
11 JM Ramseyer and FM Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace, (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1993) in Wright, ‘Who Governs Japan? Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Policy-
Making Processes’, p. 949 
12 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, 
(London; University of Washington Press, 2007) 
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Residence (Kantei) as the ‘core executive’ on security policy-making under Nakasone 
and Hashimoto through to Koizumi’s premiership.13 Shinoda shows how with limited 
power within their party and weak links with the bureaucracy, they strengthened the 
office of the Prime Minister to the extent that ‘the Kantei has supplanted MOFA in 
formulating legislation’.14 Shinoda praises this change, deeming it not only democratic 
since the Prime Minister is elected but also efficient since he can act as mediator 
between ministries and interests. Shinoda believes that the Kantei is also politically-
conscious and therefore better able to ‘pursue national interests compared to MOFA, 
which may put a higher priority on friendly relations with foreign countries.’15 
 
Despite these positives, Shinoda’s analysis does not necessarily equate to the reality of 
current policy formulation. Shinoda’s approach goes a step too far by claiming that the 
Kantei has taken over from other sectors to dominate policymaking. Consensus-building 
within the LDP, bureaucracy and other interested parties was still required to pass 
Koizumi’s landmark legislation. Furthermore as Mulgan notes, Shinoda overlooks 
structure and the fact that Koizumi was cushioned by strong domestic political support. 
Without such a backdrop it is unlikely such radical policies would have been accepted.  
 
Whilst valuable for its in-depth critique of the working of the Kantei, as a model for 
understanding the formation of policy Shinoda’s thesis is flawed. A more balanced 
perspective has come from academics that broaden their explanations to include 
additional actors. Officials retain dominance in policymaking but Japan is not quite as 
                                                            
13 The Kantei is defined by Shinoda in its ‘narrowest’ terms as the Prime Minister, chief cabinet secretary 
(CCS) and three deputy CCSs and in the ‘broader definition’ employed in his study as also including the 
Cabinet Secretariat p. 8 
14 Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, p. 14 
15 Ibid. p. 145 
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‘statist’ as once thought. Muramatsu’s ‘patterned pluralism’ model has been particularly 
influential.  
 
ii. Patterned Pluralism 
 
The model of political pluralism relates to a system where several relatively 
autonomous groups vie for power rather than one where a select number of actors direct 
policy. In contrast to ‘classical pluralism’, however, in Muramatsu’s model the state is 
not weak and competition between groups is not open-ended.16 The modifier ‘patterned’ 
is therefore added to indicate that since the state is ‘penetrated’ by predictable interest 
groups and political parties. It remains strong within the framework of LDP-dominance. 
The bureaucracy continues to act as the ‘pivot’ for policymaking alliances. 17 
Nevertheless there has been a tangible shift in the location of initiative ‘where prime 
ministerial, parliamentarian and interest group power has grown resulting in the 
bureaucracy being forced to ‘share the stage with a number of other influential actors’.18 
 
The 1980s brought two significant drivers of change: increased strain on government 
resources and economic friction with the US.19 Muramatsu argues that each of these 
factors, one domestic and the other external, made the bureaucracy more ‘defensive’ 
thereby boosting the power of the prime minister and ‘enhancing patterned pluralism’. 
                                                            
16 M. Muramatsu and Krauss, ‘The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned 
Pluralism’, in K Yamamura and Y Yasuba, eds, The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 1: The Domestic 
Transformation (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) p. 538 
17 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security, p. 542 
18 Ibid. p. 540 
19 MOF autonomy for example, once severely protected, was reduced when demands from the US forced 
Japan to liberalise interest rates in 1983. The Ministry of Finance had also suffered threats to its 
independence in the 1970s due to domestic pressure of Japan’s rising zoku and other political pressures 
ultimately led to MOF failure to uphold a balanced budget. Muramatsu, ‘Patterned Pluralism under 
Challenge: The Policies of the 1980s’ in Political Dynamics of Contemporary Japan, (Ithace NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), p.60  
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Whilst the DPJ government establishes its approach to policy, Muramatsu’s model of 
pluralism continues to provide the most viable method of analysis. Furthermore, the 
‘patterned pluralism’ recognises that the evolution of various groups occurs as a result 
of structural/environmental changes, therefore adhering to NCR. 
 
II. Domestic institutions and actors 
 
The Japanese state as an agent is commonly divided into three, consisting of the ruling 
political party, bureaucracy and business community (zaikai). This is labelled an ‘iron 
triangle,’ 20 ‘tripartite elite model,’ 21 ‘tripartite power elite22 or ‘tripod’. 23 Within the 
bureaucracy, MOFA, METI and to a lesser extent MOF and MOD participate in 
international affairs.24 The media, non-governmental organisations and public opinion 
are relatively recent additions. A key objective of this research will be to gauge the level 
of influence present at each of these levels when referring to the foreign policymaking 
process towards India.  
 
III. The Prime Minister 
 
Japan operates a parliamentary democracy in which the administrative bodies and ruling 
party serve to limit the decision-making profile of the central office. Article 65 of the 
Constitution states ‘Executive power will be vested in the Cabinet’, with Article 73 
                                                            
20 Richard Colingdon and Chikaku Usui, ‘The Resilience of Japan’s Iron Triangle: Amakudari’ Asian 
Survey, Vol. 41, No. Sept-Oct 2001, pp. 865-895 
21 Hook et al. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p. 41 
22 Haruhiro Fukui, ‘Studies in policymaking: a review of the literature’, Pempel ed. Policymaking in 
Contemporary Japan, p. 22 
23 Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policymaking: The Politics behind Politics: Informal Mechanisms and the 
Making of China Policy, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 11 
24 The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) has also played a sporadic role on the 
issue of the liberalisation of the rice trade. 
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giving this body authority to ‘manage foreign affairs’. As head-of-government and part 
of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister is also able to exert influence over foreign policy. 
Prime ministers act as spokesmen for the nation on the international stage and are 
therefore able to wield this unique attribute to their own purposes. No other political 
actor is able to mobilise cross-ministry support behind an issue, nor make final 
decisions over a policy when several alternatives are present.25 According to Nobayashi, 
the greater the personal commitment by a Prime Minister to an issue, the greater his 
influence. 26  Greater politicisation of a policy also serves to relegate officials to 
implementing rather than formulating its direction. As the below will show, this was 
evident during Abe’s premiership.  
 
The Prime Minister in Japan has witnessed an increasingly important role in foreign 
policymaking following a series of reforms.27 Yet despite the expansion of top-down 
leadership since Koizumi, Japanese people still mistrust centralised authority. Approval 
of the Kantei through the administrations of Hatoyama and Kan often floated around 
20%. Elites interviewed for this study often lamented the lack of ‘political leadership’ 
and as the following will demonstrate, despite some political interest in India, the short-
termism of Japanese premierships has resulted in disjointed progress as each attempts to 
differentiate himself from his predecessor. Furthermore as Chellaney argues, in both 
Japan and India the prime minister is not the most powerful politician in his party.28  
 
                                                            
25 An example given to this point by A Tanaka is when Prime Minister Nakasone, despite opposition from 
the Ministry of Finance, increased Japan’s defence budget.  
26 Takeshi Nobayashi, ‘Prime Minister, Bureaucracy and Ruling Party: Leadership Characteristics in 
Japan’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, The Doshisha Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 5, (1977), p. 26 
27 Studies which are devoted to this centralization of power and prevalence of ‘Kantei diplomacy’ include 
Muramatsu and Shinoda. 
28 Brahma Chellaney, ‘The Japan-India partnership to power a multipolar Asia’, Japan Times, 30 
December 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20091230bc.html (Accessed on 02/01/10) 
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As one senior Japanese diplomat in Delhi notes, Japan has ‘high productivity when it 
comes to political leaders’. Indeed in the past decade, Japan has seen eight prime 
ministers; most of whom have receded from political life due to domestic scandals.29 
Each, however, has taken a slightly different view on foreign policy as well as India. An 
overview of attitudes towards India will therefore follow before the extent to which 
these actors have influenced policy is addressed in the main body of the thesis.  
 
i. Mori Yoshiro, 2000-2001 
 
Mori’s visit to India in 2000, the first in a decade, represented the catalyst for the 
modern strengthening of ties. Critics point to the fact that President Clinton made his 
landmark ‘triumphal visit’ to India just four months earlier 30  but some discernible 
differences remain. Mori’s diplomatic agenda was concentrated with reducing the IT 
digital divide, which had become a key theme at the G8 Summit hosted by Japan that 
year. Following the Y2K panic and dot-com bubbles, India had been affirmed a hub of 
highly-skilled engineers, which acted as encouragement for Mori to stop in Bengaluru 
(Bangalore), India’s ‘Silicon Valley’.31  
 
Mori was well-received and according to former Ambassador Enoki, brought relations 
with India back to zero. For India, however, the visit represented an admission 
                                                            
29 For Abe it was the pension’s scandal, for Fukuda the lack of an Upper House majority, the lack of a 
political mandate for Aso, and rumours of financial misdealing which tainted Hatoyama. John Hemmings, 
‘Japan, the headless polity’, East Asia Forum, 8 June, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/08/japan-the-headless-polity/ (Accessed on 09/06/10) 
30 The beginnings of US rapprochement with India were certainly helpful to Japan, and indeed the 
Ambassador to Delhi at the time recalled to the author that seeing the reception granted to Clinton 
encouraged him to seem similar favour for his government. Former Ambassador Hirabayashi claims Mori 
came to India on his invitation after the Ambassador had noted the warm welcome offered to Clinton and 
wanted to create similar ‘atmospherics’ with Japan. Author’s interview with Hiroshi Hirabayashi, Former 
Ambassador to India 1998-02, 21 June 2010. Hirabahashi has also acted as an advisor to Toshiba 
31 Mori established an ‘IT Strategy Council’ and the ‘Okinawa Charter’ which allocated $15 bn over five 
years to address the divide. Purnendra Jain 'India's Calculus of Japan's Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia', in 
T. Inoguchi (ed.), Japan's Asia Policy: Revival and Response, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 211 
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according to Foreign Secretary Dixit that Tokyo was ready to ‘get down from the high 
political horse of its condemnatory and critical political stance against India’.32 Dire 
domestic approval rating and poor relations with the media, which barely covered the 
visit, also limited the progress made.33 Hence despite the ‘rapprochement’ initiated by 
Mori’s visit and increasingly favourable international environment, Japan was not ready 
to bring India into its diplomatic fold. Japan’s attention remained firmly focused on 
China, still unsure that India’s economic reforms would bring lasting rewards.  
 
ii. Koizumi Junichiro, 2001-2006 
 
Koizumi Junichiro’s term in office is generally termed a success, not only for its 
longevity and economic reforms but strengthening of relations with the US. ‘Almost by 
instinct’ according to a former MOFA speechwriter, Koizumi aligned with the 
Washington, forming a personal friendship with President Bush and later deployed the 
first Japanese troops abroad since the Second World War to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Koizumi showed little personal interest in India, focussing instead on North Korea and 
China. As essentially a populist leader34 and Chairman of the Japan Association for the 
Bereaved Families of the War Dead, Koizumi concentrated particularly on the 
abduction issue. Another theme of Koizumi’s premiership, however, was global 
governance and increasing attention around 2005 to improve the distribution of power. 
                                                            
32 J.N. Dixit, ‘Yoshiro Mori’s visit to India: A yen for change’ Indian Express, 4 September 2000, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000914/dixit.htm (Accessed on 04/05/09) 
33 Mori’s domestic position was weak before he left for South Asia due to several untimely gaffes, 
including describing Japan as a ‘divine country’, which left his approval ratings around the 12% mark. 
Author’s interview with Taniguchi 
34 Hirose, ‘Japanese Emerging Nationalism and Its New Asia Policy’, p. 59. Despite his popular appeal, 
Koizumi was a ‘maverick’ within his own party who faced frequent opposition. He had also never 
occupied a senior Cabinet position before coming Prime Minister and did not even lead a faction, instead 
belonging to the relatively small Mori faction. Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy. Acknowledgments, p. x  
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In the hope of initiating UN reform, India appeared on Koizumi’s radar. Relations with 
China were also unsettled following Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Towards the end of his premiership as India’s economic presence grew following the 
BRICs report and increasing US attention to the region, Koizumi paid a visit in 2005 
bringing relations to a positive reading. 35  According to Tanaka Naoto, Koizumi’s 
economic advisor, he also shared positive chemistry with PM Singh but the issue of 
nuclear disarmament proved problematic. Koizumi’s perception of India was primarily 
as an ally of the US and distraction from deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations. His 
tenure therefore placed India within a ‘balancing’ agenda in Asia. 
 
iii. Abe Shinzo, 2006-2007 
 
Shinzo Abe showed the greatest enthusiasm for India. More than any other Prime 
Minister, Abe placed relations as a priority and attempted to shape foreign policy 
around his own ideology.36  
 
Abe was highly influenced by his grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a 
former colonial administrator who served in the war-time Cabinet. Stories of Kishi’s 
visit struck a chord with Abe who recalled to the author the fond memories held of 
Nehru’s positive reception following Japan’s defeat.37  
 
                                                            
35 Author’s interview with Yasukuni Enoki, Former Ambassador to India, 2004-07 15 June 2010. Enoki 
was Economic Counsellor in New Delhi between 1981 and 1983, then following other posts, including 
Ambassador to South Africa, was sent as Ambassador to India. Enoki Yasukuni is also a member of the 
Komeito group; a Buddhist organisation which according to some helped him find favour with India. 
36 For an analysis of Abe Shinzo’s beliefs, see B. Edström, ‘The Success of a Successor: Abe Shinzo and 
Japan’s Foreign Policy’, Silk Road Paper, (May, 2007), pp. 1-82 
37 According to Abe, Nehru addressed a crowd of thousands introducing Kishi thus; ‘This is the Prime 
Minister of Japan which is a great country which once defeated Russia. That victory as an Asian people 
has been a great source of inspiration for Nehru and Gandhi to what Indian people could envisage.’ 
Author’s interview with Abe. 
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For Abe, unlike other Japanese premiers, personal ideology played a significant role in 
the approach Japan took towards India. Abe sought to launch a new direction for 
Japan’s foreign policy, described by Samuels as the ‘Goldilocks Consensus’ which 
placed Japan ‘not too close and not too far from the hegemon-protector’. As Hirose has 
commented, ‘With Junichiro Koizumi, the US was Number 1, Number 2 and Number 
3…I think for Abe, Asia is more important.’38 Abe certainly tempered some of his 
nationalist rhetoric upon assuming office, making conciliatory visits to China and ROK. 
Abe spoke of a ‘broader Asia’ and in his inaugural policy speech in September 2006, of 
Japan’s need to be ‘trusted, respected and loved in the world’. In order to do this, ‘Japan 
needs to stretch its wings’39 and provide security in Asia; ‘the unfinished business of my 
generation.’ In his first speech to the Diet, Abe announced a ‘shift to proactive 
diplomacy’, identifying India saying, ‘I will engage in strategic dialogue at the leader’s 
level with countries that share fundamental values such as India... with a view to 
widening the circle of free societies in Asia.’40 
 
Abe’s attraction to India only emerged, however, once he entered political life and 
heard from a senior MOFA advisor of the potential of India.41 In 2006 as Deputy Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, Abe published Utsukushii Kuni E (Toward a Beautiful Country) in 
which he devoted three pages to Indo-Japanese relations, describing them as ‘the most 
important bilateral relationship in the world.’42 Abe even went so far to claim, ‘It will 
                                                            
38 Bryan Walsh ‘Why Japan Is Cozying Up to India’, Time, 13 December, 2006, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1569557,00.html (Accessed on 04/05/09) 
39 Richard J Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 185 
40 ‘Text of Policy Speech to the Diet’, The Japan Times, October 3, 2006, p. 3 quoted in Vivek Pinto, ‘A 
Strategic Partnership Between Japan and India?’ Japan Focus, 11 January 2007, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Vivek-Pinto/2321 (Accessed on 19/05/09) 
41 From several conversations in Tokyo, this individual was likely Kenichiro Sasae, currently Vice-
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
42 Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii kuni e: jishin to hokori no moteru Nihon e (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2006), cited 
in Takio Yamada, ‘Japan-India Relations: A Time for a Sea Change?’ in K Kesavapany, A. Mani and P. 
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not be a surprise if in another decade Japan-India relations overtake Japan-US and 
Japan-China ties.’43 Indian elites welcomed his election, with some of the Indian press 
describing him as Japan’s ‘Rajiv Gandhi’, being the country’s youngest Prime 
Minister44 born after the end of the Second World War.45  
 
Abe’s ideological preferences towards India were evident in his visit in August 2007. In 
addition to paying tribute to Justice Pal in a speech to the Indian Parliament (an honour 
not even afforded the leaders of China and the US),46 Abe also visited Bengal, the state 
considered to have the greatest cultural affinity with Japan. He paid a visit to the 81-
year old son of Judge Pal,47 visited the birthplace of Rabindranath Tagore and Subhas 
Chandra Bose Museum.48 On this visit, annual summits and negotiations for CEPA 
were first aired but despite taking a delegation of around 200 business leaders and 
university vice-chancellors to India, economics were not the main focus.  
 
China was never far from Abe’s conception of Japan’s priorities but rather than 
approach China directly, he dealt with China through the use of ‘values’ rhetoric (see 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Ramasamy, Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia, (Delhi: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies , 2009), p. 160 
43 Ibid.  
44 Sudheendra Kulkarni, ‘Friend of India, Shinzo Abe to be Japan’s youngest PM’, Indian Express, 21 
September 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/friend-of-india-shinzo-abe-to-be-japans-yo/13123/ 
(Accessed on 04/06/11) 
45 At the beginning of Abe’s term, Kenneth Pyle described Abe as part of a generational shift away from 
Japan’s passive Cold-War policy toward a more active foreign policy doctrine. 
46 Taniguchi, who wrote ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ speech delivered to the Indian Parliament, had 
only visited India once before preparing the address. As he told the author, he realised that economic 
figures could not feature highly in Abe’s comments so since Indian parliamentarians are often 
‘intellectuals…they know history and would appreciate references to Indian culture’, these areas would 
be emphasised. Author’s interview with Taniguchi. 
47 Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Decades After War Trials, Japan Still Honors a Dissenting Judge’ New York Times, 
31 August, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/world/asia/31memo.html (Accessed on 19/08/09) 
Abe praised Justice Pal thus, ‘The people of Japan love Radhabinod Pal and still hold him in the highest 
esteem’ The Hindu, August 24, 2007. It is also claimed by Nandy that before Hideki Tojo went to the 
gallows he left for his wife a haiku in Justice Pal’s honour. According to a former aide of Abe, MOFA 
advised against visiting Pal’s grandson in fear of the message it might send. Nandy, ‘The Other Within: 
The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’, p. 47 
48 When referring to Bose, Abe also used the honorific ‘Netaji’ which means ‘Respected Leader’.  
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Chapter 8). As explained to the author, his reasons for seeking out India revolved 
around three developments; 1) the size of India’s economy and population, 2) lack of 
‘historical baggage’ and 3) the fact that ‘Japan and India have had the same experience 
opposing pressure from Western nations’.  
 
Attention, both internally and internationally towards the nuclear deal with the US, 
however, diluted some of the acclaim the visit might otherwise have achieved. Abe was 
also mired in domestic troubles as control of the Upper House fell to the Opposition a 
month before. A number of personnel scandals also damaged his position. As Professor 
Murata argues, whilst Abe had ‘strong conviction’ he did not have ‘strong leadership’.49  
 
iv. Fukuda Yasuo, 2007-2008 
 
Abe’s replacement, Fukuda Yasuo brought a temporary break in efforts as placating 
China served as the priority. Fukuda was keen not to conflict with Japan’s neighbours 
and sought greater compliance rather than taking an interest in values. In Fukuda’s first 
speech at the annual ASEAN meeting in November 2007 for example, he made no 
reference to India.50 His first foreign visit was to the US followed by China, none was 
made to India. Fukuda was, however, interested in the region as President of the Japan-
Sri Lanka Friendship League. Fukuda had served as CCS under Koizumi and was 
acutely aware of the importance of foreign policy as a politician. 51  Yet the 
administration lasted only 12 months before Fukuda announced his resignation in 
                                                            
49 Author’s interview with Murata 
50 Takahashi Inoguchi, ‘Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase’, Japanese Studies, 28, 1, p. 
10 
51 According to Hirose, Fukuda was greatly influence by his father who had in the late 1970s had 
established what became known as the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ of engagement with Southeast Asia. Hirose, 
‘Japanese Emerging Nationalism and Its New Asia Policy’, p. 59 
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September 2008, citing domestic stalemate. Nevertheless it was during Fukuda’s tenure 
that Japan signed the NSG waiver for the US-India Nuclear Deal suggesting more than 
just Kantei ideology was at play.  
 
v. Aso Taro, 2008-2009 
 
Aso Taro served as Foreign Minister under the Abe administration and worked on 
Japan’s ‘values-driven diplomacy’. A self-admitted ‘hawk’, Aso’s view on China fell 
broadly in line with that of Abe and they both sought to define a more autonomous 
Japan and aired the suggestion of debating nuclear weapons. According to Professor 
Naidu, Aso was determined to visit India early in his tenure as Foreign Minister. This 
never materialised due to a domestic scandal which forced Aso’s Indian counterpart to 
resign52 but frustrated by Fukuda’s approach, when Aso became Prime Minister himself 
he made no secret of his interest in India. He used his first overseas visit to the UN 
before hosting India’s Prime Minister in October 2008. In his 2007 book, ‘Incredible 
Japan’, Aso opened with a reflection on his visit to India as Foreign Minister in 2005.53 
Ultimately Aso was restricted by events since soon after taking office the global 
community became engulfed in the ‘Lehman Shock’ and subsequent economic crisis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
52 Author’s interview with GVC Naidu, Professor in Southeast Asian Studies, JNU, New Delhi, 8 March 
2011  
53 Aso Taro, Totetsu mo nai Nihon (Incredible Japan) (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2007) p. 9-11, referred to in 
Purnendra Jain, ‘From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan's Changing View of India-1998-
2007’, Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper, National University of Singapore, No. 41, (March 
2008), p. 19 
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vi. Hatoyama Yukio, 2009-2010 
 
The DPJ landslide in 2009 brought Indian fears that progress would be disrupted.  The 
coverage of India’s global significance declined in the DPJ manifestos from 2005 to 
2009,54 perhaps as a result of the US-India nuclear deal which the DPJ fiercely opposed 
and Hatoyama made no reference to India’s inclusion in his vision of an East Asian 
community. Scholars in India also noted a ‘worrisome reference linking Pakistan's 
nuclear proliferation to the Kashmir issue’.55 
 
Yet Hatoyama was reportedly determined to comply with the pledge for top-level 
annual exchanges, visiting in the final days of December 2009. As leader of the 
opposition Hatoyama had visited India and Kashmir in 2002 and auspiciously for Delhi, 
agreed not to visit Pakistan.56 In India among his calls was a visit to the BJP to learn 
from their experience in opposition.57 He was said to ‘love India’ and described by 
others as an ‘Indophile’ or ‘India-wallah’58 but this appears to relate more to India’s 
cultural rather than strategic attributes. For example during his policy speech to the Diet 
on 29 January 2010 he referred to the ‘Seven Sins’ identified by Gandhi as incisive of 
                                                            
54 In the 2005 Manifesto, the following references were made of India: ‘India is expected to be a nucleus 
of Asian economic development in the 21st century along with Japan, China, ROK, and ASEAN. It 
projects a unique charisma not only as an economic, demographic, and cultural/ philosophical giant but 
also as a huge democracy. Establishing and maintaining a close relationship, including strategic, with this 
India will be in the national interests of Japan and will expand Japan's diplomatic options.’ ‘The East 
Asian Community should never become an exclusive institution. India, Australia, and New Zealand will 
be important partners when building a full-scale East Asian Community.’ ‘DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 
House of Representatives Election’, 30 August, 2005, 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/pdf/manifesto_05.pdf (Accessed on 12/09/09)  
55 B Raman, ‘Hatoyama as Japanese PM: Implications for India’, South Asia Analysis, Paper no. 3381, 31 
August 2009,  http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers34%5Cpaper3381.html (Accessed on 
03/09/09) 
56 Rajaram Panda, ‘India and Japan: Strengthening Defence Cooperation’, IDSA Comment, December 22, 
2009, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaandJapanStrengtheningDefenceCooperation_rpanda_221209 
(Accessed on 28/12/09)  
57 Author’s interview with Y. Teddy Takeuchi, Journalist, Asahi Shimbun, Former Delhi Bureau Chief 
2000-04 26 May 2010 
58 Author’s interview with Michael Green, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, CSIS, Washington DC, 11 
July 2011 (via telephone) 
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the ‘problems facing Japan and the world today’. 59  There were also reports of 
Hatoyama’s wife sympathising with the late-guru Sai Baba, a spiritual leader based near 
Bangalore.60  
 
In the first months of his premiership Hatoyama made no public reference to India as 
being among the ‘Asian ties’ his government sought to strengthen, referring to Australia 
as the strongest bilateral prospect. 61 Hatoyama was also consumed by the Futenma 
relocation issue and as his political weight declined, so too did his ability to shape 
policy.62 For diplomats, however, it was ‘lucky that Hatoyama liked India’ so policy did 
not have to change. 
 
vii. Kan Naoto, 2010-11 
 
Kan knew little of India when he assumed the premiership following Hatoyama’s 
resignation in June 2010. Despite domestic hopes that Kan, former Health and Welfare 
Minister as well as the son of a salaryman would prove more successful at defending 
urban voters, foreign observers were concerned by his domestic focus and identity as an 
‘NGO man’ rather than one interested in business or diplomacy.63 The fact that he was 
                                                            
59 Further references to Gandhi were made throughout the speech. ‘Mahatma’s teachings echo in Japanese 
Parliament,’ The Hindu, 2 February 2010, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article98837.ece 
(Accessed on 03/08/10) 
60 Author’s interview with Takeuchi 
61 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Hatoyama were believed to share some strategic and political beliefs. 
According to Peter Drysdale, Hatoyama and Rudd share a ‘conservative social democratic view of the 
world’. Kede Lawson, ‘Hatoyama good for Australia ties: experts’, Japan Time, 16 September , 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090916a4.html (Accessed on 10/09/09); ‘Defense pact with 
Australia eyed’, Japan Times, 21 September, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20090921a1.html (Accessed on 21/09/09) 
62 Author’s interview with Tadashi Ogawa, Managing Director, Center for Global Partnership, Japan 
Foundation, Former Director of Delhi Office 20 May 2010   
63 Author’s interview with Masanori Kondo, Senior Associate Professor, International Christian 
University 17 May 2010, 23 June 2010 
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untainted by the Futenma crisis, however, was seen as an asset.64 Kan had visited India 
but few expected the country to be a diplomatic priority and indeed whilst in office, 
India policy was delegated to a greater extent to MOFA and METI.  
 
IV. The Diet and Political Parties 
 
The Japanese Diet, modelled on the UK Westminster system, consists of two houses; 
the House of Representatives (lower house) and the House of Councillors (upper 
house). Article 41 of the Constitution defines the Diet as ‘the highest organ of state 
power’ and ‘sole law-making organ of the State’ yet in reality its role in initiating policy 
is passive and confined to deliberating Cabinet proposals. Politicians are motivated by 
securing their position through re-election and maintaining a flow of financial donations 
thus distorting their interest in foreign affairs. As will be seen during this study, 
politicians have paid scant attention to India’s strategic value holding back progress. 
Unlike China-policy where factions (habatsu) and policy tribes (zoku) influence the 
government’s approach, India has yet to acquire the concerted attention of Japanese 
politicians.  
 
The dominance of the LDP through the majority of Japan’s post-war history explains to 
some extent the weakness of the Diet as a multi-party body from passing legislation.65 
The LDP was founded in 1955 as a result of a merger between the conservative Liberal 
Party and Democratic Party. The LDP platform has changed little over five decades, 
                                                            
64 Author’s interview with Murata 
65 Haruhiro Fukui, ‘Bureaucratic power in Japan’, P. Drysdale and Kitaoji eds., Japan and Australia: two 
societies and their interaction, (Canberra; Australian National University Press, 1981), p. 286. The reality 
is that for most politicians, foreign policy is a ‘second- or third-order priority.’ Green, Japan’s Reluctant 
Realism, p. 6 
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relying on the ‘single formula of economic growth and alignment with the US’ 66 
challenged only briefly between 1993 and 1995. From 2000 the LDP was forced to 
enter a coalition with the Buddhist-influence New Komeito Party which brought 
additional influences.  
 
Opposition parties have occasionally been able to exert their view in the realm of 
foreign policy. One example related to this study has been the Social Democratic Party 
of Japan (SDPJ) regarding nuclear policy, discussed in Chapter 7. 67 Yet issues of 
foreign policy rarely represent the most significant divide between political parties. The 
majority support relations with the US, unsurprisingly except the Japan Communist 
Party68 but differences that exist in the nuances of detail have the potential to shape 
policy.  
 
The DPJ, 69  in power since August 2009, share several attitudes with the LDP. 
According to their ‘Basic Policy’ the Japan-US Treaty is placed ‘at the center of our 
national security policy’70 but the associated desire to form ‘a more mature relationship 
with the US’ has strained relations. The DPJ opposed the Iraq war and stationing of US 
troops on Japanese bases and campaigned on ending the MSDF refuelling mission in the 
Indian Ocean, completed in 2010. 
 
                                                            
66 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 36 
67 The future of the Futenma airbase and role of Japan’s Coastguard were another two issues.  
68 The now defunct Liberal Party (Jiyuutoo) called for a more assertive foreign policy as well as active 
Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping, including the potential use of force. Members were also in 
favour of constitutional revision.  
69 The DPJ was formed in 1996, then expanded in March 1998 to include defectors from Ozawa’s New 
Frontier party and former members of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the Democratic Socialist 
Party, the Harbinger Party and Hosokawa Morihiro’s Japan New Party. On a social-democratic platform, 
the DPJ had 93 members in the House of Representatives and 38 in the House of Councillors. In 2003, 
under the presidency of Naoto Kan) and with Tsutomu Hata as Secretary General, further expansion was 
implemented, merging with the centre-right Liberal Party of Ichiro Ozawa. 
70 ‘Basic Policies’, DPJ, (April, 2008), http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html  
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The existence of political tribes within parties (zoku) is predominantly associated with 
domestic issues such as commerce, fisheries and agriculture where expertise in a policy 
area is used as a bridge between government and ministries.71 In the realm of external 
affairs there have, however, been an increasing number of gaiko-zoku (diplomatic 
tribe/caucuses) and Diet members’ leagues (giin renmei), consisting of politicians 
interested in particular bilateral relationships. A bipartisan Parliamentary League on 
India has existed under both LDP and DPJ administrations with Prime Ministers Abe, 
Fukuda and Aso all members.  An Indo-Japan Parliamentary Forum based in Delhi was 
launched when Koizumi visited in 2005 but has been relatively inactive since 2006.72 
 
i. The DPJ’s views of India 
 
The DPJ came to power in 2009 promising to create a ‘politician-led government’, curb 
the power of bureaucrats and shift diplomacy away from LDP practices. 73  Despite 
progress in the former objectives, structural realities have brought the DPJ to the same 
ground as the LDP. As one Director at MOFA describes, ‘gradual realism has forced 
politicians to appreciate that the environment has and will not change so it must be them 
who adapts around it’.74 Structure is thus paramount and intervening variables such as 
politicians are secondary influences. 
 
Japan’s bureaucracy is often considered to hold primary expertise in foreign affairs. 
However the ability of this knowledge to influence policy depends on political will. The 
                                                            
71 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 48; Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 73 
72 The website for the Forum for example, has for many years contained pages ‘under construction’. 
http://www.ijfp.net/index.htm  
73 In May 2010 for example it was announced bureaucratic recruitment would fall by 39% in 2011. ‘Civil 
service recruits slashed 39%’, Japan Times, 22 May 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20100522a6.html (Accessed on 22/05/10) 
74 Author’s interview with Nobukatsu Kanehara, Deputy Director-General, European Affairs Bureau, 
MOFA, 24 June 2010 
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bureaucracy continues to rely on politicians and the Kantei to make key decisions.75 
According to Kawai, former Deputy Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, 
leaders are responsible for deciding on which issues to concentrate. Indeed the 
overwhelming majority questioned, consider political leadership to be essential for the 
success of any foreign policy initiative. As one official notes, ‘there’s only so much 
bureaucrats can do. They can only prepare and make recommendations…the 
bureaucracy need to ensure politicians are comfortable with India’.76  
 
There is no consensus on the role of domestic politics on Japanese policymaking with 
some suggesting it is decisive, whilst others claim it to be ‘an illusion’. Yet in the case 
of Japan’s India relations it is clear that lack of political interest limits the mileage of 
relations. On the whole, unlike relations with China, the US or even Taiwan, India has 
yet to capture the imagination of Japanese politicians despite bureaucratic enthusiasm. 
When politicians have supported closer ties, efforts have accelerated but since policy 
relies primarily on structure, this does not automatically result in success.  
 
When the DPJ came to power, the Indian elite community feared Japan would act aloof 
towards India.77 Soon after the election India sent Shyam Saran as a special envoy to 
ensure relations continued. The party itself was feared less enthusiastic about the 
relationship than their predecessor. For the DPJ, India has certainly not been a priority 
                                                            
75 Author’s interview with senior official, Policy Planning and International Security Division 
76 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 24 June 2010. This official 
became Director of the Southwest Asia Division in June 2010 and at the time of interview, had only spent 
one day in India. However, this official had previously worked on Non-Proliferation, the NPT Review 
process and AfPak strategy.  
77 Author’s interview with Makiko Takita, New Delhi Bureau Chief, Sankei Shimbun, 7 March 2011  
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but policy has remained constant, described by one senior Indian diplomat in Tokyo as a 
‘seamless transition’.78  
 
The DPJ have, however, taken a more pragmatic approach to India. Rather than 
focusing on political goals such as the ‘values-driven diplomacy’ of Abe, the DPJ have 
shown greater interest in economics and energy policy. 79  According to DPJ staff, 
‘inclination towards India is still there but LDP terms have been dropped’. Regarding 
foreign policy they claim to be ‘realistic and practical’, seeking in the short term to 
concentrate on putting relations with the US ‘back on track’. Other observers and 
practitioners echo this assessment, believing the DPJ to use alternative ‘diplomatic 
tools’80 whilst retaining the ‘basic tone’ of policy.81 In fact capitalising on the progress 
made under the LDP, one senior Japanese diplomat believes the DPJ can claim greater 
success, certainly in terms of ‘deliverables’ such as nuclear cooperation talks and the 
conclusion of CEPA. ‘More action, less talk’ has thus benefited the relationship.  
 
A number of relatively influential politicians have furthermore shown open interest in 
India. Haraguchi Kazuhiro, Minister for Internal affairs and Communications argued for 
greater renewable energy cooperation for example (January 2010) and Ishiba Shigeru, 
Minister of Defense paid several visits to India.  
 
When high-ranking politicians shift their policy portfolios there is likely some change in 
priorities. For example whilst Foreign Minister Okada had many ties with NGOs, when 
                                                            
78 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of India, Tokyo 22 June 2010. This official is a China 
specialist who worked in Beijing as DHM before coming to Tokyo. Interestingly, this diplomat speaks 
Chinese but not Japanese.  
79 Author’s interview with Kenji Sasaki, Deputy Secretary, DPJ and Special Researcher, Cabinet 
Secretariat, GOJ and  Yuka Uchida, Assistant General Manager, International Department, DPJ, 28 
June 2010 
80 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, Delhi, 28 February 2011 
81 Ibid. 
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he was replaced with Maehara who had previously served as Minister for Transport, a 
more private-sector view of ODA prevailed.82 He was also described as a pragmatic 
rather than an ideological hawk. In opposition, Okada was vocally severe towards India, 
repeatedly asking how the NSG Deal could be justified whilst India remained a non-
NPT member.  
 
Interviewees believe that whilst the DPJ showed itself ambitious in its early months, 
domestic issues remain the focus, especially following the Great East Japan Earthquake. 
Whilst Abe with an improved economic record in Japan was able to launch grand 
strategies, the DPJ had other priorities. Without political leadership the relationship 
cannot be politically-driven but this does not mean relations are static. In fact without 
the ‘politics’ the relationship has been able to focus on more tangible issues such as 
trade and investment without paying unnecessary attention to rhetoric. This point will 
be evidenced in Chapter 6 and 8. Whilst domestic constraints can delay security 
strategy, they cannot ultimately prevent a response in line with the structural 
environment.  
 
V. Bureaucracy  
 
Japan’s bureaucracy is widely considered the third pillar in Japan’s ‘tripod system’ of 
power elites. Whilst Japan has historically ‘suffered from third-rate politicians’, it has 
‘benefited from first-rate bureaucrats’.83 
 
                                                            
82 Author’s interview with Hiroshi Suzuki, Senior Representative, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), New Delhi, 21 February 2011 
83 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 56 
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Japan has long been run by bureaucrats, even in the Tokugawa era and the US 
Occupation had a minimal impact. As noted above, the Japanese Constitution entrusts 
the Cabinet with foreign policy power but due to the often short-termism of Cabinet 
ministers their influence is nominal.84 The consequence of this being ‘Politicians reign, 
but bureaucrats rule’.85 According to Emmott, ‘politicians did not matter much at all in 
Japan’ until the financial crash of 1990. The ‘genius of the Japanese system’ was seen 
in the fact that ‘the politicians let the real experts – bureaucrats – run the country’.86 
This system started to fray as reforms strengthened the Prime Minister’s office and the 
public grew critical of such practices as amakudari (‘descent from heaven’) which gave 
lucrative post-career posts to retiring bureaucrats. Scandals such as the loss of pension 
records and economic instability also damaged the reputation of bureaucrats. Most 
bureaucrats questioned, however, said the DPJ transition had been relatively smooth 
though some worry about the long-term impact of the ‘witch-hunt’ on civil servants.87 
Furthermore, according to a former Director in MOFA, policy decisions on India rarely 
have to pass the Kantei. This was less the case under Abe who took a personal lead on 
India as noted above. 
 
Providing policy-relevant information and professional expertise is the greatest 
contribution made by ministries. Members of the Kantei¸ however, often see MOFA 
information to lack political perspective, be overly-detailed and focus on positive 
relations rather than highlight weaknesses. Whilst occasionally relations are 
                                                            
84 Shinoda notes how the limited decision-making function of the Cabinet has been taken as evidence of 
‘bureaucratic supremacy.’ Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, p. 66 
85 Chalmers Johnson, ‘The People Who Invented the Mechanical Nightingale’, Daedalus, Vol. 119, No. 3 
(Summer, 1990), p. 71 
86 Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan will Shape Out Next 
Decade, (London: Allen Lane, 2008), p. 88 
87 Author’s interview with two junior MOFA officials, Southwest Asia Division, Tokyo, 19 May 2010 
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antagonistic, in many cases politicians and bureaucrats collaborate on what is feasible as 
well as politically expedient.88 
 
A lack of unity within the bureaucracy, however, has limited its effectiveness as a 
policy-maker. As noted above, reforms from the 1990s onwards concentrated greater 
policymaking powers in the Prime Minister and ruling party. To a large extent this was 
at the expense of the bureaucracy who throughout Japan’s post-war period had 
exercised considerable control. Bureaucrats have also been stung by recent political 
realignments which have occasionally forced officials to either negotiate around 
unstable new coalitions or risk being ‘purged’ for their allegiance to a previous 
regime.89 The bureaucracy is therefore considered a ‘subordinate actor’.90 This study 
will demonstrate, however, that MOFA and METI in particular have played essential 
roles in developing relations with India. 
 
Within the bureaucracy it is assumed that several opinions exists, in line with the 
Allison’s ‘bureaucratic politics’ model, which contends that foreign policy is shaped by 
often competing values and perceptions within the domestic policymaking 
community.91 This occurs in most foreign ministries as ‘functionalists’ and ‘generalists’ 
                                                            
88 One example of this was in April 2010 when Hatoyama gave a speech at the Washington Nuclear 
Security Summit which included reference to nuclear proliferation and disarmament as well as the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. This was achieved through careful wording by METI officials, keen to 
sell Japan’s technology for financial reasons as well as not upsetting the US whilst also cautious of 
potential opposition from the Social Democrats, then in coalition with the DPJ. ‘Political hazards follow 
the dissing of bureaucrats’, Sentaku Magazine, Japan Times, 17 May 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100517a1.html (Accessed on 17/05/10) 
89 In 1994, a senior MITI official Naito Mashisa was forced to resign by the Hosokawa cabinet for being 
too loyal to politicians of the previous LDP regime. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 57 
90 Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6: Japan’s Initiatives and the Agent-Structure Framework’ p. 9 
91 Allison’s argument contends that by using the case study of US superpower behaviour during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, one can appreciate how ministries and other bureaucracies ‘pursue at best 
their own versions of the national interest and at worst their own parochial concerns, so that foreign 
policymaking becomes and inward-looking battleground in which decisions are produced by horse-
trading more than logic’ Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), p. 85 
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vie for influence. Since there is no fixed national interest, attitudes are liable to 
fluctuate. Ultimately policymaking is a process of conflict and consensus-building 
where changing conditions and importantly, perceptions of conditions as NCR 
highlights, act as key determinants in the formation of policy.  
 
i. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
The most influential role in managing Japan’s foreign and security policy is played by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).92 Whilst an increasing number of politicians 
have become interested in international affairs, this does not always equate to sufficient 
understanding. Here is where the foreign ministry plays a crucial role dedicating its 
service to country-specific as well as strategic international perspectives. Diplomats 
describe their role as placing before politicians the pros and cons of policy options, 
tuning their arguments to the domestic impact. 93  Unless national norms are 
compromised, MOFA recommendations generally receive de facto approval from 
politicians. 
 
During the Cold War the North American Affairs Bureau took the lead in almost all 
areas of security strategy. The US alliance dominated policy, often to the extent that 
                                                            
92 Japan’s Foreign Ministry, consists of fifteen bureaux apart from the Ministerial Secretariat: six regional 
bureaux (Asian and Oceania, North American, Latin American and Caribbean, European, Southeast and 
Southwest Asian and Middle Eastern/African), Public Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Disarmament, Non-
proliferation and Science Department, Economics, International Cooperation, International Legal Affairs, 
Consular Affairs, Intelligence and Analysis Service and Foreign Service Training Institute. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html  
93 Author’s interview with two junior MOFA officials, Southwest Asia Division, 19 May 2010 
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critics labelled the Ministry ‘the Asian Branch of the State Department’ or ‘the State 
Department’s annex at Kasumigaseki’.94  
 
Assigning a ‘belief’ or ‘attitude’ to a government agency is problematic but some trends 
can be identified. The US alliance continues to dominate discussions, particularly after 
the Futenma debate which consumed bureaucrats’ attention for much of 2009/10. The 
influence of the so-called ‘China School’95 is also a significant factor. These diplomats, 
educated or trained in China are supportive of policies favourable to Beijing. As 
Kaneko argues, they envisage a regional structure resembling an equilateral triangle 
between Japan, China and the US whereas the majority of the Japanese government 
advocates a more isosceles-like structure which sees Japan and the US at less of a 
distance.  With no rival ‘India School’, MOFA has been ‘largely ambivalent to India’s 
rise’. 96 Instability in Pakistan and civil war in Sri Lanka have also occupied the minds 
of officials assigned to the region. As Tanaka Hitoshi, former Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs admits, for several years he was unsure where to place India in Japanese 
strategy. Only after India’s economic rise was secured and China and the US drew India 
into Japan’s strategic radar, the business community and MOFA began to show similar 
interest. As one Mainichi reporter described, the ‘bureaucracy is now riding’ on India’s 
popularity.97  
 
                                                            
94 Indian diplomats also took this view during this year; Former Ambassador Sahdev notes that during his 
tenure, Japan’s foreign policy originated from the ‘Second Secretary in Washington’. Author’s interview 
with Sahdev. 
95 The China Division now also includes Mongolia, Taiwan and Hong Kong but the majority of work 
focuses on mainland China. Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 
MOFA 20 May 2010 
96 In addition, MOFA, like almost all government bodies, is also suffering from budgetary cuts which 
strain ability to expand. Author’s interview with two junior MOFA officials, Southwest Asia Division, 
Tokyo, 19 May 2010 
97 Author’s interview with Naoya Sugio, Correspondent in Chief, Mainichi Shimbun, New Delhi, 11 
March 2011 
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In the past half-decade MOFA has slowly come to appreciate the strategic importance 
of India. 98  This realisation was evident in 2010 when further reforms to MOFA’s 
organisation were announced by Okada to take account for shifts in global power. 
Okada mooted plans to create an ‘Emerging Countries Bureau’ and transfer diplomats 
from posts in the developed world to new hubs of activities such as India, South Africa 
and Brazil.99  
 
ii. The Southwest Asian Affairs Department 
 
MOFA is not just one unified body, but an amalgamation of departments with differing 
ideological tendencies. In previous years the Southwest Asian Affairs Department, 
created in 1958 following Nehru’s visit to Japan, was considered one of the least 
important. On official interviewed, who worked in the Division in the 1990s, recalls the 
department being ‘very quiet’, overseeing few VIP visits. However by 2005 interest in 
India was growing as could be seen in Foreign Minister Aso’s decision to appoint a 
Director General solely for South and Southeast Asia rather than one who also oversaw 
China.100  
 
Currently approximately twenty staff, including administrative support, make-up the 
Division. The Division oversees seven countries in the region including the activities of 
                                                            
98 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
99 Joel Rathus, ‘Japan’s Foreign Ministry reforms: Shifting priorities?’ East Asia Forum, 4 September, 
2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/04/japans-foreign-ministry-reforms-shifting-priorities/ 
(Accessed on 04/09/10) 
100 Author’s interview with senior official, Policy Planning and International Security Division. There 
are, however, still two Southeast Asia Divisions as opposed to just one for Southwest Asia. In 2006 there 
were rumours Japan would create a South Asia Department, after President Bush merged the South and 
Central Asian Affairs bureaus but this did not materialise. Monir Hossain Moni, ‘Japan and South Asia: 
Toward a Strengthened Economic Cooperation’,  Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
(2007) http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/journals/apssr/pdf/200706/1_moni.pdf , p. 19 (Accessed on 
09/10/09)  
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SAARC but according to the former Director of the Division, 80% of time is devoted to 
India. Two individuals hold responsibility for Pakistan whilst five look at India. This is, 
however, just bilateral relations and other departments are charged with covering issues 
such as non-proliferation. Pro-Pakistan elements exist within the Ministry which 
complicate some more pro-India initiatives101 but according to officials, priority is now 
given to relations with India.  
  
By merely assessing the calibre of appointments to the Division, one can see the 
increased attention given relations. For example the greater importance of India was 
evident in 2011 when Saiki Akitata was posted as Tokyo’s new Ambassador. For many 
years India was considered a ‘punishment posting’102 but Saiki is well-regarded in Japan 
as former Director General for the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau and as someone 
who led on the Six-Party Talks.103 His appointment was also welcomed by the strategic 
community in Delhi who recognize Saiki as one of Japan’s ‘rising stars’.104 Furthermore 
Indian diplomats appreciate the new Ambassador not being at the end of his career. Ms 
Yoshida, Counselor at the Embassy of Japan, Delhi is also high-ranking. Whilst 
officials therefore believe the Division to remain ‘marginalised’ by some, 105 they also 
admit growing recognition from senior-level officials.  
 
                                                            
101 According to former Ambassador Hirabayashi, this is in part due to the Japanese tendency to 
sympathise with the weaker side and greater congruence in diplomatic styles, for example Pakistani 
diplomats have been noted as demanding a lower profile than others in the region. Hirabayashi notes for 
example that India behaves like a ‘great power’ whilst Pakistan is more humble. Author’s interview with 
Hirabayashi 
102 Author’s interview with Kondo 
103 Saiki has also previously served as Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Obuchi and Deputy Chief of 
Mission to the Embassy of Japan in the US. Saiki’s father was also a senior diplomat in India during the 
late-1960s.  
104 Author’s interview with Senior Indian MEA official 
105 During his 2007 visit, Abe apparently found it difficult to find someone from Japan who could speak 
Hindi to the standard he required. His grandfather had experienced a similar problem and insisted on 
using a translator to demonstrate his good feelings towards the Indian people. Author’s interview with 
Abe. 
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iii. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
 
METI 106  has become increasingly active in Japanese international affairs. Whilst 
primarily a domestically-orientated ministry, the oil crises of the 1970s alerted officials 
to the dramatic implications of external events. Bureaucrats began to consider issues 
previously left to MOFA and the Defense Agency. Today METI’s remit covers trade, 
industrial, commercial, small business and technology policy. Within the ministry, the 
International Trade Administration Bureau107 and International Trade Policy Bureau108 
are most involved in foreign policy.  
 
Whilst the briefs of METI and MOFA differ in several fundamental respects, they share 
the core purpose of promoting and defending Japanese interests. This has not prevented, 
however, ‘turf’ battles and ‘territorial’ disputes.109 Two prominent examples include 
MITI’s strong support for the establishment of APEC in 1989 in contrast to MOFA’s 
reticence that such a move would alienate relations with the US.110 Proposals for an 
ASEAN+6 strategy as opposed to ASEAN+3 (which implicitly gave greater bargaining 
power to China) also split opinion.111 However, as will be demonstrated in the case of 
India the two ministries have found remarkable congruence of opinion. METI was the 
                                                            
106 Formerly known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry before the 2001 governmental 
reforms. Several onlookers consider the change in name to highlight the ministry’s greater policy-
influence ambitions. 
107 Responsible for trade insurance, foreign exchange, and import/export promotion 
108 Responsible for international trade negotiations and World Trade Organisation, G8 and APEC policy 
109 Tensions with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture (particularly over trade 
liberalisation) have also hampered the cohesion of Japanese policymaking.  
110 Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6: Japan’s Initiatives and the Agent-Structure Framework’, p. 9 
111 As Terada has discovered, when METI announced the initiative for regional integration in April 2006, 
it did not consult MOFA, which ‘did not conceal its dissatisfaction with the way which its rival ministry 
treated [them]’ (Asahi Shimbun, 28 July 2006). According to Terada, the basis for their differences lies in 
METI’s desire to create a single market in East Asia whilst MOFA considers the grouping as a political 
body similar the East Asia Summit.   
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first ministry to truly appreciate India’s value and has since been the most 
enthusiastic.112  
 
Opinion of METI’s effectiveness is however mixed, for example they have been 
accused of struggling to find a role for themselves. As of 2010 METI still only held five 
individuals with direct responsibility for India113 and the fact remains that policymaking 
ability is tempered by hierarchy within Japan’s bureaucracy. Both METI and affiliated-
JETRO, appreciate for example the impossibility of moving forward on a nuclear 
energy deal with India (discussed in Chapter 7) without MOFA.114 Yet METI’s role; 
advising Japanese companies on how and where to invest in India, has proved 
particularly useful.  
 
iv. The Ministry of Finance 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) holds considerable influence over Japanese 
administration. As Green identifies, MOF’s control over the nation’s budget acts as a 
‘carrot’ whilst its tax bureau plays the role of the ‘stick’.115 Former MOF officials are 
often more numerous in the Diet than those from other ministries, demonstrating the 
importance of finance to Japan. 
 
                                                            
112 Author’s interview with Rinichiro Nagasawa, New Delhi Bureau Chief, Nikkei Shimbun, 1 March 2011  
113 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010. This official is also an India specialist who worked in Delhi between 2003 and 2008 
and is currently working in Delhi at JETRO.  
114 Author’s interviews with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
115 The reputation of the ministry suffered with the death of the 1955 system, encouraging whisperings of 
‘Ministry of Failure’. 
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For the majority of the ministry’s history, the objective was to achieve a balanced 
budget or surplus.116 Most of MOF attention is channelled towards domestic issues with 
foreign influence is limited to the International Finance Bureau, which concentrates on 
securing Japan a greater role in international financial institutions and stability in 
currency exchange markets.117 However, even within this division, interest in India has 
been slow to emerge. Kawai for example noted that there was ‘almost no’ interest in 
India in the ministry during his tenure; India ‘never came onto the radar’. India’s 
significance is thus not shared equally across Japan’s bureaucracy.  
 
v. The Ministry of Defense 
 
For most of Japan’s post-war history, the then ‘Japan Defence Agency’ and Self-
Defense Forces have been institutionally disadvantaged by the Constitutional mandate, 
which restricts Japan’s military to civilian control.118 Until January 2007, the Director 
General’s title was relegated to ‘Minister of State’ rather than ‘Minister of Defense’ 
with only ‘nominal’ membership of the Cabinet.119  
 
The scale and sophistication of Japan’s military, and particularly naval capabilities, has 
long been a source of pride for Japan. Following growing speculation and debate over 
the incrementally advancing influence of the JDA on Japan’s foreign policymaking 
                                                            
116 Emmott, ‘The Economic Sources of Japan’s Foreign Policy,’ p. 53 
117 Mochizuki also appreciates the role of MOF in the allocation of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and the Defence Budget. The former became particularly politicised following the Tiananmen 
Square incident in 1989 which challenged Japan’s policy towards providing ODA to China. Mochizuki, 
Mike M., ‘China-Japan Relations,’ David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics 
(California: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 135-150 
118 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 75 
119 The post of Director General of the Defence Agency has long been considered a rather minor post for 
a fairly inexperienced middle-level politician. Calder equates this role to Head of the Economic Planning 
or Environmental Protection Agencies. Kent Calder, ‘The Institutions of Japanese Foreign Policy’, in 
Richard Grant ed., The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 
1-24 
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process120 and with Abe as Prime Minister, a bill was passed on December 15, 2006 
upgrading the JDA to a Cabinet-level ministry on January 9 2007. The Minister of 
Defense (MOD) is now empowered to ‘react more rapidly and accurately to diverse 
emergency situations as the exclusive minister in charge of national defence’.121 Japan’s 
ability to respond to crises has also been strengthened, as was seen in March 2011 
following the earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku. 122 In 2009 the MOD oversaw an 
annual budget of almost $50bn and close to 240 000 military personnel and is 
considered to be strengthening its foreign policy influence.123 
 
Uncomfortable memories and suspicion of militarism among the public, however, 
continue to relegate the Ministry from exerting similar influence to other militarily-
advanced states. Public acceptance of SDF activities is low so that according to one 
military scholar, the Ministry is the least popular to join. When Koizumi decided in 
2002 to send non-combat troops into Iraq, the MOD faced severe press and public 
criticism. Within the bureaucracy unease with the MOD also exists. According to two 
scholars, ‘MOFA doesn’t like the military’ but ‘they know they need it foreign 
policy’.124  
                                                            
120 The utility of Japan’s forces in disaster relief following the 2004 tsunami, dealing with North Korea’s 
increasingly hostile activities and growing concerns for maritime security led many to believe that the 
JDA had already elevated itself into a de facto military. 
121 The Minister is assisted by a senior vice minister, two parliamentary secretaries, an administrative vice 
minister, eight directors-general, chief of staff of the joint staff office and three branch chiefs of staff. In 
addition whereas previously, according to Izuyama, the Policy Directorate in all-but-name only really 
dealt with US-Japan relations whilst the International Planning Directorate oversaw all other relations 
since ‘Defence Policy’ used to equate to solely this alliance, today other partners are considered. Author’s 
interview with Marie Izuyama, Chief 6th Research Office, National Institute for Defense Studies 13 May 
2010  
122 ‘Special Feature: The Defence Agency's Transition to the Ministry of Defence’, Japan Defence Focus, 
Japan Ministry of Defence, No. 4, 2007, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no04/special.html Other 
amendments upgraded international peace-keeping activities to ‘primary missions of the SDF’ in 
consultation with the Security Council. 
123 Author’s interview with Alessio Patalano, Lecturer, Japanese Military and Naval Policy, King’s 
College London 21 April 2010 
124 Author’s interview with Takehisa Imaizumi, Advisor, Ocean Policy Research Foundation 22 June 
2010. An example of MOFA oversight over the Ministry can be seen in the fact that Defence Attaches 
affiliated to embassies are seconded from the MoD but report to MOFA. Author’s interview with 
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Yet following the growth of the Chinese military, this mood has begun to gradually 
change. Greater incremental respect has also been witnessed following the ‘triple-
disaster’ of March 11, which saw Japan’s SDF deployed in their largest peacetime 
operation. Images of 100 000 SDF troops (40% of the total) mobilising to assist in the 
massive disaster relief operation with American allies through ‘Operation Tomodachi’ 
softened some previous ambivalence.125 As will be seen in detail in Chapter 8, the 
‘military’, particularly Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Forces have been among the 
earliest and keenest to deepen ties with India.  
 
VI. Business community 
 
As might be expected from an economy heavily reliant on external trade, the Japanese 
business community have played an important role in foreign relations as non-state 
actors. Johnson has noted that the term ‘private sector’ is slightly misleading in Japan 
since the boundaries of public and private are less clear-cut but nevertheless the ‘zaikai’ 
or business world represent a noteworthy actor. The zaikai consists of the Japan 
Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), 126  the Japan Association of Corporate 
Executives and the Japan Chamber of Commerce. Among these, the Keidanren with 
1,609 members of which 1,295 are companies, 129 industrial associations, and 47 
regional economic organisations127 sits at the ‘high temple’ playing the largest role in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Izuyama. The Ministry’s reputation also suffered in 2009 when former Air Self-Defense Force Chief of 
Staff, General Tamogami attempted to give officers history classes that criticised Japan’s current civilian 
control.  
125 Michael Auslin, ‘Japan Learns to Accept the Military’, Wall Street Journal, 15 April, 2011 
126 Prior to a merger in May 2002, the Keidanren also included the Japan Federation of Employees’ 
Association (Nikkeiren) http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/profile/pro001.html (Accessed on 02/02/10) 
127 Official figures as of May 28, 2009 Ibid. 
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foreign policy.128 This group is far from monolithic but generally promotes open, free 
trade whilst seeking to expand Japanese firms’ presence in the world market, primarily 
through exports and FDI.129  
 
The election of the DPJ in 2009 was thought to adjust the zaikai influence over policy. 
According to The Economist in 2007 the LDP received $30m from this lobby whilst the 
DPJ was granted only $1m. 130  Yet despite the initial ideological differences, for 
example the different weight given to social spending over corporate interests, the two 
have begun to work closer together. Industry and politicians have a more direct route in 
the US and India but relations are still strong. 
 
The role of business organisations will be considered an especially significant aspect of 
Japan’s foreign policy towards India. 131  Economic trading ties between the two 
governments predated and could even be argued to surpass, the emergence of strategic 
interests currently in development.  
 
VII. Mass Media 
 
Mass media has the potential in most societies to not only inform and educate the 
domestic population through distributing news but also shape public opinion. In Japan 
                                                            
128 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 65 
129 Emmott, ‘The Economic Sources of Japan’s Foreign Policy,’ p. 55 
130 ‘Business in Japan under the DPJ’, The Economist, 3 September 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14376289 (Accessed on 04/09/09) 
131 According to Kondo, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Keidanren had previously 
divided areas between them, so that the Keidanren kept the majority of the seemingly profitable 
economies whilst the ToC was left with India, Sri Lanka, Egypt etc. Now India’s economy has 
blossomed, ToC are keen not to lose control over this asset. Author’s interview with Kondo 
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the industry has often been considered the ‘fourth authority.’132 As Campbell notes, 
whilst it is difficult to measure the impact of the media on specific policy outcomes, for 
many policymakers media opinion is considered a ‘surrogate for public opinion’.133  
 
Japan enjoys a per capita readership, which by a substantial margin, is one of the 
highest in the world, with each household receiving 0.95 newspapers by 2009 (down 
from 1.15 a decade earlier).134 Yomuiri alone has a circulation of approximately 10m. 
Readership is furthermore not limited to one provider with many government 
employees in particular reading up to three newspapers a day.135  
 
Broad ideological identities can be recognised in the major broadsheets with Yomiuri, 
Nikkei and Sankei supporting the US-Japan alliance whilst the Asahi136 and Mainichi 
have been more critical and anti-establishment, calling for a reduction of Japan’s SDF 
and opposition the revision of Article 9.137 
 
                                                            
132 S. Pharr and E. Krauss, ‘Media and Policy Change in Japan’, John Campbell (ed.), Media and Politics 
in Japan (Hawaii; University of Hawaii, 1996), p. 187 
133 J. Campbell in Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, p. 13 
134 Annual survey by NSK's Circulation and Newsprint Section (October 2009) 
135 Japan is also characterised by the concentration of its mass media. Broadcasting networks and national 
newspapers often form powerful conglomerates. 
136 According to Green, however, within the Asahi there remains ‘an intense battle’ between the realists 
on the political and economic desks and idealists in the city and Kansai section, with the realists currently 
holding the edge Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 69. According to Kaneko, during the 1920s and 
1930s and prior the Pacific War, the Asahi Shimbun was in fact nationalist but following the end of 
hostilities turned to the Left and against the establishment ‘out of repentance’. Author’s interview with 
Kumao Kaneko, Founding Director of Nuclear Energy Division, 1978-82, Ambassador of Japan at IAEA 
and NPT Conferences, Founding President, Japan Council on Nuclear Energy, Environment & Security 
10 May 2010 and 25 June 2010  
137 The Yomiuri continues to be the most widely-read newspaper in Japan with a subscription of 10.02 
million. This is followed by the Asahi with 8.11 million, the Mainichi with 4 million, Chunichi with 3.47 
million and Seikyo (owned by Soka Gakkai) with reportedly 5.5 million. Minoru Matsutani, ‘Newspapers 
here soldiering on’, 3 March 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090303i1.html (Accessed 
on 28/05/09). In addition to the 10m Yomiuri sold daily in Japan, it has been reported that a further 3.6m 
are sold in the evening. 
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The quality of Japanese journalism is, however, often criticised as bland138 and to have 
a limited impact on the policy-making process.139 Baum echoes this sentiment arguing 
that in Midford’s words, ‘the new media focus more on human interest international 
news than geopolitics but are still essentially neutral. 140  The restrictive kisha club 
system’s (press club) continued prevalence is also often criticised by outsiders for 
failing to provide an open arena for media scrutiny.141  
 
The media nonetheless play an important role in disseminating information. In the past 
and to some extent still today, media coverage of Japan’s relations with India have been 
sporadic. Reports on India often focused on stories of drought, poverty and 
ethnic/religious violence. These occasionally still appear but considerable space is also 
now given to stories of economic success.  
 
Whilst The Hindu¸ a respected Indian publication once stationed a reporter in Tokyo, 
high costs of living and the availability of newswires has deterred printing offices from 
establishing bureaux abroad. 142  There is currently not one Indian newspaper 
correspondent based in Japan. For Japan’s part, greater effort has been made to report 
‘on the ground’ and witnessed some expansion in recent years.143 The Asahi Shimbun 
                                                            
138 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, ‘Japanese Attitudes towards Foreign Policy,’ Richard L. Grant, (ed.), The 
Process of Japanese Foreign Policy: Focus on Asia, (London; Royal Institute for International Affairs, 
1997), p. 139 
139 According to The Economist, ‘news in Japan does not so much break as ooze’, ‘The teetering giants’, 
The Economist 
140 Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security, p. 179 
141Kisha club members belong to the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association and must be 
recommended by other members before joining. Bureaucrats generally favour this system, which allows 
them to carefully select what information is feed to the public and maintain convivial relationships with 
officials.  Jun Hongo, ‘Press club faithful fight change’, The Japan Times, 7 October 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091007f1.html (Accessed on 07/09/09) 
142 A correspondent in Singapore now covers all of East Asia. Author’s interview with Eishiro Takeishi, 
New Delhi Bureau Chief, Asahi Shimbun, New Delhi, 14 March 2011  
143 On the whole, Japanese journalists have received a warm welcome in India but in 2010 some tension 
was raised when the NHK bureau chief was refused a renewed visa; according to reports following some 
unfavourable coverage of Lok Sabha elections in 2009. ‘Japanese journalist refused visa extension’, Sify 
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for example had for many years just one reporter covering the South Asia region. This 
has now been expanded to one for Pakistan and Afghanistan (following 9/11), one for 
India and another concentrating on economic affairs.144 The Nikkei has two offices in 
India; Delhi and Mumbai in response to the ‘huge interest’ in Japanese companies in 
India according to the chief correspondent.145 The Mainichi146 and Yomiuri has one 
correspondent each, who also cover Afghanistan and Pakistan 147  and the ultra-
conservative Sankei¸ only established a bureau for India in 2009.148 The allocation of 
staff by newspapers in both Japan and India is of course the prerogative of individual 
businesses and not a government decision however the sparse presence explains some 
of the limited understanding of the relationship at the popular level.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the press has played an important role in fostering 
and presenting public debate on whether Japan should export its nuclear technology to 
India. Business titles such as the Nikkei increasingly produce pieces supporting greater 
commercial interaction, reporting on the investment climate and experience of other 
Japanese and international firms operating in the Indian market. This effort therefore 
also contributes to Japanese corporate planning. Furthermore as Chapter 3b 
demonstrated, the media in Japan (and India) has fixated on the security ‘balancing’ 
aspect of Japan’s interest in India with some attention given to economic incentives. By 
framing publicity of the relationship in this manner, this has played a part in public 
                                                                                                                                                                              
News, 12 July, 2010, http://www.sify.com/news/japanese-journalist-refused-visa-extension-news-
national-khmtOdcchib.html (Accessed on 20/02/10) 
144 This task was previously under the remit of a correspondent in Bangkok but in 2008 was moved to 
India. Author’s interview with Takeishi 
145 According to Nagasawa, Japanese firms are also interested in the region now the civil war in Sri Lanka 
has been concluded and prospects for the garment industry in Bangladesh are increasing.   
146 In the late 1990s the Mainichi was forced to leave India following a tax dispute which some reporters 
believe to have been an attempt to ‘squeeze’ Japan following the imposition of sanctions. The office then 
moved to Islamabad which at the time appeared a ‘good move’ as focus shifted to the Taliban but was 
soon moved back to Delhi.  
147 Those articles which are produced must also be cleared by Tokyo headquarters, which continues to 
give preference to matters relating to the US alliance. Author’s interview with Hirabayashi 
148 Author’s interview with Takita 
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perceptions which officials and particularly elected politicians must consider as they 
develop their approach.  
 
VIII. Additional actors 
 
In addition to the above, one must not overlook the role played by civil society. External 
organisations have long contributed semi-official or ‘second-track’ dialogue in Japanese 
diplomacy. 149 Furthermore sub-national governments (SNGs), pressure groups, think 
tanks, academics and public opinion play a notable function. 150  Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are also playing a greater role in Japanese diplomacy. Overall 
however, interest groups are generally more active on domestic issues than foreign 
affairs.151  
 
Individuals have also played a decisive role. As Jain notes, ‘personal connections and 
advocacy have been necessary for early breakthroughs.’ Interviewed twice for this 
study, Yachi Shotaro played an instrumental part in shaping Japan’s approach to 
India. 152 Yachi was Abe’s most trusted diplomatic bureaucrat who regularly shared 
foreign policy ideas whilst the latter was Deputy CCS and later Prime Minister. 
According to Abe, Yachi was particularly instrumental in convincing MOFA colleagues 
of the value of his approach.153 Sasae Kenichiro, currently Vice Foreign Minister, also 
deserves attention. It is thought by some scholars that it was based on Sasae’s 
                                                            
149 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 66 
150 Hook et al. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p. 61-65 
151 Hilsman cited in Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, p. 13 
152 Yachi had little experience himself of India prior to taking these roles in government but studied in 
depth the ‘drain theory’ critique of colonialism in India during postgraduate study. Author’s interview 
with senior official, MOFA, 26 June 2009 
153 Within MOFA, Yachi was considered ‘on a different planet’ to Tanaka Hitoshi as far as strategic 
vision, causing some tension around the launch of Abe’s ‘Arc of Freedom and Democracy’ initiative. 
Author’s interview with Tomohiko Taniguchi, Former Deputy Press Secretary to MOFA and Chief 
Speechwriter 6 May 2010 
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encouragement that Mori and perhaps even Abe visited India.154 Indeed Sasae often 
represents the Japanese delegation at bilateral talks.   
 
Unofficial individuals have also participated in the rejuvenation of Japan’s ties with 
India. One notable lobbyist is Vibhav Kant Upadhyay who once studied in Japan and 
established in the 1990s the ‘India Center’, which hosts regular meeting between key 
decision-makers.155  According to the organisation’s website, the body also organises 
cultural events such as ‘Namaste India’ held every November in Tokyo. Despite some 
tensions between Upadhyay and MOFA and the scholarly community,156 Upadhyay’s 
connections with several senior politicians in both Japan and India (including Prime 
Ministers Mori, Abe and Hatoyama), have increased the connectivity between states. 
Kan even said of Upadhyay in 2006, ‘He is the one who educated me about India. He 
urged me to visit India.’ Adding, ‘we may have differences domestically on Japan-
China relations, but there are no differences whatsoever on Japan-India relations.’157 In 
September 2011 an India-Japan Global Partnership Summit was arranged by the 
organisation.158  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
154 According to Hirose, Sasae came to realise the potential for greater cooperation after witnessing 
Japanese and Indian diplomats in conversation. Author’s interview with Hirose. 
155 ‘India Center Japan’, http://www.india-center.org/content/main.php (Accessed on 10/11/08) 
156 Upadhyay is said to have ambitions for the Indian Parliament. According to one academic, during 
official Prime Ministerial visits to India, Japanese Prime Ministers often ‘slip away’ to meet Mr 
Upadhyay’s contacts. 
157 ‘When 80,000 Japanese said Namaste India,’ Indian Express, 24 September 2006, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/when-80-000-japanese-said-namaste-india/13340/  (Accessed on 
08/11/08) 
158 ‘India-Japan Global Partnership Summit (IJGPS)’ 5-7 September 2011, 
http://www.indiajapansummit.org/en/  
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i. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
 
The role of India’s Prime Minister also deserves attention even though the Indian 
policy-making structure sits outside this thesis’ remit. In comparison to India’s 
bureaucracy, which has shown less enthusiasm, Dr Singh is frequently referred to by 
officials and scholars (less so in Japan) as crucial.159 According to one senior MOFA 
official in Delhi, Singh ‘is the man who has elevated cooperation to this level’. An 
internationally-respected economist, Singh pushed especially hard for economic 
agreements, according to Pant making a personal intervention to secure the conclusion 
of CEPA.160 One Director of the Southwest Asia Division noted to the author that Singh 
was instrumental in securing preferential treatment for Japan in the DMIC161 and to a 
senior JICA official, the consensus in Tokyo is that ‘the time is now to bolster ties’ in 
case someone less admiring assumes his post.162  
 
Singh is noted by Japanese officials to also have been ‘patient’, according to one Asahi 
Shimbun correspondent, with Japan’s domestic political instability.163 The assistance 
provided by Japan in the wake of the 1991 BOP crisis has contributed to this view, as 
has Singh’s economist-background which reportedly endears him to Japan’s economic 
strengths and the benefits of free trade. 164  Following the March 2011 earthquake, 
Singh’s condolences were appreciated as evidently heartfelt. Singh expressed his 
‘deepest condolences’, promised ‘our resources are at the disposal’ of Japan, stating ‘I 
                                                            
159 Other Indian politicians noted to be sympathetic towards Japan include the Finance Minister, Pranab 
Mukherjee and Head of the Planning Commission, Montek Singh who was in government during the 
1991 BOP crisis. Author’s interview with Sugio 
160 Harsh Pant, ‘Singh’s Japan stop was first step to shoring up regional security’, Japan Times, 1 
November 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101101a2.html (Accessed on 01/11/10) 
161 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 24 June 2010 
162 Author’s interview with Suzuki 
163 Author’s interview with Takeishi 
164 Author’s interview with Kondo 
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consider our bilateral relations with Japan to be one of the most important…we 
have.’ 165  Singh has also remarked that the ‘sky’s the limit’ regarding relations’ 
potential.  
 
IX. Public opinion 
 
The public has played an indirect role in influencing policymaking. Japan’s leaders in 
an established democracy, rely on the public to secure their mandate. For example 
during the Koizumi years when public support was strong, policymakers were able to 
make more proactive international moves. It has often been said that Japan operates a 
‘theatre audience democracy’ in which the electorate observe politics but the landslide 
election of the DPJ in 2009 demonstrated the influence of the ballot box. The DPJ 
platform argued for many domestic reforms but also for changes in Japan’s international 
outlook.  
 
Despite this potential constraint on policymaking, the public can be susceptible to 
manipulation. Policymakers ultimately control the flow of information exposed to the 
public and can distract the electorate with domestic issues (as Koizumi proved with his 
radical reforms of the Post Office). The ability of other actors, such as the media to steer 
opinion towards support for a policy is also a factor. Public opinion is only able to 
establish the parameters or ‘general background against which policy-making agents 
reach decisions’.166 
 
                                                            
165 ‘Can our N-plants survive Japan quake, PM wants to know’, Indian Express, 14 March, 2011, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/can-our-nplants-survive-japan-quake-pm-wan/762244/ (Accessed on 
15/03/11) 
166 Hook et al. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, p. 65 
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The norm of pacifism is considered by some scholars to represent a major determinant 
of Japanese foreign policy. Yet for the past decade a ‘creeping realism’ has been 
identified. The additional concern with terrorism following 9/11 has proven another 
factor. In a recent interesting analysis, Midford argues that public opinion in Japan was 
‘never pacifist’.167 Instead Japanese attitudes about the military originate from what 
Thomas Berger identifies as a ‘culture of anti-militarism’ rather than from pacifism per 
se. Following Japan’s disastrous experiment in militarism, distrust has proven difficult 
to reverse. Nevertheless, encouraged in part by elites, Japan is growing to appreciate 
military power for ‘deterrence and defence’.168 The upgrade of the JDA in 2007 did not 
arouse public opposition nor, at first, did Abe’s attempts to launch a debate on revision 
of the Constitution. In fact opinion polls have gradually shown increased support. In 
line with NCR, however, which privileges structure, Midford also argues that public 
opinion has been predominantly ‘reacting directly to the material reality of the 
international state system’.169 
 
Furthermore a very small percentage of voters base their choices on foreign policy.  As 
Midford argues, public opinion’s salience increases on questions such as ‘overseas 
deployments’ but less so for ‘issues such as a new multilateral initiative’.170 Thus as 
Chapter 8 will demonstrate in discussing Abe’s ‘Arc’ initiative, public opinion was not 
a factor in its demise, instead elite caution and external unease brought the idea from 
favour. The extent to which a government policy conflicts with an established public 
norm also determines the weight of public opinion. On the issue of nuclear technology 
                                                            
167 In this analysis, Midford puts forward eight situations in which public opinion is able to influence 
policymaking, Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security, p. 2 
168 Midford adds the important caveat that Japanese public opinion is ‘defensive realist’ since offensive 
power remains unpopular. 
169 Ibid. p. 177 
170 Ibid. p. 11 
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transfer for example, domestic opposition was voiced and will be critiqued in Chapter 7. 
As will be shown, public opinion is able to only slow down security policy change but 
not stop it.  
 
In the most recent MOFA-commissioned ‘Opinion Survey on the Image of Japan in 
India’ in 2009, 171  76% of respondents considered relations to be friendly or very 
friendly with 92% seeing Japan as a reliable friend of India. Asked about common 
images of Japan, respondents described Japan as ‘technologically advanced, 
economically powerful and peace-loving country’, with people who were ‘diligent, 
efficient in management practices, and inventive’. Japan was rated the ‘most liked 
country’ with 33% in comparison to 29% for the US which came second.172 According 
to an Ambassador to Delhi, Japan is the country India most wants to emulate.173  
 
However despite these positive sentiments, genuine understanding between citizens is 
low. For Japan in large part this is due to the fact that until the late 1990s South Asia 
was hardly visible in the Japanese perception of ‘Asia’ or ‘Asia-Pacific’. Separated by 
over 6000km, Japanese citizens believe they share little with India. Whilst this distance 
equates to that between Tokyo and Hawaii 174 and pales in comparison to that with 
Washington, a ‘psychological distance’ remains. Japan and India are seen as at the 
‘extremes of Asian culture’.175 The early cultural linkages and economic exchange is 
                                                            
171 ‘2007 opinion leaders were interviewed on an individual basis in 12 major cities in India for the 
opinion survey on Japan. Under the commission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the opinion survey 
on Japan was also conducted in India in 1986 and 2000’ 
172 In 1994, however, Jain cites survey results where only 23.9% of the respondents said they felt a sense 
of affinity with SA while the corresponding figure for ASEAN was 35.4% and 53.8% for China. Jain, 
‘Japan and South Asia – An Overview’, in Jain ed., Distant Neighbours, p. 5. For further details on the 
survey, see  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/survey/2000/section2.html#1  
173Author’s interview with Sakutaro Tanino, Former Ambassador to India 1995-8, 1 July 2010 
174 Author’s interview with Takita 
175 Author’s interview with Hideki Esho, Professor of Economics, Hosei University 24 May 2010 
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barely known in Japan and as one Japan Foundation official notes, mutual 
understanding is very ‘superficial’.176 
 
The scope of Asia is nevertheless experiencing a gradual change. In many ways the 
progress differs according to generation providing two opposing images of India. Older 
generations continue to consider Asia’s border at Burma. Images of India relate to 
Gandhi and Nehru in the positive sense and negatively as a region of conflict and 
famine. The Sino-Indian border conflict and annexation of Goa are especially identified 
as ‘puncturing’ perceptions.177 For the young, however, India is seen as software giant 
with growing prosperity. This situation is of course not unique to Japan and indeed the 
US too has broadened its conception of the region and begun to refer to the ‘Indo-
Pacific’ region rather than just the ‘Asia-Pacific’.178 
 
Japan’s foreign policy with India has, however, benefited from little public attention, 
especially when compared to bilateral relationships with the US and China, leaving 
Japan’s policymakers relatively free rein to debate strategy.  
 
X. Conclusion 
 
As Miyagi correctly noted, the state is ‘not an independent, coherent autonomous actor 
separated and aloof from society’ but ‘an arena and arbiter of conflicting demands and 
claims’. 179 Such a belief deviates from pure realism’s acceptance of the state as a 
                                                            
176 Author’s interview with Ogawa 
177 Author’s interview with Seth 
178 See Michael Auslin, ‘Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward A Regional Strategy’, AEI, 
December 2010, http://www.aei.org/docLib/AuslinReportWedDec152010.pdf (Accessed on 03/01/11) 
179 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 16 
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unitary actor arguing instead that a pluralist concept of an intricate and often complex 
system exists. 
 
The above section demonstrates the compound collection of actors present in Japan’s 
policymaking process and how models that overly emphasise the role of the 
bureaucracy, political parties or the prime minister, fail to appreciate this plurality. As 
the remainder of this thesis will show, Japan’s policy towards India has involved each 
of the above actors to differing degrees with MOFA remaining core to the process. 
Before embarking on this analysis, however, it is necessary to track the historical 
development of Japan-India relations, the focus of the following chapter.
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5. Japan’s Policy and Relations with India: An Historical Review  
 
This chapter presents an historical overview of Japan’s relations with India.1 Particular 
attention is given to the nature of Japan’s diplomacy as well as the reception policy has 
received. The empirical discussion will provide the context from which the following 
analysis should be considered and demonstrate how historical interactions have shaped 
the current relationship. Through a chronological assessment the chapter highlights the 
factors that have previously shaped Japan’s approach towards India, indicating how 
structure, in line with NCR has been the major impediment. 
 
As stated in the Introduction, post-war political, economic and security ties between 
Japan and India were ‘not only minimal, but also cool and formal.’2 Tokyo’s interest in 
Japan has been sporadic, waxing and waning with geopolitical shifts. 3  Japan-India 
relations have been shaped by a combination of pragmatic interests regarding economic 
prospects and wider structural factors. At the cultural level people-to-people contact has 
contributed to improving popular thinking but normative ideas have found limited 
traction. Overall the picture is one of Japanese ambivalence for the majority of India’s 
                                                            
1 Among the studies into historical ties, Murthy offers the most in-depth overview with Sareen and Lebra 
providing insights into more specific periods. PA Narashimha Murthy, India and Japan: dimensions of 
their relations, (New Delhi: ABE Publishing House, 1986); T.R. Sareen, Japanese Prisoners of War in 
India, 1942-1946: Bushido and Barbed Wire, (Global Oriental; Folkestone, 2006); Lebra, Joyce 
Chapman, The Indian National Army and Japan, (Singapore; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). 
Other chapter-length pieces, which recount historical links include Kalam and Jain. Abul Kalam, Japan 
and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships, (Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 
1996); Purnendra Jain,(ed.) Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia, (New Delhi; Sterling 
Publishers; 1996); Purnendra Jain, 'India's Calculus of Japan's Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia', in T. 
Inoguchi (ed.), Japan's Asia Policy: Revival and Response, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 211-236 
2 Satu Limaye, ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, p. 225 
3 Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan  and South Asia: Between Cooperation and Confrontation’ in Inoguchi Takashi 
and Purnendra Jain (eds.), Japanese Foreign Policy Today, (New York; Palgrave, 2000), p. 265 
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short history. Only recently, on the heels of economic potential, has interest reached 
levels commensurate with shared interests. 
 
Japan’s external policy history is characterised by attaching itself to the great power of 
the day. Regarding Japan’s approach to India therefore, a constant factor has also been 
the influence of foreign powers. This issue is recognised by NCR’s appreciation of 
structure. During the early decades of the twentieth century, Britain disapproved of any 
Japanese sympathy for the Indian independence movement and later Washington’s Cold 
War vision proved a substantial obstacle to economic and political interaction. When 
the US became strategically aware of India in the 1990s, Japan’s policy closely 
followed. Japan and India have also converged against a common opponent in the past, 
as can be seen in Japan’s assistance to India’s independence and embrace of Japan at the 
end of the Pacific War when Japan was practically an ‘Asian orphan’.4 
 
The significance of historical links should not be overstated as those taking a liberal 
theoretical viewpoint might emphasise. Instead these links should be considered within 
the NCR context of their impact on policymakers’ perceptions. Historical links can 
provide a useful justification for renewed activity. Whether this is the case for Japanese 
officials who refer to a ‘romantic’ history in their diplomatic discourse or if cultural 
links do actually influence perceptions of Japan’s affinity with India, will be analysed 
further into the study.  
 
The chapter is divided into broad time-periods. The genesis of Indo-Japanese contact 
from the sixth century through the Meiji period will first be sourced, before turning to 
                                                            
4 Author’s interview with KV Kesavan, Distinguished Fellow, Japanese Studies, Observer Research 
Foundation, 1 March 2011  
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the turbulent twentieth century, paying attention to key episodes including wartime 
connections, the post-war environment and onset of the Cold War. The examination will 
conclude in the 1990s from when the remainder of this study will concentrate.  
 
I. Early encounters 
 
Japan’s historical connections with India originated in the sixth century when Buddhism 
reached Japan through China. 5 The first Indian to reach Japan was Bodhisena who 
assumed the role of ‘Master of Ceremony’ for the Consecrating Ceremony of the Great 
Buddha at the Todaiji Temple in Nara in 752.6 The Japanese syllabary of Kana has been 
traced by some to the Sanskrit alphabet.7 
 
II. Sixteenth century cultural and economic contact 
 
The first Japanese visit to India occurred much later, during the late sixteenth century. 
Japan had begun to establish political contact with Portugal in colonised India. 
According to Leupp, Japan at first believed the Portuguese to be indigenous to India and 
that Christianity was in fact an Indian religion. In 1596 at the height of anti-Christian 
persecutions, Japanese Christians fled to the colony of Goa, establishing a community 
of traders as well as slaves captured by Portuguese ships. Indians travelled to Japan as 
lascars (sailors) on Portuguese and then British-commissioned ships during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Until the First World War, Chinese and Indian 
textile manufacturers and textile merchants established branches in Kobe, Yokohama 
                                                            
5 Author’s interview with Seth  
6 Ambassador Yasukuni Enoki, ‘A strong cultural and historical bond linking Japan and India’, Speech to 
Delhi Rotary Club, 9th February 2006. In 2002, the 1250 year anniversary of the sanctification, a statue of 
Bodhisena was erected in Nara. 
7 Interview with the author, Eijiro Noda, Former Ambassador to India 1985-89 25 June 2010 
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and later Osaka.8 As this thesis will later show, Japan’s interest in India has consistently 
originated in economic incentives.  
 
III. Meiji-era economic contact and the opening of diplomatic channels 
 
India continued to be a key supplier of raw materials to Japan throughout the Meiji era 
(1868-1912).9  In the 1890s Japan started importing considerable amounts of Indian 
cotton through Bombay to establish and support its own textile industry. The first 
Japanese Consulate in India was opened in Bombay in 1894 and in 1907 the first 
Consulate-General in Calcutta, then the capital of British India. By 1903 the ‘Japan-
India Association’ was established by among others, Prime Minister Okuma.10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Hiroshi Shimizu, ‘The Indian merchants of Kobe and Japan's trade expansion into Southeast Asia before 
the Asian-Pacific War’, Japan Forum, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 25 – 48. For further detail see RA 
Brown, Capital and Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia, (London; Macmillan, 1994) and Claude 
Markovits, Merchants, Traders and Entrepreneurs: Indian Business in the Colonial Period, (London; 
Macmillan, 2000). 
9 According to some estimates, by the end of the Meiji period India accounted for 10% of Japan's total 
foreign trade. Osamu Sawaji, ‘A New Era of Japan-India Relations’, The Japan Journal, (December 
2007), 
http://www.japanjournal.jp/tjje/show_art.php?INDyear=07&INDmon=12&artid=ca3d183e4aa7b102c482
f80af209c56a&page=2 (Accessed on 09/10/08)  
10 ‘History of the Japan-India Association’, Japan-India Association website, http://www.japan-
india.com/english/news/view/5 (Accessed on 16/06/09) Okuma was the 17th Prime Minister of Japan 
under the Emperor of Meiji and the founder of Waseda University, Tokyo. The organisation’s activities 
initially centred round economic interaction, opening a Japan Commodity House in Calcutta. By the end 
of the Showa era, however, the association’s activities began to take a more political character, following 
MOFA’s authorisation of ‘foundation’ status in 1939. During the subsequent war the association 
supported India’s independence movement, much to Allied opposition resulting in the outlawing of future 
activities. Participants temporarily changed the association’s name to Japan-India Economic Association 
but resumed the original title once Japan’s sovereignty was restored in 1952. During these years the 
Association enjoyed the chairmanship of several eminent Japanese elites, including Hisato Ichimada, 
governor of the Bank of Japan from 1952, Yoshio Sakurauchi (later president of the House of 
Representatives) from 1977. 
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IV. Intellectual exchange – the friendship of Tagore and Tenshin 
 
The late Meiji period also witnessed the emergence of intellectual exchange epitomised 
by the friendship between Indian Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941)11 
and Okakura Tenshin (1863-1913). Okakura, an art critic and historian, met the Bengali 
poet in India at the turn of the century. They shared a common perception of Asia, 
evolved from the Buddhist vision of the world around the three poles of Japan, India 
and China.12 This was embodied in the famous opening sentence of Okukura’s seminal 
work The Ideals of the East (1904); ‘Asia is one’.13 Asians were also they believed, 
united in their shared experience of colonial humiliation.14 
 
Tagore greatly admired Japan for differentiating itself from the West but believed Japan 
could use lessons from Western civilisation and become Asia’s only successfully 
modernised power. Tagore called on Japan to ‘Let the greatness of her ideals become 
visible to all men like her snow-crowned Fuji rising from the heart of the country into 
the region of the infinite.’15 
 
The extent to which this romanticised vision of an ‘oriental character’ 16 influenced 
Japan-India relations, however, is disputable. Certainly Tagore had an impact on the 
Japanese people and his writings were widely distributed in Japanese. Okakura was 
                                                            
11 In 1913, Tagore became the first Asian to win the Nobel Prize 
12 Pekka Korhonen, ‘The Geography of Okakura Tenshin’, Japan Review, Vol. 13 (2001), p. 120 
13 Okukura, influenced by the Hindu revivalist Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) whom he travelled to 
meet in February 1902, viewed European civilisation as characterised by materialism and scientific 
progress rather than spiritualism. For Vivekananda, Asia ‘produces giants in spirituality just as the 
Occident produces giants in politics [and] giants in science’. S. Vivekananda, The Complete Works of 
Swami Vivekananda, i (Calcutta, Bourne End and Advaita Ashrama: Ramakrishna Vedanta Centre, 1991-
2), p. 6 
14 Emmott, Rivals, p. 27 
15 Rabindranath Tagore, ‘The message of India to Japan: a Lecture’, Delivered at the Imperial University 
of Tokyo, (1916), p. 31 
16 Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships, p. 104 
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arguably more famous abroad than at home where his views of ‘Asianism’ found little 
support. What is of note, however, is that Tagore and Okakura did not agree on all 
matters and certainly not on the behaviour of their respective nations. In particular 
Tagore feared Japan’s growing nationalism and ‘un-Asian’ actions towards China 
during the 1930s.17 This ‘bout with utilitarian Asian consciousness’18 did not ultimately 
provide the foundations of any official political alignment and whilst occasionally 
scholars point to this episode, its practical implications were negligible. The 
international structure was not yet amenable to closer ties.  
 
V. Political awakening; Indian independence and wartime interaction 
 
An oft-overlooked episode of early Japan-India cooperation occurred during the Indian 
independence movement. As has been seen, the majority of Japan’s relations with India 
were on a limited scale, intellectual or economic. The late nineteenth century, however, 
brought more political interaction as Japan’s modernisation encouraged early 
protagonists of pan-Asianism. 19 ‘British India’ was watched with concern by many 
elites in Meiji Japan as turbulent events unfolded. To many the Indian experience 
exemplified the dangers of Western penetration.20  
 
                                                            
17 Giri Deshingkar, ‘The Construction of Asia in India’, Asian Studies Review, Volume 23 Number, 2 
June 1999, p. 175 
18 Limaye, ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, p. 226 
19 Yukiko Sumi Barnett, ‘India in Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei’s Pan-Asian Thought and His Idea of India in 
Early Twentieth-Century Japan’, Journal of the Oxford University History Society, (2004) p. 3 
20 Another Japanese pan-Asianist, influenced by Indian nationalism was Ôkawa Shûmei. With a strong 
anti-Western thought he believed Japan had a ‘divine mission’ to free Asiatic nations from ‘Western 
oppression’. Christopher W. A. Szpilman, ‘The Dream of One Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei and Japanese Pan-
Asianism’ in Fuess ed., The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Post-war Legacy, (Munich; Iudicium 
Verlag, 1998), pp. 49-63. His support for India led to Britain putting pressure on the Japanese government 
to monitor his activity and demand the Japan and India Association to withdraw Ôkawa’s membership. 
He was later indicted as a Class A war criminal by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.  
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The Indian freedom fighter Rash Behari Bose21 (1886-1945) arrived in Tokyo in 1915 
seeking to broaden pan-Asianist thought.22 Encouraged by Japan’s victory over Russia 
in 1905, Bose saw Japan as an example in the fight against colonialism. The defeat was 
widely celebrated by India for ‘destroying the myth of European supremacy over Asian 
and serving as a mighty inspiration for Indian nationalists who were struggling to free 
their country from British rule’.23 Nehru noted his pride at being Asian upon hearing the 
news.24 Among popular perceptions Japan’s status markedly improved.25 
 
For Japan the partnership with India was attractive. Asian leaders were beginning to 
turn their backs on Japan’s military stance so the pan-Asian ideology preached by Rash 
Bose and his followers legitimised Japan’s behaviour.26 An Indian government was also 
perceived as being friendlier than Britain with whom relations had markedly soured. 
Furthermore trade had dwindled since 1923 when the Anglo-Japanese alliance broke 
down due to pressure from the US.27 A mixture of structural incentives supported by 
                                                            
21 Rash Bihari Bose married a Japanese woman and even became naturalised as a Japanese citizen. Bose 
is also credited with bringing the first truly ‘Indian’ curry to Japan in the 1920s. For more on R.B. Bose’s 
activities in Japan see Takeshi Nakajima, Bose of Nakamuraya, An Indian Revolutionary in Japan, 
(translated by Prem Motwani), (Delhi: Bibliophile South Asia, 2009). Nakajima’s writings on the subject 
have, however, often faced criticism in India. 
22 Rash Bose used the pseudonym Raja P.N.T. Tagore when he arrived in Japan, claiming he was a 
distinct relative of the laureate Tagore who was then creating a stir among Japanese intellectual circles. 
http://www.liveindia.com/freedomfighters/24.html Before Bose died (in Japan) he was honoured by the 
Japanese government with the Order of the Rising Sun (2nd grade) PA Narashimha Murthy, India and 
Japan: dimensions of their relations, (New Delhi: ABE Publishing House, 1986), pp. 85-98 
23 Jain and Todhunter, ‘India and Japan – Newly Tempering Relations’, Jain (ed.), Distant Asian 
Neighbours, p. 86. Bose’s revolutionary ambitions were also ignited by the partition of Bengal in the 
same year. 
24 Deshingkar, ‘The Construction of Asia in India’, p. 175 citing Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Letter No. 117,’ 
Glimpses of World History, Vol. 2, Allahabad, Kitabistan, (1934) pp. 726-7. 
25 Aftab Seth, ‘India and Japan’, Foreign Service Institute, Indian Foreign Policy, Challenges and 
Opportunities, (Delhi; Academic Foundation, 2007), p. 815. Furthermore, according to Professor 
Kinoshita, Indians wrote songs to celebrate Japan’s victory. Author’s interview with Toshi Kinoshita, 
Professor of Economics, Waseda 29 June 2010 
26 Cemil Aydin, ‘Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945’ Japan 
Focus, March 12, 2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Cemil-Aydin/2695 (Accessed on 15/08/09) 
27 Ahmad Rashid Malik, Pakistan-Japan Relations: Continuity and Change in Economic Relations and 
Security Interests, (London; Routledge, 2008), p. 164  
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normative support thus emerged. However as below will demonstrate, elite consensus 
was lacking and no national leader or bureaucratic body took charge.  
 
In 1942 Indian expatriates gathered in Tokyo and Bangkok to form the Indian 
Independence League and Indian National Army (INA). Initially the INA was 
composed of only Indian expatriates and British POWs but in 1944 Subhash Chandra 
Bose, 1887-194528 (no relation to Rash Bihari Bose) convinced the War Minister and 
later Prime Minister, Tojo Hideki to support the Indian anti-colonial cause.29 Bose (also 
known as ‘Netaji’, Respected Leader)30 had been put in charge of the INA in place of 
Rash Bose whose popularity had fallen upon accusation that his interests sided more 
with Japan than India.31 Japanese forces fought with the INA at the ‘U-Go Offensive’ at 
Manipur yet both the Battles of Imphal and Kohima ended in failure with the INA-
Japan troops suffering heavy losses.32  
 
                                                            
28 Details of Subhas Chandra Bose’s death remain disputed. Official reports claim that Bose died 
following an air crash in Taipei on August 18, 1945 whilst flying to Tokyo. Others, including Justice Pal, 
point however to testimonies from Japanese and the only Indian survivor who contradict this account and 
suggest that Bose may have in fact been travelling to the USSR for political refuge. Several inquiries have 
been held, most recently in 2005, which concluded that the air crash was considered a cover by Japanese 
military officials to allow Bose to continue his efforts for Indian independence. Yet no proof of Bose 
arriving in the USSR could be found since access to Russian archives was denied. Rajeev Sharma, ‘An 
Indian Cover-up?’, The Diplomat, 23 April 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/indian-
decade/2010/04/23/india-cover-up/ (Accessed on 23/04/10) 
29 In the days leading up to Tojo’s agreement, Hitler had previously suggested to Netaji that he collude 
with the Japanese who were making substantial gains at that time in Southeast Asia. On 16 June, Netaji 
was invited to visit the Diet where the Japanese Prime Minister surprised him with the declaration, ‘We 
are indignant about the fact that India is still under the ruthless suppression of Britain and are in full 
sympathy with her desperate struggle for independence. We are determined to extend every possible 
assistance to the cause of India's independence. It is our belief that the day is not far off when India will 
enjoy freedom and prosperity after winning independence.’ Ranjan Borra, ‘Subhas Chandra Bose, The 
Indian National Army and the War of India’s Liberation’, The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1982 
(Vol. 3, No. 4), http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v03/v03p407_Borra.html pp. 407-439  
30 ‘Netaji’ was elected twice as president of the Indian National Congress but following disputes over 
Gandhi’ non-violent protest policy, resigned. The ashes of Bose, who allegedly died in a plane crash off 
Taiwan in 1945, are actually kept in the Rentokuji temple in Tokyo, Suginami ward. 
31 Borra, ‘Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian National Army and the War of India’s Liberation’  
32 The battle lasted from March to July 1944 and marked the turning point of the Burma campaign, 
signalling the end of the Japanese offensive on this front. For further detail, see Joyce Chapman Lebra, 
The Indian National Army and Japan, (Singapore; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008). This study 
looks at the origins of the INA through the imagination of Iwaichi Fujiwara, a young Japanese 
intelligence officer and the relationship between the Japanese Imperial Army and Indian National Army. 
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During the 1920s many activists including Nehru supported cooperation between India 
and other Asian nations to form an Asian federation and destroy the ‘keystone of the 
arch of imperialism’.33 Many were also unhappy with the progress of Gandhi’s non-
violent movement. Unconditional mutual support was not, however, widespread. Whilst 
S. Bose accepted Japan’s imperialism and even supported Japan’s militarist invasions,34 
Sugata Bose, Harvard professor and great-nephew of Bose has also argued that whilst 
India was grateful for Japan’s assistance, ‘grave suspicion’ of Japan’s motives to ‘return 
to Asia’ after decades of indifference to nationalism continued. 35  Japan’s official 
endorsement of ‘pan-Asian’ thinking held a distinct meaning from that in India. 36 
Whilst the Indian notion centred on the objective of independence from the British Raj, 
Japan’s vision was imperialistic.37 Pan-Asianism for leaders like Bose was therefore 
more a means to an end rather than an end in itself.38 The normative affiliation was 
therefore unable, without supportive structural conditions, to bring relations to a new 
level.  
 
An additional episode of interaction, often neglected is the experience of Japanese 
POWs in India in the early 1940s.39 The subject of POWs is muted in Japan due to the 
                                                            
33 Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships 
34 Panda and Fukazawa eds., India and Japan: In Search of Global Roles, p. 11 
35 Onishi, ‘Decades After War Trials, Japan Still Honors a Dissenting Judge’. The extent to which Japan 
truly supported the Indian cause is also disputed by those who argue that Japan refused to allow India 
administrative authority over the occupied Andaman Islands (Indian territory). This is criticised as an 
effort by Japan’s military to consume India under Japan’s envisioned Asian leadership. See ‘What Does 
The Film Pride—The Fateful Moment Describe?’Akahata, (Official newspaper of the Japanese 
Communist Party), 8 July 1998 
36 Professor Brij Tankha in particular cautions against placing too much emphasis on these historical 
interactions. Author’s interview with Brij Tankha, Professor of Modern Japanese History, University of 
Delhi and Hitotsubashi University 24 May 2010  
37 Aydin, ‘Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945’ 
38 Ibid. Okawa is said to have been shocked at the suggestion by Bose to seek cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, despite his opposition to Communism. Bose, it is reported, responded, that he was prepared ‘to 
shake hands even with Satan himself to drive out the British from India’.  
39 Works on Japan and the INA include Tikak Raj Sareen, Japan and the Indian National Army, (Delhi; 
Agam Prakashan, 1986), Indian revolutionaries Japan and British imperialism, (Delhi; Anmol 
Publications, 1993), ‘Subhas Chandra Bose, Japan and British Imperialism’, European Journal of East 
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influence of the bushido code of war, which prohibits surrender. The capture of 
Japanese soldiers was indeed unique but a total of nearly three thousand are recorded as 
having been imprisoned in India during the war.40 Sareen notes that Japanese POWs 
from New Zealand formed associations upon their return to Japan whilst those who 
spent time in India ‘faded into oblivion’.41 Interestingly this episode was not mentioned 
by any Japanese officials or academics interviewed for this study. 
 
VI. Justice Pal’s dissenting verdict 
 
The episode engrained most favourably in Japanese minds is the dissenting voice of the 
Bengali Justice Radhabinod Pal at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 
November 1948. Other judges criticised the court’s verdict but Pal’s ‘not guilty’ verdict 
left the deepest impression. News of his discordant view was banned in Japan and 
Britain until 1952.42  
 
Judge Pal’s opposition was not, however, based on approval for Japan’s actions or a 
conclusion that the accused were innocent. He acknowledged Japan’s wartime violence, 
including Nanjing, stating that ‘the devilish and fiendish character of the alleged 
atrocities cannot be denied.’43 Where he differed was in whether the actions were illegal 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2004), pp. 69-97 and Indian National Army: a documentary study, Delhi; 
Gyan, 2004) 
40 T.R. Sareen, Japanese Prisoners of War in India, 1942-1946: Bushido and Barbed Wire, (Global 
Oriental; Folkestone, 2006), p. xiii 
41 Ibid. p. 243 
42 For further discussion on the Tribunal see Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice; The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), Takeshi Nakajima, Pal Hanji, Tokyo Saiban 
Hihan to Zettai Heiwa-shugi, (Judge Pal: His Criticism of the Tokyo Trial and His Absolute Pacifism) 
(Hakusui-sha, 2007) and Ushimura Kei , ‘Pal’s “Dissentient Judgment” Reconsidered: Some Notes on 
Post-war Japan’s Responses to the Opinion,’, Japan Review, 19, (2007), pp. 215-224 
43 Bernard B. V. Röling and C. F. Rüter, eds. The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East 29 April 1946-12 November 1948 (Amsterdam; APA-University Press, 1977) p. 981 
cited in Kei , ‘Pal’s “Dissentient Judgment” Reconsidered’ p. 218. Brook, however, argues that Justice 
Pal’s judgement on Nanjing fell short of condemning Japan to the same extent as judges from Western 
161 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
in an indictable sense. Pal disagreed that there was a conspiracy to wage war and 
objected to the ‘ex post facto’ introduction of the terms ‘crimes against peace’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’. Other scholars have since concurred with his arguments.44 
 
Pal’s criticism was directed towards the Tribunal. He viewed the trial as ‘much more a 
political than a legal affair’, characterised by a ‘thirst for revenge’ and ‘victors’ justice’. 
He sought a purely legalistic reading of events leading up to and during the years of 
conflict, which according to Ambassador Seth, ‘reinforced the impression that just as 
Gandhi wanted a “fair and non-violent” victory against Britain, Pal wanted a “fair and 
non-violent” judgement of Japan.45 Pal was no doubt inspired by personal conviction 
against colonialism based on his experiences under British rule and respect for 
Gandhi. 46  He believed that Western powers had created the conditions for Japan’s 
military actions and deemed it hypocritical that they too were not charged with such 
crimes.47  
 
Pal’s opinion was also in an individual capacity and not representative of the Indian 
government. Despite some positive views in the Indian press, Nehru rejected Pal’s 
comments in a confidential cable describing his judgment as ‘wild and sweeping 
                                                                                                                                                                              
powers who at the same time were trying to reassert their colonial position. Timothy Brook, ‘The Tokyo 
Judgment and the Rape of Nanking,’ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 60, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 673-
700. In opposition, Mr. Kase, who once served as an adviser to PM Yasuhiro Nakasone, however, has 
labelled Pal’s conclusions about Nanjing, ‘a complete lie’ and evidence that Pal had fallen victim to 
‘Chinese and Allied propaganda’. 
44 See Richard Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971); John Dower, Embracing Defeat (New York: Norton, 1999), pp. 443–484 
45 Seth, ‘India and Japan’, p. 812 
46 Justice Pal had also studied in Kolkata, so according to Nandy was aware of the connections between 
Bengalis seeking independence and Japanese nationalists. Ashis Nandy, ‘The Other Within: The Strange 
Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’, New Literary History, 23-1, (Winter 1992) p. 53 
47 Nakajima, Pal Hanji, Tokyo Saiban Hihan to Zettai Heiwa-shugi (Judge Pal: His Criticism of the 
Tokyo Trial and His Absolute Pacifism) (Hakusui-sha, 2007) Review by Fumiko Halloran, The Japan 
Society Review, Issue 14 Volume 3 Number 2 (2008) http://www.japansociety.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/review_volume_3_number_1_2008_Issue_14.pdf  (Accessed on 15/08/09) 
162 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
statements…many of which we do not agree at all, we have had to inform Governments 
concerned informally that we are in no way responsible for it.’48 
 
Whether or not Pal’s comments were ‘the argument for Japan’s innocence’ or 
representative of Indian views, however, the anecdotal quality of his remarks promoted 
the idea of intimacy between Japan and India. The episode has been imprinted in the 
minds of Japanese people, especially those of a nationalist persuasion. With little 
information available to the people of Japan about the events of the war, the trial served 
as a vital framework to construct post-war identity.  
 
Ultra-nationalists in Japan have unsurprisingly glorified Pal’s words as equating Japan’s 
behaviour as ‘innocent’ or even supporting of Japan’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.49 The erection of a monument to Pal in a focal area of the Yasukuni Shrine 
complex in 2005 demonstrates the respect given to his views, 50  as does the film 
‘Puraido – The Fateful Moment’ which contributed to some of the late-twentieth 
century myth-making of the Far Right in Japan.51  
 
 
 
                                                            
48 A.G. Noorani, ‘The Yasukuni “hero”’, Frontline, The Hindu, Vol. 24, Issue 21, Oct 20-Nov 02, 2007, 
http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2421/stories/20071102503906000.htm (Accessed on 17/08/09) Jawaharlal 
Nehru cited in a cable to the Governor of West Bengal on November 29, 1948, (Selected Works of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 8; pages 233 and 413, respectively.) 
49 Review of Pal Hanji, Tokyo Saiban Hihan to Zettai Heiwa-shugi 
50 Statues in memory of Justice Pal can also be found in Kyoto and on the shores of Lake Ashino, 
Kanagawa Prefecture, south of Tokyo, Murthy, India and Japan: dimensions of their relations, pp. 245-
46 
51 In ‘Pride’ (released summer 1998), the personal story of Hideki Tojo is recounted through the eyes of 
his wife, Katsuko. The film portrays Tojo as a respectable family man who, faced with the stern defence 
of Prosecutor Joseph Keenen, is unable to convince the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
that America’s actions in dropping the atomic bombs on Japan equate to charges of murder levied and 
him and his fellow military generals. For further analysis on the film, see Michael J. Green, ‘Can Tojo 
Inspire Modern Japan?’ SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer-Fall 1999, pp. 243-250 
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VII. ‘Feelings of friendship’: post-war peace negotiations 
 
Additional events post-war encouraged further positive sentiment. Unlike Pal’s 
independent attempt, India’s government invited then-occupied Japan to participate at 
the Delhi Asian Games as an independent nation in 1951 and was a central player in 
lobbying for Japan’s entry into the UN and the first Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung 
in 1947. The Conference marked a turning point in the idea of a modern ‘Asia’ but 
somewhat ironically considering the path of Asian integration thereafter, the Conference 
paid little attention to economic relations.52  
 
At a similar time negotiations around drafting an acceptable peace treaty brought the 
perception of ‘the extraordinary feeling of friendship’53 from the Indian people. Without 
the territorial claims that complicated Japan’s other post-war treaties, that with India 
was one of Japan’s simplest. Yet it was the decision by India to waiver the right to 
reparations as well as Japanese properties under Indian custody in her peace treaty 
following the cessation of war, which engrained appreciation towards India.54 
 
Upon examination Indian views towards Japan were not as ‘extraordinarily friendly’55 
as the Japanese have since accepted. Rather as Sato’s analysis suggests, India’s consent 
to relinquish the right to reparations was negotiated and followed direct requests from 
                                                            
52 David Camroux, 'Asia … whose Asia? A 'return to the future' of a Sino-Indic Asian Community', The 
Pacific Review, 20:4, (2007) pp. 554  
53 Hiroshi Sato, ‘India Japan Peace Treaty and Japan’s Post-War Asian Diplomacy’, Journal of the 
Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 17, (December 2005) 
54 The SFPT in its Article 15 (a) enforced J to return property of the Allied Powers and their nationals 
seized during the war. Other South Asian countries also decided not to press for reparations even though 
they had been targeted by Japanese air raids. Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and 
Developing Relationships p. 115 
55 According to Sato, ‘The Japanese Foreign Ministry, on receiving the final Indian draft which must have 
been unexpectedly favourable, quickly responded, appreciating the draft as a gesture of ‘extraordinarily 
friendly consideration’ by the Indian people’ 
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MOFA. Nevertheless on 28 April 1952, Japan and (now independent) India established 
diplomatic relations and KK Chettur, who had served as Liaison Representative 
assumed the first post of Indian ambassador to Japan.56 As Japan struggled to resume 
diplomatic relations with South-east Asian nations, Indian amity was a welcome 
support. The international structure necessitated making friends.  
 
According to Kalam, India took the cause of post-war Japan in ‘almost a crusade spirit’. 
Believing it dangerous to humiliate and economically cripple a population known for its 
industriousness and pride.57 India endorsed proposals to help Japan’s rehabilitation and 
‘rejoin the comity of (free) nations’.58 According to Sato, however, India’s actions were 
primarily due to Nehru. Nehru’s pro-Japan sentiments had been seen in his response to 
Japanese schoolchildren requests for an Indian elephant in 1947. 59 Although Nehru 
distanced himself from Pal’s comments, he is said to have sympathised with the 
Japanese cause, opposing the trial of Emperor Hirohito as an unnecessary ‘witch hunt’ 
which would inevitably ‘cause ill-feeling’ among the Japanese people.60 Despite some 
internal opposition,61 Nehru was more concerned with Japanese support for his political 
                                                            
56 The treaty was signed in on June 9 1952 in Tokyo and later ratified in Delhi on August 27. For the full 
text of the treaty, see http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSA/19520609.T1E.html 
57 Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships, p. 117. India 
repeated the same theme in the Commonwealth Working Party deliberations in London (May 1950) 
arguing against any kind of treaty provisions which would arouse ‘the resentment of the Japanese’. 
58 Murthy, India and Japan: dimensions of their relations, p. 205 
59 The elephant kept at Ueno Zoo was considered a considerable comfort to the Japanese people who 
during the war had destroyed almost all their animals, both domestic and exotic.  
60 According to Sato, ‘Compared to his ‘pacifist’ fact, Nehru’s strong sympathy toward nationalist 
sentiment in post-war Japan has been overlooked. He observed on the occasion of the Sydney Conference 
of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers that ‘countries like Japan were not kept down permanently and 
India should not subscribe to any statement which laid down Japan should be kept weak in any sense of 
the word’ SWJN Vol 14, Pt 2 438 and 482’ Sato, ‘India Japan Peace Treaty and Japan’s Post-War Asian 
Diplomacy’, footnote 43.  
61 ‘We are told that in the course of the negotiation over the IJPT, Indian Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry was opposed to returning the Japanese properties, on the ground that Indians in Japan suffered 
loss due to the depreciation of yen currency. Despite their opposition, Nehru signed the treaty’ [MOFA 
1955c 3] Ibid.  
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ambitions in Asia than economic interests.62 Nehru’s pan-Asian aspirations for world 
government with India at the forefront soon faltered63 but the economic possibilities 
continued to develop. As NCR argues, following favourable international structure 
political support is the next-most important condition, followed by bureaucratic 
agreement. Similar to Abe in the next generation therefore the role of individual leaders 
in driving policy was evident though without a suitable structural environment and 
broad political support, progress was limited. 
 
VIII. Post-war economic relations 
 
The immediate post-war years witnessed a boom or rather resumption of Indo-Japanese 
economic exchange.64 South Asia was the first area where Japan sought to reintegrate 
into Asia. As early as May 1948 India welcomed a Japanese trade mission.65 India 
unlike other other Allied nations perceived of Japan’s eventual economic recovery in a 
positive rather than competitive light. India ‘did not foresee any element of economic 
threat in the recovery of the Japanese economy’. 66  By March 1952, before the 
conclusion of the peace treaty, a ‘semi-official’ mission under Taizo Ishizaka, President 
of Toshiba Corporation paid another visit to India.  
 
                                                            
62 This was against the advice of the Ministry of External Affairs’ Secretary-General, Sir Girja Shankar. 
‘The Yasukuni “hero”’. Sato further states that Nehru’s diplomacy often undervalued economic concerns, 
‘He often revealed himself amazingly ignorant of economic matters; and the Ministry of External Affairs 
under Nehru, until the mid 1950s, paid scanty attention to economic and commercial matters.’ 
63 Deshingkar, ‘The Construction of Asia in India’ 
64 Hitachi first came to India in the 1920s and considered India their ‘top market’. Like Mitsubishi, the 
company left for the war years but soon returned. Mitsubishi was also based in Kolkata before the war but 
was forced to withdraw once hostilities began. The trading company re-entered in 1952 seeking a ‘second 
life’ in Delhi where it imported paper, chemicals and power plant material and exported soy meal.  
65 Sato, ‘India Japan Peace Treaty and Japan’s Post-War Asian Diplomacy’, footnote 25 Asahi Shimbun, 
28th Dec 1951, 5th Feb 1952. The delegation consisted of 14 members with 11 members from private 
businesses and one each from MOFA, MITI and Exim Bank. 
66 Ibid.  
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When many other countries limited iron ore exports, Goa continued to supply Japan. 
During the 1950s and 1960s India was Japan’s biggest supplier and made an important 
contribution to Japan’s post-war iron and steel industry boom. Whilst Japan struggled to 
penetrate Southeast Asian markets facing opposition as a result of Japan’s wartime 
behaviour, India was an attractive destination.67 Furthermore up until the late 1950s, 
Japan and India’s economic systems were relatively similar operating a state system 
with similar standards of living. According to Esho India was in fact ahead of Japan.68 
 
As a mark of recognition for India’s goodwill, upon assuming the premiership Kishi 
chose India for his first official visit. According to Asrani, Kishi was also attracted to 
Nehru’s international prestige and wanted to demonstrate to Washington that Japan had 
other friends in the region. 69  Following Nehru’s reciprocal visit in 1958, Japan’s 
Foreign Minister established a separate division within the Asian Affairs Bureau called 
the Southwest Asia Division. Economic relations dominated discussion, particular 
surrounding yen loans to India which were to be incorporated into India’s five-year 
plan. When Commerce Secretary Dr KB Lall visited Tokyo in 1958, he and his 
counterpart certified a currency-exchange agreement. On February 4 an ‘Agreement on 
Commerce Between Japan and India’ was signed and the President of the Keidanren 
                                                            
67 Author’s interview with senior official and former Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA 
25 June 2010.This official’s career includes Director for Western Europe, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet 
and Deputy Director for G8 meetings. Due to the timing of his tenure, which coincided with 9/11, he 
spent the majority of his time devoted to Pakistan. One Director of the Southwest Asia Division told the 
author that almost 80% of his time was spent dealing with India. From 1953, Japan began exporting arms 
abroad, despite some hostility. This was terminated in 1967 by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato following 
domestic political pressure, particularly from the Left. Sugio Takahashi, ‘Transformation of Japan’s 
Defence Industry? Assessing the Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs’, Security Challenges, vol. 
4, no. 4 (Summer 2008), pp. 101-115 
68 As recounted by Esho, Maso Ara, a Japanese historian of India at Tokyo University who was the first 
scholar the visit in a official capacity after the war wrote in a letter to his new wife about the difference in 
India’s fortunes, noting in particular his amazement at being offered two eggs at breakfast, something 
impossible in bankrupt Japan at the time. Author’s interview with Esho 
69 Author’s interview with Arjun Asrani, Ambassador to Japan, 1988-92, New Delhi, 12 March 2011 
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also visited India. The international structure temporarily provided some ‘fertile’ years 
for relations. 
 
IX. The onset of Cold War bipolarity 
 
The honeymoon period, however, did not last. As India’s economic direction veered 
towards a socialist-inspired state-system and Japan’s US alliance became engrained, the 
two nations drifted apart. Economic interaction was severely restrained by India’s 
aversion to foreign trade whilst political developments soured relations. From 
seemingly promising relations Japan’s interests became pragmatic rather than 
ideological. ‘The overriding factor’ behind Japan's interest was that Northeast and 
Southeast Asia were ‘effectively off limits’.70 As NCR portends, structure outweighed 
normative concerns. 
  
For the majority of the 1950s Japanese interest centred around compensating and re-
engaging with war-torn countries. India gradually ‘disappeared’ to be allied in all but 
name with the Soviet Union. In truth India’s post-independence relations with the 
Soviet Union were ambivalent. Relations between Nehru and Stalin were cold, warming 
only to ‘cool’ under Khrushchev. In many ways India’s leaning towards the Soviet 
Union was more a result of their increasing unease at the level of military and economic 
aid afforded to Pakistan by the US.  
 
The 1960s broadened the structural chasm. Nehru’s sudden death in 1964 caused severe 
internal problems and India’s stance on the Vietnam War distanced Japanese and Indian 
                                                            
70 Taizo Miyagi, ‘Looking Beyond Cold War History in Asia’, Tokyo Foundation, 1 July 2008, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2008/foreign-and-security-policy/looking-beyond-cold-war-
history-in-asia (Accessed on 08/08/09)  
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foreign policy objectives further. By 1966 India was experiencing another balance-of-
payments crisis, met by President Johnson’s cool response and refusal to offer US 
bilateral aid.  
 
Overall India’s post-war ideology was fundamentally political whilst for Japan, due to 
the highly politicised nature of its former relations with the region, an economic 
approach was preferred. Shastri notes a concern in India towards Japan’s ‘unquestioned 
loyalty’ towards the US as merely ‘client state,’ despite all of India’s efforts.71  
 
India had reason to suspect Japan of abandoning its previous anti-imperialist stance. 
When in 1961 Indian armed forces entered the then Portuguese colony of Goa, India 
expected Tokyo to at least criticise colonisation. In fact Japan’s response was mute.72 A 
year later during the India-China border dispute, Japan remained neutral. On Japan’s 
part the altercation of 1962 accelerated Japanese disenchantment with India as a leader 
of an ‘idealistic’ non-alignment movement. The following two decades have hence been 
characterised as ‘a dark age for the relationship’ when the international structure 
overpowered the limited normative ‘friendship’ of previous years. 
 
The Cold War highlighted the ‘diametrically opposite political orientations’ of Japan 
and India.73 As India freed itself from colonial rule from Great Britain, Japan restricted 
its policy for the next sixty years to the US. The policy of ‘seikei bunri’, divorcing 
                                                            
71 Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships, p. 117 
72 KV Kesavan, ‘India-Japan Relations in the Changing Foreign Policy Perspectives’, in Panda and Ando, 
India and Japan: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives, p. 147 
73 Murthy, India and Japan: dimensions of their relations, pp. 344-345 
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politics from economic issues was accompanied by gentle moves into leading 
multilateral industrial and financial institutions with an influential role.74  
 
India chose a vastly different course. Invigorated by independence Delhi adopted the 
political stance of championing the voice of newly independent nations whilst 
protecting infant industries and shunning international trade. India, keen to limit outside 
influences from its economy, missed out of Japan’s leap into Asia’s trade and 
investment boom.75 As Esho comments, Japan and India during the Cold War were 
largely ‘indifferent’ to one another due to structure. 
 
X. Prospects by the 1980s 
 
Despite the continuation of Cold War polarity, events briefly reinvigorated interest 
among Japanese elites. For one the economic reforms introduced by Rajiv Gandhi 
brought the prospect of commercial activity to the table. Gandhi paid three visits 
officially and unofficially keen to increase Japanese participation in India’s industrial 
development.76 Gandhi held a particular affection for Japan and in 1989, upon hearing 
of the death of Emperor Showa, announced a three-day mourning period. This gesture 
was greatly appreciated in Japan.77 
 
                                                            
74 Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia, p. 10 
75 Emmott, Rivals, p. 28 
76 According to Eijiro Noda, former Ambassador to India recalls, Rajiv Gandhi personally ensured land 
was set aside for a Japanese school in Delhi, much to the appreciation of Japanese residents. Author’s 
interview with Noda 
77 President Venkataraman attended both the funeral of the Emperor Showa and the enthronement 
ceremony of the new Emperor 
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By the late 1980s business delegations from Japan were increasing in size. Japan had 
made ‘some success in penetrating the Indian economy’ 78  as moves proceeded to 
combine Japanese and Indian economic strengths. Between 1981 and 1987 trade more 
than doubled and the number of joint ventures in India tripled.79 At the official level 
Nakasone’s 1984 visit80 increased the amount of yen credits granted to India and in 
1985 the two governments agreed to aid technology transfer in the IT industry and 
extend assistance to modernise India’s railways and textile industry.81 
 
Japanese companies, however, grew increasingly disappointed with India (see Chapter 
6). Successful firms such as Toshiba, Sony, Mitsubishi, Honda and Nissan tried to 
penetrate the market but soon abandoned after heavy losses. Companies assumed the 
case of Suzuki could be repeated, only to face severe bureaucratic and infrastructural 
obstacles. Japanese interest remained muted and soon ‘withered as the reforms [of Rajiv 
Gandhi] themselves’. 82  By the end of the century’s penultimate decade, India was 
facing yet another economic crisis. 
 
From the geo-strategic perspective and NCR’s adherence to structural importance, the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during the 1980s 83  reawakened Japanese 
                                                            
78 Deborah L. Haber, ‘The Death of Hegemony: Why “Pax Nipponica” Is Impossible’, Asian Survey, Vol. 
30, No. 9 (September, 1990),  pp. 892-9 
79 Haber: Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1988 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
1988), p. 534. Indian exports to Japan went from $557 to $1,405 million, and Indian imports from Japan 
grew from $880 to $2,175 million between 1981 and 1987. Also Xinhua, August 11, 1987, Indo-Japanese 
joint ventures increased from 34 in 1980 to 108 in 1986.  
80 At first the hope from Japan had been for Indian support at grouping such as the G7 but it was soon 
clear that political progress was unachievable.  
81 Haber: O.P. Sabherwal, ‘Nakasone Visit and After,’ Mainstream, May 12, 1984, p. 5; Economic Times, 
November 30, 1985, p. 1.  
82 Limaye, ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’  
83 The conflict between the Soviet Union and Islamist mujahedeen resistance lasted a total of ten years, 
from December 24 1979 to February 15 1989 
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policymakers to the strategic importance of India.84. Yet despite the fact that the US was 
attempting to manage relations with India and Pakistan concurrently, Tokyo made little 
effort to strengthen political ties.85  
 
What is important, as NCR appreciates, is the perception which practitioners of Japan’s 
foreign policy held towards India. The extent to which India ‘depended’ on the Soviet 
Union is open to debate but the fact that the majority of Japanese diplomats perceived of 
there being a ‘reliance’86 limited Japan’s ability to cultivate relations with its ally’s 
adversary. 
 
XI. Post-Cold War 
 
The shattering of Cold War bipolarity presented an overdue opportunity to forge closer 
ties. Both governments had the chance to develop independent foreign policies free 
from Cold War perceptions ‘borrowed from other nations.’87 In 1991 India introduced a 
‘Look East’ policy and radically restructured its economy through liberalisation. The 
structural conditions were therefore made but as this thesis’s NCR model maintains, 
whilst structure is essential it has to be filtered through policymakers’ perceptions and 
account for intervening domestic-level influences.  
 
The end of the Cold War and introduction of economic reforms provided vital structural 
conditions for greater interaction between Japan and India. However since the 
                                                            
84 This has been identified by Inoguchi as a milestone in Japan’s recognition of India and the South Asian 
region 
85 Nakasone visited India and Pakistan in the hope that Japan could represent the interests of developing 
countries at forums such as the G7 but little was achieved. The major objective of the visit turned out to 
be improving economic, rather than political links.  
86 Author’s interview with Satoh 
87 A Madhavan, ‘The Post-Cold War Equations’, Kanwar ed., India-Japan: Towards a New Era, p. 40 
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‘transmission belt’ of policy is jagged, other influences most notably in India’s domestic 
stability, unsettled an immediate post-Cold War rapprochement. Instability in South 
Asia or more precisely the perception of instability in the wake of the Ayodhya Crisis, 
bomb-blast in Bombay Stock Exchange and plague scare in Gujarat, confirmed 
Japanese fears that economically India was an unsafe destination for investment as well 
as a political minefield.88 The continuing strife with Pakistan gave the strong impression 
that India would be economically challenged for many decades. 
 
XII. Conclusions  
 
From the above overview a number of issues stand out; 1) structural factors provide the 
overwhelming reason for Japan’s distance from India. 2) Japan and India have 
predominantly interacted on an informal level. 3) Economic interests have previously 
blossomed but been disrupted by external structural events as well as India’s closed 
economic system. Whilst official Japanese rhetoric speaks of a sense of closeness to 
India, the reality of relations has depended on pragmatic interests.  
 
As Japan has constantly appreciated since the cessation of its imperialist agenda, 
historical animosity can place severe challenges on political relations. However whilst 
the lack of animosity removes one hurdle, it also means that Japan and India without 
considerable shared experience, falter when seeking common understanding.  
 
India has figured only on the periphery of Japan’s world view. The exchanges of 
intellectuals and religious ideas whilst useful rhetorically, has not translated into 
                                                            
88 Chintamani Mahapatra, ‘Changing Role of Japan and India in International Affairs’, Panda and Ando, 
India and Japan: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives, p. 135 
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sustainable economic or political partnership due to the absence of a favourable 
structural environment. The complementarity voiced during the late 1940s and 1950s is 
often utilised by those keen to augment Indo-Japanese economic contact, as are the 
spiritual links despite the fact that Buddhism has long been on the decline in India.89  
 
Few in Japan realise the importance of India during the post-war era in particular and 
few bureaucrats consulted for this study point to genuine episodes of Indo-Japanese 
partnership as rationale for closer present-day ties. Overall the above outline of Japan’s 
historical relationship with India points to the pragmatic nature of Japan’s interest 
which has sought Indian partnership when the economic and strategic benefits have 
proved attractive.  
 
 
The remainder of this thesis will concentrate on three primary threads of Japan’s 
diplomacy towards India. The economic incentive has been considered paramount and 
will be the focus of the next chapter. How Japan has balanced its traditional ‘nuclear 
allergy’ when engaging with a non-NPT signatory occupies the following chapter, 
before analysis of Japan’s security interests in India provide the final case study. By 
employing NCR and extensive interview evidence, the variety of influences will be 
made evident with the ultimate conclusion pointing towards the necessity of structural 
pressures, tempered by unit-level factors. 
 
 
 
                                                            
89 According to many Hindu nationalists, the Buddha was merely another incarnation of the Hindu god 
Vishnu. However, where Buddhism remains strong, particularly in West Bengal, Japan’s relations with 
India have been strongest 
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6. Japan’s Economic Interest and Interaction with India 
 
Japan’s limited diplomatic dealings with India cannot easily be delineated from 
economic initiatives. Japan’s interest in India has been influenced, certainly initially, by 
economic interest, providing the backbone to Japan-India ties. Japan’s policy choices 
have not solely been shaped by strategic incentives but in parallel with economic 
objectives. Whilst at times political strategy has provided the public face of Japan-India 
cooperation, behind the scenes the economic imperatives of engaging with India have 
provided another major impetus.  
 
This first case study will analyse the economic dimension of Japan’s interest in India. 
The chapter will analyse the reasons behind economic indifference during much of the 
latter half of the twentieth century before looking at the areas in which Japan has 
recently used economic cooperation in the form of aid, investment and trade to improve 
relations on a wider scale. Among the additional questions is how India’s economic 
growth has been interpreted in Japan and how this has translated into policy strategies. 
Behind the rhetoric of opportunities, it is important to qualify such statements with 
analysis of how and why cooperation was not possible in the past and how Japan’s 
economic engagement factors into Tokyo’s wider strategy. 
 
The chapter will begin with an overview of Japan’s historical economic interests before 
turning to contemporary interaction. Japan’s assistance following India’s 1991 balance-
of-payments crisis when the door to greater engagement was opened is then reviewed, 
followed by the impact on economic relations of the nuclear tests of 1998 which 
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brought a further dip. The events of 9/11 and subsequent lifting of sanctions are then 
addressed. A further external stimulus from ROK’s success in India is also identified as 
an important structural factor behind Japan’s reappraisal of India’s economic merit. 
 
In Chapter 5 it was noted how during the post-war era, the two nations held healthy 
economic relations. However during the Cold War, Japan and India followed 
diametrically opposed economic models. Rather than the political affinities explaining 
Japan and India’s deviation from one another in these decades, differing economic 
systems provided the major structural obstacle.  
 
Japan has primarily viewed India as an ODA destination rather than trade or investment 
partner. Indeed ODA has represented the major concentration of Japanese efforts during 
the period of study. With this in mind the remainder of the chapter divides into two. The 
first section will explore Japan’s ODA strategy towards India whilst the second looks at 
private initiatives (supported by the Government of Japan). Regarding ODA the chapter 
will address how Japan has channelled its ODA to improve the infrastructure and 
business environment to facilitate the entry of Japanese firms and stronger diplomatic 
ties which greater interaction might produce. The section will also identify obstacles, 
successes and the decision-making process.  
 
For the second section, trade, investment (FDI) and projects such as the DMIC will be 
the focus. Trade has long been one of the weakest areas of interaction but hopes are 
high following the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) in February 2011.90 The background to this deal is discussed with analysis of 
                                                            
90 This agreement is also referred to as EPA, omitting the ‘comprehensive’ prefix in Japan whilst CEPA is 
preferred in India.  
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its likely impact as well as what the signing of the Japan-India CEPA demonstrates 
about Japan’s approach to free trade and economic diplomacy. The auto industry, 
pharmaceuticals and IT sector are among those believed to show greatest promise and 
are examined in detail with special reference to the unique success of Suzuki in the 
Indian market.  
 
India also acts as an ‘insurance policy’ for Japanese firms wary of China’s long-term 
stability. Japan’s India’s policy therefore highlights the shift in economic strategy from 
one dependent on first Southeast Asia, followed by China, to one where multiple 
emerging markets are wooed. The economic dimension of Japan’s India policy has also 
gained greater salience as official government rhetoric has retreated from overt political 
overtones discussed in Chapter 8. The financial crisis from 2007 onwards also shifted 
perceptions from predominantly political/strategic concerns in light of the post-9/11 era 
towards one where ‘economic diplomacy’ takes centre stage. 
 
Within the thesis’ NCR framework, the primacy of structural factors is apparent through 
an examination of the importance of India’s economic stature, the need to diversify 
from the Chinese market and competitive profile of ROK. Based on these issues Japan’s 
economic interest appears inevitable and self-evident. Yet despite the rhetoric of 
matching economies the reality is very different from the hypothetical. Regardless of 
the existence of structural complementarities, Japan and India have not exploited these 
chances fully. The reasons for reticence must therefore be traced to additional 
intervening factors which have challenged structural forces. Primary among these has 
been the perception of India’s inadequacy as a market for Japanese investment. Japan’s 
peculiar approach to business which traditionally avoids risk has also played a part, in 
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addition to several complaints which have not yet been suitably addressed by the Indian 
government regarding among others; infrastructure, tax and labour laws.  
 
Private firms, METI and JETRO have all been slow to adjust to India’s sustained 
economic growth. Politicians too have hesitated to see India as an economic partner. 
Only once this barrier was weakened by reports such as that by Goldman Sachs in 2003 
and ever-greater evidence of India’s sustained growth, has economic engagement taken 
a rising trajectory. The efforts of the Japanese governments have been instrumental 
nonetheless in alerting the business community, on whom responsibility for improving 
economic ties lies. 
 
I. India’s 1990-1 economic crisis – an opportunity for Japanese action 
 
The 1990s represented the first time India looked seriously towards East Asia. The end 
of the Cold War brought dramatic change to India’s orientation with a new opportunity 
to define its international role and distance itself from the Soviet experiment. India’s 
shift, however, was primarily necessitated by economic near-calamity when 
concurrently Japan was able to make the first positive move towards India for decades. 
Structural changes therefore brought the two together. 
 
For much of the century following independence, India maintained a tightly regulated 
‘Licence Raj’ in which foreign investment was vehemently avoided. During these years 
India achieved a steady growth of around 3.5%;91 the ‘Hindu rate of growth’. A small 
                                                            
91 A cautionary note is necessary here since states and institutions measure economic figures according to 
different criteria making comparison complex. India for example reports GDP growth according to the 
fiscal year rather than the calendar and calculates based on income gained from factors of production 
whilst China using expenditure. According to The Economist this means that taxes and subsidies 
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number of Japanese businesses attempted to enter the market but the Cold War 
distraction and frequent failing of initiatives, hardened opinion.92 By the late 1980s, 
India’s experiment with a socialist economic system reached crisis point.93 A rising 
fiscal deficit and overvaluation of the rupee forced Rajiv Gandhi to introduce some 
minor liberalisation reforms but none was great enough to stave off the balance-of-
payments (BOP) imbalance, which by 1990-91 had reached possible catastrophe. 
India’s foreign exchange reserves reached near depletion to the extent it was said that 
India had only enough funds to finance two to three weeks worth of imports.94  
 
India under the new leadership of P.V. Narashimha Rao with Manmohan Singh as 
Finance Minister was determined to avoid seeking IMF support and indeed sought 
bilateral assistance.  Taiwan reportedly refused the petitions of the Indian Minister of 
Commerce but Japan acquiesced 95  providing an emergency loan (with the UK) of 
$300m.96 The IMF soon provided the bulk of support for recovery whilst demanding 
India pledge 67 tonnes of its gold reserves in exchange. 
 
Singh, Prime Minister since 2004 often remembers this act on visits to Japan but 
Japan’s intervention was not strategic with closer relations foreseen as a result. Instead 
the effort was part of Japan’s aid programme, in-keeping with the objective of assisting 
                                                                                                                                                                              
complicate the results. ‘India v China: The X factor’, The Economist,  20 April 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18586836 (Accessed on 20/04/11)  
92 Author’s interview with Sanjeev Sinha, Founding President, Sun & Sands Advisors 22 June 2010 
93 Political shocks, both external and domestic, heightened the crisis with various internal disputes (three 
changes of government in two years), the dissolution of the Soviet Union, unification of Germany and 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and subsequent oil shock. This latter event hit India’s economy 
particularly hard due to India’s dependence on crude oil supplies and intake of remittances from workers 
who returned to India. 
94 Arunabha Ghosh, ‘Pathways Through Financial Crisis: India’, Global Governance 12 (2006), p. 415 
95 Author’s interview with Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor of Chinese Studies, JNU, New Delhi, 1 March 
2011  
96  ‘A New Era of Japan-India Relations’, p. 3 
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developing countries in need.97 India’s government had to practically ‘beg’ Japan for 
financial support. According to Gurumurthy, India’s Foreign Minister was forced to 
wait in a hotel lobby for his Japanese counterpart, only to be brushed aside to speak 
with the Vice Minister, a bureaucratic and lower-ranking representative.98 Nevertheless 
the episode marked an important turning point in relations, not least the perceptions of 
elites in Delhi. Thereafter India launched a new economic strategy, providing the major 
structural impetus for Japan’s renewed interest in the region.  
 
II. 1990s – Limited economic progress through ‘turbulent’ times 
 
Economic reforms took several years to lure Japanese businesses to the Indian market. 
Liberalisation was a process rather than an event, which continues to this day. By 1995 
the environment was free enough to encourage a small number of Japanese firms to 
enter. Of those who took the risk, however, most left abruptly following India’s nuclear 
tests in 1998. The tests and Japan’s subsequent reaction as a result, cost the relationship 
at least two years of progress. As Ambassador Hirabayashi commented at the time, the 
introduction of a 4% additional customs duty also led foreign investors to adopt ‘a 
cautious wait and watch attitude while others like the FIIs [Foreign Institutional 
Investors] are even pulling out of the country.’ The attraction of the India market had 
furthermore been ‘worsened by swadeshi rhetoric’.99  
 
                                                            
97 Author’s interview with Sugio and Sahdev 
98 Author’s interview with Ramamurthy Gurumurthy, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Institute for 
Economic Studies 17 May 2010. The IIES is a quasi-academic institution and consultancy affiliated with 
Waseda University and headed by Eisuke Sakakibara 
99 ‘Swadeshi’ refers to the approach taken by the Indian independence movement to improve India’s self-
sufficiency by boycotting British goods ‘Japan does not recognise India, Pak as N-weapon states,’ Rediff 
News, July 3, 1998, http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/jul/03bomb.htm (Accessed on 13/10/10) 
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The number of firms established in India in 1998 was meagre. The imposition of 
sanctions or ‘economic measures’, was not therefore considered by MOFA to represent 
a significant cost to Japanese industry. The predominant economic instrument was ODA 
and in 1986 Japan became India’s largest bilateral provider.100 By 1988 the US was 
only ninth.101  
 
The nuclear tests threw Japan’s ODA projects into immediate disarray. JICA (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency) officials were holding a concluding appraisal session 
on day of the tests, having to cut short their meeting to return to Tokyo to decide a 
course of action. According to officials stationed in India, the period was ‘turbulent’ and 
‘depressing’.102 Relations had been on a rising trend with several projects in operation. 
Many staff assumed the sanctions would continue indefinitely and sought ways to 
identify bottlenecks and continue their work in India. For example Japan decided not to 
curtail the Delhi Metro project which was paid for through ‘time-sliced loans’. 103 
Japan’s ambassador sought to clarify the purpose of economic ‘measures’ not to 
‘penalise’ India but rather an ‘expression of dismay and disappointment,’104 leaving the 
door ajar for renewed engagement. 
 
India’s economic prospects were also damaged by internal conflict. In the latter months 
of 2001 international attention was brought to the subcontinent when India’s parliament 
was attacked. Large scale mobilisation of troops to India’s border areas followed as 
                                                            
100 India’s second-biggest donor is said to contribute half of Japan’s commitments. Author’s interview 
with Suzuki 
101 Sourced from New York Times, 21 April, 1988, p. A6 in Haber, ‘The Death of Hegemony’, pp. 892-9 
102 Author’s interview with Shohei Hara, Director, South Asia Division, JICA 18 June 2010. Hara’s 
family was also involved in Indian business 
103 Author’s interview with Hara 
104 ‘Japan does not recognise India, Pak as N-weapon states’ 
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fears grew of a fourth Indo-Pakistan war. General Musharraf assumption of power in 
Pakistan also unnerved onlookers. 
 
Despite the efforts of Japanese diplomats, few Japanese firms were willing to enter such 
a volatile market. President Clinton’s successful visit to India in April 2000 reversed the 
‘tilt’ towards Pakistan105 yet this was insufficient to promote an upswing in trade and 
investment. Whilst the political environment had been improved to allow for greater 
Japan-India interaction therefore, the reality economically was much harder to pursue. It 
was evident that far more than just diplomatic overtures were needed to encourage 
Japanese stakeholders.  
 
III. The lifting of sanctions 
 
Japan’s inability to act independently was evident when despite the wishes of the 
majority of MOFA, political goals of leadership and pressure from the US triumphed in 
the timetable of sanctions imposed on India following the 1998 tests.  
 
Japan remains unsure of the extent to which their sanctions damaged India but knew 
that with other nations they sent a clear message of displeasure. Their sustained impact, 
however, was less evident. As one senior official noted, ‘collectively sanctions were 
effective but Japan couldn’t act alone’. One senior official noted that sanctions had 
‘functioned’ for two years but thereafter had become a ‘burden’ and no longer an 
instrumental diplomatic tool.106  
                                                            
105 According to Talbott and the ‘nearly universal verdict of Indian commentators at the time’, Clinton’s 
visit was ‘one of the most successful such trips ever’. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 193 
106 Author’s interview with senior official and former Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA 
25 June 2010 
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The decision to lift sanctions on India and Pakistan was lead by the US but the topic 
was discussed at length in the Diet.107 Bureaucrats interviewed agreed that the rationale 
rested on the changing global system following 9/11, demonstrating the importance of 
structure in Japan’s decision-making. As one MOFA Director admits, Japan’s move was 
not because India had done anything good for disarmament but since the ‘global 
situation had changed’.108 
 
The decision was not solely due to 9/11. Japan had been looking for a reason to ease the 
‘economic measures’ almost as soon as they were imposed. In February 1999, just ten 
months after the Indian tests, thirteen states met in Tokyo to discuss restarting World 
Bank economic assistance 109  chaired by a Japanese official. 110  The outcome of 
discussions was never really in doubt, briefed as they were by Talbott on the progress 
made in negotiating with both India and Pakistan on non-proliferation.   
       
Officials were also aware of how the decision would play domestically, demonstrating 
the role which unit-level considerations play. In a sense, Japan could point to ‘success’ 
in the form of India’s verbal moratorium on future tests but only the global shift as a 
result of 9/11 focusing on security in South Asia provided the excuse acceptable to the 
Japanese public. Even then MOFA was wary.  As one senior official explained, the 
                                                            
107 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
108 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010. The 
decision in the US was similarly based on pragmatic calculation. As Talbott states, sanctions had ‘long 
since passed the point of diminishing returns.’ As the White House commented, ‘waiving these sanctions 
does not reflect a diminution of our concerns over nuclear and missile proliferation…rather it reflects a 
considered judgement that we are more likely to make progress on our non-proliferation agenda through a 
cooperative relationship in which sanctions are no longer an issue.’ Talbott, Engaging India, p. 213 
109 These talks were held at the senior official level between the G8 nations (Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the US) in addition to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Ukraine and ROK. 
13 powers to discuss sanction easing for India, Pakistan. 
110 Nobuyasu Abe, Director General for arms control and scientific affairs at the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry 
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word ‘teishi’ (suspension) was avoided in preference for the more tentative term 
‘discontinue’. ‘Abolish’ would have been impossible.111 
 
By the next millennium the international structure was only slightly more hospitable to 
engagement. The prospect of nuclear cooperation was not raised (at least officially) in 
the talks Mori held to neutralise the 1998 diplomatic nadir in preference for more 
practical initiatives, primarily focused around the IT sector. It was thus India’s 
economic profile rather than political structure which reawakened Japan to India’s 
advantage. 
 
IV. Reassessment of India’s economic worth 
 
When Wilson and Purushothaman asked in 2003, ‘Are you ready?’ in their ground-
breaking Goldman Sachs’ report on the future state of the world economy,112 the answer 
from Tokyo was an uncomfortable ‘No’. Few in Japan and further afield had expected 
the conclusions to have been quite as stark as they were.  
 
The authors not only predicted that the ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would 
overtake the G6113 in dollar terms by 2040 but most acutely heard by onlookers in 
Tokyo that India’s economy could be larger than Japan’s by as early as 2032.114 India 
was identified as the country likely to show the most growth despite having the most 
                                                            
111 Author’s interview with senior official and former Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA 
25 June 2010 
112 D. Wilson and R. Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050’, Goldman Sachs, Global 
Economics Paper No, 99, October 1, 2003, p. 17 
113 This includes the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the UK though the term itself is no longer 
used, in preference for G7 or G8. 
114 Ibid. p. 14 
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‘work to do’ in certain areas.115 With the qualifier of good governance and institutions, 
India emerged from its colonial image as one of the future winners of globalisation. 
Whilst India’s projected real GDP growth in coming years was estimated between 5.9 
and 6.1%, Japan’s wavered around 1%.116 The report did not discount Japan as an 
important power, indeed of the current G6 only the US and Japan were predicted to 
remain in the top six economies. But the report marked the next stage of Japan’s gradual 
reassessment of India and beginning of more concerted efforts to actively engage. 
Whilst Brazil and Russia were less keenly pursued, Japan’s new India policy emanated 
in part from this report.117  
 
India’s economy, once the major barrier to interaction between Japan and India, now 
represented the centrepiece of Japan’s ‘second wave’ of interest. With reports that India 
would be the fastest growing economy by 2012, 118 Japanese firms and government 
sought to bolster this aspect of relations. The global reassessment of India is predicated 
on its remarkable growth, forming the basis of Japan’s strategy of engagement.  
 
India’s existence on Japanese exporters’ radar was highlighted further following the 
launch of talks for an India-Thailand FTA (a precursor to the India-ASEAN FTA signed 
in August 2009). Since several Japanese goods are assembled in production bases in 
Thailand, they too could benefit from an ‘Early Harvest’ Programme wherein tariffs 
have been removed from several items. India is now almost fully integrated into 
                                                            
115 For example in expanding education 
116 Wilson and Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050’ 
117 Author’s interview with Madoka Koda, Senior Economist, Japan Center for International Finance 29 
June 2010. The JCIF is a non-profit research institute funded by members such as banks, trading 
companies and manufacturers. The organisation conducts country-risk assessments, mainly in developing 
countries. Koda is responsible for India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka but 80% of her attention is on India 
but is expected to rotate her role every three years.    
118 ‘India to be world's fastest growing economy by 2012: Report’, Indian Express, 15 November. 2010, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-to-be-worlds-fastest-growing-economy/711629/ (Accessed on 
15/11/10) 
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conceptions of the Asian economy. As India’s relations with ASEAN and China have 
grown in the economic field, Japan has been unable to ignore India’s presence.119 As 
India’s Finance Minister P. Chidambaram, told delegates at Davos in January 2006, 
‘You can't afford not to engage India.’120 
 
India’s ‘growth potential’ is frequently cited as another key attraction,121 particularly 
within the middle class whose consumer power is eyed by many. Between 2001 and 
2009, the grouping grew on average at 12.9% a year to constitute 12.8% of all Indian 
households.122 In the short to medium term this domestic demand is where Japanese 
companies see the most potential. In the longer term the hope is that India, as an ideal 
geographic link to Europe and the Middle East, can serve as a manufacturing hub but 
India has not yet proved itself a viable export platform.123 India also aspires to this 
function hoping to form a similar supply chain model as seen in China and ASEAN.124  
 
Interest in India in the new millennium was thus not only due to geopolitical shifts. The 
influence was also economic. Even after liberalisation, which had begun nine years 
earlier in 1991, India’s economy was considered largely insignificant. Yet as Urata 
notes, the ‘payoff from the reforms was most dramatic after 2000’.125 Whilst economic 
                                                            
119 Author’s interview with A. Tanaka 
120 ‘You can’t ignore us anymore: PC to World,’ Express India, 30 January, 2006, 
http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=62204 (Accessed on 04/05/09) 
121 Geethanjali Nataraj, ‘India-Japan Investment Relations: Trends and Prospects’, ICREIR, Working 
Paper No. 245, January 2010, p. 9 
122 Shujiro Urata, ‘The Indian Economy: Growth, Challenges and Regional Cooperation’, Asia Research 
Report 2009, Japan Center for Economic Research, March 2010, 
http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/asia09intro.pdf, p. 5 
123 Author’s interview with Koda 
124 Author’s interview with Senior Indian MEA official 
125 Shujiro Urata, ‘How India’s Dynamism Can Energize Japan – Cooperating on Infrastructure and 
Environment to Clear the Way for Growth’, Asian Research Report 2009, Japan Center for Economic 
Research, March 2010, http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/nikkei100115.pdf p. 2 
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growth averaged just below 6% a year between 1991 and 2003, from 2003-2007 the rate 
was more than 8%.126 
 
The global financial crisis from 2008 also placed India in a favourable light. The US 
banking failure was not initially considered a crisis for Japan.127 However when the 
downturn kicked in, Japan felt the pain contributing a whole percentage to the global 
GDP shrink of 4.2% in the first quarter of 2009. Meanwhile the Indian economy was 
relatively unscathed. Growth rates have continued to impress, standing at 8.9% in the 
second quarter of 2010.128 According to the IMF, India’s economy grew a total of 
10.4% on the previous year, outpacing even China.129 The ‘Lehman shock’ whilst also 
accelerating China’s rise, according to a METI official also alerted Japan away from the 
US market towards India.130 
 
In tandem with economic dynamism, India has also shown greater interest in global 
affairs. As Ambassador Enoki noted, `We observe that India is now attempting to shift 
in her diplomatic stance of a ‘labour union leader’ to that of an ‘executive of the world 
management’ status.131 India’s ‘Look East’ approach to break out of the South Asia 
‘box’ has already yielded some positive dividends, including membership of the ARF, 
ASEAN+3 and the conclusion of FTAs with Thailand, Singapore132 and now Japan and 
ROK. In 2010 alone India improved its status within the IMF through greater voting 
                                                            
126 Ibid. 
127 With the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group were 
able to purchase 21% of Morgan Stanley and Nomura Holdings took over the Asia-Pacific and European 
operations of Lehman Brothers. 
128 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Indian growth has lifted all boats’, East Asia Forum, 16 January, 2011, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/16/indian-growth-has-lifted-all-boats/ (Accessed on 16/01/11) 
129 ‘The Hindu rate of self-deprecation’, Economist, 20 April 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18586958 (Accessed on 20/04/11)  
130 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
131 Former Ambassador Enoki cited in Satu Limaye, ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, p. 225 
132 For Singapore the FTA was a ‘win-win’ deal. Author’s interview with Sakikibara. Singapore is India’s 
top investor and one of the primary supporters of the East Asia Summit over other regional groupings.  
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rights and firmly established itself as a key member of the G20. Japan has therefore 
greater need to work closely with India in multilateral forums. 
 
Nevertheless without a solid industrial framework, Japanese investors have been 
deterred from FDI in sectors such as manufacturing, which have proven profitable in 
China and Southeast Asia. Japanese firms have enjoyed a certain ‘pampering’ in these 
markets and hoped to receive a similar ‘free rein’ in India. 133  This has not been 
forthcoming. Before India can become a manufacturing hub, a number of alleged 
complaints need to be resolved. Several are valid concerns, however, in keeping with 
this thesis’ NCR framework by looking at how the perceptions of those engaging with 
India interact with structural conditions the nature of Japanese policy can be 
appreciated.   
 
V. Japan’s complaints134 
 
Delegations to India have not been shy in letting their feelings known to Indian 
officials. Indeed Japan has long complained to India of its faults as an investment 
destination. In 1992 the report of the 100-strong Japanese Economic Mission to India 
listed many of the same problems present-day businesses urge for reform. 135  The 
Keidanren were sufficiently confident however to state in 1995 that ‘Japan aims to be 
                                                            
133 Author’s interview with Jagmohan Chandrani, Community Leader, Japan 26 June 2010  
134 These problems afflict Indian companies as well of course. Author’s interview with Gurumurthy  
135 In the January 1992 Report of the 100-Member Japanese Economic Mission to India, the following 
proposals were made to the Government of Japan: ‘Promoting of frank exchange of opinions, 
strengthening of ODA etc, flexible operation of trade insurance, active support for the expansion of 
investments, promotion of personnel and cultural exchanges and establishment of permanent medical 
clinic with J doctors.’ For the private sector objectives were identified as ‘the promotion of investments, 
expansion of flight networks and promotion of surveys in such areas as investment opportunities.’ Rokuro 
Ishikawa, ‘Report of the 100-Member Japanese Economic Mission to India in January 1992 LED’, India 
and Japan: Toward a New Era, (Delhi, UBS, 1992), pp. 157-160 
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the biggest investor in India by 2000.136 It was not to be, however, so much so that by in 
2010, whilst referring to India as a ‘long term partner and friend’, the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (JCCI) maintained their earlier charges.137 In 2010 for example 
the JCCI still considered visas as the second item of a list of ‘Suggestions for 
Government of India’.138 These were later slightly relaxed during Singh’s October 2010 
visit to Tokyo.  
 
Japan’s petitioning to Indian officials has not been welcomed in India. As one report by 
the Machinery Export Association of Japan showed, the number of complaints 
regarding FDI to India was ‘unproportionately [sic] big for its relatively small FDI 
accomplishments from Japan’.139 In fact as alluded to above, regarding the changing 
balance of power between Japan and India, economically many in India have grown to 
resent or become frustrated with Japan’s constant calls for reform. 
 
Economic delegations provide the opportunity for potential investors to learn about 
India’s investment environment. However despite frequent ‘fact-finding’ missions, 
                                                            
136 Asahi Evening News 1 February 1995 in Ibid.  
137 Japan is also the only country to have a Chamber of Commerce just for Japanese rather than with the 
home country. Author’s interview with Asrani 
138 According to the report, ‘As the economic interactions between India and Japan have become more 
intense, the number of Japanese companies in India is increasing rapidly, and the visa problems are 
becoming all the more serious. We request the following measures: To extend the duration of validity by 
3 years for employment visas, to remove or relax the limitations of employment visa for foreign personnel 
to the extent of the 1% of the total persons employed on the project, to flexibly relax the 2 year stay 
requirement when one applies for business visa or employment visa from Indian mission in the third 
countries.’ ‘Suggestions for Government of India by Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in India 
(JCCII), India Embassy of Japan, April 5, 2010, http://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-
Relations/2010_.pdf Visa rules were somewhat eased in late 2009 following Hatoyama’s visit. ‘India, 
Japan look to ease visa rules to boost trade’, Daily Times, Pakistan, December 30, 2009, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\30\story_30-12-2009_pg5_35 (Accessed on 
02/01/10) 
139 Toshihiko Kinoshita, ‘How to promote FDI in India through lessons in East Asia?’ Paper presented at 
seminar on FDI in India, cosponsored by FICCI and JETRO, December 20, 2000, 
http://homepage3.nifty.com/tkinoshita/research/pdf/NewDelhi.pdf p. 8 The Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) was established in 1927 and is the largest business 
organisation in India. 
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hopes for tangible results have steadily decreased.140 Several Japanese trade missions 
have visited India but through uncoordinated efforts (separate delegations from the 
Agriculture Ministry and JETRO for example) little has been agreed. When Abe made 
his state visit to India from August 21 to 23, 2007 he was accompanied by a 200-strong 
delegation of Japanese business leaders. The hope was to stir interest in India as an 
investment destination. Nevertheless not one business deal was struck as a result of the 
visit.141 
 
Furthermore it has been noted that whilst visits have been frequent, delegations often 
consist of submitting complaints, creating an unfavourable impression of Japanese 
business. As one METI official laments, these missions are plagued by Japanese 
practice which defers decision-making so that delegations simply follow the Prime 
Minister on his tour.142 JETRO offices in India are also said to be frustrated by repeated 
‘wait and see’ conclusions 143 and Indian commentators note Japan’s ‘excruciatingly 
slow’ decision-making144 and absurd excuses for inaction.145 Prime Minister Singh is 
said to have compared Japan’s inertia with that of China where a deal worth $3bn can 
be agreed in just five minutes.146  
 
 
                                                            
140 Author’s interview with Go Yamada, Senior Economist, Japan Center for Economic Research 25 June 
2010. JCER is affiliated with Nikkei and 100% private but from 2010 has become a public institution 
141 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010. This contrasts particularly with 2010 when a Chinese delegation visited India with 
Premier Wen Jiabao and $16 bn worth of deals was struck and $10 bn when President Obama visited 
earlier that year. Kevin Rafferty, ‘Indian elephant too slow for the Chinese dragon’, Japan Times, January 
4, 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110104a1.html (Accessed on 04/01/11) Abe’s visit 
was also overshadowed by the global debate over the US-India civil nuclear agreement..  
142 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
143 Author’s interview with Koda 
144 Author’s interview with Seth 
145 Author’s interview with Sahdev 
146 Author’s interview with Kondo 
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i. India’s shortcoming as an investment destination 
 
Japan’s hesitancy has been based on some reasonable foundations. Among the major 
obstacles to developing business identified by JETRO are: diverse languages, cultures 
and laws across the country, high tariffs, limited production sites (due to poor 
infrastructure) and use-restrictions and strong local competitors.147 India’s tax system is 
also described as ‘cumbersome and complicated’. 148 Firms have to deal with some 
poorly-skilled and unproductive labour and the presence of strong domestic companies 
like Tata, which make foreign firms’ operation difficult. Unlike ASEAN and China 
where foreign firms receive some preferential treatment, in India domestic competition 
is strong. Deregulation is slow as firms claim that seemingly endless bureaucratic red 
tape deters investors, unclear over the differences in business practices across states and 
administrative regions. In some cases no matter what efforts are made at the centre to 
improve India’s investment environment, bureaucracy at the state level intervenes.149 As 
Rafferty commented, India is an ‘elephant that walks slowly.’150  
 
ii. Infrastructure  
 
Poor infrastructure has been the major cause of complaint. According to a 2006 JBIC 
study, inadequate infrastructure was the primary bottleneck.151 Indeed India’s record is 
                                                            
147 ‘Japanese Manufacturers in the Indian Market Move to Secure Their Lead’, Nikkei Business, April 20, 
2010, http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/eng/20100420/214079/ (Accessed on 19/03/11)  
148 ‘Suggestions for Government of India by Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in India’ 
149 Author’s interview with Satoh 
150 Rafferty, ‘Indian elephant too slow for the Chinese dragon’ 
151 ‘Issues in Promising Countries and Regions’, Survey Report On Overseas Business Operations by 
Japanese Manufacturing Companies - Results of JBIC FY 2006 Survey: Outlook for Japanese Foreign 
Direct Investment (18th Annual Survey), November 2006, 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/about/press/2006/1122-01/houkokusyo.pdf p. 21 JBIC is a policy-based 
financing institution, established in October 1999 to provide ODA loans and promote external economic 
cooperation.  
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globally dire, especially considering the promise reported for India’s economy. 
According to the World Economic Forum in 2010 India ranked 89th out of 133 in 
infrastructure, 89th for road quality, 90th for ports, 65th for air transport and 106th for 
quality of electricity supply.152 In no Indian city is water available 24 hours-a-day and 
whilst China contains 3.75m km of highways, India has only 67 000km. When 
improvements are proposed, 70% are stalled because of land acquisition delays, which 
India has been unable to adequately address.153 As one Japanese ambassador noted, 
whilst China in the 1990s was embarking on ambitious construction projects, India was 
yet to run a highway.154 A lack of department stores, supermarkets and quality hotels 
was also cited as hindrances by businessmen who ventured early into India. In 1995 
Taisuke Shimizu of the Bank of Tokyo said, ‘A lot of Japanese firms would be 
interested to invest in India if they could be sure there were proper facilities – roads and 
communications – available to them,’ 155  a claim repeated over a decade later by 
Japanese investors and Saiki, Japan’s current ambassador.156 In addition, in the WB’s 
annual report, ‘Doing Business 2011’ India ranked 134th position of the 183 covered.157 
This represented an increase of just one place since 2010.  
 
                                                            
152 Kevin Rafferty, ‘Failings of Indian infrastructure’, Japan Times, September 3, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100903a1.html (Accessed on 03/09/10  
153 ‘India’s economy: One more push’, The Economist, July 21, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18988536 (Accessed on 21/07/11) 
154 Author’s interview with Tanino 
155 The Daily Star, 2 Feb 1995, 7 cited in Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and 
Developing Relationships add page number 
156 ‘Infrastructure development key to attracting investments: Japan Envoy Akitaka Saiki,’ Economic 
Times, 11 July 2011, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/infrastructure-
development-key-to-attracting-investments-japan-envoy-akitaka-saiki/articleshow/9184042.cms 
(Accessed on 12.07/11) 
157 ‘Doing Business 2010, Making a difference for entrepreneurs’, Doing Business, November 4, 2010, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/annual-
reports/english/db11-fullreport.pdf p. 4 (Accessed 18/02/11) 
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Power generation is also deficient as high costs and black outs frustrate both businesses 
and residents. 158  These problems are not only trying for the individual but add 
considerably to costs and frustrations for factory production.159 To overcome this India 
plans to build several large-scale power plants.160 Estimates vary but according to Rajiv 
Kumar approximately $567bn is needed to bring India’s infrastructure to standard.161 
Between 2012 and 2017 the government plans to spend $1 trillion on infrastructure 
investment to constitute 9%, up from 4% of GDP.162 
 
iii. Investment climate 
 
Japanese firms have also faced delays due to the dichotomy present in India whereby 
some favour FDI whilst others resist. Within the modern generation of leaders, 
integration into world markets is viewed by some as an important means to facilitate 
stability. Public figures such as PM Singh are aware of the strategic and security 
benefits. According to former Ambassador to Japan Asrani, Singh was told when he 
once represented India’s bid to join APEC, to return after increasing exchanges with 
Southeast Asia.163 Singh is also especially keen for investment, rather than recurrent 
delegations, to defend himself domestically following the gamble of aligning with the 
US.  
 
                                                            
158 Author’s interview with G. Yamada 
159 Author’s interview with Suzuki 
160 Kojo Sako, ‘Japanese Companies Venturing into the Indian Market: India requires different marketing 
strategies from ASEAN and China’, Mizuho Economic Outlook and Analysis, 23 May, 2008, 
http://www.mizuho-ri.co.jp/research/economics/pdf/eo/MEA080513.pdf p. 2 
161 ‘India Needs $500bn In Infrastructure: Think Tank Chief’, Nikkei, 20 May, 2010, 
http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20100520D20SS921.htm (Accessed on 21/05/10) 
162 Rafferty, ‘Failings of Indian infrastructure’ 
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Others, however, are more hesitant. In contrast to China which has depended on inward 
FDI to integrate into the global economy, India has been more cautious. According to 
the 2003 World Investment Report by 2002 foreign affiliates represented 50% of 
Chinese exports, up from 9% in 1989.164 A similar figure of around 10% is recorded in 
India today. Inward FDI is primarily market-seeking, known as ‘horizontal’ rather than 
export-promoting or ‘vertical’.165  
 
Sustained high tariff rates are cited as further reason for multinationals’ reticence. 
Whilst there has been a sizeable reduction since 1991 from an average of 115% to 32% 
in 2000 and 15% in 2007 according to the WTO,166 traders resent India’s prohibition of 
FDI in retail (except single brands where only up to 51% is allowed), atomic energy, 
lottery, gambling and betting. In April 2010 the Japan Retailers Association petitioned 
India once again to relax regulations to allow for multi-branded investment in India’s 
‘vibrant and potential market’167 worth an estimated $450m. Whilst the government is 
cautious about protecting millions of shopkeepers and suppliers of India’s kirana 
outlets, pressure is growing to open up. Walmart and Carrefour have already opened 
stores. 168  Singh stated in his 2010 visit to Japan, ‘in due time’ this will change. 
Compared to the US and UK, however, Japan’s retail interest is less intense.  
 
                                                            
164 Veeramani Choorikkadan, ‘India gearing up for growth’, East Asia Forum, August 8, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/08/india-gearing-up-for-growth/ (Accessed on 08/08/10) 
165 Ibid.  
166 Chung-Ho Kim and Barun Mitra, ‘Choosing the slow lane en route to free trade’, Japan Times, 7 
August, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090807a2.html (Accessed on 07/08/09) 
167 ‘Japanese retailers want India to remove FDI restrictions’, Hindustan Times,2  April, 2010,  
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Japanese-retailers-want-India-to-remove-FDI-restrictions/Article1-
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168 ‘Carrefour in India, A wholesale invasion’, The Economist, 20 May 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16168260 (Accessed on 20/05/10) 
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Those in the financial sector also wish India to raise the upper limit of FDI in the 
insurance sector from 26%.169 Tariffs now equal a similar level to those in ASEAN 
which has somewhat buoyed trade and the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
established a Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA) to ease the approval 
of FDIs, pleasing investors.170 
 
iv. Corruption 
 
The existence of corruption has long been known and accepted in India. For Japanese 
companies the practice has not served as a primary deterrent since its use is also well-
known in China and Vietnam where Japan has carved out a market. As business leaders 
told the author, since the majority of scandals have affected domestic firms they have 
not been too concerned. In recent years, however, high-level bribes totalling millions of 
dollars have threatened India’s growth. According to a KPMG report in March 2011, 
foreign investors are now taking note.171 In another survey India is ranked the fourth 
most-corrupt country in the world, with investors notably more wary than five years 
ago.172 Real estate, construction and telecommunications are cited as the most affected; 
areas where Japan is trying to make ground.  
 
Since Indian law attributes some responsibility for a firm once 5-10% of equity is 
granted, firms are also worried about becoming embroiled.173 When comparisons with 
                                                            
169 ‘Suggestions for Government of India by Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in India’ 
170 ‘Face to Face Interview: Interview with Mr. Osamu Watanabe: JETRO Focusing on Business Match-
Making Programme’, India One Stop, 23 June, 2003, http://www.indiaonestop.com/face2face/osamu.htm 
(Accessed on 15/06/09) 
171 ‘Corruption 'threatens India's economic growth' BBC News, 15 March 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12740213 (Accessed on 15/03/2011) 
172 ‘Business in India: The price of graft’, The Economist, 24 March 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18441135 (Accessed on 24/03/11)  
173 Ibid.   
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China have been levelled at India, the common response has been to point to India’s 
‘soft infrastructure’ referring to the rule of law but this system is also criticised for 
moving too slowly.174 Japanese companies, as inherently ‘risk-averse’ are particularly 
liable to react negatively. India is also perceived as a difficult market to leave after 
Toshiba made heavy losses when a battery cell project failed.175  
 
v. ‘Distant neighbours’ 
 
India’s geographic distance is often given as the primary reason for Japan’s delay. 
Flights are infrequent and compared to China or ROK, journey time can be nine times 
as long, before travel from airport to business location on India’s volatile roads is 
considered.176 This ‘tyranny of distance’177 is therefore a burden for both Indian and 
Japanese firms who cannot complete business trips in one day as is the case locally.  
 
vi. Democratic delays 
 
Rhetorically Japan and India’s shared democratic profiles have provided a basis for 
relations. In some senses, however, India’s ‘democratic dividend’ has slowed economic 
progress. Japanese firms are acutely cautious of political stability when investing 
abroad. Continuity rather than any particular regime is the dominant concern as can be 
seen in Japan’s preference for countries such as Singapore, China and Vietnam which 
hold limited democratic credentials but offer few surprises and quick, centralised 
                                                            
174 According to The Economist, there are an estimated 30 million cases waiting to be addressed. ‘The 
Hindu rate of self-deprecation’  
175 Author’s interview with Sahdev 
176 Estimates vary but whilst the distance between Tokyo to Delhi is 5800km, taking 7.5 hours, some 
flights between Japan and China are as low as 40 minutes. In winter 2009 there were only 21 flights 
between Japan and India per week compared to 635 between Japan and China.  
177 Author’s interview with Kinoshita 
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decision-making. Since organisations in the private sector by nature seek environments 
with minimal bureaucratic intervention and maximum opportunity for profits, tight 
regulation over economic and financial systems is a problematic deterrent. Japanese 
businessmen note with envy how in China a straight highway can be installed 
‘overnight’ whereas in India due to local disputes, they twist and turn.178 Infrastructure 
developments have also been delayed from trade union pressure and strict land 
appropriation laws. Even giving bribes is seen as simpler in China.179  
 
vii. Human flows 
 
Human interaction is also low. As one METI official comments, whilst money and 
investments might be increasing, ‘people are slower to move’.180 Japan is keen to utilise 
India’s youthful population, 181  which according to the US Census Bureau’s 
International Database 2000 by 2025 will number 100m in India compared to Japan’s 
just 60m. Yet the number of Japanese residents in India numbers only 3284 (in October 
2008)182 whilst there are approximately 120 000 in China and 115 000 in ASEAN.183 
The number of Indians living in Japan is also comparatively low (approximately 20 
000) with the majority consisting of IT engineers living in the outskirts of Tokyo, 
around Edogawa ward.184 
                                                            
178 Ibid.  
179 Rafferty, ‘Failings of Indian infrastructure’ 
180 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
181 Those aged between 20 and 24 years old 
182 ‘Japan-India Relations’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/india/index.html Haldia, Bangalore and Kolkata are identified as the regions with the most 
significant Japanese populations. In Haldia there is a Mitsubishi plant in Haldia (and Japanese town, 
Sataku), a Toyota factory in Bagalore and historical and cultural links in Kolkata which attract Japanese 
to this region. According to one senior official with experience in the Delhi Embassy, psychologically the 
Japanese and West Bengalis share much in common.  
183 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
184 In December 2008 the total was 22 335 Indian nationals residing in Japan.  
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VI. Japan’s weaknesses 
 
Culpability for poor economic relations has not been solely due to India’s inefficiencies. 
The Japanese economy has also stifled opportunities, particularly as stagnation has 
become the norm. Even though Japan remains a successful, rich economy, the third 
largest in the world, the perception of Japan has weakened.  
 
i. Ingrained business practices 
 
The financial crisis hit Japan’s export-dependent economy particularly hard. In 2009 the 
economy contracted by 3.1%.185 Deflation was also recorded for the first time since 
2006 in November 2009, bringing investors’ fears to reality. 186  Whilst India’s has 
enjoyed exponential growth since opening up to trade, Japan’s economy in 2010 was 
the same size it was in 1991, when India pleaded for Japan to come to its rescue.  
 
Initiative has also been lacking among Japanese businesses. Despite concerted efforts by 
the Japanese government, those petitioning for greater cooperation note the limitations 
of centralised efforts. International onlookers have long criticised Japan (both its firms 
and government) for being ‘risk-averse’. Indeed many within Japan decry the habit of 
avoiding rather than ‘managing’ risk. 187 Others believe Japan’s incentive to expand 
abroad has weakened since Japan secured rich-country status. 188 Furthermore whilst 
                                                            
185 David Warren, ‘Lecture by David Warren, British Ambassador to Tokyo’, Embassy of Japan, London, 
January 21, 2010 
186 ‘Japan’s ailing economy’, The Economist, 20 November, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14943913 (Accessed on 20/11/09) 
187 Warren, ‘Lecture by David Warren, British Ambassador to Tokyo’ 
188 Author’s interview with Rajiv Kumar, Director, Indian Council for Research and International 
Economic Relations , New Delhi, 21 May 2010 
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those ‘on the ground’ in India appreciate the opportunities and increasingly top 
management does as well, the prevalence of middle-managers to concentrate on the 
short-term and overlook long-term strategy is cited as an obstacle.189 Whereas India 
maintains a ‘top-driver’ approach, the Japanese decision-making process is much 
slower.190 According to Chandrani there is also no consensus on who will take the lead 
with India, resulting in little practical application of India’s potential. A culture of ‘pass 
the buck’ therefore prevails.191  
 
Diplomats often speak of India and Japan’s inherent ‘complementarities’ but Japan’s 
economic profile does not directly suit India. For decades Japan has capitalised on 
advanced technology products, which concentrate on the high-end of the market. A 
strong yen has also hurt Japanese exports competing with lower-priced rivals. Japanese 
firms are hesitant to compromise on quality, long one of their strongest competitive 
assets. For the Indian market a ROK’s strategy has proven, ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
thinking is required. Sony for example was forced to close its assembly plant when 
ROK televisions cost half the price.192 Some Japanese firms have adapted but these are 
the exception. Panasonic for example has developed air-conditioners, which operate 
with little energy to suit India’s poor power supply.193 In addition since these machines 
                                                            
189 Author’s interview with Etsuji Nakajima, Chief Strategist, Mistui & Co. India Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 11 
March 2011. Nakajima is responsible for corporate planning, acting as a consultant for Japanese 
companies coming to India.  
190 Rajaram Panda, ‘Introduction’, in Panda and Ando, India and Japan: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives, 
p. 7 
191 Author’s interview with Chandrani 
192 Sony has now returned to India to tap into the growing market for televisions among other electronic 
products. Author’s interview with Naidu 
193 Panasonic announced in 2010 their intention to build a factory in Haryana as well, which is expected 
to be ready by 2012. The factory was thought to also serve as a ‘launching pad for exports to Africa’. 
Panasonic planning factory in India’ 7 October 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/07/idINIndia-
52036220101007 (Accessed on 08/10/10); Sanjoy Majumder ‘India's new face as Asia's car industry 
hub’, BBC News,13 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13735511 (Accessed on 
13/06/11) 
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are often on constantly, they have been designed to make little noise.194 On the whole 
Japanese firms have continued to sell what they want in India rather than what the 
market demands.  
 
ii. Cultural differences  
 
Different business cultures are also cited as obstacles.195 On a superficial level it has 
been suggested that Indians’ ‘talkative nature’ unsettles Japanese businessmen who 
equate such characteristics as bad for business. 196 Businesses are keen to invest in 
regions where living environments are favourable but many Japanese complain about 
the quality of the expatriate lifestyle in India, for example cuisine, temperature and 
sources of entertainment. Indeed in 1990 one Japanese businessman admitted that ‘what 
is normal in India may be extremely abnormal to us Japanese’, creating a ‘certain 
incompatibility or “gap” in perception.’197 Furthermore as one businessman explained 
to the author, ‘No one chooses to come to India, they are forced to’.198 
 
iii. Lack of knowledge 
 
At the official level Japan lacks the expertise to fully exploit economic opportunities in 
India. This issue is frequently cited by those currently involved in the bilateral 
relationship. Whilst JETRO and some private organisations are working to improve 
                                                            
194 ‘Japanese firms push into emerging markets’, The Economist, August 5, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16743435 (Accessed on 05/08/10) Ambassador Asrani also pointed to 
this adjustment, whereby following a two-year study of Indian households it was concluded that almost 
every middle class family owned a fan and by removing all non-essential frills, costs could be 
substantially reduced. Author’s interview with Asrani 
195 Author’s interview with Eisuke Sakakibara, President of Indian Institute for Economic Studies, 
Former Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs 17 May 2010 
196 Ibid. p. 9 
197 Kanwar, ‘Winds of Change’, India-Japan: Towards a New Era, p. 5 
198 Author’s interview with businessmen, March 2011, Kolkata, India 
200 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
contact, the network remains poor. Japan is an ‘info-intensive society’ but with most 
only available in Japanese this information is inaccessible from the outside. METI admit 
that language problems prevent Indian businesses from finding information online. 
Within government ministries, officials admit to limited expertise. Diplomats and trade 
bureaucrats are frequently moved around posts, preventing those with expertise from 
following through policy initiatives. Regarding India, however, given the importance 
the government claims to afford this new market, the lack of knowledge is particularly 
unexpected. 
 
The role of government in the economic relationship nonetheless remains central. 
MOFA have supported human resource exchanges and METI has sponsored 
information-sharing events and delegations discussed above. Yet as Sinha argues, whilst 
the bilateral can survive in the short term with strategic thinkers, in the longer term the 
relationship needs to be business-led.199 Whilst the government can provide information 
on opportunities, only the private sector can act on them.200  
 
The chasm between Japan and India thus appears substantial. However in order to 
address some of these concerns, Japan has made efforts to improve the situation. This 
has been attempted through a large-scale ODA commitment, where this chapter’s 
attention will now focus. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
199 Author’s interview with Sinha 
200 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
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VII. The Role of ODA in Japan’s strategy towards India 
 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy represents one of the strongest 
areas of Japanese diplomacy and an area of interest for academia.201 As Miyagi notes, 
this instrument has been ‘distinctive’ of Japan’s foreign policy approach since 
‘economic capabilities are highly developed compared to...political stature’, 
representing what she terms Japan’s ‘lopsided power profile’.202 Through the provision 
of economic assistance Japan has repeatedly maintained its own national interests 
whether they are diplomatic/political or economic.  
 
Following an outline of Japan’s ODA history and current policy approach, this section 
will turn to how Japan has utilised ODA to further widen diplomatic objectives towards 
India. India has presented an ‘exceptional case’ in which traditional forms of ODA have 
needed to be adjusted to suit India’s unique economic and political position and attitude. 
Japanese policymakers have not been able to employ traditional techniques to acquire 
influence as India’s relationship with Japan has developed from ‘aid recipient’ to 
‘investment partner’. 203  The primary actor involved in this aspect of Japan’s India 
policy remains Japanese bureaucrats (particularly MOFA, MOF and METI) 204  but 
additional players such as the Indian government and Japanese public opinion 
contribute. Whilst India’s economic potential has provided the structural interest in 
improving economic relations, intervening variables such as domestic support for ODA 
                                                            
201 Academic study of Japan’s ODA policy has largely centred on either comparisons with other donors or 
how policy decisions were made; pointing to the often disjointed process. Scholars who have studied 
Japan’s ODA towards the region in particular include Varma and Kalam. Lalima Varma, ‘Japan’s Official 
Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, India Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 3 (July/September 
2009), pp. 237-250; Abul Kalam, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing 
Relationships, (Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 1996) 
202 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 44 
203 Pant, ‘India Looks East and discovers Tokyo’  
204 The MoF is considered especially important since they allocate funds but MOFA holds more experts 
or are more powerful than METI equivalents.  
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and obstacles from both sides to capitalising on ODA’s potential merit, have fashioned 
the policy process.  
 
i. Japan’s post-war ODA strategy 
 
Japanese ODA initially served as an additional form of reparations in repentance for 
actions during the Pacific War. As part of Japan’s return to the international community, 
Japan joined the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in 
Asia and the Pacific,205 a collection of states whose aim was to enhance economic and 
social development in the region in 1954. 206  Japan benefited significantly from 
particularly the intervention of the US to revive Japan’s near-bankrupt economy, 
showing impressive growth by the late 1960s. It was felt in Japan therefore that as a 
member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 
1964, greater efforts should be made to assist the developing world through ODA. 
Within this grouping Japan was a founding member of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC).  
 
An additional stimulus emanated from the fact that whilst Japan’s economic growth had 
been described as miraculous through subsequent decades, Japan’s diplomatic profile 
remained weak.  Leheny argues that through development assistance Japan had the 
‘opportunity to build a distinctive approach’ for international affairs in contrast to its 
                                                            
205 ‘Network’s Final Edition’, Network Magazine, Volume 41, September 2008, 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/network/vol41/vol_41_1.html  
206 The idea was conceived at the Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo, 
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in January 1950 and formally began operations on July 1, 1951. Originally the 
geographical focus of the group was South and Southeast Asia but after 1977 the formal name was 
changed to take account of wider membership. The concept of ‘self help and mutual help in the 
development process’ are central to the organisation.  http://www.colombo-plan.org/history.php  
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deference to the US on most other major issues.207 By the early 1980s, according to 
Brooks and Orr, Japan adopted the approach favoured by other major donors of 
prioritising ‘basic human needs’208 and by the start of the 1990s was the world’s largest 
bilateral donor. Japan held this salutary position until 2001.209 
 
Reasons behind the provision of ODA are not wholly altruistic. Often the donor country 
benefits as much if not more than the recipient. This is difficult to measure but within a 
realist theoretical approach it is reasonable to assume that strategic and/or commercial 
incentives drive ODA policy. Japan has certainly used aid as both an ‘instrument of 
punishment and reward’. 210  Japan’s payments have consistently served their own 
interest, for example by securing oil supplies from the Middle East. According to Dipak 
Gyawali, ‘Foreign aid is merely an extension of a country’s foreign policy in the age of 
commerce and industry’. 211  In addition to hoping to restore relations with former 
adversaries therefore, Japan has consistently sought to use ODA to serve economic 
objectives by providing a favourable market and environment for Japanese investors. 
India is no exception. 
 
Of central importance is that Japan’s increased ODA commitments have not run in 
parallel with India’s greater need. In fact as India’s growth has continued and more has 
been spent by the central government, India’s ‘need’ for Japanese assistance has fallen 
                                                            
207 David Leheny and Kay Warren, ‘Introduction: Inescapable solutions: Japanese aid and the 
construction of global development’, David Leheny, Kay Warren eds., Japanese Aid and the Construction 
of Global Development, Inescapable Solutions, (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 5 
208 William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., ‘Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance’, Asian Survey, Vol. 
25, No. 3 (Mar., 1985), p. 327 cited in Ibid. p. 7 
209 Japan has also made valuable contributions to denuclearising efforts and peace missions to war-torn 
regions like Africa. On February 15th 2008, Japan pledged $3bn to fund the ‘Programme to Tackle the 
Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States). ‘Japan provides aid to tackle proliferation of weapons in Africa’, United Nations 
Development Programme, Newsroom, http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/february/japan-aid-
africa-20080215.en;jsessionid=axbWzt8vXD9 
210 Jain, ‘Japan and South Asia: Between Cooperation and Confrontation’ p. 266 
211 Jain, Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia, p. 15 
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compared to decades earlier. This demonstrates how Japan’s use of ODA has followed 
the desire to capitalise on India’s growth.  
 
ii. The first ODA Charter 
 
For much of the post-war period Japan’s ODA followed ‘principles’ rather than law.212 
As Yasutomo explains, ODA was used on an ‘ad hoc’ and ‘case by case’ basis in 
response to foreign policy priorities. 213  Only on 30 June 1992 did the Japanese 
government establish an ‘ODA Charter’, which would outline Japan’s long-term aid 
strategy. Japan reoriented its approach to take a more active international role in the 
face of criticisms for its ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and low global profile.  
 
Under the Charter’s guidance, the worthiness of recipients was to be clarified against 
criteria including military expenditures, weapons’ development, human rights and 
democratic credentials. At its core was the belief in ‘self help’ as the preferred method 
of promoting economic growth and prosperity.214  
 
iii. Praise and criticism 
 
Japan’s pro-growth emphasis has proved successful. As Leheny notes, the Asian 
countries who received Japanese assistance have shown some of the most remarkable 
                                                            
212  Author’s interview with Masaaki Odashi, Chairperson, Japan NGO Center for International 
Cooperation 10 June 2010. Japanese NGOs have also found it difficult to find a presence in India. In part 
this is due to the Indian approach which prefers domestic organisation to external due to a desire for 
independence, which contrasts with Nepal for example which hosts several Japanese groups.  
213 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 45 
214 This principle contrasts with that in traditionally found in the West of ‘Noble Obligation’. According 
to Takayanagi, the translation of ‘ownership’ from Jijo doryoku has been disputed. Akio Takayanagi, 
‘Recent trends in Japan’s aid policies and prospects for change’, Presentation at the North-South Institute, 
Sept. 9, 2009, p. 14 
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growth in recent decades, far more than that experienced by recipients of European and 
North American aid.215 The threat of economic competition from their neighbour has 
hardened many to continuing assistance and has not sheltered Japan from external 
criticism.216  
 
Japan’s ODA has been censured for its mercantilist orientation. In particular the focus 
on infrastructure rather than social issues has caused some to question the genuine 
compassion behind Japanese efforts.217 With the focus on economic growth, some have 
charged Japan for disproportionately directing funds to potential export destinations 
rather than democracy and human rights.218 The geographical focus on Asia rather than 
further afield is also related to this first point. A preference for yen loans instead of 
grants has been another consistent criticism from outside of Japan’s ODA stance.  
 
Among the strongest critiques, however, has emanated from the domestic population. 
During Japan’s post-war boom decades, public support for ODA was strong. Yet when 
the domestic economy suffered severe recession and subsequent stagnation from the 
1990s onwards, enthusiasm for ambitious aid projects decreased sharply. Officials were 
under new pressure to defend expenditure and demonstrate how Japan benefited from its 
generosity. Even in 2010 Foreign Minister Okada admitted in response to reasons 
behind an ODA study, ‘We conducted the review to win more public support for foreign 
aid…To do so, we have to strategically and efficiently implement aid projects.’ 219 
                                                            
215 Leheny and Warren, ‘Introduction: Inescapable solutions: Japanese aid and the construction of global 
development’, p. 7 
216 In 2008, the year China hosted the Olympic Games in Beijing, Japan announced it would cease new 
yen loans to China.  Jain, ‘From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership,’ p. 17 
217 Author’s interview with Odashi 
218 Leheny and Warren, ‘Introduction: Inescapable solutions: Japanese aid and the construction of global 
development’, p. 7 
219  Okada cited in ‘Foreign Ministry seeks aid-policy revision to enhance efficiency’, Japan Times,30 
June, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100630a9.html (Accessed on 30/06/10) 
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Accusations of corruption in the implementation of projects also hardened public 
opinion as well as a generational shift whereby younger generations who had not 
experienced Japan’s post-war reliance on aid, were less favourable. When asked 
whether Japan should increase its levels of ODA, in 1991 (when Japan became the 
world’s largest donor) 41.4% agreed whereas by 2004 the number had more than halved 
to 18.7% before recovering slightly to 30.4% by 2008.220 In this year 18.5% thought 
ODA should decrease, compared to only 8% in 1991 and the percentage of those in 
favour of stopping ODA stood at 3.3% in contrast to 1.3% seventeen years earlier. 
Predominantly due to this ‘aid fatigue’ Japan adjusted its ODA policy, thus showing 
again the important role which domestic concerns play, within the environment set by 
structure. 
 
Koizumi promised in 2001 to radically reform Japan’s ODA programme. From 2001 to 
2008, Japan’s position as top donor gradually slid to fifth place, overtaken by the US, 
Britain, France and Germany.221 The increase in these states’ budgets was also due to 
UN commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which following the 
9/11 attacks took greater significance as a possible means to counter terrorism through 
economic assistance.222 According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 
2008 a total of $119.8bn was distributed as foreign aid, representing a 10% increase on 
the previous year.223 Yet Japan came 14th in a ranking of net ODA as a percentage of 
                                                            
220 ‘Public Opinion Polls’, Takayanagi, ‘Recent trends in Japan’s aid policies and prospects for change’, 
p. 11 
221 K.V. Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, 
ORF Occasional Paper No. 14, May 2010, 
http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/occasionalpaper/attachments/india_japan_12755
45633112.pdf , p. 23 (Accessed on 26/06/10) 
222 Ibid. 
223 ‘Giving more generously: Which rich countries gave in foreign aid last year’, The Economist, 31 
March 31, 2009, http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13400406&fsrc=nwl 
(Accessed on 20/06/10)  
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GDP with an estimated total of $9.4bn.224 At present there is little prospect that this 
trend will reverse225 but in order to balance this declining budget, Japan has initiated 
moves to improve efficiency. In 2005 Koizumi began to downsize the administrative 
arm and appointed highly-regarded Dr Ogata as Director, signalling a move towards 
such UN norms as human security.226 
 
By 2003 the Charter was once again due for renewal. Both the global and domestic 
environment had altered considerably in this time, requiring Japan’s ODA policy to 
change accordingly. Of the structural developments, the end of the Cold War and onset 
of greater globalisation were most significant but on the domestic-level, public support 
for Japan’s ODA programme had further declined. From 2003 Japan’s ODA took an 
additional or at least more explicit purpose as a foreign policy tool. In the revised 
Charter of 2003 the objective ‘to contribute to peace and development of the 
international community’ with ‘assuring Japan’s security and prosperity’ was added to 
the text.227 The strategic use of ODA, however, had been identified many years before. 
In 1979 Prime Minister Masayoshi stated that ODA would be employed to contribute to 
global ‘comprehensive security’ and in 1980 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko echoed the 
objective for ODA to be applied to ‘areas which are important to the maintenance of the 
peace and stability of the world’. 228  The change in direction, however, involved a 
refocus on not just global security but specifically that of Japan.  
 
                                                            
224 Ibid.  
225 ‘Interview: President Sadako Ogata’, Network Magazine, Volume 41, September 2008, 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/network/vol41/vol_41_1.html 
226 Leheny and Warren, ‘Introduction: Inescapable solutions: Japanese aid and the construction of global 
development’, p. 20 
227 ‘Philosophy: Objectives, Policies, and Priorities’, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29, 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf, 
p. 4 
228 Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy, p. 46 
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VIII. India as an ODA destination 
 
ODA has long been the ‘core component’ of Japan’s India policy,229 a point noted by 
Prime Minister Rao during a visit to Tokyo in June 1992.230 Indeed India was the first 
country to receive Japanese economic assistance in 1958 following a state visit by 
Nehru in 1957. Japan’s ODA has benefited rhetorically from its independence from 
possible allegations of post-war guilt so that according to Tanaka Hitoshi, interviewed 
for this study, in these early years India served as a ‘showcase’ for development 
assistance.231 During the 1980s and Cold War tensions, Japan began to direct ODA to 
countries like Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, which were considered in close proximity to 
‘areas of strategic importance’.232 Following 1991 liberalisation Japan added India to its 
list of ‘strategic’ hubs. 
 
South Asia slowly began to witness a steady increase in Japanese aid inflows. 
According to Khan between 1975 and 1989 Japan’s ODA to South Asia233 increased 
eight-fold in dollar terms. 234 By 1998, these countries received almost $1.5bn from 
Japan (14% of total aid) with $504.95m going to India. 235 According to one JICA 
                                                            
229 Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, p. 19 
230 ‘Japan’s contribution in trade and direct investments in India has indeed been very small, although in 
terms of ODA, Japan is our largest donor’ Murty 1993, pp. 449–455 quoted in Lalima Varma, ‘Japan’s 
Official Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, India Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 3 
(July/September 2009), p. 237 
231 Author’s interview with Hitoshi Tanaka, Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs 14 May 2010. 
Tanaka’s father previously worked in India as a trader 
232 Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, p. 25 
233 The economic region of South Asia comprises of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Japan has a particularly long ODA relationship with Sri Lanka who, according to 
Suzuki (JICA), has an ‘impeccable track record on payment’, except following the Asian Tsunami of 
2004. Sri Lanka was the first country to give up on reparations from Japan post-war and has received 
substantial sums from the Japanese government to support the economy affected by a thirty-year civil war 
which only concluded in 2009.  
234 Haider A. Khan, ‘Japanese Aid to South and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis’, April-May 
2001, p. 4 
235 Yet interestingly, Pakistan with an economy significantly smaller than India’s, received $491.54 
million, an almost equal amount. This highlights the tactical shift which has occurred in the past two 
decades whereby Pakistan was considered of greater strategic value than India. However, as Khan also 
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official, by 1997 Japan’s commitment had reached ¥20bn, on a par with China and 
Indonesia as Suzuki’s success in the car industry encouraged some ‘hype’. 236  The 
nuclear tests, covered in detail in Chapter 7 however, hardened opinion. Officials agree 
that India was an ‘unfairly small recipient’ of ODA until this time but point to India’s 
nuclear behaviour as being an important reason.237  Japan suspended all new ODA 
packages but maintained the Delhi Metro and other ongoing projects as well as 
humanitarian and emergency aid. Japan was keen to protect its own interests in schemes 
such as the Delhi Metro.238  
 
After a positive figure of ¥1.3bn in loans in 1997, the suspension resulted in similar 
figures not being reached again until 2004. By 2008-09 according to OECD figures, 
South and Central Asia received 20% of Japanese ODA (see figure 5 below).239  In line 
with Japan’s gradual reassessment of India’s economic and political importance, ODA 
has risen so that by 2003 India was once again the largest recipient of Japanese aid. In 
2006 Japan issued its first Country Assistance Program for India. 
 
Whilst Japan’s total ODA budget has continued to witness year-on-year reductions, 
contributions to India’s development have witnessed a positive upward trajectory. As 
the graph below demonstrates, Japan’s ODA to India rocketed in 2001 to near 250% of 
the 2000 figure, before almost doubling again the following year. From FY 2003 India 
has been the top recipient of Japanese soft loans, overtaking China.  By March 2010 a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
notes, aid to Southeast Asia far exceeded that given to South Asia at $2437.66 million, almost one bn 
more than South Asia received. Ibid. p. 9-10 
236 Author’s interview with Hara. Those entrusted with India policy within Japan’s bureaucracy have 
often sustained historical connections with India. Of those officials interviewed by the author, several had 
read ‘Indian studies’ whilst at university or come into contact with India through parents working with 
Indian business.  
237 Author’s interview with senior official, Climate Change Division, MOFA 2 June 2010 
238 Ibid.  
239 ‘Gross Bilateral ODA 2008-09’, OCED, DAC, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/5/44285062.gif    
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cumulative total of over ¥3000bn was sent to India as ODA.240 From 2007 India also 
benefited from a new approval procedure in which requests were considered 
biannually.241 In FY 2009 the figure reached ¥2.2bn though according to Suzuki from 
JICA, this figures was especially high to fund such large projects as the Delhi Metro, 
which represented 30-40% of the total. Despite concern that the fallout from the 
Fukushima disaster would dampen Japan’s commitment, in June 2011 the Ambassador 
confirmed the original loan amount would be provided.242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
240 ‘Japan to provide ODA of Rs 10,500 crore to India in FY 2009’, NetIndian News Network, Delhi, 29 
March, 2010, http://netindian.in/news/2010/03/29/0005940/japan-provide-oda-rs-10500-crore-india-fy-
2009 (accessed on 05/02/11) 
241 Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, p. 24-
25 
242 Anirban Bhaumik, ‘Fukushima fallout: Japan to go slow on nuke talks with India’, Deccan Herald, 14 
June 2011, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/168694/fukushima-fallout-japan-go-slow.html 
(Accessed on 05/06/11) 
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Figure 5: 
 
Japan's ODA to India (million yen) 
 Fiscal Year ODA Loan Grant Aid Technical Cooperation Total 
1997 1327.25 41.94 13.35 1382.54 
1998 115.37 3.98 10.19 129.54 
1999 0 12.92 9.83 22.75 
2000 189.26 18.29 9.03 216.58 
2001 656.59 14.34 10.15 681.08 
2002 1112.39 9.1 9.6 1131.09 
2003 1250.04 17.44 10.34 1277.82 
2004 1344.66 29.89 9.67 1384.22 
2005 1554.58 21.09 8.36 1584.03 
2006 1848.93 5.96 13.17 1868.06 
2007 2251.3 3.97 12.31 2267.58 
2008 2360.47 4.28 11.79 2376.54 
2009 2182.17 3.81 18.55 2204.53 
Total: 34004 884.96 293.51 35182.47 
Note: The total amount of ODA Loan and Grant Aid are E/N basis. Technical 
Cooperation is JICA disbursement basis. 
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Figure 6: 
Japan's ODA to India (million yen)243 
 
 
IX. Objectives in India 
 
As the opening of this chapter stated, Japan has faced numerous difficulties entering the 
Indian market for both genuine and perceptual reasons. In theory ODA payments are 
intended to improve the socio-economic condition of a recipient.  As one diplomat 
phrased, Japan is trying to ‘increase trust’ through its ODA policies. 244  Regarding 
India’s acceptance of Japanese funds, however, the emphasis is widely seen as falling 
on the economic rather than the social side. Indeed as one Japanese diplomat admitted 
in the late 1990s in light of India’s economic potential, ‘We decided to shift our aid 
programme to infrastructure rather than poverty alleviation.’245 
 
                                                            
243 Graph compiled by author with above statistics from MOFA 
244 Author’s interview with senior official, Climate Change Division, MOFA 2 June 2010 
245 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, ‘Why Japan tilted towards India’, Hindustan Times25 October, 2010, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/617444.aspx  
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Japan attaches several objectives to its ODA programme in India. First and foremost is 
to improve the business environment. Loans are linked to incentives which it is hoped 
will encourage India to become ‘more economically minded’. According to one MOFA 
official in charge of overseeing Japan’s ODA to India, whilst poverty reduction and the 
MDGs are important, Japan is ‘trying to focus on motivating Indian business minds’.246 
In the Country Assistance Programme for India of 2006, India’s ‘enhanced presence in 
the international community’ was cited as a principal reason for Japan’s economic 
assistance as a means to contribute to ‘peace, stability and prosperity in Asia’. India’s 
potential in the ‘new Asian era’ was also mentioned as was the desire to ‘strengthen 
India’s commitment to the international economy’…‘where strong market economies 
and economic partnerships are being promoted’.247 
 
In essence Japan is promoting ‘faster and inclusive growth’ in line with India’s 11th 5-
Year Plan. 248  Within this remit, power stations, energy savings and environmental 
projects take particular preference, as do schemes to encourage greater non-agricultural 
employment.249  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
246 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010.  
247 ‘Japan’s Country Assistance Program for India’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/india.pdf, p. 4  
248 Author’s interview with Hara 
249 Whilst India’s IT industry receives widespread international attention, a far larger proportion of the 
population are engaged in work related to agriculture. 
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X. Strings to Japan’s ODA programme 
 
i. Infrastructure 
 
Whilst coverage of ODA loans has been broad, the overwhelming concentration has 
been placed on infrastructure, power supply, transport and other sectors which would be 
beneficial to Japanese investors. For the power industry from 1978 to 2010 Japan 
provided ¥1.21 trillion in 72 loans.250 Regarding transport links in 1996 the Calcutta 
(now Kolkata) Metro Project became operational251 and in 2002 the first section of the 
Delhi Mass Rapid Transport System (Metro) was opened.252 An interesting point to 
note, however, is that whilst Japan built the railway, the trains on the line are from 
ROK, highlighting the competition Japan feels from its economic rival, analysed in 
greater depth below. Nevertheless based on this experience, Japan plans to build another 
metro system in Chennai and Bangalore. An Outer Ring Road Project in Hyderabad and 
Energy Saving Project are also currently receiving the majority of Japanese funds, 
notably in the form of loans rather than grant contributions.   
 
In many ways yen loans are quite different from traditional conceptions of aid and the 
concentration of yen loans is fairly unique. 253 As Sato from MOFA notes, it is ‘very 
rare’ for such a large proportion – as much as 99% - to be provided in loans which need 
                                                            
250 ‘Country Assistance Evaluation of India: Summary’, Third Party Evaluation, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, March 2010, p. 11 
251 The project began in 1983 and was actually completed just four years later but due to poor preparation 
by the federal government over land disputes among other issues, the Metro was delayed another decade. 
Varma, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, p. 246 
252 According to a Mitsubishi official, many phases were finished ahead of schedule and by employing 
Japanese environmental and employment conditions, proved a useful way for Japan ‘to get into India’. 
Author’s interview with Ajay Vargu, Planning & Coordination Department, Mitsubishi Corporation 
India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 4th March 2011 
253 Author’s interview with senior official, Climate Change Division, MOFA 2 June 2010 
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to be repaid.254 Whereas in other states such as the UK and US in which grants equate to 
100% of aid contributions,255 Japan’s approach is focused squarely on improving the 
environment for Japanese investment through loans.256 As one MOFA official notes, 
‘Japan is more conscious of the private sector than other countries.’257 In 2000 loans 
equated to 87.39% of the total with technical cooperation representing 4.17% and aid 
another 8.44% (see table below). However by 2009-10 99% was dedicated to loans, 
mainly for large-scale infrastructure projects.  
 
Figure 7: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
254 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
255 ‘Bilateral Aid from Major Countries’, sourced from JBIC, Delhi in Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: 
Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, p. 25 
256 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
257 Ibid.  
Aspects of Japan's ODA as a % of total 2000-2009 
Fiscal Year ODA Loan Grant Aid Technical Cooperation Total 
2000 87.39 8.44 4.17 216.58 
2001 96.40 2.11 1.49 681.08 
2002 98.35 0.80 0.85 1131.1 
2003 97.83 1.36 0.81 1277.8 
2004 97.14 2.16 0.70 1384.2 
2005 98.14 1.33 0.53 1584 
2006 98.97 0.32 0.70 1868.1 
2007 99.28 0.18 0.54 2267.6 
2008 99.33 0.18 0.50 2376.5 
2009 98.99 0.17 0.84 2204.5 
Average 97.18 1.71 1.11 
 Source: Figures calculated by author based on data from Figure 1 (MOFA, 2010) 
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In other sectors Japanese ODA has contributed to clean water and forest conservation 
projects. 258  Indeed there has been a tangible shift from 1998 when power plants 
received almost half of ODA.259 Levels of technical cooperation have always been low, 
amounting to 4.2% of the total received in 2000, before decreasing to proportionally 
0.8% by 2002 where the rate stabilised. As the overall contribution has grown, however, 
these programmes have expanded. JICA for example is supporting a long term project 
to rear silkworms in southern India following a request from India. This industry has 
been fundamental to Japan since the Meiji period and whilst production has declined 
from its peak in the early twentieth century, expertise remains strong.260 By the end of 
financial year 2008 Japan had received 5,394 trainees from India in exchange for 855 
experts sent to India with an accumulated technical cooperation fund of ¥27.5bn.261  
 
 
                                                            
258 This latter scheme has been coordinated with the national Joint Forest Management (JFM) project 
begun by the Indian government in 1988.  
259 Author’s interview with Kondo 
260 ‘A New Era of Japan-India Relations’, p. 4 
261 ‘Outline of Japan’s ODA to India’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 2010, p. 2 
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Figure 8 
Flows of Japanese ODA according to sector: 1975-1990 and 1991-2007 
 
Source: JBIC, Delhi262 
 
ii. Human exchange 
 
Commentators of Japan-India relations frequently point to the lack of human exchange 
as a key weakness in current ties and as the above discussion demonstrated, 
understanding between business communities is minimal. The Japanese government 
albeit in a limited sense, has taken this recommendation on board and launched 
initiatives to promote cultural and people-to-people interaction. 
 
JICA is currently supporting an initiative with IIT Hyderabad to mobilise greater 
academic exchange, particularly in the engineering discipline where it is thought 
collaboration could be particularly profitable. 263  India’s theoretical ability can be 
complemented by Japan’s strength in application. Japan has also issued a grant of 
                                                            
262 Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, p. 28 
263 This initiative was first discussed during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to India in August 2007. A 
working group was subsequently established to investigate the potential, looking particularly at 
cooperation in environment and energy, digital communications, design and manufacturing, nano-tech 
and nano-science, and urban engineering. ‘Country Assistance Evaluation of India: Summary’, p. 18 
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¥787m to a project at Indira Gandhi National Open University.264 These efforts are 
nevertheless meagre compared to the linkages between Japan and China or India and the 
US. As another official responsible for ODA to India commented, whilst the number of 
academics in Japan focusing on Indian philosophy and anthropology are an ‘asset’, they 
do not contribute to the future of the relationship; ‘If Japan is serious about bilateral 
relations, the number of interlocutors must increase’.265 There are also plans to increase 
tourist and language exchange, by among other initiatives increasing the number of 
direct flights between the two countries. Between 2003 and 2007, the number rose from 
8 to 20.266  
 
iii. Distribution 
 
Japanese aid can be divided into three categories; yen loans, grants and technical 
assistance. Officials commit to a legal loan agreement before beginning dispersement of 
funds which are repayable at a fixed interest rate over a stipulated period. This rate 
ranges between 0.3% and 1.2% per annum over 15 to 30 years. For environmental 
projects the interest rate is slightly less than for others at 0.75% with a grace period of 
10 years followed by 40 year tenure.267 JICA oversees the implementation of Japan’s 
ODA.  
 
                                                            
264 ‘Government of Japan extended ¥787 million Grant Aid to India for the project for Strengthening of 
Electronic Media Production Center in Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU)’, Press 
Release, Japanese Embassy in India, 26 July, 2010, http://www.in.emb-
japan.go.jp/Press_Releases_Embassy/PR13-2010.html (Accessed on 26/07/10) 
265 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
266  ‘India still tops ODA list’, Rediff News, 3 January, 2008, 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/jan/03japan.htm (Accessed on 28/07/10) 
267 ‘Japanese Loan Assistance to India’, Government of India Portal on Development Assistance, 
http://www.externalaid.gov.in/portal/index.jsp?sid=1&id=321&pid=317  
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As referred to above, the number of open grants to India is low.268 Grants are 100% 
financed by the central government whereas loans receive less than 20%, acquiring the 
remainder through the repayment of loans and the market. In 2000 grants represented 
8.4% of the total ODA afforded to India, dropping to 2.1% in 2001. A year later as 
loans doubled, the amount apportioned for grants more than halved (see Figure 5). By 
2006 the rate reached 0.3% where it has remained since. Nevertheless from 1977 to 
2009, Japan contributed ¥88.5bn in grant aid. 
 
Loans have long been the preferred means to distribute Japanese economic assistance. 
These are passed onto the state by the central government who subsidises poorer states 
and assesses their borrowing capability.269  According to JICA, whilst grants involve far 
less bureaucracy they are not considered as successful. Loans on the other hand, require 
Cabinet approval and face detailed scrutiny. This official admits, however, to being ‘a 
loan man’ in favour of this form of development assistance over grants due to his career 
background in this field. 270  However budgetary constraints are also cited by JICA 
officials as reasons for the preference for loans.271  
 
MOFA, MOF and METI work together on country assistance, occasionally calling on 
other ministries for their expertise. For example an education project goes through the 
Education and Science Ministry and train project through Land Ministry. JICA is the 
implementation arm. In India after a Tokyo Task Force was established to formulate 
policy, led by Esho Hideki, members of the Embassy of Japan, JICA, JETRO and 
occasionally JBIC contribute to its implementation. Consensus among ministries is 
                                                            
268 According to one JICA official, grants to India currently amount to approximately 1 bn yen but have 
usually totalled only 200 million, which is still almost double that given to either Vietnam or Indonesia.  
269 Author’s interview with Suzuki 
270 Author’s interview with Hara 
271 Author’s interview with Suzuki  
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necessary before a project can go ahead. On the whole Japan prefers to work 
independently rather than with other organisations or states though there are some 
exceptions, for example in the health sector where Japan is working with UNICEF to 
eradicate polio and in poor states such as Bihar, Japan is working with the WB and 
Britain’s DfID. Japan also occasionally cooperates with the WB and ADB through the 
exchange of information. Overall however, ‘Japan doesn’t like donor coordination’.272  
 
A significant development in Japan’s aid policy emerged following the merger between 
JICA and JBIC in 2008. Previously two separate bodies within MOFA distributed 
Japan’s ODA funds; the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), founded in 
1974 administered yen loans whilst JICA established in 1999, 273 oversaw technical 
cooperation and grant aid.  Under this decentralised system, ministries contributed 
independently of one another in what often became disjointed programmes. 274  By 
bringing operations for technical assistance, yen loans and grant aid ‘all under one roof’ 
it was hoped ODA would deliver greater efficiency.275 The merger also made JICA the 
largest bilateral donor agency in the world. Ogata articulated on the new forming of 
JICA that Japan’s ODA would work under the principle of ‘the three Ss’; to ‘speed up, 
scale up and spread out’, improving not just the quality and efficiency of Japanese 
projects but also their reach by including more NGOs and volunteers.276  
 
                                                            
272 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010. The 
reasons for this are also due to India’s preference for bilateral commitments since donor cooperation is 
seen as ‘ganging up’ against the state.  
273 In October 1999, the then Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
merged to form JBIC. Previously yen loans were handled by OECF, grants by MOFA and technical 
cooperation (TC) by JICE. ‘Other official flow’, OOF was covered by EXIM Bank. Post-1999 yen loans 
were covered by JBIC, grant by MOFA and TC by JICA. 
274 Leheny and Warren, ‘Introduction: Inescapable solutions: Japanese aid and the construction of global 
development’, p. 6 
275 ‘Interview: President Sadako Ogata’, Network Magazine, Volume 41, September 2008, 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/network/vol41/vol_41_1.html 
276 Ibid.   
221 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
iv. Ownership  
 
Japan has never sought to ‘hand-hold’ nations through their development but rather 
provide the necessary conditions and incentives for their own growth. The implicit 
understanding being that once reasonable levels of development are reached, Japan will 
be a preferred economic partner with which to share the dividends. Japan’s own 
experience during the post-war period acts as a further lesson, which guides ODA 
policy. 277  This ‘self-help’ approach largely suits India which places a premium on 
‘ownership’. Unlike other developing countries which hold regular ‘donor meetings’, 
India takes the lead in allocating resources from the centre.  
 
XI. Obstacles  
 
i. From India: 
 
Japan considers India a wise destination for Japanese funds and is largely comfortable 
with extending their loans to Delhi. 278 There has been comparatively little controversy 
over corruption and bribery in Japan’s aid projects in India and the government has 
always repaid loans on time. Yet India has presented Japan with several challenges in 
the distribution of aid. For the business community, licence approval is frequently cited 
as overly time-consuming, a charge echoed by ODA agencies in addition to labour 
disputes which delay projects. 279  Furthermore since aid is received by the central 
                                                            
277 Kesavan, ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War Period’, p. 23 
278 Author’s interview with Hara 
279 Varma, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, p. 247 
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government and then distributed across states, Japanese officials complain that tracking 
aid is problematic.280 
 
Japanese officials appreciate the weakened effectiveness of ODA to influence India in 
the way previously successful elsewhere.281 When Japan poured generous funds into 
China and Southeast Asia during the latter half of the twentieth century, few other 
countries were vying for similar influence. India in contrast, enjoys the competition of 
several large states. France for example, recently started its own aid programme, 
combining her agenda in India seeking, in one official’s view, to gain a foothold in 
India’s high-speed rail and nuclear sectors.282  
 
Additional obstacles lie in the fact that the federal Indian government wants to spread 
projects across all twenty-eight states. As will also be noted below, Japanese interests in 
Japan remains concentrated around production hubs and often wishes to channel its 
ODA to these regions. Japan is not able to dictate where its money goes, rather ODA 
agencies must rely on requests from the recipient government, which Japan can then 
consider283 or announce an interest and receive proposals.284 As METI claims, whilst 
ASEAN countries are more flexible, the Indian government is difficult to influence.285  
 
Efforts to promote exchange have also been hampered by India’s restrictive attitude to 
foreign volunteers. According to some at JICA, India only wants people to engage in 
                                                            
280 Ibid.  
281 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
282 Author’s interview with Hara 
283 This point was mentioned by several METI and MOFA officials as problematic. 
284 Author’s interview with Suzuki 
285 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
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teaching Japanese, judo or nursing rather than business or academia.286 Whereas JICA 
currently has only 13 volunteers stationed in India, 287 the number in much smaller 
Bhutan and Nepal is over 50. Japan’s scope for a greater presence through Japanese 
NGOs is also held back by the existence of numerous domestic organisations which 
leaves little room for well-meaning but non-native groups. When Japanese businesses 
and residents speedily left India following the nuclear tests for example, the impact on 
NGOs was negligible since their presence was so minor.288 Whilst the DPJ has shown 
itself more interested in NGOS than the LDP,289 there is little central government, as the 
name ‘NGO’ suggests, can do to increase their activity.  
 
ii. From Japan: 
 
Japan has also been criticised for continuing to allocate funds on a ‘case by case’ basis 
rather than integrating its programme in India’s own policies and those of other donors. 
Japan has largely concentrated its aid to the states of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh 
where according to Japanese officials requests following an initial project have spurred 
related requests.290 In the latest review in March 2010, the lack of consistency and 
flexibility which this shows was highlighted. An officer at the Indian MEA noted the 
                                                            
286 Author’s interview with Hara. The opposing view, however, points to Professor Shiba from METI 
who has successfully taught Japanese manufacturing in India. Author’s interview with Kondo 
287 As of May 1, 2009, ‘Outline of Japan’s ODA to India’, p. 2 This meagre figure, however, was the 
result of a slight positive turn in 2006 when after thirty years, the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 
(JOCV) were allowed to resume their operations, even though to only teach the Japanese language. In 
1978 an Indian government policy had suspended their permit to remain.  
288 Author’s interview with Odashi 
289 For example in May 2010, former Foreign Minister Okada launched an Advisory Group on NGO 
practices. ‘The Establishment of the “NGO Advisory Group on the State of International Cooperation by 
Japan” (Proposal), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 May, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/5/0525_01.html 
290 ‘Country Assistance Evaluation of India: Summary’, p. 21 
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limitations which Japan’s annual commitments provide in contrast to a long-term 
development plan.291  
 
Despite the 2003 reforms coordination remains disjointed, especially since the 
objectives of ODA and METI/private sector initiatives often overlap. For example 
whilst MOFA takes the lead in ODA projects, METI and MOF are occasionally 
consulted over private sector-focused benefits and of course financial backing. Whilst 
SMART cities and the DMIC are the projects of METI, highways policies are overseen 
by MLIT (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) and others by 
MOFA through JICA such as the Freight Corridor.292 As one official criticised, central 
management is lacking with communication channels often confused and poor 
coordination between political, economic and ODA strategies.  
 
Image and perceptions also enter the equation. As noted above, policymakers are 
acutely aware of domestic criticism and have often channelled funds to central research 
initiatives rather than local ones to achieve greater visibility.293  
 
XII. India’s reception of Japanese aid 
 
Japan’s ODA policy has also been affected by the reception it receives in India. In line 
with this thesis’ adherence to NCR, perceptions of policy fashion its future 
implementation as intervening variables. Officially India is ‘100% appreciative of 
Japanese ODA’.294 When Prime Minister Singh engages in public dialogue with Japan 
                                                            
291 Ibid. p. 18 
292 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
293 Author’s interview with Hara 
294 Author’s interview with Tanino 
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the importance of ODA is always mentioned and a paragraph suggesting India’s 
gratitude included in annual statements. This might well be due to Singh’s personal 
experience of the 1991 currency crisis which strongly benefited from Japanese 
assistance. Nevertheless officials and diplomats note a frustration with how Japanese 
aid is increasingly viewed in Delhi. 
 
According to both interlocutors and academics, a creeping ‘arrogance’ among Indian 
policymakers complicates Japan’s ODA policy towards India. Japan does not face 
similar charges of ODA equating to ‘war compensation’ as has occasionally been the 
case regarding China, but with India a feeling of ‘acceptance’ rather than ‘appreciation’ 
pervades the interaction. Japan has been criticised for continuing to treat India 
‘vertically’ but as Hirose argues, whilst Japan has been ‘economically arrogant, India is 
politically arrogant’. Even in the 1980s according to one Japanese academic, MOF 
officials were shocked to be greeted by their Indian counterparts in unbuttoned summer 
shirts.295  
 
India has its own objectives which frequently do not run in parallel with those in Japan. 
India’s intractable desire for self-sufficiency has been a feature of Indian politics since 
independence. When Japan offered aid following a devastating earthquake in 2001, the 
Indian government refused, shocking Japanese officials.296 Following the 2004 tsunami, 
despite being a victim with over 16 000 casualties, India again turned away foreign 
aid.297 According to Williams this was also a move ‘specifically intended to enhance its 
                                                            
295 Author’s interview with Esho 
296 Author’s interview Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center, former South Asia Analyst, JIIA 25 
August 2009  
297 It should also be noted that a similar position was taken by the Japanese government following the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. Whilst considerable sums were pledged by foreign governments, Japan was 
keen to deal with the devastation without external assistance. 
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bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat’ by proving its status as a responsible 
power.298 Especially following the experience in 1966 and the war with Pakistan, India 
is adamant not to compromise her sovereignty.299 Indian policymakers are trying to shift 
Japan’s focus away from ODA towards FDI and PPPs (public-private partnerships).300 
In essence, India wants ‘trade, not aid’.301  
 
Indian bureaucrats also largely see an external loan as ‘their money’ since interest is 
paid. 302  The central Ministry of Finance receives the amount from abroad, before 
distributing often at a rate of 5%. 303  The borrowing capacity of states is also 
considered.304 The government thereby accrues a profit for the nation’s budget.305 A 
difference in perceptions of relative roles exists whereby Japan sees itself as a donor and 
India considers itself an equal partner.  
 
As one official on condition of anonymity explained, there are fears that Japanese 
development aid has become ‘expected and taken for granted’. At completion 
ceremonies, whilst in other countries the chief dignitary is a Japanese representative, in 
India they are invariably Indian.306 Therefore whilst India might ‘appreciate’ grants and 
loans issued by Japan, their effectiveness as a foreign policy tool is debatable.  
 
This situation has affected Japan’s ability to fashion ODA policy to its own purposes. 
Japan cannot easily direct funds to a state government or particular initiative but must 
                                                            
298 Brad Williams, ‘Why give? Japan’s response to the Asian tsunami crisis’, Japan Forum 18(3) 2006, 
http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/polwb/RJFO_A_194647_O.pdf, p. 406 
299 Author’s interview with Esho 
300 Pant, ‘India Looks East and discovers Tokyo’  
301 Varma, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, p. 248 
302 Author’s interview with Hara 
303 In some of the poorer states in the northeast, this charge is not made.  
304 Subsidies are provided by the Indian government for weaker states. Author’s interview with Suzuki 
305 Author’s interview with Esho 
306 Author’s interview with Hara 
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rely on the federal government to put Japan’s contribution to good use. Furthermore 
according to JICA in Delhi, whilst loan allocation is increasing there are insufficient 
workable projects in which Japan can invest.  
 
XIII. 2010 and beyond 
 
For the first few months of the DPJ government, little was reported on aid policy. It was 
omitted from their political platform and foreign policy went unmentioned in their five 
pillars of policy, in contrast to the LDP who mentioned aid as a foreign policy tool. In 
June 2010, however, MOFA called once again for revision of the Charter to improve its 
efficiency in the face of further budget cuts. A study conducted with contributions from 
NGOs and business representatives, released in June 2010, proposed a ‘new way 
forward’.307 Falling public sympathy but also the realisation that ‘Japan’s international 
presence has become comparatively eroded’ was noted. The plurality of actors now 
involved in development is cited as a further rationale for review. The objective 
therefore was to improve ODA’s ‘strategic value and effectiveness’.308  
 
To improve efficiency the report proposed reforms to major aid agencies such as JICA, 
considering distributing loans in foreign currencies to reduce exchange risks and 
accelerating the distribution of ODA loans by as much as half and including greater 
dialogue with other stakeholders. The method of responding to individual requests for 
projects by governments might also change in the future, according to Okada. No doubt 
in part in response to previous criticisms, the government hinted towards moving from a 
                                                            
307 ‘ODA Review, Summary of the Final Report’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 29 June, 2010. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/pdfs/review1006_summary.pdf  
308 ‘Enhancing Enlightened National Interest: Living in harmony with the world and promoting peace and 
prosperity’, ODA Review Final Report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 2010, Foreword, p. 3 
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‘project based to program-based’ system which would work in closer sync with 
recipient objectives. 309  Some recognition of the need to focus on more ‘bottom of 
pyramid’ (BOP) schemes was also noted whilst also ‘promoting public understanding 
and support’.310 BOP initiatives are emphasised by the Delhi office of JICA.  
 
The scope of non-governmental organisations in Japan’s ODA policy might increase 
under the DPJ since they have an ideologically stronger affiliation with NGOs. 
According to the Final Report, a new ODA Charter will consider ‘enhancing human 
resource mobility between NGOs and MOFA/JICA’, ‘support to solidify NGOs’ 
financial basis, expand assistance to NGOs and include ‘deliberation on the 
establishment of a new modality for cooperation with NGOs’.311 For India, however, 
this is unlikely to have significant impact due to India’s protectionist policy towards 
foreign intervention and the abundance of home-grown organisations, which benefit 
from inherent knowledge of India’s laws and environment.  
 
XIV. Conclusions on ODA’s role 
 
For many years Japan has used ‘strategic ODA’ as a seemingly benevolent means to 
promote domestic economic growth. In addition by providing generous ODA packages, 
Japan has been able to endear governments to becoming politically involved. As Miyagi 
notes, this was the case regarding Japan’s policy towards the Middle East.312 In India, 
                                                            
309 Ibid. p. 11 
310 Ibid. p. 3 
311 Ibid. p. 17 
312 Miyagi notes that this was primarily involved in providing aid to Palestinian refugees. Miyagi, Japan’s 
Middle East Security Policy, p. 43 
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however, Japan has faced unfamiliar difficulties. Many analysts consider India a ‘very 
exceptional country’ which requires a different approach to that employed elsewhere.313 
 
Japan is thus still developing its ODA policy towards India. ODA is explicitly stated by 
MOFA as a tool for Japan’s wider foreign policy but specifically towards India, acts as 
an instrument to encourage FDI. In 2010 the environment was cited before 
‘infrastructure development and investment environment’ in the list of priority areas for 
Japan but according to officials involved, the ‘honne’ aspect of Japanese thinking is 
always concerned with strengthening economic relations. 314  As data below by the 
OECD shows, Japan continues to prioritise ‘Economic Infrastructure’ over other sectors 
of ODA with ‘Social Infrastructure’ and ‘Production’ ranking second and third 
respectively. Germany is the only other country to cite infrastructure as a priority area. 
 
Japanese officials hold hopes for a ‘more strategic’ use of ODA in the future. There is a 
sense of frustration that despite Japan’s efforts, India’s reciprocal appreciation and 
economic/political/cultural linkages are significantly less than those with other ODA 
partners. Officials speak of the need for ‘more equal-footing in relations’ and point to 
both Japanese and Indian weaknesses in explaining obstacles. The desire now is to 
insert Japanese funds in initiatives which will create ‘bilateral assets for the future’ in 
‘pivotal places’.315 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
313 Author’s interview with Esho 
314 Author’s interview with senior official, International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
315 Author’s interview with Hara 
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Figure 9 
Dispersion of Japan’s Global ODA 
 
ODA demonstrates another independent aspect of Japan’s interest in India, aside from 
US influence and one which is likely to continue to grow apace as Japan’s attention on 
India’s economic potential increases. According to JICA in Delhi, Japan has several 
objectives but ‘economic interests have recently been a lot more emphasised’. ‘India is 
very important to JICA; India is getting a lot of attention…its exciting times’.316 The 
case of ODA to Japan’s overall policy towards attracting India as a strategic partner also 
highlights the centrality of economic interests to Tokyo’s approach.  
 
                                                            
316 Author’s interview with Suzuki 
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India is always keen for confirmation of their status as Japan’s largest bilateral recipient, 
consistently the case since 2003. Yet whilst Japan holds this title, India no longer 
receives the most of Japan’s ODA.  According to OECD data (see Figure 9) Indonesia 
ranks first among the top ten recipients of Japan’s Gross ODA for the year 2008-09 (the 
most recent figures available) at $1.37bn, with India a close second at $1240m. In order 
to continue pleasing Indian officials, Japan is likely to feel pressure to continue to 
expand their ODA operations despite reservations as to its effectiveness for Japanese 
goals.  
 
ODA, whilst for many years the only economic element of Japan’s India policy is now 
coupled with private sector initiatives, strongly supported by Japan particularly METI. 
PPPs are growing, slowly moving on from government projects. Japanese companies 
are still hesitant to work solely with private companies so the inclusion of government 
guarantees is seen as necessary. According to Asrani, the ‘private sector is taking the 
lead’.  
 
This chapter will now turn to efforts being made to improve trade and investment; 
utilising some of the infrastructure improvements Japanese ODA has provided. Analysis 
will be made of what can be learnt about wider economic strategy whilst continuing to 
consider the interaction between structural and unit-level variables.   
 
XV. Moving into the ‘new frontier’ and reducing dependence on China 
 
Japan’s interest in India points to a transformation in Japan’s economic strategy. The 
development of Japan’s post-war economy has been well documented, particularly by 
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such scholars as Johnson, Pyle and van Wolferen. 317 By forming a ‘developmental 
state’, a term coined by Chalmers Johnson, Japanese government and business formed 
an alliance to bring Japan out of post-war poverty to growth and prosperity. The LDP, 
who governed almost uninterrupted over this period, enjoyed consistent support. 
Outside of Japan, Asian neighbours soon adopted Japan’s export-led model with 
comparable success in what became the ‘tiger economies’ of Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and ROK. Later in 1978 China also opened its economy, establishing ‘special 
economic zones’ to export abroad, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Vietnam.318 Japan’s role in Asia was described by Foreign Minister Okita Saburo as 
‘lead goose’. 
 
India during this period remained of secondary interest to the Japanese business 
community. Following the Plaza Accord of 1984, Southeast Asia became the focus of 
Japan’s economic diplomacy. In the early 1990s Japan established the value-chain 
model or ‘factory Asia’ before China’s accession to the WTO in late 1999 attracted 
FDI.319 As soon as China opened, Japan entered. According to reports, Deng Xioping 
personally pleaded with the Sony boss Akio Morita in a meeting arranged by Henry 
Kissinger.320 Despite some teething problems, the zaikai grew less wary and once again 
began to ‘tie its fate with the Chinese economy’. 321  Japanese firms experienced 
                                                            
317 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975, 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1982); Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan (D.C.; 
Heath, 1996); Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless 
Nation, (New York; Vintage Books, 1987, 1992) 
318 ‘The export trap: Asia’s failing export-led growth model’, Asia.View, The Economist, 25 March 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/13356518 (Accessed on 25/03/09) 
319 Author’s interview with Naoki Tanaka, President, Center for International Public Policy Studies, 
Tokyo 25 June 2010 
320 ‘Culture shock: Chinese labour unrest is forcing Japanese bosses to change’, The Economist, 8 July, 
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16542339 (Accessed on 08/07/10) 
321 Taniguchi, ‘A Cold Peace: The Changing Security Equation in Northeast Asia,’ p. 445-456 
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impressive returns, so much so that by 2009 almost 6000 companies had set up 
subsidiaries in China. 
 
In recent years and months, however, Japanese firms have been forced to consider 
alternative markets. The Gulf War of 1995, subsequent oil shocks and more recently the 
rise of China’s economy and 9/11 attacks have ushered in a new era of economic as well 
as political policy. China remains the first choice for the majority of Japanese firms and 
interest in India or China is not a zero-sum game. Nevertheless appreciation that Japan 
should not have ‘too many eggs in one basket’ is growing.  
 
Within China the stability of labour has been called into question by a series of strikes 
and subsequent annual wage increases of 10-15%.322 In early 2010 strikes at a Honda 
factory unsettled business who assumed the CCP would ensure strikes were 
minimised.323 Japanese firms are also concerned by China’s reliability as a recipient of 
Japan’s intellectual property, which many fear could be exploited.324 Added to this, 
festering anti-Japanese feeling which occasionally erupts into riots or boycotts has 
hardened Japanese firms to the problem of over-concentrating on China.  
 
Japanese firms are also wary of the limitations of the Chinese market. The market for 
SMEs remains relatively favourable but for larger firms the Chinese market is reaching 
saturation.325 Companies fear missing opportunities elsewhere, despite their hesitancy to 
establish new markets themselves. Investment opportunities in China are not, however, 
drying up but by ‘risk-hedging’ as one government advisor explained. India can 
                                                            
322 ‘Culture shock: Chinese labour unrest is forcing Japanese bosses to change’ 
323 Author’s interview with Seth 
324 Ibid. 
325 Author’s interview with Sinha 
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represent an ‘insurance policy’.326 By diversifying their risks, the private sector hopes to 
avoid being at the ‘economic mercy of China’.327  
 
Today Japan is desperate to branch out overseas. After years attempting to deal with 
domestic economic stability following exploratory years abroad in the 1980s, firms in 
ever-greater numbers are again looking offshore for growth potential. The days of Japan 
as ‘an island’ appear limited. Japan has increasingly noticed the promise of other 
emerging markets over those established in North America and Europe. Even before the 
economic crisis, the triangular model of production between Japan (headquarters), 
ASEAN (production) and the US (consumption) was being called into question as the 
US’ ability to absorb Japanese products declined.328 From 2000 to 2010 exports to the 
US halved and those to Europe fell by a third whilst Nikkei has noted the importance of 
sales in emerging markets to the profits of both major-listed and smaller companies.329 
Under Japan’s previous system, poorer countries such as Thailand (known as the 
‘Detroit of Asia’) were used as a production base for export to rich markets but firms 
are increasingly realising that it is the developing markets they should seek to supply. 
With this in mind, Japanese companies are adapting their products to suit the markets 
of, not just the BRICs, but also the ‘MINTS’ (Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia), the Balkans and Vietnam.  
 
Domestic factors also play a role, as NCR assumes. The strong yen has encouraged 
firms to move operations abroad, as has Japan’s low productivity compared to other 
states. According to METI overseas subsidiaries have profit margins as much as one 
                                                            
326 Author’s interview with Naoki Tanaka 
327 Author’s interview with Kinoshita 
328 Author’s interview with Naoki Tanaka 
329 ‘Japanese firms push into emerging markets’ 
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third higher than within Japan.330 Japan’s corporate tax rate of 41%, among the highest 
in the G20 is considered a further incentive.331 In order to avoid these rates, several 
firms have moved production to states such as Thailand to take advantage of FTAs. 
Notably the rate of corporate tax in ROK is almost half that of Japan.332 
 
India has not been the only recipient of Japan’s change; Vietnam was the initial 
alternative to the Chinese market. Vietnam offers Japan several advantages, not least 
geographical proximity. In addition Japanese scholars and officials note how despite 
rhetoric praising India’s democratic status, in business situations Vietnam’s centralised 
system offers a swifter decision-making process. As one economist noted, Vietnam is 
very easy to deal with since government decisions are almost always carried through.333 
Vietnam is also not experiencing the labour friction of China, currency rise and anti-
Japan sentiment.334 
 
i. Rare earths 
 
In addition, Vietnam holds reserves of rare earths which in 2010 became a strategic 
commodity. Following the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands dispute in which China suspended 
the export of rare earth metals, Japan sought alternative suppliers. According to China 
the decision to reduce the quota of exports by as much as 35%335 was to crack down on 
illegal mining and protect the environment but the international community read 
                                                            
330  ‘Leaving home: Japan’s big companies are shipping production abroad’, The Economist, 18 
November, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17527225 (Accessed on 18/11/10) 
331 ‘Corporate euthanasia’, A special report on Japan, The Economist, 18 November, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17492760 (Accessed on 18/11/10) 
332  ‘Leaving home: Japan’s big companies are shipping production abroad’ 
333 Author’s interview with Koda 
334 Yuzuru Takano, ‘Manufacturers flee China for Vietnam’, Asahi Shimbun, 26 June, 2010, 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006250440.html (Accessed on 27/06/10) 
335 ‘Rare action, Corporate Japan adjusts quickly to a shortage of rare earths’, The Economist, 20 January 
2011, http://www.economist.com/node/17967046 (Accessed on 20/01/11)  
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Chinese actions as a deliberate attempt to punish Japan. China holds a third of the 
world’s reserves but produces approximately 97% of global supply. Japan is also the 
country which imports the most of these elements due to Japan’s specialism in 
electronic goods. Reportedly 22.6% of companies surveyed by JETRO reported being 
affected by the incident. 
 
A number of countries agreed to work with Japan to diversify its dependence on China. 
In October 2010 Hanoi agreed to supply Tokyo as part of a ‘political and strategic 
decision’. 336 Australia has also benefited from Japan’s expansion from China. In late 
2010 Japan and Australia signed an agreement to supply Japan.337  
 
India was also sought as a potential partner. Whilst India only holds 3% of known 
reserves338 it is thought to hold vast amounts that are yet to be explored. Japanese 
companies had recognised this opportunity before the fallout with China, for example in 
January 2010 Toyota announced plans to process rare earth chloride in the Indian state 
of Orissa.339 Whilst cooperation is still in its early stages and extraction is yet confirmed 
as commercially viable and environmental concerns linger, this example demonstrates 
how external conditions are able to bring Japan and India closer. As noted in Chapter 4 
                                                            
336 ‘Rare earths supply deal between Japan and Vietnam’, BBC News, 31 October, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11661330 (Accessed on 31/10/10) 
337 Joel Rathus, ‘Australia and Japan: Emerging partnerships in the shadow of China’, East Asia Forum, 
29 November, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/29/australia-and-japan-emerging-
partnerships-in-the-shadow-of-china/ (Accessed on 29/10/10) 
338 Until 1948, however, India was one of the world’s largest exporters of rare earths. Shebonti Ray 
Dadwal, 'The Sino-Japanese Rare Earths Row: Will China's Loss be India's Gain?' Strategic Analysis, 35: 
2, (2011), pp. 181-185 
339 Hrusikesh Mohanty, ‘Toyota plans processing plant for rare earth chloride,’ 26 January, 2010, 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/toyota-plans-processing-plant-for-rare-earth-
chloride/383640/  (Accessed on 12/08/11) Author’s interview with Senior Indian MEA official 
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regarding India’s hesitancy to be seen to be hedging against China, when this issue was 
raised with the Indian MEA, the response was cautious.340  
 
Nevertheless by having established economic links with these countries in advance, 
when the urgent need for greater supply of a particular product arose Japan was able to 
more readily fulfil demand. The Japanese government also pledged $1bn for research in 
November 2010 to secure supplies. This effort seemingly soon paid off when in July 
2011 Japanese researchers found approximately 100bn tons of rare earths in the Pacific 
Ocean floor.341 Japanese companies are often criticised as impotent to change but on 
this occasion moved with speed. 
 
ii. Limitations of other partners 
 
Vietnam is limited in size so represents just a ‘stop-gap’. 342 India in contrast is nine 
times the size of Japan and shows impressive signs of future growth. India’s large 
domestic consumer market has also shielded its economy from the global recession. 
Even though the Chinese market for Japanese goods is over thirty times greater,343 this 
is expected to fall swiftly. In a sense therefore the timing of sustained growth following 
liberalisation was fortuitous since it coincided with a growing realisation in Japan that 
markets in China and Southeast Asia were reaching saturation.  
 
                                                            
340 Ibid. 
341 ‘Japan finds rare earths in Pacific seabed’ BBC News, 4 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
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343 Ronojoy Banerjee, ‘Slowdown blues make Japan favour India over China as investment hub’, 
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Japanese officials are trying to portray India as not just ‘China +1’ but a separate entity. 
Whilst Vietnam or ASEAN might be considered a supplementary destination for trade 
and investment, the government is keen for India to represent its own engine of 
growth.344 
 
XVI. Trade – a disappointing record 
 
Despite Abe’s hopes that Japan-India ties would surpass those with China, exchange of 
goods and services has been one of the weakest links between the two countries. Whilst 
investment figures have shown impressive growth in recent years, trade remains 
meagre. By 2006 trade totalled only $8.25bn whereas that with China totalled 
$250bn.345 Exports grew from $2.4bn in 2005-06 to $2.8bn in 2006-07 and $3bn by 
2008-09 but this figure remains below potential. Among those products India exports 
are shrimps (Japan is the largest importer), mangoes, minerals, spices and cotton. Trade 
between India and Japan is also unbalanced with exports from India in 2009-10 totalling 
$3.63bn whilst imports in goods such as heavy machinery, electronics, pharmaceutical 
and biotechnological products were $6.73bn; almost double. As noted in Chapter 5, 
Indian iron ore once provided an important resource for Japan’s post-war recovery but 
as India grows increasingly keen to keep its own reserves, Japan has shifted to Australia 
and Brazil.346 
 
                                                            
344 Author’s interview with Koda and  Enoki  
345 Purnendra Jain, ‘New roadmap for Japan-India ties,’ Japan Focus, September 4, 2007, 
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In 2007-08 bilateral trade crossed the $10bn mark347 and in 2009-10 stood at $11bn but 
this accounted for just 0.9% of total trade in value terms.348 This figure also missed by a 
significant margin the goal of $20bn by 2010, set out during Abe’s tenure.  High 
agricultural tariffs among other issues discussed above, have been attributed to these 
disappointing figures. 349 Whereas in the 1920s India ranked fifth as an importer of 
Japanese goods by 2010 Japan was 10th as an export destination for India whilst India 
was 25th as an export destination for Japan.350  
 
Figure 10: 
Japan-India Trade 1998-2006 
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China’s comparable position highlights further the relatively minor role each other 
holds in their respective trade portfolio. In 2008-2009 for example India-China trade 
reached $42bn whilst Chinese exports totalled $32.5bn. 351 China is both Japan and 
India’s largest trading partner and Japan’s trade with China amounts to twenty times 
more than that with India.352 The current target is $25bn by 2014.353 
 
For much of the post-war era, India like other South Asian countries conducted little 
outside trade but Japan did become India’s third largest trading partner in the mid-1990s 
where it has remained. A considerable amount of trade also flows through third-
countries in ASEAN too, such as Thailand which is problematic to calculate. 
Nevertheless Japan-India trade is growing much faster than that between Japan and 
China.354  
 
XVII. Key industries for Japan-India cooperation 
 
i. The auto industry 
 
The auto industry represents Japan’s major stakeholder in relations.355 The industry has 
been nurtured by successive Indian governments and is very important to India’s 
growth. Automobile manufacturers have for many years acted as the centrepiece for 
                                                            
351 India-China Trade, Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India, 
http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp  
352 As Kondapalli notes, however, whilst trade between China and India is over $60 million, the ‘devil is 
in the detail’ since figures include Taiwan and Hong Kong and it is difficult to quantify what is 
channelled through the internet. Author’s interview with Kondapalli. 
353 ‘India’s trade deal with Japan: Exporting yoga’, The Economist, 17 February 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/02/indias_trade_deal_japan (Accessed on 17/02/11) 
354 Author’s interview with Vashdev Rupani, India Chamber of Commerce, Japan 8 June 2010   
355 According to an article by LDP politician Yuriko Koike, the term ‘rickshaw’ originates from the 
Japanese word ‘jinrikisha’ (human-powered vehicle). Yuriko Koike, ‘Suzuki and strategic alliance’, 
Project Syndicate, February 15, 2010, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/koike2/English 
(Accessed on 16/05/10) 
241 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
interaction, so much so that joint ventures between Japanese and Indian vehicle 
manufacturers predated government initiatives. According to Mancheri, Japanese FDI in 
the auto industry equated to 41% of investment from 2000 to 2007.356 In 2009 there 
were 71 Japanese companies working in the sector, involved in their manufacture and 
production of components.  
 
The car industry was not immune from the obstacles Japanese firms faced in other 
fields. However in order to work around the Indian environment, joint ventures have 
been the common mode of entry. Assembly makers and local producers work in close 
collaboration, maintaining Japanese management techniques and transferring 
technology in a way in which both parties benefit. As McKinsey has suggested, this 
route offers Japanese firms quick access to the market and avoids the ‘indignity’ of a 
takeover; ‘Allying with international players will be the name of the game for the next 
five years.’357 
 
Under the moderate reforms of Rajiv Gandhi, Japanese automobile firms entered in the 
1980s. Honda and Delhi-based Hero formed a joint venture in 1984358 and as discussed 
below, Suzuki began production in 1981. The industry began to grow substantially in 
2003 and despite the financial crisis of 2008, continues to display positive growth.  
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ii. The case of Suzuki 
 
Foreign policymaking is not solely the labour of diplomats but increasingly one 
involving multiple actors. As NCR requires, by opening the ‘black box’ of domestic 
actors it is necessary to assess the efficacy of Japan’s engagement with India by 
considering other organisations. The business community is one such grouping and as 
the case of Suzuki proves, in order to create a favourable foreign policy environment 
elite members of business have played a crucial role. In many respects the Maruti-
Suzuki joint venture represents the ‘flagship’ Japanese investment to date.359  
 
Following Indira Gandhi’s unforeseen return to power in 1981 and another visit to the 
IMF for financial support, the Indian government introduced some limited 
liberalisation, particularly in the auto sector. Suzuki heard rumours that Volkswagen 
AG360 in (then) West Germany had been contacted for possible collaboration with the 
Indian state-owned firm Maruti Udyog Ltd and put forward its own proposals, which 
were eventually accepted.  
 
Maruti Udyog was founded by Sanjay Gandhi, Indira Gandhi’s son with the objective to 
produce a ‘people’s car’ for India’s growing middle class.361 Indira Gandhi was said to 
be so distraught by her son’s early death in a plane accident that she personally ensured 
the company was a success.362 
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Domestically Suzuki was in dire straits. The firm had been forced to sell shares to 
General Motors and was essentially compelled to seek out new markets. The partnership 
almost immediately showed dividends. By 1984 a ‘Maruti Revolution’ meant demand 
outstripped supply and a two-year waiting list was imposed. In 1985 the company 
produced 50 000 units annually, surpassing 1m in FY 2009.363 Since entering India the 
venture has manufactured almost 9m units and maintained a market share of 54.4%.364 
India will soon be the company’s largest production base and an ‘export hub’ for wider 
afield.365 
 
Suzuki’s success in India has not been shared by the majority of Japanese car firms. 
Following Suzuki’s example Japan pushed for further joint ventures involving namely 
Honda and Nissan but both were rejected. 366  Toyota also faced problems when in 
partnership with DCM India and ultimately failed. Suzuki-Maruti has too been affected 
by problems such as industrial action, for example in September 2000 in the Gurgaon 
factory when it had promise to reinvest profits in India rather than Japan. A strike in 
June 2011 saw almost 2000 workers strike for 13 days at the main factory in 
Haryana.367  
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Furthermore Japan’s presence in Indian industry has not universally been welcomed. In 
1986 for example a convention on ‘Japanese Influence on Indian Automobile Industry’ 
voiced concern over the threat of Japan’s competitiveness. 368  Japan’s ‘mercantilist’ 
approach to Indo-Japanese relations was also criticised. In fact due to the problems of 
the Maruti case, the Indian government slowed its liberalisation of the automobile sector 
for fear of becoming dominated by Japan.369  
 
The reason for Suzuki’s success has not been due to any particular government-led 
initiative but rather certain market conditions and Suzuki’s own business opportunism. 
Osamu Suzuki, President of Suzuki Motor Corporation is described as a ‘creative 
decision-maker, a maverick’ who took a well-timed gamble by taking his company into 
such uncertain territory.370 He is reportedly close to the Indian government, particularly 
the Gandhi family, a position firms such as Toyota and Honda do not enjoy. The nuclear 
tests of 1998 did not adversely affect Suzuki since he faced fewer international 
competitors and had an established position in the market. 
 
The auto industry remains one of the strongest for Japanese firms interested in India’s 
growth. For instance Nissan Motor Co. is considering India as an additional export base 
to Thailand and Toyota Motor Corp. is increasing production.371 In mid-2009 Honda 
Motor Co. released its own small car in India and plans to build a second car plant after 
sales in 2009 grew by 111%.372 
 
                                                            
368 Haber, ‘The Death of Hegemony’, p. 902 
369 Ibid.  p. 903 
370 Koike, ‘Suzuki and strategic alliance’ 
371 In 2009 Toyota held just 3% of the market but announced in December 2010 strong advance orders for 
its first model of small car in India. ‘Toyota: Advance Indian orders strong for Etios’, Japan Times, 17 
December, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20101217a7.html (Accessed on 17/12/10) 
372  ‘Honda to build second cycle plant in India’, Japan Times, 10 March, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100310a2.html (Accessed on 10/03/10)  
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India’s car market is not yet on a par with China’s where in comparison to 9.34m 
produced and sold in 2008 in China, India only provided 2.42m. Manufacturing is also 
12-15% cheaper in China.373 Where India’s strength lies is in the potential of the market 
with an aspiring middle class with significant purchasing power. India’s auto market is 
Asia’s third largest and projected to triple over the next decade at a time when demand 
in other markets is falling.374 
 
iii. The promise of the IT sector 
 
Another evident complementarity has been identified as the IT sector. Whilst Japan is 
ranked one of the most innovative countries according to patent and researcher per 
capita, Japan’s software industry is virtually non-existent.375 In India, however, the IT 
industry begun in the 1970s has gained international reputation.376  
 
Japan’s early interest was based around India’s IT potential. When Mori made his 
landmark visit to India in 2000, he was not only going to bolster the US’ heightened 
interest in the subcontinent but also for domestic ends. By stopping first in Bangalore, 
India’s ‘Silicon Valley’, it was evident where Mori’s priorities lay. Mori came fresh 
from the Kyushu-Okinawa G8 Summit where the idea of using information technology 
to bring economic growth had been widely discussed. Mori used the opportunity to 
                                                            
373 Mancheri, ‘Investment by Japanese automobile manufacturers in India – a win-win situation’ 
374 The Suzuki-VW tie-up was one of several during 2009 to feed the growing Asian market. General 
Motors and SAIC in China signed a deal to produce cars in India and PSA Peugeot Citroën and 
Mitsubishi were also holding negotiations. Suzuki’s foothold in the emerging market was cited as one of 
the company’s strongest assets. ‘Asian alliances: VW, GM and Peugeot-Citroën’, The Economist, 9 
December, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/15063005 (Accessed on 09/12/09) 
375  ‘Innovation through regulation: Why America’s corporate innovation beats Japan’s’, Business.view, 
The Economist, 2 June, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13766329 (Accessed on 02/06/09) 
376 Keiichi Hirose, ‘Firms eye Hyderabad, India’s newest star’, Japan Times, 16 October 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101016f2.html. (Accessed on 16/10/10) Japan largely missed 
out in the early years of India’s ‘tech-boom’ preferring to outsource IT to the US. The language barrier, 
small population of Indians in Japan and preference for completing business in-house all served as 
additional barriers. 
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emphasise Japan’s technological advances and launch a ‘Japan-India IT Promotion and 
Cooperation Initiative’.377 During a speech to IT business leaders Mori claimed ‘IT is 
the key to the prosperity in the 21st century. Since my administration was inaugurated, 
one of its central pillars has been the promotion of the IT revolution’.378 Japan’s role, it 
was envisaged, was to support developing countries by investing in infrastructure and 
forming policies for the IT sector.379  
 
Following this initiative IT cooperation increased significantly. In December 2005 10 
000 of the approximately 17 000 Indians residing in Japan were thought to be working 
in the IT sector.380 By the end of 2008 the figure was 22 000.381 Whilst the US and 
Europe have remained priority destinations, Japan has attracted a number of companies 
seeking to balance Japan’s high-tech hardware capabilities with their own software 
skills. The easing of visa rules in 2001 served as a major stimulus. Whilst there was 
little rhetoric calling for political synergy during Mori’s visit, it was evident that 
practical economic cooperation formed the basis of Japan’s ‘rapprochement’.  
 
iv. Pharmaceuticals  
 
Another industry where Japan and India have pooled their resources, expertise and 
demand is pharmaceuticals. In particular Japan has its eye on Indian generic drugs 
                                                            
377 ‘Face to Face Interview: Interview with Mr. Osamu Watanabe: JETRO Focusing on Business Match-
Making Programme’, India One Stop, http://www.indiaonestop.com/face2face/osamu.htm  
378 ‘Speech concerning Information Technology by Prime Minister Mori at the meeting with the leaders 
from Indian IT companies, hosted by Honourable Mr. S. M. Krishna, Chief Minister of Karnataka, ‘IT 
Cooperation between Japan and India in the 21st Century’, 22 August, 2000, Bangalore, India   
379 Rajaram Panda, ‘India and Japan in the New Century’, Nalini Kant Jha (ed.), South Asia in Twenty-
First Century: India, Her Neighbours, and the Great Powers, (Delhi: South Asian Pub, 2003) p. 276 
380 Trevor Clarke, ‘Japan’s own Indian tech boom’, Japan Times, 9 January, 2007, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20070109zg.html (Accessed on 09/01/07) 
381 ‘Indians aid Japan’s IT industry’, Japan Times, 14 November, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20091114f5.html (Accessed on 14/11/09) 
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which represent almost 99% of all the drugs India produces at a much cheaper cost. 
India’s pharmaceutical industry is a rarity for its international competitiveness without 
foreign collaboration.382 Japan contains an ageing population and the second-largest 
market for pharmaceuticals but its domestic drugs industry is plagued by stringent 
regulations and price controls, which are considered a ‘de facto non-tariff trade 
barrier’. 383  Even though the sector is thought to be widely recession-proof, it has 
suffered from bureaucratic rules, which often involve duplicating lengthy trials to 
satisfy the conservative Ministry of Welfare and Health.384 A lack of mutual recognition 
for licences385 has also caused friction, especially when Japan argues that Indian drugs 
are unsuitable for Japanese.386  
 
Japan’s Health Ministry was also long-hesitant to allow Indian mangoes into Japan due 
to a virus-carrying fly which reportedly resides in the seeds inside.387 For twenty years 
Indian mangoes were prohibited from import creating another de facto trade barrier.388 
The ban was finally lifted in June 2006 and in November 2010 after repeated calls from 
Islamabad. Tokyo also lifted the ban on Pakistani mangoes suggesting a more relaxed 
attitude.389 
 
                                                            
382 Author’s interview with Ken Kubo, Researcher, South Asia, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), 
Indian Statistical Institute, 28 February 2011. The Institute for Developing Economies (IDE) particularly 
studies the agricultural sector in India. The IDE is formally affiliated with METI but works mainly 
autonomously or with JETRO.  
383 ‘A homespun elixir: Japan’s drug firms on the move’, The Economist, 20 May, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16168270 (Accessed on 20/05/10) 
384  Ibid. 
385 Author’s interview with Noda 
386 Indeed some diplomats claim to feel stronger affects from Indian drugs even though the US accepts 
Indian drugs, weakening their case. For many years this dispute has raged. Interestingly for example, in 
1992 following a Japanese Economic Mission one of the requests made to the Japanese government was 
for the ‘establishment of permanent medical clinic with Japanese doctors’, demonstrating Japan’s concern 
with the Indian medical system. 
387 Author’s interview with APS Mani, President, India IT Club Japan 18 June 2009 
388 India is the world’s largest producer of mangoes. Author’s interview with Sakakibara 
389  ‘JA to introduce Pakistani mangoes in Japan’, AAJ News, 23 November, 2010, 
http://www.aaj.tv/2010/11/ja-to-introduce-pakistani-mangoes-in-japan/ (Accessed on 23/11/10) 
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The details over pharmaceuticals proved one of the most cumbersome to resolve during 
CEPA negotiations. India called on Japan to relax regulations on the sale of particularly 
low-cost generic drugs in Japan, a demand which few Japanese bureaucrats or 
politicians were then willing to relent. India is also keen for its doctors and nurses to be 
able to practise in Japan but the issue of language has proved troublesome. 390  
 
In order to placate the public and health community, Japanese companies have entered 
the Indian markets through joint ventures; the purchase of Ranbuxy Laboratories by 
Daiichi Sakyo the most notable example.391 The Japanese government has made some 
efforts to reduce launch times for new drugs to 2.5 years and encourage greater use of 
generic drugs but the issue has proven a sticking point. 392 In March 2010 the Indian 
Ambassador raised the issue again calling for quick clearance of drugs into the Japanese 
market.393  
 
A breakthrough came in 2010 within the DPJ’s ‘New Growth Strategy’.394 The victory 
of the DPJ was suspected to bring fundamental changes to Japan’s business 
environment since ideologically, DPJ members whilst from a broad swath of 
backgrounds were supposed to favour policies to the Left rather than the pro-business 
perspective which characterised the LDP. In the opening months of the new 
administration, however, it was clear that economic growth was the priority. In order to 
                                                            
390 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
391 When Daiichi Sakyo bought the Indian firm Ranbuxy Laboratories, however, this ‘hit an emotional 
nerve’ in India according to Kubo Ken since this company was regarded as a ‘crown jewel’ example of an 
‘Indian success story’. The deal also ran into trouble a few weeks after its launch as a scandal accusing 
Indian factories using poor operating standards, shocked Japan’s confidence. Author’s interview with 
Kubo 
392 The goal is to increase the share of generics to over 30% by FY2012. ‘JETRO Seminar in India: 
Investment Opportunities – Japanese Pharmaceutical Market "Case Studies of Alliances and M&As 
between India and Japan”’, Press Release, JETRO, 20 November, 2009 
393 Author’s interview with Noda 
394 For more detail on the DPJ’s ‘New Growth Strategy’, see 
http://www.Kantei.go.jp/foreign/topics/2009/1230strategy_image_e.pdf  
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bring about a ‘strong economy, robust public finances and a strong social security 
system’, among the measures was the intention to ‘relax regulations on foreign doctors 
and nursing care workers for providing medical care services in Japan’.395 Whilst not 
specifically directed towards India, the announcement no doubt pleased lobbyists in 
India. Eventually CEPA allowed generic drug exports similarly swift approval processes to 
domestic firms.396  
 
Once again economic realities encouraged Japanese decision-makers to loosen 
previously-held positions to improve relations with India. The argument that reducing 
restrictions would lower government healthcare expenditure has for obvious reasons, 
not been cited by officials. MOFA officials continue to argue that they ‘won’t give 
special treatment to India’ and that they are ‘not going to compromise on drugs and 
security’397 but according to one economist, the fear of losing space in the auto industry, 
stirred the bureaucracy to concede. As will be evidenced in other instances (such as 
nuclear exports), Japan’s bureaucracy has been forced to reduce previously held 
ideological objections for greater economic goals. 
 
XVII. Japan’s ‘flagship’ investments: the DMIC and DFC 
 
Japan has not just lamented India’s poor infrastructure, efforts have been made to 
employ Japanese expertise to improve the situation. Japan can do little about India’s 
labour and tax system but can assist infrastructure-development.398 By assisting in the 
                                                            
395 ‘On the New Growth Strategy’, Cabinet Decision, DPJ Government, 18 June, 2010, p. 51 
396 Sourabh Gupta, ‘Japan-India economic ties and the promise of the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor’, 
East Asia Forum, 4 November, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/04/japan-india-economic-
ties-and-the-promise-of-the-delhi-mumbai-industrial-corridor/ (Accessed on 04/11/10) 
397 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA 30 June 2010 
398 Author’s interview with Koda 
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construction of a more favourable environment for investment furthermore the Japanese 
government is able to demonstrate their commitment to working with India.  
 
‘Flagship’ investments include the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and 
Dedicated Multimodal High Axle Load Freight Corridor project (DFC). This latter 
project was the initiative of India, particularly PM Singh who conceived of both an 
eastern and western plank and announced plans during Koizumi’s 2005 visit. The 
DMIC, however, proposed in 2006 emerged in part due to Suzuki’s operations in India. 
The majority of Suzuki-Maruti vehicles are produced in plants on the outskirts of Delhi 
yet in order to export them to Europe and elsewhere the nearest port is Mumbai 
(Bombay), at a distance of 1500km. 399  Suzuki, hoping to improve the situation, 
petitioned the Indian government to work with Japan to improve logistics. METI then 
interviewed manufacturing companies in Japan to explore issues they faced in India to 
learn that not only an industrial zone would be beneficial but also a logistics park. 
Officials amalgamated suggestions into one proposal to present to the Indian 
government who agreed to endorse the plan.400 According to some experts, there was 
some tension with MOFA over this project which was thought to overrule the initially 
planned DFC and be too ambitious but currently both are in progress.401 
 
In October 2008 Japan agreed to provide India with a low-interest loan worth $4.5bn to 
construct a 1483km long railway between Delhi and Mumbai, linking India’s two 
                                                            
399 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
400 Suzuki Ltd had also hoped for a rail-line directly from their plant to be part of the plans but this was 
rejected so the company entered into independent talks with the state government. Author’s interview 
with Kondo 
401 Anonymous interview 
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largest cities (see Figure 11 below).402 The corridor will hold a 4000MW power plant, 
three ports and six airports. In addition ‘High Impact Developments’ were proposed at 
loci of 150km either side, covering six states, 403  offering to double employment 
potential, triple industrial output and quadruple exports from the region in five years.404 
The area of the project is expected to equal the size of Honshu and represents the first 
attempt to conduct such a vast project across states. Whilst Japan is concentrating on the 
Western corridor due to the concentration of Japanese businesses interested in the area, 
an Eastern corridor is under consideration, financed by the WB.  The Indian government 
has agreed to invest $90bn in the project with another $70bn expected from private 
investments.405  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
402 In February 2011 as CEPA was signed, the two governments also agreed to a joint fund of $9 bn to 
kick-start the project. ‘India, Japan target $25-bn trade by ‘14’ Business, Standard, 17 February 2011, 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-japan-target-25-bn-trade-by-/14/425494/ (Accessed 
on 17/02/11) 
403 These states are Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra 
404 ‘India’s Economic Prospects & India-Japan Partnership’, Address by H.E. Mr H.K. Singh, Ambassador 
of India at  Special Breakfast Meeting for Japan Center of Economic Research, November 12, 2009, p. 58 
405 Author’s interview with Kondo 
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Figure 11 
Map of Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor 
 
Source: DMIC website, http://delhimumbaiindustrialcorridor.com/ 
 
Whilst there are valid concerns that Japanese companies will lose out to European and 
US companies interested in investing in the corridor406 (Japan is not the only country 
given favourable treatment), the project will no doubt ameliorate relations. By creating 
‘zones of economic activities’, Japan expects to be granted the opportunity to build 
clusters for Japanese operations along the corridor. In March 2010 Toshiba Corp., 
Hitachi Ltd. and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. all announced plans to embark on 
projects for solar power generation and sewer systems as well as feasibility studies on 
                                                            
406 For example along the DMIC it is still undecided whether the freight railway should run on electricity 
or diesel. According to Sako, Japanese makers have recommend the electrical method, ‘but if the diesel 
method is adopted there is a possibility that contracts will be awarded to GE which has proposed double-
deck containers hauled by diesel locomotives.’ Sako, ‘Japanese Companies Venturing into the Indian 
Market: India requires different marketing strategies from ASEAN and China,’ p. 27 
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‘smart grid’ power transmission line networks along the corridor.407 Other Japanese 
firms have committed to work with state governments to create eco-friendly cities.408  
 
As METI willingly admits, previous policy was to make repeated requests to the Indian 
government to little avail but has now altered its approach to work closer with Indian 
officials. The DMIC it is hoped will provide a manufacturing hub where Japanese 
businesses can thrive and feed off Japan’s experience. As one diplomat noted, the 
project is ‘not a philanthropic effort’ but an attempt to create a market for Japanese 
business to exploit.409 Given their long-term application furthermore, these two ‘mega 
projects’ may offer more than CEPA signed in 2011. The current target for completion 
is 2017. 
 
Opinion of the project is, however, mixed though the majority of those questioned 
looked upon plans favourably. According to Panda, the scheme will ‘catapult the 
bilateral relations to a level that will be the envy of other nations in Asia.’410 Those 
Japanese businesses involved are also positive. According to Mitsubishi, the DMIC is a 
‘God-given opportunity’, which no other country has been able to suggest, 
demonstrating Japan’s unique role in India.411 In addition whilst on such projects there 
are usually limits to Japanese involvement (of around 70%) this is not the case, offering 
even greater opportunities. For JICA the DFC (part of the larger DMIC) is ‘the next big 
                                                            
407 ‘China’s IT certification not a threat: Naoshima’, Japan Times, 24 March, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100324a3.html (Accessed on 24/03/10) 
408 Mizuho Corporate Bank and JGC Corporation agreed in November 2010 for example to work with a 
Singaporean property company, to promote urban development in a Special Economic Zone. ‘Mizuho, 
JGC to push Indian urban property project’, Japan Times, 18 November, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20101118a1.html (Accessed on 18/11/10) 
409 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
410 Rajaram Panda, ‘India-Japan Economic Relations: Focus on the DMIC, IDSA Fellows Seminar, 25 
March 2011, http://www.idsa.in/event/IndiaJapanEconomicRelationsFocusonDMIC (Accessed on 
27/03/11)  
411 Author’s interview with Vargu 
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thing’ which will act as the ‘anchor for all other projects’. Sceptics, however, doubt the 
likelihood of land acquisition efforts bearing fruit and greater attention going to other 
projects such as a corridor between Bangalore and Chennai. 412  Other sectors eyed 
include asset management, scientific exchange, 413 green technologies, the steel and 
cell-phone industry.414  
 
XVIII. Domestic level actors  
 
i. The role of METI 
 
METI has played a pivotal role encouraging Japanese investment in India. In north 
India the work of METI and JETRO in securing the DMIC brought significant 
investment and more recently Japan has turned its attention south. In May 2010 JETRO 
opened a further office in Chennai (Madras), Tamil Nadu recognising the need to focus 
on individual states for trade opportunities. By choosing Chennai, Japan stated its hope 
to use India as a springboard to Southeast Asian markets, a new initiative for Japan.415 
Chennai is also known as a hub for electronics and IT production, dubbed the ‘Detroit 
of India’416 but also an area where commercial ports are particularly poor. Tamil Nadu 
also recently saw the launch of a new Nissan plant and the government has noted an 
interest in the Chennai-Bangalore corridor which might include a bullet train between 
                                                            
412 Author’s interview with Kondo 
413 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of India, Tokyo 22 June 2010 
414 According to Kubo Ken at the IDE, JSW (an Indian firm) and JFE (second steel company) are 
planning to build several plants. Author’s interview with Kubo 
415 According to Masayuki Naoshima, Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan is 
looking at Chennai as India's gateway to South-East Asian countries.  
416 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
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cities.417 In 2010 the JCCI report noted that it was ‘necessary to expand, maintain and 
improve roads around Chennai and access to Ennore Port.’  
 
JETRO has signed Memoranda of Understanding with four state governments 
(Rajasthan 2006, Gujarat 2007, Orissa and Madjya Pradesh 2008) and plans to sign 
another with Maharashtra. In July 2006 JETRO agreed with Indian officials to establish 
the first exclusive Japanese Investment Zone in Neemrana, Rajasthan and plans are 
afoot to create a similar park for Japanese investors in Tamil Nadu.418 In August 2009 
seventeen Japanese companies had established themselves in the industrial park where 
Hitachi is planning to set up a power plant.419 In addition METI have sponsored events 
to broaden awareness of Japanese brands in an attempt to tap into India’s growing 
middle-class market.420 
 
ii. Politicians 
 
Political influence has also played a limited part. Okada, Foreign Minister was 
previously a ‘METI man’ and Naoshima, METI Minister had formerly worked for 
Toyota which according to one official, encouraged him to support auto companies, 
                                                            
417 ‘JETRO sets up shop in Chennai’, ENS Economic Bureau, 3 May, 2010, 
http://expressbuzz.com/finance/jetro-sets-up-shop-in-chennai/170248.html (Accessed on 03.05/10) 
Moreover, according to the Japanese ambassador to India, Hideaki Domichi, the Government of Japan is 
keen to extend financial assistance to the proposed Chennai-Bangalore corridor project. ‘This project is 
another strategic area from our point of view. Big Japanese companies like Toyota are already here, and 
the Chennai area is also attracting a lot of Japanese investments.’ 
418 ‘More Japanese firms planning foray into State’, The Hindu, 1 May, 2010, 
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article419420.ece (Accessed on 01/05/10) 
419 Arpita Mathur, ‘Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in India: A Weak Link in Ties’, RSIS Policy 
Belief, Issue No. 1, 19 March, 2010, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_brief/RSIS%20-
%20PB%20-Issue%20no%201%20-%202010%20%28pdf%29.pdf (Accessed on 06/10/10) p. 2 
420 The inclination of METI to publicise their efforts more than MOFA should also be considered when 
assessing the number of initiatives publicised by the ministry.  
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particularly in Chennai. 421  The most tangible area where politicians have affected 
Japanese economic strategy, however, has been in how policy is rhetorically framed. 
Chapter 8 and Chapter 4’s discussion of the role of Prime Minister ideology argued that 
under the LDP a security-focused approach was sought before economic linkages had 
been secured. This ultimately failed but under the DPJ a more practical method has been 
adopted. This places Japanese policy in greater sync with India’s vision. 
 
iii. Limitations of government initiatives 
 
Overall, despite Suzuki’s efforts, initiative remains government-led. This represents a 
potential handicap for the future health of relations where it is widely believed private 
investment should take the lead. Diplomats on both side of the relationship regret the 
‘shepherding’ 422  Japanese businesses have relied upon thus far. As one Deputy 
Ambassador to India in Tokyo states, the two cannot continue to be ‘hand-held’.  
 
Despite concerted efforts, economists and trade diplomats alike recognise that only 
private sector activity will allow bilateral relations to truly prosper.423 In Chapter 7 it 
will be noted how influence from the business community has factored into Japan’s 
nuclear policy but regarding trade and investment, government officials have found it 
harder to exert similar pressure. As Kondo states, the most important person for 
Japanese firms in India to know is the Japanese ambassador since many negotiations are 
channelled through the Embassy. For Korean firms, business takes the lead.424  
 
                                                            
421 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
422 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of India, Tokyo 22 June 2010 
423Author’s interview with Esho 
424 Author’s interview with Masanori Kondo, December 21, 2010, London 
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Encouraging greater FDI to bolster economic relations has been a particular priority for 
Japan’s government, where the focus of this chapter will now turn.   
 
XIX. FDI as a foreign policy tool 
 
Foreign Direct Investment into India has been a historically weak area of cooperation. 
Japan has been a ‘belated convert’ to the benefits of FDI, in stark contrast to China who 
has viewed FDI as an essential element of its economic success. In Japan, despite a 
large consumer market, the country receives one of the lowest ratios of FDI inflows in 
the world.425 Strict regulations and high labour costs are seen as the primary culprits. 
India too has been a late-comer to the benefits of investment from outside parties and 
despite its potential is forecast to witness little FDI due to labour laws, inefficiencies 
and poor infrastructure. China will no doubt remain at the forefront (3rd globally) of FDI 
interests in Asia in the future, as the EIU-CPII ‘World Investment Prospects to 2011’ 
report noted.426  
 
After years of hesitation regarding China’s potential in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Japanese companies launched with gusto into the Chinese market. India therefore lost 
out on Japan’s late 1980s ‘investment boom’. Regrettably when India did initiate 
reforms in the early 1990s, Japan was experiencing the fallout of its burst bubble. Japan 
accounted for just 6% of India’s FDI between 1991 and 2006 according to a report by 
the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). 427 In FY2007 Japan’s FDI totalled only 
                                                            
425 ‘Three Asian giants, Forecasting foreign investment in China, Japan and India’, The Economist, 6 
September, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9769084 (Accessed on 19/12/08) 
426 ‘World Investment Prospects to 2011: Foreign direct investment and the challenge of political risk’ is 
produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) with the Columbia Program on International 
Investment (CPII). It charts global FDI trends over the next five years, by surveying more than 600 direct 
investors. http://www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=eiu_world_investment_prospects_2007&rf=0  
427 Mathur, ‘Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in India: A Weak Link in Ties’ 
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$815m compared to $411 million in smaller Vietnam and $1899m in China.428 India’s 
attractiveness as an investment destination has multiplied and a number of Japanese 
complaints remain valid but the figure remains poor given the potential. In 2009-10 
total FDI into India fell by almost a third due in part to the economic crisis but 
according to analysts also due to unease over the Indian market – either for overheating, 
slow progress on reforms and corruption which received particularly high media 
attention that year.429 Inflation is also a growing concern.430  
 
i. Japanese commercial interest 
 
Among the first Japanese ventures in India was Sony. Following negotiations with the 
Indian government, ‘Sony India’ established operations in January 1995 with a 100% 
subsidiary.431 As the METI Minister Hashimoto Ryotaro said in his speech in Delhi on 
6 January 1995, Japan had been ‘reawakened to India’s vast potential both as a 
manufacturing base and as a huge consumer market’.432  
 
After a slow start, between 2006-07 and 2009-10 the number of firms operating in India 
tripled to 300 as companies, impressed with India’s ability to weather the economic 
downturn, entered.433 Fourteen million people joining the working population each year 
also offered appealing consumer demand. India has become the most favoured 
                                                            
428 Nataraj, ‘India-Japan Investment Relations: Trends and Prospects’ 
429 ‘India's economy: Calling on the gods’, The Economist, 3 March 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18291557 (Accessed on 03/03/11)  
430 ‘India’s economy: the half-finished revolution’, The Economist, 21 July 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18986387?story_id=18986387 (Accessed on 21/07/11) 
431 ‘About Sony: Sony India’, http://www.sony.co.in/article/211979/section/overview  
432 Hashimoto quoted in Varma, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, 
p.  237 
433 ‘There is a lot of excitement among Japanese companies about India. The country has weathered the 
downturn better than most countries, giving an opportunity to Japanese companies’, Naoyoshi Noguchi, 
former Director General of JETRO. Banerjee, ‘Slowdown blues make Japan favour India over China as 
investment hub’ 
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destination (70% of those surveyed by JBIC) for long term investments. In the medium 
term, 58% of companies surveyed want to do business in India.434 According to JETRO 
chairman Hayashi Yasuo, ‘Japanese investment in India tripled in 2006 and doubled 
again in 2007.’435 Whereas Japan’s investment used to be one fifth of that which went to 
China, the figure is now approximately a third.436 Figures released in January 2011 
largely echo earlier sentiments with JBIC reporting 74.5% now choosing India as an 
investment destination for the next 10 years. JETRO’s annual survey of ‘Overseas 
Business Operations of Japanese Manufacturers’ 437  showed that 83% of companies 
surveyed expressed a desire to ‘strengthen or expand their overseas operations’. When 
asked in JETRO’s recent survey the reasons for pursuing emerging countries, the 
opportunities from the middle class represented 68.1% of respondents’ interest. 
 
Between 2000 and 2010 Japan ranked seventh in cumulative FDI equity inflow, 
estimated at approximately $3,714m,438 with $1,183m between April 2009 and March 
2010. Some of the largest investments included expansion by Honda and Canon. 
Toshiba Corporation has also announced a joint venture in India for the manufacture of 
turbines and plans to market televisions.439  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
434 ‘India and Japan’, India Brand Equity Foundation, June 2010, 
http://www.ibef.org/india/indiajapan.aspx 
435 ‘Japan's Renewed Interest in India: An “Upward Trajectory”’ 
436 Author’s interview with Koda  
437 The survey was conducted from July through August 2010, covering 961 companies, of which 605 
returned valid responses (response rate: 63%). 
438 According to the latest data released by the Department of Policy and Promotion (DIPP), ‘India and 
Japan’, India Brand Equity Foundation 
439 ‘Toshiba looks for better India sales’ Japan Times, 23 July 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nb20110723a4.html (Accessed on 23/07/11) 
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In the financial sector, Japan’s Mizuho Financial Group joined the State Bank of India 
and in 2011 hinted at plans to extend operations in India well as other emerging Asian 
markets. The State Bank also projects growth in Japanese branches. 440 Bridgestone 
Corporation, another Japanese firm which produces automobile tyres, entered India in 
1998 and currently holds a market share of almost 30% and hopes to expand.441 Hitachi 
Construction Machinery recently bought out its partner, Tata Motors. In 2010 Yamaha’s 
announced plans to double its number of sales outlets in India in the next five years442 
and even Japan Tobacco has considered India as rising taxes and health consciousness 
                                                            
440 Hiroko Nakata, ‘State Bank of India bullish on Japan business’ Japan Times, 21 January 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100121a3.html (Accessed on 21/01/10) 
441  ‘Japanese Manufacturers in the Indian Market Move to Secure Their Lead’, Nikkei Business, 20 April, 
2010, http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/eng/20100420/214079/ (Accessed on 20/04/10) 
442 Subramaniam Sharma, ‘Yamaha to Double India Showrooms to Tap Rural Demand’, Business Week, 
18 June, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-18/yamaha-to-double-india-showrooms-to-
tap-rural-demand-update2-.html (Accessed on 18/06/10) 
Figure 12     FDI inflows into India from Japan ($bn) 
Year FDI from Japan 
Total FDI inflows into 
India 
Japan’s share of total 
FDI flows 
2002-03 0.41 3.13 13.15 
2003-04 0.08 2.63 2.96 
2004-05 0.13 3.75 3.36 
2005-06 0.21 5.55 3.75 
2006-07 0.09 15.73 0.54 
2007-08 0.82 24.5 3.32 
2008-09 0.41 27.33 1.48 
2009-10 .18 25.89 4.57 
Source: Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India. 
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reduces the smoking rate in Japan.443 In India the 120m smokers represents a four-fold 
increase on the number of potential customers in Japan.444  
 
Figure 13                   Net Inflows of FDI from Japan and India 
 
 
 
The year 2009 was particularly active for Japanese FDI.  Two major takeover deals 
boosted Japan’s annual figure when the pharmaceutical firm Daiichi Sankyo bought 
34.8% of Ranbuxy Laboratories for $4.6bn445 followed by NTT DoCoMo, the telecoms 
conglomerate bought a 26% stake in Tata Teleservices Ltd.446 These two acquisitions 
accounted for over four-fifths of the total FDI from Japan.447 With a strong yen these 
firms have also been able to acquire foreign assets at a reduced rate. In 2009 Japanese 
investment to India in the fiscal year surpassed that of China. However according to 
                                                            
443  ‘Japan Tobacco eyes India to offset shrinking market at home’, Japan Times, 18 March, 2010 
(Expired story) 
444 Under the existing policy, FDI up to 100% was allowed in tobacco, with prior permission of the 
Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), and subject to the company obtaining an industrial licence. 
In April 2010, however, the Indian government blocked FDI in the tobacco industry, scuppering the plans 
of Japan Tobacco International to increase their market share to 74% from 50%. ‘Govt bans FDI in 
cigarette manufacturing’, Business Standard, 9 April, 2010, http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/govt-bans-fdi-in-cigarette-manufacturing/391345/ (Accessed on 09/04/10) 
445 ‘A homespun elixir: Japan’s drug firms on the move’ 
446 ‘Japan's Renewed Interest in India: An “Upward Trajectory”’ 
447 Author’s interview with Rajaram Panda 
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Kondo, whilst Japan likes to make this claim, technically Chinese trade surpassed that 
with India for the calendar year. Furthermore Japanese FDI has remained largely 
concentrated in two major sectors; the automotive industry (60%) petrochemicals 
(20%). 448  Greater variety is expected in the future and METI predicts that the 
conclusion of market research by electronics companies will soon see greater 
investment in this sector.449 Scholars predict the trend to continue with slightly lower 
figures in coming years without such large projects but an upturn is undisputed.  
 
ii. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) 
 
Japan’s interest in India can also be calculated by the increase in Foreign Institutional 
Investors (FII). According to IBEF the first ‘India Investment Funds’ were established 
in 2004, doubling to sixteen between 2005 and 2007 totalling $8.2bn.450 Interestingly as 
one Ambassador to India commented, in 2009 whilst FDI totalled approximately $8bn, 
so too did both ODA and FII. Ordinarily FII represents just 10-15% of the total.451 As 
India is considered a more transparent destination for funds, the appeal of the market 
has grown. FIIs have witnessed a ‘new flurry’ of interest in Japan with an increasing 
number of queries into pension funds among others.452 Japan’s large cash reserves are 
                                                            
448 Geethanjali Nataraj, ‘India and Japan: Increasing interest, declining inflows’, East Asia Forum, 9 
September 2009,  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/09/india-and-japan-increasing-interest-
declining-inflows/  (Accessed on 09/09/09) p. 19 
449 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
450 Portfolio investors from Japan into India include funds such as Nomura India Security Investment 
(US$ 920.5 million), Shinko Pure India Equity Fund (US$ 617.1 million), JF India Fund (US$ 142.7 
million), BlackRock India Equity Fund (US$ 929.1 million) Mitsui-Sumitomo India-China Equity Fund, 
HSBC India Open Fund (US$ 1033.3 million) from HSBC Investments (Japan) K. K, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Asset Management Co., Ltd. (US$ 264.1 million) and Shisei Investment Management Co., Ltd (US$ 
241.9 million) among others. ‘India and Japan’ India Brand Equity Foundation  
451 Author’s interview with Enoki   
452 Author’s interview with Bhattacharyya 
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encouraging investors to look abroad, especially as interest rates remain puny at 
home.453  
 
XX. The Japan-India ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement’ 
 
The centrepiece of Japan’s economic relationship with India has been negotiations 
towards a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). In November 
2004 during the ASEAN summit meeting in Vientiane, Japan identified India and China 
as priority partners of the ‘next-generation of FTAs’ and established study groups to 
explore opportunities. Negotiations began in January 2007. Both countries agreed to 
aim for completion within two years but eventually fourteen rounds over four years 
were required to cover all issues of disagreement. Despite concern that CEPA would not 
be signed into law after Fukushima and since in India only 38% of Bills were passed in 
the Parliament in 2010, 454 CEPA was approved and came into force on August 1st 
2011.455  
 
The negotiations were the longest of the twelve METI has concluded. Japan was 
particularly keen to reduce tariffs on vehicle components exported in large numbers 
from Japan. India’s primary issue was for Japan to simplify the approval procedure for 
generic drugs and allow greater numbers of Indians to work in Japan. The India-ROK 
agreement was on Japanese negotiators’ minds too.  
 
                                                            
453 ‘Japanese financial firms develop a yen for India’, Business Rediff, 3 August, 2009, 
http://business.rediff.com/report/2009/aug/03/japanese-financial-firms-develop-a-yen-for-india.htm 
(Accessed on 03/08/09) 
454 Author’s interview with SS Parmar, Commander, Indian Navy and Research Fellow, IDSA, 1 March 
2011  
455 The Japan-Indonesia FTA was delayed for example by the political calendar. Author’s interview with 
Kondo, December 2010.   
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The final agreement required Japan to reduce tariffs on 97% of Indian imports whilst 
India reduced tariffs on 90% by 2020. In total approximately 9000 products were freed 
from duties. 456  Japanese exporters now enjoy the same liberalisation on auto-parts, 
white goods and iron and steel products as Korean firms. CEPA went beyond a 
traditional FTA, which would only remove tariffs and trade barriers. The accord with 
India could instead be described as an ‘FTA+’457 since it also facilitates the exchange of 
services such as software and banking, promotion of investment, movement of natural 
persons, competition and protection of intellectual property rights.458 This is particularly 
important for Japan and India who rely heavily on the service-sector. According to 
Nataraj (one of the few Indian economists looking at the relationship), this sector 
represents 50% of GDP in India and over two-thirds in Japan.  
 
Greater labour exchange is also proposed, aided in part by a visa agreement secured in 
2010 to allow Japanese workers in India to stay for three years. A social-security 
agreement is also set to be agreed by 2014 focused on Indian nurses and Japanese care-
workers.459 India certainly has plenty of labour at its disposal compared to Japan which 
is expected to shrink by 3.5m by 2020 according to the ILO whilst Goldman Sachs 
believe India’s will grow by 110m.460  
 
                                                            
456 ‘Broad agreement is reached to forge free-trade pact with India’, Japan Times, 10 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100910a4.html (Accessed on 10/09/10) 
457 Author’s interview with Bhattacharyya 
458 S. D. Naik, ‘India–Japan Ties – Moving to the Next Level,’ The Hindu Business Line, 2 January 2007 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article1645326.ece (Accessed on 
05/11/08); ‘Joint Declaration between the Leaders of Japan and the Republic of India on the Conclusion 
of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement  between Japan and the Republic of India’, 
Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister of Japan, 25 October, 2010, 
http://www.Kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201010/25sengen_india_e.html   
459 ‘India, Japan target $25-bn trade by '14’ 
460 ‘India’s trade deal with Japan: Exporting yoga’ 
265 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Both governments voiced enthusiasm at the signing in February 2011, with Japan 
stating that CEPA will ‘elevate the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and 
India to a new level [and] make maximum use of respective competitive advantages to 
promote the development of both economies.’461 Okada noted the Agreement also made 
Japan and India ‘mutually…each other’s greatest bilateral trade EPA partners’.462 For 
Prime Minister Singh the agreement was ‘a historic achievement that signals the 
economic alignment of two of the largest economies in Asia; ‘It will open up new 
business opportunities and lead to a quantum increase in trade and investment flows 
between our two countries.’463 
 
Neither Japan nor India is truly ‘liberalised’. In fact both countries have shown their 
willingness to shoulder international pressure for free trade policies and sideline the 
Doha Round of WTO negotiations. Japan operates several strictly regulated sectors, 
which themselves deter foreign investors. As The Economist pointed out in 2007, Japan 
once restricted imports of foreign skis, claiming Japanese snow was different.464 Both 
governments reserved some industries from free trade promotion, notably agriculture 
and pharmaceuticals. Japan for example was able to exempt sensitive items such as rice, 
beef, pork and poultry.  It was thought that India’s list of ‘negative’ items would be 
larger than that of Japan with 8% of tradable items included whilst only 3% were for 
Japan but in the end, Japan benefitted most from the agreement. 465 India is known as a 
                                                            
461 Ibid.  
462 ‘Statement by Mr. Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, on Agreement in Principle 
on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the Republic of India’, 9 
September, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/9/0909_03.html 
463 Masami Ito, ‘India, Japan agree on broad trade deal’, Japan Times, 26 October 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20101026a1.html (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
464 ‘No country is an island: Japan is reluctantly embracing globalisation’ 
465 ‘Breakthrough in Japan-India trade talks, including pharma, look set to see signing of FTA this 
year’, The Pharma Letter, April 12, 2010, http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/27146/breakthrough-
in-japan-india-trade-talks-including-pharma-look-set-to-see-signing-of-fta-this-year.html (Accessed on 
12/04/10) 
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tough negotiator so it is perhaps surprising that Japan gained so much from CEPA. 
There had been increasing will on both sides, however, to present something favourable 
and stop stalling over details. Japan at least realised that it had more to lose, being at a 
disadvantage compared to other economies, from not concluding CEPA.466  
 
India was more willing to compromise over CEPA by 2009/10 as the structural 
environment developed. India realised they were never going to benefit significantly 
from the deal but were keen to send China a message of intent, especially as China’s 
diplomacy showed more dynamism. The existence of structural pressure thereby played 
an important role. According to the ADB Institute, Japan’s exports to India are expected 
to rise by 2.5% whilst India’s exports to Japan would only increase by 0.3%.467 The 
benefits for India after concluding CEPA with Japan can therefore largely be seen as 
strategic. Just as Japan has been encouraged to forge pacts following China’s moves, 
India has also been spurred to act. India is competing with China for Japanese 
investments. CEPA represents India’s first FTA with a developed economy. 
 
Opinion on the deliverables of CEPA is mixed. Overall, commentators and stakeholders 
appreciate the symbolic value of the agreement, demonstrating commitment and intent 
to closer ties. News of the agreement was given prominent attention in Japan whilst 
India’s coverage was more muted. Representatives from the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association and Japan Iron and Steel Federation for example were 
positive.468 However according to a Mitsubishi official interviewed, companies asked 
                                                            
466 Author’s interview with Esho. In addition, since import duties are higher in India than elsewhere, 
partners gain more from FTAs. 
467 Masahiro Kawai and Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, ‘Forging a Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
between Japan and India: Prospects and Challenges,’ India-Japan Economic Corporation Seminar, 
ICRIER, July 14, 2008, p. 13 
468 ‘Japan, India To Nix 90% Of Tariffs In 10 Years’, Nikkei, 26 October 2010, 
http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20101025D25JFF05.htm (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
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about their expectations note that since tariffs are already quite low, at 5-10% the 
impact is unlikely to be large. In fact with the yen’s rise, the change might just even 
out.469 The majority of experts sourced, believe it will take 5-10 years for any difference 
to be tangible and Japan’s campaign for reform will likely not abate now CEPA has 
been signed. As Professor Kondapalli appreciates, pressure on India to open its retail 
sector and continue liberalising the economy, especially labour laws will continue.470 
There were, however, more immediate political goals sought on both sides. Officials 
wary of the political schedule and need to demonstrate progress were keen to conclude 
during Singh’s annual visit. Some more sceptical voices, also believe the speedy 
resolution of previous sticking points by India was due to their desire to ‘give 
something to Japan’, in the hope of greater dividends in the future (see Chapter 7 for 
details of these aims). Each FTA is complicated in democracies but by mid-2010 there 
was added pressure to conclude a deal. As a senior diplomat at the Delhi Embassy 
explains, ‘We cannot negotiate forever, Japan has a strategic edge in technology but we 
cannot fall behind’.471  
 
Furthermore as Gupta has argued, whilst CEPA might appear ‘plain-vanilla in content’, 
the atmosphere of protectionism within which it was signed signalled progress. 472 
CEPA was also significant for Japanese foreign policy in a broader sense. The extended 
FTA agreement represented Japan’s first such agreement with a major economy and the 
DPJ’s first trade deal. The deal was also announced as part of the DPJ’s ‘New Growth 
Strategy’ (June 2010) whereby the government stated that ‘in order to achieve the 
“strong economy”….it is necessary to deepen economic relationships with Asian and 
                                                            
469 Author’s interview with Vargu 
470 Author’s interview with Kondapalli 
471 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
472 Gupta, ‘Japan-India economic ties and the promise of the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor’  
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emerging countries whose markets are expected to grow.’ In addition to this inclination 
towards states such as India, Japan has stated an intention to ‘play a leading role in 
actively promoting bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements within the Asia-Pacific 
region’ by increasing efforts to conclude negotiations with Australia and Korea.473  
 
The conclusion of the agreement was not purely strategic and in response to growing 
fears over China's economic dominance, yet objectives were more than just economical. 
It would be mistaken to correlate these actions as merely evidence of Japan’s ‘reactive’ 
status as Curtis has argued. Certainly the external environment influenced decision-
making but no more drastically than all states pursuing national interests. India’s middle 
class, estimated at 620m by 2020,474 is the prize being fought.  
 
XXI. FTAs as strategic foreign policy tools 
 
CEPA represents a wider change of course in Japan’s economic policy whereby FTAs 
are the preferred means to strengthen economic cooperation and bring Japan economic 
growth. ‘Free trade agreements’475 have witnessed a boom in recent years. Whereas in 
1991 there were just six, by 1999 there were 42 and a decade later in 2010 the figure 
stood at 167.476 According to economists, the challenges of promoting pan-regional free 
trade have encouraged governments to form sub-regional agreements and today Asia 
                                                            
473 Japan’s haste in resuming negotiations over a Japan-Australia is thought to also be due to China’s own 
talks with Australia over trade. FTA negotiations have progressed little due to Australia’s already-low 
tariffs but strategically the two governments have appreciated greater synergy of interests. Rathus, 
‘Australia and Japan: Emerging partnerships in the shadow of China’, Talks with Korea have stalled over 
a number of issues, including disagreement with Korea’s negotiations with the US which many in Tokyo 
felt would deter trade away from Japan. Noriyuki Mita, Director for FTA/EPA Affairs, METI ‘Japan’s 
EPA/FTA and Regional Economic Integration Policy’, Seminar given to participants of Waseda GIARI 
Summer Institute on Regional Integration, August 2009 
474 Miya Tanaka, ‘Japan-India pact may help exports’, Japan Times, 26 October 2010,  
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nb20101026a1.html (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
475 There is currently no consensus behind a universal definition 
476 ‘Doing Doha down: Trade agreements’, The Economist, 3 September, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14363297 (Accessed on 03/09/09) 
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holds more FTAs than any other region. The global financial crisis is thought to have 
also accelerated this trend as Asian countries appreciate the importance of intra-Asian 
trade over reliance on the US market.  
  
Yet some argue that the proliferation of regional trade deals actually hampers Doha 
talks ever reaching a conclusion.477 Economists argue that they distract governments 
from the multilateral process and that since trade barriers within Asia are relatively low, 
their utility is small.478 The practical uses of FTAs are also open to dispute. According 
to one survey by the ADB, only one fifth (22%) of exporters in Japan, ROK, Singapore 
and Thailand in 2008 took advantage of free trade deals. Baldwin also argues that in 
ASEAN countries the ASEAN Free Trade Area accounts for less than 3% of total 
trade.479 The ‘noodle soup’ of agreements nonetheless has become the modus operandi 
for the majority of states in Asia who appreciate the greater costs of remaining outside 
rather than within new frameworks.  
 
Japan was a late starter to FTAs. According to one METI bureaucrat, until the 
millennium Japan had only ‘one spear exclusively focused on the WTO round’. 480 
Following disenchantment with the multilateral system, Japan took a more active stance 
launching several simultaneous rounds of negotiation. Japan’s first agreement came in 
                                                            
477 ‘Doing Doha down: Trade agreements’ 
478 Aaditya Mattoo, from the World Bank cited in ‘Asian trade: The noodle bowl’, The Economist, 3 
September, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14384384 (Accessed on 03/09/09) 
479 Baldwin cited in Thomas Hale, ‘The de facto ‘free trade area’ in East Asia’, East Asia Forum, 29 
December, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/29/the-de-facto-free-trade-area-in-east-asia/ 
(Accessed on 29/12/10) 
480 Yochiro Sato, ‘Japan and the Emerging FTAs in the Asia-Pacific Leadership’, in Sato and Limaye eds., 
Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the Security Challenges, p. 37 
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2000 with Singapore, coming into effect in 2002.481 This was followed soon after by 
talks with Mexico, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.  
 
Additional stimulus came in 2002 when China made the surprise statement of a free 
trade proposal to ASEAN. Koizumi rushed to meet ASEAN leaders and announce a 
similar pact even though domestic disagreement prevented consensus. By the end of 
2003 Japan and ASEAN agreed instead to initiate individual agreements with the hope 
of concluding all by 2012. This, however, would still be behind the schedule pursued by 
China. In November 2010 Japan agreed to conclude an FTA with Peru after only 
launching preliminary talks in May 2009.482 Once again Japan was keen to tap into the 
South American market where the US and China had already established a foothold.483  
 
Further external influences emerged from other states’ activism. In addition to China’s 
agreement with ASEAN,484 India’s own negotiations for a FTA served as a wake-up 
call to Japanese diplomats. 485  As part of India’s ‘Look East’ strategy, India has 
branched out from the subcontinent and sought integration in the region to the East. 
Singapore in particular has long held strong affinity with India,486 not only due to the 
number of Indian-born residents but also a shared concern with Chinese dominance. 
India and ASEAN signed and concluded an FTA in August 2008. 
                                                            
481 Notably this FTA was simpler to negotiate due to Singapore’s non-existent agriculture sector which 
has caused major disruption to negotiations with other governments. 
482 In June 2011 the FTA was signed on almost 99% of trade items, however, controversial products such 
as rice and frozen fish were exempt.  Peru and ROK had earlier in March of 2011 signed a similar FTA in 
addition to agreements with the US, China, Singapore and Canada. Alex Martin, ‘Japan and Peru sign 
free-trade agreement’, Japan Times, 1 June 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nb20110601a4.html  
483 ‘Japan, Peru conclude FTA talks, eye market for autos’, Japan Times, 15 November, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20101115a2.html, (Accessed on 15/11/10);‘Joint Statement on 
the Conclusion of Negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and Peru’, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November 14, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa1011/joint1011.html 
484 The final FTA officially began on January 1, 2010 
485 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
486 Mita, METI ‘Japan’s EPA/FTA and Regional Economic Integration Policy’ 
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An India-ROK FTA also came into effect in January 2010 offering ROK firms greater 
use of India as a manufacturing hub en route to the Middle East and Indian IT workers 
opportunities in ROK. Korea has proven itself as an ambitious actor on the FTA stage, 
signing agreement with the EU among others and recently restarting talks with the 
US. 487  According to reports, trade leapt 40-50% after CEPA with India came into 
force.488 As a later section addresses, ROK has acted as an important structural stimulus 
to Japan. 
 
XXII. Obstacles on the road to free trade 
 
Despite ambitious hopes, free trade and ‘open regionalism’ in Asia has been difficult to 
achieve. The WTO demand for unanimous decisions and increase in the number of 
members has made reaching conclusions problematic,489 as have the diverse economic 
interests in the region.490 On a global scale India has been widely blamed for its role in 
the collapse of the Doha round in July 2008 and Japan has faced strong criticism for its 
defensive position on fisheries and agriculture. According to the WTO, India and Japan 
came in 3rd and 7th respectively as members subject to complaint by the dispute 
settlement body (DSB) between 1995 and 2009. 491 As a statement by the Japanese 
                                                            
487 ‘Corporate euthanasia’ 
488 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, Delhi, 28 February 2011 
489 Mita, ‘Japan’s EPA/FTA and Regional Economic Integration Policy’ 
490 In South Asia, regional conflicts have prevented economic cooperation from making significant 
progress, with the exception of a preferential trade agreement (customs union) signed in 1993. Sato, 
‘Japan and the Emerging FTAs in the Asia-Pacific Leadership’, p. 50 
491 WTO sources cited in ‘Global trade disputes: Trading blows’, The Economist, December 1, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15006195 (Accessed on 01/12/09) 
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Government noted in November 2010, whilst the Doha Round ‘continues to be 
important…[its] fate remains uncertain.’492 
 
Japan like India, presents two conflicting approaches to business. On the one side 
international corporations such as Toyota, Honda, Suzuki, Sony and Canon actively 
seek foreign markets. According to Koizumi’s economic advisor, only a quarter of 
Sony’s sales are for the domestic market whilst 90% of Canon’s are abroad. Yet import 
penetration and inward FDI remain among the lowest in the OECD. 
 
Agriculture has proved a decisive sector for both Japan and India in trade negotiations. 
Whilst India’s Prime Minister is largely in favour of free trade due to his background as 
an economist, several of his fellow politicians are sensitive to the political need to 
protect agriculture. 493  The sector represents almost 15% of GDP and provides 
employment to 55% of the workforce.494 
 
In Japan, protection of agriculture, particularly rice production has stifled Tokyo’s 
attempts to wield greater diplomatic influence. EPAs involving Japan frequently 
liberalise just 50-60% of farm products (rice can only be negotiated at the WTO) whilst 
in ROK, almost 99% of non-rice trade is liberalised.495 The farm lobby, led by the Japan 
Agricultural Co-operatives hold particular political sway, so much so that according to 
the OECD, Japanese pay twice as much for their food as the market would suggest. 
                                                            
492 ‘Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships’, Ministerial Committee on Comprehensive 
Economic Partnerships, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November 6, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/policy20101106.html  
493 Author’s interview with Kondo, London 
494  ‘Agriculture’, India Brand Equity Foundation, November 2010, 
http://www.ibef.org/economy/agriculture.aspx Other sources put these figures at 18% and 60% 
respectively. Choorikkadan, ‘India gearing up for growth’ 
495 Richard Katz, ‘Why Is Korea More Able to Reach FTAs Than Japan?’ SSJ Discussion Forum,14  
December, 2010, http://ssj.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/archives/2010/12/ssj_6455_why_is.html (Accessed on 
15/12/10)  
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Farming accounts for just 2% of GDP but strong political leadership has been 
consistently unable to silence protectionist voices.  
 
The DPJ’s struggle pushing through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2010/11 was 
primarily due to Japan’s farm industry’s ability to hold Japan’s wider economy 
hostage.496 Japanese opinion towards free trade is strong. According to a 2010 Pew 
Research Centre poll, the majority (72%) favoured increasing trade (in ROK the figure 
was 88%).497 Yet as Richard Katz points out, institutional restraints prevent Japan from 
acting on this goodwill. Whereas in ROK the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
oversees all stages of negotiation, in Japan each chapter is negotiated by those 
ministries which are potentially affected giving rise to in-fighting and even veto rights 
to one ministry. MOFA leads negotiations but has to negotiate internal frictions such as 
contradictions between Agriculture and Industry. This bureaucratic ‘turfism’ stifles 
decisive decision-making and can occasionally lead to embarrassment for the Japanese 
government, as was the case when Koizumi hoped to sign a FTA with the President of 
Mexico during a visit but was delayed by the Ministry of Agriculture.498 Minister Okada 
created a bureau specifically to manage Japan’s FTAs and reduce the influence of 
                                                            
496 Foreign Minister Maehara referred to in ‘Japan and its unfree trade: Paddies vs. Prius’, The Economist, 
11 November, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17472720?story_id=17472720 (Accessed on 
11/11/10) The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) currently only counts Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand and 
Chile among its members but should the US also join, the body would serve as a precursor for a larger 
free trade organisation encompassing both Asian and Pacific markets. According to Mulgan, the TPP 
would be ‘tantamount to signing an FTA with the US. Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Japan’s early decision on 
the TPP: Pie in the sky or credible commitment’, East Asian Forum, 2 June 2011, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/02/japan-s-early-decision-on-the-tpp-pie-in-the-sky-or-credible-
commitment/ (Accessed on 02/06/11) 
497 Ibid.  
498 Overall these disputes are settled internally to avoid public admittance of failure or bad publicity but 
occasionally spill out into the mainstream press. Mita, ‘Japan’s EPA/FTA and Regional Economic 
Integration Policy’ 
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individual ministries499 but following events in Tohoku in March 2011, negotiations 
towards TPP were further delayed.500  
 
XIII. Neighbourly rivalry – the role of ROK in stimulating Japanese policy
  
This section will focus on the structural external stimulus of ROK efforts in India on 
Japan’s own approach. The intervening variable utilised by NCR of policymakers’ 
perceptions becomes additionally apparent in this context. The inadequacy of solely 
looking at structure is clear when considering how both the systemic reality of ROK’s 
headway and perceptions of being overtaken, accelerates policy. 
 
At the end of the twentieth century, as Japanese firms made a dash for the exit following 
India’s nuclear tests, ROK firms recognising the opportunity following the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, stepped into the market.501 Firms such as Daewoo, Hyundai, 
LG and Samsung took the risk of expanding operations to East European and previously 
centrally-planned economies whilst Japan concentrated on the US and Western 
European markets.  
 
                                                            
499 Joel Rathus, ‘Japan’s Foreign Ministry reforms: Shifting priorities?’ East Asia Forum, 4 September, 
2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/04/japans-foreign-ministry-reforms-shifting-priorities/ 
(Accessed on 04/09/10) 
500 Japan also announced the intention to ‘press ahead with fundamental domestic reforms’ and ‘bold 
policies’ to strength competiveness and established a ‘Headquarters for the Promotion of Agricultural 
Structural Reform’ to ‘promote both high-level EPAs and [work for the] improvement of Japan's food 
self-sufficiency and revitalization of its agriculture industry and rural communities’. Yet the group does 
not include amongst its senior members, representatives from either MOFA or METI, suggesting to some 
commentators the limited ability of the group to usher in reform. Author’s personal correspondence with 
Sourabh Gupta, Senior Research Associate, Samuels International Inc. Prior to the earthquake, the Kan 
government had set June as a deadline for a decision on the TPP. 
501 Author’s interview with senior official, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, 
METI 10 June 2010 
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ROK has long understood not just the utility but also necessity of trade for its own 
economic growth with its own small domestic market.502 According to Kim and Mitra, 
70% of ROK jobs are directly linked to international trade.503 A decade ago ROK had 
signed not one trade pact but has recently overtaken Japan in the race to secure deals 
with ASEAN, the US and EU.504 Whilst Japan’s agreements account for just 16% of 
total trade, in Korea the figure is 36% with a further 26% of trade under pacts currently 
under negotiation.505  
 
In India the ROK has been particularly active. Trade with India grew by approximately 
40% in 2007-08 and eclipsed Japan’s efforts to forge significant ties. In January 2010 
just four months after inking the deal, a FTA between India and the ROK came into 
effect. As has been discussed above, some Japanese companies such as Suzuki were 
able to use the leverage of Japan’s advanced economy to gain market share. ROK 
however, realised it did not have these tools at their disposal so approached Indian 
business through alternative means. Whereas Japanese manufacturers such as Toshiba 
and Sony have been keen to maintain the high quality and subsequent price of their 
goods, 506 Korean firms have adjusted their prices to the market. According to one 
Mitsubishi official, Japan had ‘no clue where to start’ but soon discovered they were 
‘too late’.507  
 
                                                            
502 According to some, Korea’s forward position in the race for FTAs is due to clever exploitation of a 
WTO loophole called the ‘Enabling Clause’ which allows ‘developing countries’, a term under which 
ROK is still classified, of delaying potentially indefinitely ‘sensitive’ sectors such as agriculture from 
their regional trade agreements. Ordinarily states who sign FTAs must liberalise trade barriers on 
‘substantially all trade’ (ie. 90% or more)502 over a reasonable period of time. Article 24, GATT, 5. a)-c), 
Argument made by Dr Mark S Manger in Katz, ‘Why Is Korea More Able to Reach FTAs Than Japan?’  
503 Chung-Ho Kim and Barun Mitra, ‘Choosing the slow lane en route to free trade’, Japan Times, 7 
August, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090807a2.html (Accessed on 07/08/10) 
504 Ibid.  
505 Katz, ‘Why Is Korea More Able to Reach FTAs Than Japan?’; ‘Japan and its unfree trade: Paddies vs. 
Prius’ 
506 Author’s interview with Esho 
507 Author’s interview with Vargu 
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ROK’s business strategy involves several techniques alien to Japanese firms. Firstly 
ROK firms understand the price-sensitive nature of the consumer and offer substantially 
lower prices. As Sako argues, as demand for infrastructural projects such as ports and 
roads increases in India and the necessity of high-tech facilities is questioned, cheaper 
Korean and Chinese proposals look more attractive.508 Even Suzuki uses Korean steel 
sheets. Trade between ROK and India was thus approximately $15bn in 2009 compared 
to $11bn between Japan and India, despite the significantly larger Japanese economy.509  
 
ROK corporations also make a substantial public relations and advertising commitment 
after detailed market research. For example in April 2010, LG announced they would 
spend $5m on a marketing campaign. 510  LG also advertises in a dozen Indian 
languages. 511  Product design is lower quality but uses indigenous innovation by 
employing Indian talent and tradition and localising production. As the Nikkei 
correspondent in Delhi notes, Korean companies have made the effort to understand 
their customers in fine detail, for example LG note than whilst in the north, white is the 
preferred colour of refrigerator, in the south it is red.512 ROK’s Finance Ministry has 
actively encouraged the country’s young talent to consider India rather than the US and 
pointed to the example of managers have settled in India. 513 The CEO of Samsung has 
lived in India for twelve years, settling with his children who speak both Hindi and 
Korean.  
                                                            
508 Sako, ‘Japanese Companies Venturing into the Indian Market: India requires different marketing 
strategies from ASEAN and China’, p. 25 
509 Pant, Harsh V., ‘Rise of China prods India-ROK ties’, Japan Times, 7 September 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100907a1.html (Accessed on 07/09/10) 
510 Amit Sharma, ‘India as export hub; to spend $5 mn on marketing: LG India’, Economic Times, 5 April, 
2010, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/India-as-export-hub-to-spend-5-mn-on-
marketing-LG-India/articleshow/5761263.cms (Accessed on 05/04/10) 
511 ‘Land of Eastern promise’, The Economist, 19 November 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14915094 (Accessed on 19/11/09) 
512 Author’s interview with Nagasawa 
513 ‘Land of Eastern promise’ 
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India holds a different psychological association in ROK which impacts the nature of 
their approach. According to one scholar, whilst India is a ‘type of hell’ for Japanese, it 
is a ‘type of heaven’ for Koreans, keen to free themselves from conscription and 
alternatives in Africa and the Middle East. 514  Also according to businessmen at 
Japanese companies in India, the Koreans are ‘hungrier’, keen to demonstrate their 
development and appreciate that they will have no ‘second chance’ in India.515  
 
Commentators frequently refer to Korean firms as ‘aggressive’ in the Indian market,516 
going so far as to call their workers ‘soldiers’. 517  Nevertheless the effort has paid 
dividends. ROK is now the major supplier of household appliances. Sakakibara 
estimates that 60-70% of Indian electronics are from ROK firms such as LG and 
Samsung. In the colour television market, ROK firms hold a 40% share.518 According to 
LG Electronics, ‘The Indian market is the number one priority’.519 
  
ROK’s presence is also evident in India’s auto industry. Hyundai, which entered India is 
1995, is currently India’s second-largest car manufacturer. Hyundai benefits from tariffs 
of just 1-5% following the India-ROK CEPA whilst Suzuki faces 12%. Osamu Suzuki 
reportedly feels ‘handicapped’. 520  Japanese firms are further obstructed by fierce 
internal competition. In the auto industry for example, Japan has Suzuki, Toyota, 
Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Daihatsu, Mazda and Subaru.521 This slows the ability of 
                                                            
514 Author’s interview with Kinoshita 
515 Author’s interview with Nakajima  
516 Author’s interviews with Gurumurthy, Naoki Tanaka and Sakakibara 
517 Author’s interview with Kondo 
518 Sako, ‘Japanese Companies Venturing into the Indian Market: India requires different marketing 
strategies from ASEAN and China’, p. 31 
519 Sharma, ‘India as export hub; to spend $5 mn on marketing: LG India’  
520 ‘Leaving home: Japan’s big companies are shipping production abroad’  
521 ‘Corporate euthanasia’ 
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government to merge the interest of Japanese companies. Across the economy Japan is 
also overly dependent on the car industry as METI appreciates, which provided half of 
all GDP growth from 2000 to 2007.522  
 
ROK is also active in the pharmaceutical industry. According to the Indian 
Pharmaceuticals Export Promotion Council (Pharmexcil), the Indo-ROK CEPA 
provides an additional 6% from the waivered customs duty. With few natural resources 
itself, ROK is also interested in Indian minerals and metals such as iron and steel.523 
This creates yet another field of competition with Japan who hopes the minerals market 
will privatise in the future.524  
 
The largest foreign investment in India has in fact come from the ROK steel giant, 
POSCO which intends to invest $12bn into a port and steel plant in Orissa. Plans have 
progressed slowly for five years but in May 2011 the Environment Minister Jairam 
Ramesh confirmed approval.525 The plant is expected to produce 12m tons of steel a 
year and provide 50 000 jobs526 but local activists have objected on the grounds that 
resources will be depleted entirely in two decades and bring unnecessary disruption to 
residents.527 
 
Japanese officials now strongly lament their oversight and appreciate the time lost in 
pursuit of moral anti-nuclear goals. Previously Japanese firms criticised their ROK 
                                                            
522 Ibid.  
523 Author’s interview with Dipak Basu, Professor of Economics, Nagasaki University 22 May 2010 
524 Ibid. 
525 According to reports there were also internal disputes over this plant with the Indian Steel Minister 
complaining at the slow decision of the Environment Ministry. ‘POSCO’s Indian steep project: Greens vs 
jobs’, The Economist, 6 January 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/17860057, (Accessed on 
06/01/11); ‘India gives final okay to $12bn Posco steel plant’, BBC News, 3 May 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13263586 Accessed on 04/05/11) 
 
527 ‘POSCO’s Indian steep project: Greens vs jobs’ 
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rivals for pursuing failing projects whilst enjoying legal protection from the Indian 
government but have recently understood the necessary compromises their competitors 
made. 528  ROK’s presence in India is not universally welcomed by the domestic 
population529 but on a strategic level ROK’s gamble is paying off. The ROK has grown 
in international stature from a rather closed foreign policy centring on North Korea to 
one in which Seoul was able to successfully host the G20 Summit of 2010 and host the 
Nuclear Security Summit in 2012.530  
 
Identifying the exact timing when Japan realised ROK’s forward position is 
problematic. Yet attention was caught when the Delhi embassy reported that India-
Japan trade was smaller than just the Korean electrical producer LG.531 The myth was 
shattered that business could not ‘make good’ in India. By entering markets considered 
unimportant, 532 ROK has overtaken Japan providing a strong incentive to catch up. 
Furthermore India’s willingness to concede to Japanese demands is lessened as a result 
of ROK’s success.  
 
Japanese diplomats and businessmen now see ROK’s experience as a lesson from which 
to learn. Japanese diplomats have become aware of the need not to delay. Thus the 
structural influence of ROK presence in India, which ‘stole the march’ according to one 
Indian Ambassador has interacted with the intervening perception of policymakers and 
business leaders to fashion Japan’s approach. 
 
 
                                                            
528 Author’s interview with Kondo 
529 Author’s interview with Narushige Michishita, Associate Professor, GRIPS 13 May 2010 
530 Author’s interview with senior official, Policy Planning and International Security Division 
531 Author’s interview with Chandrani 
532 Author’s interview with Koda 
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XXIII. Importance of perceptions 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how concerns of Japanese firms and trade diplomats, 
both genuine and prejudiced, have slowed economic progress. As the consultancy 
KPMG noted, ‘Japanese investments are not a knee-jerk reaction. They take a long time 
to consider and think through.’533 Likewise only when these perceptions are overcome 
can genuine economic engagement develop. Japan’s ‘cautious’ attitude remains within 
some aspects of the business community but at the government-level, concerted efforts 
have been made to catch up on lost time. Whilst officials are loath to admit it, the 
example of ROK’s success in the Indian market has proved a significant driving force. 
Perceptions have both accelerated and slowed economic engagement but whilst 
structural factors have been essential, the manner of policy has depended largely on 
perceptions.  
 
For much of the twentieth century India was viewed as economically insignificant. Only 
once fears of potential instability within Japan’s traditional economic model were 
identified was the ‘second wave’ of interest ignited. Genuine economic figures have 
played an important role in supporting these considerations but attitudes within both 
business and government spheres have proven decisive. Japan has been slow and 
ambivalent to decide on a direction for India, despite structural advantages.  
 
XXIV. Conclusions 
 
The most pressing area in which policymakers foresee a future today is how to 
encourage the business community to engage actively with India. With the brief 
                                                            
533 ‘Japan's Renewed Interest in India: An “Upward Trajectory”’  
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exception of political hawks such as Abe who framed India through a strategic lens, the 
economic dimension has consistently and is likely to remain, the centrepiece of Japan’s 
India policy.  
 
As a result, contrary to widespread opinion, Japan’s interests in India appear largely 
economic in the scope for the time being. With the exception of the conclusion of 
CEPA which should largely be viewed in a strategic context, the majority of Japan-
India economic interaction has been practical. Whilst it has become commonplace to 
associate Japanese foreign policy with anti-China hedging, regarding India the 
predominant concern is how to lift Japan out of economic stagnation and India is 
viewed as pivotal to this goal.534 The strategic benefit of Japan is actually more keenly 
felt in India, despite rhetoric trying to distance Delhi from such an approach. 
 
‘Economic diplomacy’ has long been a key determinant of Japan’s wider foreign policy 
goals, whether in Middle East policy, where energy sources are prioritised or Southeast 
Asia, for decades a factory for Japanese products. For India without the drastic 
economic reforms witnessed in the late twentieth century, Japan’s interest is likely to 
have remained at Cold War levels. By analysing how Japan has approached India as an 
economic partner, this chapter has also highlighted trends in Japan’s ODA strategy and 
free-trade credentials; both important aspects of Japan’s wider diplomatic efforts.  
 
Among the structural influences on Japan’s economic strategy, post-liberalisation 
economic growth has dominated. Added to this, China’s uncertain economic stability 
and neighbourly competition from ROK firms have served as further incentives. 
                                                            
534 Author’s interview with Harsh Pant, Lecturer, Asia-Pacific Security and Nuclear Proliferation, King’s 
College London 12 April 2010 
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Previously in this thesis it was argued that China’s presence has pressured Japan to look 
elsewhere for strategic reassurance. In the economic sphere, China’s dominance has led 
to a similar reappraisal of the economic environment, placing favour on India. Whilst 
Japan’s India policy has been free from some of the pressures which impact Sino-
Japanese economic ties, such as inherent suspicion, India has presented fresh challenges 
and pressures. The ROK factor in particular has shown that India’s federal state system, 
inadequate infrastructure and complicated tax and labour laws, whilst problematic, have 
not held back other competitors.  
 
Whilst structurally Japan and India are complementary economic partners, additional 
actors and intervening ideologies have limited the strength of relations. As this chapter 
has shown, economic complementarities are not by themselves sufficient. Indeed as one 
Japanese economist explained, a blind man with good use of his legs might not find an 
ideal partner in a legless man with good sight.535 The attitudes of stakeholders have 
represented a major impediment to closer relations, highlighting the importance of 
incorporating perceptions into analysis. 
 
The drive behind economic relations originated in Japan. During the initial post-war 
years India made some efforts to encourage Japanese investment in India, only to be 
sidelined in preference for other markets. Japan was delayed by the 1998 nuclear tests 
but overall Japan’s business culture and India’s economic deficiencies have represented 
the major factors behind economic indifference. In the modern era, whilst India enjoys 
international attention Japan realises the need to be proactive. What can be noted 
therefore is the development from when economically India offered little benefit, to one 
                                                            
535 Author’s interview with Kinoshita 
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in which both the market and geopolitical environment encourage Japan to take an 
active interest in India. 
 
By examining how Japan has approached India, evidence of how policy is formulated 
can also be studied. Japan’s India policy demonstrates a rare instance when METI and 
MOFA correlate in a manner which has not achieved in other areas. India has 
represented a rare instance of ‘joined-up thinking’ on the part of Japanese officials who 
appreciate the need to bring strong political and economic relations together. 
Bureaucrats are not interested in recreating the situation in China where economically 
warm relations have coexisted with frosty political ties. Instead, the two are aligned in 
parallel.  
 
Japan’s engagement with India has represented a steep learning curve which remains in 
its infancy. At present, Japan’s economic diplomacy is still in development and thus 
unable to prop up the political intentions of Tokyo. Even so, high volumes of trade and 
investment do not concurrently result in political amity. The cases of US-China and 
India-China economic ‘interdependency’ clearly demonstrate this point.  
 
Japan has been a reluctant convert to India. As Delhi correspondents note, ‘Japan has no 
other frontier; India is the only big market left in the world.’536 ‘India was not necessary 
until recently’. A senior official at the Delhi Embassy echoes these arguments, stating 
that the reason Japan is looking to India is ‘out of necessity’. The ‘market comes first’ 
so twenty years after the initiation of reforms, it is ‘inevitable’ for ties to deepen. This 
‘logic’ is also cited by Indian officials interviewed.537 Japan and India are not, however, 
                                                            
536 Author’s interview with Susumu Arai, Correspondent in Chief, Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 March 2011  
537 Author’s interview with Bhattacharyyam  
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yet economically interdependent which reduces the urgency in improving relations but 
as the case of rare earth supplies shows, with China’s economic bellicosity growing, 
Japan is likely to feel greater pressure to diversify. When in mid-2010 China officially 
overtook Japan to be the world’s second largest economy, Japan’s response was 
relatively stoic, especially considering how much faster the reordering had occurred but 
brought ever-closer the realisation that a change in strategy was required for the 
future.538  
 
Whilst Japan is commonly considered a ‘trading state’, Japan is also known for its 
strong anti-nuclear stance. Whereas Japan’s economic credentials have often led 
commentators to consider Japan and India as complementary states, divergent views on 
the uses of nuclear technology have historically cut a chasm between potential relations. 
The subject of Japan’s nuclear policy as it has played out in the approach to India will 
therefore be the next topic of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
538 ‘Japan as number three: Watching China whiz by’, The Economist, 19 August 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16847828 (Accessed on 19/08/10) 
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7. The Nuclear Dilemma 
 
This chapter’s purpose is to demonstrate how Japan’s nuclear policy has permeated 
relations with India. Whilst divergent nuclear postures have historically proved the 
major irritant in relations, recent years have shown how the international system (the 
major influence on Japanese foreign policy) has altered the environment to one which 
facilitates greater engagement. In 1998 Japan led the effort to reprimand India for 
testing its nuclear weapon but just over a decade later announced negotiations to share 
nuclear technology with the non-NPT signatory. What drove Japan to make such a 
dramatic policy turnaround? What were the major drives behind this decision? Who 
were the key actors? It is these questions which this chapter will answer by laying out 
the conditions for Japan’s decision-making whilst placing the nuclear issue within the 
context of Japan’s wider engagement with India.  
 
i. Organisation 
 
The chapter opens with an historical appraisal of the international nuclear system, the 
formation of the non-proliferation regime and both Japan and India’s historical ties with 
nuclear technology. From this section it will be clear that each state holds a unique 
perspective. The following sections will analysis the major structural factors which 
shape Japanese strategy namely; 1) the ‘nuclear renaissance’, 2) internationalisation of 
the nuclear industry and 3) the US-India nuclear deal. With each of these conditions in 
place, Japanese policymakers have adjusted their nuclear principles from fiercely anti-
nuclear to an active negotiator in nuclear trade. 
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This thesis concentrates not only, however, on the role of systemic forces, whilst these 
are seen as primary. Intervening with the structural changes, domestic politics, public 
opinions, business interests and importantly the cognitive perception of these issues by 
policymakers have contributed to policy-formation. Japan does not present a unified 
opinion on the nuclear question. It is therefore necessary to ‘open the black box’ as 
NCR encourages and identify the many voices within Japan as well as their relative 
strength. From the analysis below it will be seen that public opinion and business 
aspirations are key actors in Japanese policymaking. 
 
To conclude, the chapter turns to two events which in diametrically different ways 
throw into question Japan’s traditional nuclear posture; Japan’s 2010 initiation to 
conclude an independent civil nuclear cooperation treaty with India and the ‘triple 
disaster’ of March 2011. The background and progress to negotiations will be provided 
with an assessment of the likelihood for agreement at the time of writing in light of 
developments at Fukushima. 
 
I. History of the Nuclear Industry 
 
The genesis of the nuclear industry can be traced to President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ speech in 1953. Eisenhower proposed a system in which states without nuclear 
weapons could access nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes.1 The potential 
of nuclear proliferation was, however, first recognised by J. Robert Oppenheimer, the 
Scientific Director of the Manhattan Project in 1946, who suggested the US conceal its 
                                                            
1 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 12 
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military intentions under the cover of nuclear power plants.2 The IAEA was established 
in 1957 as an autonomous institution to prevent such application and the transfer of 
technology to military purposes. 
 
A year later, Frank Aiken the Irish Minister for External Affairs first proposed measures 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. 3 By 1961 Aiken’s resolution was approved 
unanimously by the UN General Assembly and negotiations began in earnest to form a 
treaty. However as the document was drafted, China launched its first nuclear test in 
1964 during the Tokyo Olympic Games.4 Those involved hurried to complete an initial 
draft as France also developed a weapons programme and the Cuban missile crisis 
further complicated the international power balance. 
 
i. The Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
In 1968 the Treaty was opened for signatures, marking January 1st 1967 the official 
demarcation date. This declared that all states that had launched before 1967 were to be 
known as ‘nuclear weapon states’ (NWS) but the semantics were not the issue. What 
                                                            
2 ‘We know very well what we would do if we signed such a [nuclear weapons] convention: we would 
not make atomic weapons, at least not to start with, but we would build enormous plants, and we would 
call them power plants - maybe they would produce power: we would design these plants in such a way 
that they could be converted with the maximum ease and the minimum time delay to the production of 
atomic weapons, saying, this is just in case somebody two-times us; we would stockpile uranium; we 
would keep as many of our developments secret as possible; we would locate our plants, not where they 
would do the most good for the production of power, but where they would do the most good for 
protection against enemy attack.’ J. Robert Oppenheimer, ‘International Control of Atomic Energy,’ in 
Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch, (eds.), The Atomic Age: Scientists in National and World 
Affairs, (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 55 
3 In fact in 1958 Aiken proposed only recognition of ‘the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of 
nuclear weapons’ which was later resolved after only the Soviet Union voted in favour whilst the US and 
its allies abstained. By 1960 Aiken had secured the support of Japan, Mexico, Morocco and Ghana behind 
a resolution to call on ‘all governments to make every effort to achieve permanent agreement’ to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons. ‘How Ireland sowed seeds for nuclear disarmament’ Irish Times, 14 April, 
2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2010/0414/1224268296428.html (Accessed on 
05/10/10) 
4 It should be noted that at this time, Japan had yet to formally normalise relations with China. 
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some states protested against, was the agreement to exclude NWS from IAEA 
inspection. The NPT was originally established for a 25-year period, with five-yearly 
progress conferences. By the 2000 review, however, the regime was weakened by India 
and Pakistan’s tests and the US Senate’s failure to ratify the CTBT in October 1999. 
 
ii. Japan and India’s views of the NPT 
 
Before looking at how Japan and India’s respective nuclear policies have interacted with 
one another, it is necessary to assess each state’s unique relationship with the issue of 
nuclear proliferation. Japan and India hold diametrically opposing views. For Japan the 
NPT represents the international community’s best efforts at halting the spread of 
nuclear weapon technology and the most widely subscribed treaty in existence. India 
loathes the NPT and the regime it symbolises. For both governments and its citizens the 
NPT is highly emotional.5  
 
India has several objections to the NPT. The Treaty is believed to represent at best a 
blatant move to stifle its own nuclear ambitions and at worse a feeble attempt to stop 
proliferation, supposedly its primary purpose. The treaty is considered a ‘rotten system’ 
and ‘charter for an inherently discriminatory club’6 whose rules are articulated by the 
US. The NPT is said to embody for Indian policymakers and commentators ‘the three 
Ds’ of US nuclear policy; dominance, discrimination and double standards.7 
 
India especially criticises the NPT’s claim to further the campaign for global 
disarmament. The 1968 treaty asked its signatories to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith 
                                                            
5 Author’s interview with Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow, South Asia, IISS 3 March 2010 
6 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 13 
7 Ibid. p. 27 
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on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.’ For India this equated to merely the aspiration 
of reductions in nuclear stockpiles with no targets or penalties for inaction.8 According 
to Talbott ‘this provision was never taken seriously by the five nuclear “haves”…it was 
a sop to the “have nots.”’9 
 
For Japan, even though its own security was assured by the US, the government 
hesitated before signing.10 By the time of India’s 1974 test Japan (like Germany) had 
still not yet ratified, four years after initially adding its signature. Japan had been the 
first country in the 1960s to accept international inspection of its plants but only signed 
one month before the Treaty came into force in 1970.11 MOFA had long advocated 
Japan’s adherence to non-proliferation but domestic obstacles emerged. Prime Minister 
Tanaka faced challenges from some anti-China groups 12  and MOFA called for 
regulations to mirror those of members of the European Community. In addition whilst 
neglected in official documents, Japan faced pressure from the US, Canada and 
Australia. France and the UK also demanded Japan to sign the treaty, threatening to 
withdraw their crucial supply of materials. Japan was hesitant but eventually succumbed 
to ratify in 1976.13  
 
 
                                                            
8 India also criticised the toleration of sub-critical or laboratory-type tests which only a few states with the 
capability were able to conduct. Marie Izuyama and Shinichi Ogawa, ‘The Nuclear Policy of India and 
Pakistan,’ NIDS Security Reports, No.4 (March 2003), p. 83 
9 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 13 
10 Finland was the first state to sign, followed by Ireland 
11 According to Limaye, Japan and India held similar reservations over sovereignty issues regarding the 
NPT and delayed signing until the eleventh hour. Author’s interview with Limaye 
12 Frank C. Langdon,  ‘Japanese Reactions to India's Nuclear Explosion’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 
(Summer, 1975), p. 176 
13 Author’s interview with Kaneko  
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To appreciate the dissimilar stances between Japan and India it is necessary to assess 
both states’ nuclear history. The following section will further demonstrate how Japan 
and India hold unique relationships with nuclear technology proving that one size does 
not fit all. For both the ‘nuclear question’ has provided a means of identity; for India the 
acquisition of nuclear technology marked ‘de facto’ great-power status whilst for Japan 
the decision to refuse nuclear development represented a pacifist and responsible status.  
 
II. India’s nuclear development 
 
During Nehru’s premiership nuclear weapons were shunned in tune with the leader’s 
pacifist ideology. As early as 1953 Nehru called for a ‘standstill agreement’ on testing 
through a UN resolution.14 One man’s ideology, whilst significant was not the only 
reason why India chose not to launch a nuclear programme until 1964. The ruling party, 
the Indian National Congress largely concurred with Nehru’s position, believing that by 
demonstrating ‘self-restraint’ India could maintain it’s morally superior role as leader of 
developing, post-colonial countries and mark a distinction with China.15 Furthermore 
the international system did not necessitate such a programme until the border war with 
China alerted Indian leaders to the challenge at their periphery.  
 
When Nehru died on 27 May 1964,16 however, India began in earnest to catch up, 
launching the Subterranean Nuclear Explosions (SNEP) project. China’s first test on 16 
                                                            
14 Sumit Ganguly, ‘India’s Nuclear Free Dream’, The Diplomat, April 22 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/2010/04/22/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-free-dream/ (Accessed on 22/04/10) Nehru was 
not wholly opposed, however, to nuclear technology being used for peaceful purposes. Indeed a nuclear 
energy program has been on the agenda since Indian independence. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Nuclear 
Policy,’ Major Powers’ Nuclear Policies and International Order in the 21st Century, (Conference) 
National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo, 18 November, 2009 
15 Izuyama and Ogawa, ‘The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,’ p. 61 
16 ‘Light goes out in India as Nehru died’, BBC News, 27 May 1964 (Accessed on 12/10/10) 
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October 1964 also hastened India’s efforts.17 Just two years after the bitter experience of 
the Sino-Indian war, India expected the US, UK and/or Soviet Union to come to India’s 
defence at least verbally, but all three were mute.18 Politicians from northern India who, 
as a result of events in 1962, held strong anti-China sentiments, also pushed forcefully 
for raising the bar vis-à-vis competition with China.19 
 
India was behind in its nuclear development but quickly gained ground due in part to its 
colonial history. Before gaining independence India was able to share the expertise 
exchanged between the US and UK during the Manhattan project of the 1940s. India 
also enjoyed the talents of Homi Bhabha, educated at Cambridge who became the 
‘father of India’s Atomic Energy Program.’20  
 
i. Smiling Buddha – 1974 
 
As Japan’s radar skipped over the subcontinent to concentrate on the Middle East 
during the oil crises of the 1970s, India drew international attention by launching its 
own nuclear test on 18 May 1974. 21 The test labelled ‘Operation Smiling Buddha’ 
irreversibly impaired India’s image as a pacifist nation. The Indian government went to 
                                                            
17 According to the official communiqué released following the test, the explosion was conducted at 3pm 
Beijing-time in the western region of China but reports from Washington claimed the test site to be a 
province bordering the Soviet Union. The stated purpose was to protect the Chinese people ‘from the 
danger of the US' launching a nuclear war.’ There were other objectives, however, including sending a 
message of strength as the first non-white nation to enter the ‘nuclear club’ and to Moscow since just 12 
hours earlier, Nikita Khrushchev was replaced as Soviet leader. Seymour Topping, ‘China Tests Atomic 
Bomb, Asks Summit Talk On Ban; Johnson Minimizes Peril’, New York Times, 16 October 1964 
(Accessed on 12/10/10) 
18 Izuyama and Ogawa, ‘The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,’, p. 61 
19 Ibid. 
20 The Atomic Energy Establishment in Mumbai was renamed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre after 
he died in a plane crash on his war to an IAEA meeting in 1966 and is known as the ‘cradle’ of India’s 
nuclear research industry. Author’s interview with Kaneko 
21 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also had domestic intentions, believing the test would boost her 
popularity at home.  
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great lengths to stress the ‘peaceful’ purposes behind the tests22 and urged countries not 
to reduce their economic cooperation. 23  Envoys emphasised the energy factor and 
disassociated the event from military objectives. As Talbott notes, such a ‘handy cover 
story’24 also fitted with the ideology of Indira Gandhi’s father Nehru. The tests marked 
a watershed in India’s post-war development, overcoming India’s post-1962 inferiority 
complex.25 
 
ii. Rajiv Gandhi 
 
In June 1988 Rajiv Gandhi after assuming office following his mother’s assassination,26 
appeared to distance himself from his mother by calling for an ‘action plan,’ which 
would set a timetable for the global elimination of nuclear weapons.27 He called for 
NWS to eliminate their arsenals by 2010 and assured that if such a promise was made, 
India would relinquish the option of testing again. 28 This episode is often cited by 
Indian policymakers keen to demonstrate India’s commitment to disarmament.  
 
Nevertheless at a similar time, Rajiv Gandhi was suspected of re-launching India’s 
nuclear programme under the tacit implication that should such a commitment not be 
made, India was justified to ‘join [the] ranks’ of the other nuclear powers. 29  The 
                                                            
22 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 14 According to Talbott, during the 1950s and 60s the US and Soviets 
thought nuclear explosions could prove a useful way of making craters in the ground but proved not to be 
cost effective 
23 Author’s interview with Tetsuya Endo, Former Governor of the International Atomic Energy 
Association and Vice Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan 30 June 2010. Ambassador 
Endo was Director of the South West Asia Division of MOFA from 1973-75. 
24 As Talbott notes, however, Indira Gandhi also spoke of plans to ‘keep its options open’. Talbott, 
Engaging India, p. 16 
25 Author’s interview with Takeuchi 
26 She was gunned down by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984 in reprisal for her use of force to end a siege by 
Sikh militants in Amristar. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 19 
27 Ganguly, ‘India’s Nuclear Free Dream’ 
28 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 20 
29 Ibid. 
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ultimate stimulus, however, was ever-greater evidence that Pakistan was developing 
capability.30 Rumours that China was assisting Pakistan only furthered India’s cause. 
The testing of a long-range nuclear missile, the Hatf-5 just one month prior to Pokhran 
represented a catalyst.  
 
India’s second round of nuclear tests in 1998 should not perhaps have come as the 
surprise it did. Since the NPT was ‘unconditionally and indefinitely’ extended in 199531 
and CTBT negotiations concluded in 1996, India saw fewer options to avoid flexing 
nuclear muscle. 32  This structural circumstance fits this thesis’ espousal of NCR, 
demonstrating how the state system – or more particularly the elites of India’s 
perception of the state system – dictated India’s decision to enter unofficially the 
‘nuclear club’.  
 
Such conditions, however, are unable to explain the timing and nature of India’s 
resolution. To explain this, the domestic political development as a result of the 
inauguration of a BJP-led government in February 1998,33 overturning almost 48 years 
of Congress Party rule, was crucial. 34 During the campaign the BJP made no secret of 
their approval for the option of ‘inducting’ nuclear weapons.35 Several BJP members 
                                                            
30 Ever since India’s 1974 test, Pakistan had made clear its intention to one day equal India’s capability. 
In a press conference in May 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto admitted, ‘even if we have to eat grass, we will 
make nuclear bombs.’ Ibid. p. 17 
31 Ganguly, ‘India’s Nuclear Free Dream’ 
32 Whilst Nehru had supported a test ban by the 1990s the majority Indians perceived of the treaty in 
similar terms to the NPT; one designed by the US to restrict other powers from competing with their 
achievement. According to Talbott, the US ‘pulled out all the stops to secure an indefinite extension of 
the NPT’ which was ‘dismaying’ to the Indians who saw the possibility of India being welcoming into the 
‘haves’ club even less likely as a result. India also feared the CTBT being ‘universalised,’ relegating India 
further for snubbing both the NPT and CTBT. In the end the US failed to ratify the CTBT with pressure 
from Indian Americans adding to the opposition. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 16 
33 The BJP formed the National Democratic Alliance 
34 According to Talbott, Congress lost for a variety of reasons, including ‘slippage of support in key 
states, the rise of regional parties, disaffection with a hung parliament, and an anti-incumbent mood in the 
electorate.’ Talbott, Engaging India, p. 38  
35 Izuyama and Ogawa, ‘The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,’, p. 63 
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were antagonistic towards China and disagreed fundamentally with much of Nehru’s 
pacifist ideology. The party’s ideology centred on ‘Hindutva’, a form of nationalism 
which shared few similarities with Gandhi’s philosophy. The BJP was keen to 
differentiate itself from the previous administration and characterise themselves as 
realists.36  
 
Scholars have struggled to locate an official ‘nuclear policy’ from Indian elites.37 In 
general Indian elites consider nuclear weapons to hold political significance rather than 
military utility. As Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh argued, they allow for ‘political 
space and strategic autonomy.’ 38  Their acquisition was a ‘logical next step in the 
evolution of India’s sense of itself…a rite of passage’, which as with China, would 
force the US to take it seriously. 39  According to Rajagopalan, Indians are ‘highly 
pessimistic’ about other states’ acquisition of nuclear weapons but believe the accrual 
themselves is justified. India’s nuclear history can therefore be described as ‘gradual 
and reactive’ to external events. 40 Rather than developing a programme on its own 
initiative, India’s actions largely emerged as a consequence of threats, both perceived 
and genuine. India’s efforts have concentrated on preventing ‘vertical’ proliferation 
between NWS as well as the ‘horizontal’ spread among new members of a nuclear club.  
 
 
                                                            
36 Author’s interview with Hirabayashi 
37 According to Rajaggopalan, ‘In January 2003, the government released a brief press statement (of just 
349 words) that revealed some aspects of the ‘official’ nuclear doctrine…[which includes] an important 
qualifier: India will consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to a ‘major attack’ on India or on 
Indian forces anywhere with chemical or biological weapons (CBW). This dilutes both the NFU pledge as 
well as the pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.’ Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Nuclear 
Policy’  
38 In essence, as Tellis has argued, what Sundarji and Subrahmanyam were suggesting was a view of 
nuclear weapons that emphasized its political rather than military utility, its deterrence rather than war-
fighting capability. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and 
Ready Arsenal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001) cited in Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’  
39 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 141 
40 Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’  
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III.  Japan’s nuclear history 
 
Japan and India hold fundamentally different views on the application of nuclear 
weapons. As Kaneko, a retired nuclear official pointed out to the author, Japan as a 
defeated nation had different cards to play during the Cold War compared to revitalised 
India post-independence.  
 
Japan was the only country to experience the reality of nuclear warfare in Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima in August 1945. Many assume Japan to hence reject nuclear technology in 
any guise. Yet Japan has historically not been as anti-nuclear as some may believe. 
Prime Minister Kishi is known to have favoured nuclear weapons, followed by Ikeda 
who informed the US that several of his Cabinet approved of Japan acquiring the 
capability. Prior even to this, Japan had tried to manufacture nuclear weapons during the 
war but upon the American Occupation had been forced by MacArthur to dispose of all 
devices in the Pacific.41  
 
By 1964 following China’s nuclear test, Prime Minister Sato is said to have told US 
Ambassador Reischauer that ‘it stands to reason that, if others have nuclear weapons, 
we should have them too.’ Sato is often considered the father of Japan’s anti-nuclearism 
due to his efforts to encourage the Diet to adopt the ‘three non-nuclear principles’ 
(Hikaku Sangensoku), winning the Nobel Peace Prize as a result. 42  Nevertheless 
evidence emerged in 2009 that not only had Sato sanctioned a study into the viability of 
nuclear weapons but also entered into a secret pact with President Nixon to allow 
                                                            
41 Author’s interview with Kaneko 
42 As a Cabinet decision under Prime Minister Sato, Japan pledged to ban arms deals with communist 
states, countries subject to an embargo under UN resolutions, and those involved in international 
conflicts. ‘Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html 
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nuclear weapons to be stationed in Okinawa. 43  The principles nonetheless quickly 
became ‘kokuze’ (national promise) with consecutive governments taking the position 
to ‘neither confirm nor deny’ 44  their violation, thereby leaving the door open for 
reinterpretation.  
 
Japan continues to appreciate the value of nuclear weapons and few in Tokyo would 
approve of the US abandoning its nuclear arsenal.45 The ‘secret pact’ referred to above, 
demonstrates Japan’s real view at least among elites, of the possible utility of atomic 
weapons. Shinzo Abe as Deputy CCS said in May 2002 that the Constitution would not 
prevent Japan from acquiring a small nuclear arsenal and several powerful figures have 
endorsed a revision or ‘re-interpretation’ of the Constitution to allow for nuclear 
capability.46 Japan certainly has the technology to produce a full plutonium cycle and is 
thus as McCormack argues, the state with the greatest ‘potential’ to join the nuclear 
weapons club. Despite some debate to the contrary, the possibility of Japan ever 
deciding to ‘go nuclear’ is minuscule since neither the international environment nor a 
consensus within the political or public spectrum are in favour.47 
                                                            
43 Roger Pulvers, ‘Words of wisdom from beyond the grave of Japan’s secret pacts,’ Japan Times, March 
28, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100328rp.html (Accessed 28/04/10) Further proof 
was also uncovered confirming that the US had introduced nuclear weapons into Japan, violating one of 
the nuclear principles, long before Sato took the premiership. In addition, in 2010 it also emerged that 
Japan had discussed going nuclear with West Germany in 1969 before joining the NPT. ‘Tokyo sought 
out Bonn on going nuclear in ‘69’, Japan Times, 30 November 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20101130a3.html (Accessed on 02/12/10) 
44 Tomoko Kiyota, ‘Japan’s Non-nuclear Principles: Change in the Offing?’ IPCS Article No. 2948, 
August 17, 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2948  
45 Author’s interview with Robert Dujarric, Director, Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple 
University 19 May 2010 
46 Another senior official agreed; ‘We should have a real umbrella and perhaps nuclear weapons’ saying 
that the US umbrella is not sufficient. Interview with senior MOFA official, 26 June 2009. 
47 Voices remain, both within and outside of Japan, arguing for Japan to nuclearise. Their volume tends to 
surge and ebb according to external, structural conditions such as whether North Korea has proven 
particularly provocative as was the case in May 2009 when Pyongyang announced plans to resume its 
nuclear programme and after launching a satellite rocket a few days before. The official government line 
has always renounced nuclearisation, however, this has not prevented figures such as Ozawa Ichiro 
suggesting that Japan could easily produce 'thousands of nuclear warheads'. Japan could 'go nuclear' in 
months By Marc Erikson. Ishihara Shintaro, Governor of Tokyo has also as recently as March 2011, 
overtly said Japan ‘should develop nuclear weapons’ to counter the North Korean threat, allow Japan to 
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Japan is keen to maintain the image as defender of the NPT regime. The secretive 
programmes of Iran and North Korea have heightened international concern with 
proliferation but also arguments for retaining a deterrent. Japanese officials also fear 
ROK going nuclear.48 Prime Minister Kan voiced intentions to ‘step up our efforts to 
get India to sign the NPT’ and Japan has also continued to press for the universal 
implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT.49 Japan does not want to lose 
any credibility by being seen to abandon its non-proliferation aspirations. In relations 
with India therefore Japan hopes to play the role of ‘disagreeable friend’, encouraging 
India to take responsibility for its nuclear facilities.50  
 
Kan stopped short of announcing the codifying of the principles into Japanese law, as 
called for by among others the mayor of Hiroshima.51 Critics also accused the DPJ of 
continuing the policy of previous administrations by failing to energise adherence to the 
NPT. Whilst during the election campaign in 2009 the DPJ promised to take a leading 
                                                                                                                                                                              
stand up to Russia and increase Japan’s bargaining power. Danielle Demetriou, ‘Japan “should develop 
nuclear weapons” to counter North Korea threat’, Telegraph, 20 April 2009,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/5187269/Japan-should-develop-nuclear-weapons-
to-counter-North-Korea-threat.html (Accessed on 18/07/11). See Chapter 2’s theoretical discussion of 
‘creeping realism’ for more analysis of Japan’s adjusted reading of the Constitution.  For earlier works 
predicting a remilitarised Japan, see George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with 
Japan, (New York; St Martin’s Press, 1991) and Simon Winchester, Pacific Nightmare: A Third World 
War in the Far East, (London: Sidgwick and Harrison, 1992). More recently, arguments for Japan 
remilitarising, including with nuclear weapons are analysed in Paul Midford, ‘China views the revised 
US-Japan Defense Guidelines: popping the cork?’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4 
(2004), pp. 113-45. Llewelyn Hughes argues that domestic factors prevent Japan adopting the nuclear 
option and indeed public support is low, though this is changing and according to pollsters depends on 
how exactly the question is asked. Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): 
International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan’, International Security, Vol. 31, 
Issue 4, pp. 67-96 
48 Author’s interview with Tadashi Inoguchi, Professor Emeritus of University of Tokyo 9 June 2010 
49 Statement by Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe, Representative of Japan to the NPT Review Conference in 
2010, at the Plenary Meeting of Main Committee II, May 10, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/review2010-4/maincommittee2.html  
50 Author’s interview with Takeuchi 
51 ‘Nuke deterrence still vital: Kan,’ Japan Times, 7 August, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20100807a5.html (Accessed on 07/08/10) Major Akiba, winner of the Ramon Magsaysay Awards 
(considered the Asian Nobel Prize), had also urged Japan to leave the US nuclear umbrella in the mission 
to build a nuclear-free world.’ 
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role in the May 2010 Review Conference, neither Hatoyama nor Okada attended.52  
Okada previously pressed particularly hard for the Non-First Use agreement but 
lowered his expectations once in government.53  
 
IV.  Japan and India’s nuclear policies clash 
 
For the majority of the Cold War period, Japan and India’s opposite nuclear postures 
were at a distance. In 1998, however, the two states’ policies collided providing the first 
opportunity for each to take notice. 
 
On May 11th 1998 in Pokhran, Rajastan just 150km from the Pakistan border, India 
exploded a nuclear bomb. The explosion generated heat of approximately a million 
degrees centigrade, sending shockwaves as far as Mt Fuji. Two days later another test 
was conducted. Prime Minister Vajpayee praised the work of Indian scientists to a 
jubilant media who described India’s achievement as an ‘explosion of self-esteem’ and 
‘a moment of pride.’ As had been hoped, global attention was drawn to India’s nuclear 
status. India admitted the tests were for military purposes therefore blowing their earlier 
cover of ‘peaceful’ intentions. 
 
The US response played a role in Japan’s nuclear reaction but overall media pressure 
and domestic disapproval drove Tokyo’s response. Japan’s initial reaction was one of 
‘betrayal’ 54  and anger. Demonstrations were held outside the Indian embassy and 
pressure placed on the government. MOFA received letters and calls complaining about 
                                                            
52Masami Ito, ‘Japan avoiding initiative in non-nuclear movement,’ Japan Times, May 12, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100512f1.html (Accessed on 13/05/10) 
53 According to one senior official who worked under several LDP administrations, such promises are 
merely tatamae rather than honne.  
54 This word was used by several officials and scholars interviewed by the author 
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India’s actions. Prime Minister Hashimoto described the tests as ‘extremely 
regrettable’ 55 and Foreign Minister Obuchi lodged a formal protest with the Indian 
Ambassador.56 
 
There was little internal debate over how Japan should react. Japan cancelled future 
ODA projects to India as well as a scheduled World Bank Forum for India donor 
countries due to be held in June 1998. Following India’s second test yen loans were also 
suspended. Hashimoto called Ambassador Hirabayashi back to Tokyo ‘for 
consultation’, sending a strong and rarely-used diplomatic message. Indian scientists 
were also prohibited from Japan but humanitarian projects were maintained.57 Japan 
drafted a UN resolution (1172) condemning India and the Indian Ambassador was 
considered a diplomatic ‘outcast’ and India as a whole a nuclear pariah.58 Moreover 
Japan refused (and at least officially continues) to recognise either India or Pakistan as 
nuclear weapon states.59  
 
India had to some extent anticipated a stern response. According to one Indian scholar, 
the government thought reactions would in fact be stronger with the cessation of all FDI 
and were hence pleasantly surprised.60 In particular India expected Japan’s reaction to 
be hostile given Japan’s nuclear history and unique ‘allergy’. 
 
                                                            
55 ‘Japan freezes economic grants to India,’ Japan Times, May 13, 1998, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19980513a1.html (Accessed on 04/05/11) 
56  ‘World Reaction to the Indian Nuclear Tests’, James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies 
Archives, http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/reaction.htm (Accessed on 04/05/11) 
57 According to Hirabayashi, trade, investment, technical cooperation, assistance to grassroot and non-
governmental projects as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief measures were included from 
Japan’s withdrawal Author’s interview with Hirabayashi 
58 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
59 ‘Japan does not recognise India, Pak as N-weapon states’  
60 According to Chaudhury however, only one paper was written by the Finance Ministry, on the potential 
impact of a nuclear test on India’s economy. Author’s interview with Roy-Chaudhury 
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Understanding, however, was tarnished by Hashimoto’s comment to a journalist that 
Japan needed to ‘punish India’. 61 The word provoked a strong reaction and hardened 
feelings of goodwill. Other diplomatic blunders on Japan’s part also disrupted progress. 
In the midst of the Kargil crisis of 1999 when Indian camps were attacked, deputy 
MOFA spokesmen indicated that both sides were to blame. Delhi responded with 
disbelief, calling in Japan’s Ambassador for ‘gentle protest’. India rejected Japan’s 
characterisation of India and Pakistan as on a similar level, forcing Tokyo to apologise 
for their ‘mistake’.62 
 
Japan’s official response was also based on domestic political issues. As Jain notes, as 
Japan struggled with a banking crisis, international criticism and an impending Upper 
House election, Hashimoto wanted to appear pro-active and decisive.63 Hashimoto was 
also about to attend the G8 meeting in Birmingham and wanted to deflect attention from 
Japan’s economic performance. This tack was altered by Mori’s 2000 visit which 
avoided the subject except when pressed by an Indian reporter.64 
 
Indian officials tried to reason with Japan pointing to India’s unstable neighbourhood 
and absence of a US nuclear umbrella. 65 There were also some feelings of offence since 
prior to the tests India had held Japan in high regard.66 However most in Delhi paid 
little attention to Tokyo’s reaction. As one Japanese official recounts,67 reports focused 
on New York and London. An Indian press official also recalls that little attention was 
                                                            
61 Despite this comment, there is evidence of Hashimoto’s personal interest in India and conviction that 
India would one day reach major power status. Hashimoto, a keen climber, had visited India several times 
to scale the Himalayas. Author’s interview with Hirabayashi 
62 This was done at the 24th G8 meeting in Birmingham, England between May 15 and 17, 1998 
63 Jain, ‘From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership,’ p. 6 
64 Author’s interview with Naidu  
65 As one scholar noted, some Indian officials resent Japan having the US umbrella over it but refusing to 
hold it themselves with no plan B for when ‘the rain starts to fall’. 
66 Author’s interview with Enoki 
67 Author’s interview with Ogawa 
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paid to Japan. 68 To this day India officially describes Japan’s reaction as ‘adverse’ and 
‘an error in judgement’.69 India’s Foreign Secretary made a point during Mori’s visit not 
to call for the lifting of sanctions70 and merely ‘took note’ when they were lifted.71 He 
also blamed the sanctions as ‘an irritant in bilateral relations’ and as having no effect 
but to harm Japanese business. For other sections of India’s elite, they ‘agreed to 
disagree’ with Japan.72 
 
V. ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ 
 
The structural factors which served to reignite relations will constitute the following 
section of this chapter. The first is the ‘nuclear renaissance’ which emerged in the years 
after the 1998 tests. Not only geopolitical but industrial developments have coincided to 
create a context for Japan-India engagement. During the initial years of the Cold War, 
enthusiasm for nuclear energy was curbed by international hostility to anything 
‘nuclear’. The two oil crises of the 1970s, however, reawakened curiosity, only to be 
halted by the Three Mile accident in the US and Chernobyl disaster in the Ukraine. 
Nuclear projects subsequently went into a ‘winter-like freeze.’73 
  
                                                            
68 This senior official, recently stationed in Tokyo, was part of the Indian External Affairs Ministry press 
team at the time of the tests. 
69 Author’s interview with Sahdev 
70 Chietigj Bajpaee, ‘The Samurai and the Swami Rediscover Each Other’, IPCS Issue Brief, No. 51 
(September 2007), http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/512858895IPCS-IssueBrief-No51.pdf (Accessed on 
19/05/09) 
71  Satu P Limaye, ‘India-East Asia Relations: The Weakest Link but Not Goodbye’, Comparative 
Connections, CSIS, Vol. 4, No. 4, (January 2003), p. 8 
72 Ambassador Hirabayashi recalls a distinct difference in approach between the Indian Foreign Ministry 
and political establishment following the tests. Whilst the BJP held resolve, the Foreign Ministry in 
particular restrained from complaining about Japan’s sanctions and shared with the Ambassador his 
sadness at the damage recent events would have on their countries’ relations. Other interpretations in 
India were that Japan didn’t want India’s power profile to overtake and frustration that they themselves 
should go nuclear. At this time, Japan also did not expect India to grow. Author’s interview with 
Hirabayashi 
73 Tetsuya Endo, ‘Countries Planning to Introduce Nuclear Power Generation and the 3Ss - Making the 
3Ss an International Standard,’ ICNND Research Paper, June 2009, p. 2 
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The twentieth century, however, witnessed a resumption or ‘renaissance’ of interest in 
nuclear power generation for primarily two reasons. Energy demand from China and 
India and the parallel concern for rising global temperatures saw nuclear power enjoy a 
‘dramatic worldwide comeback’. The sharp increase in the price of crude oil in 2003-04 
also stimulated interest in alternative sources.74 According to the World Energy Outlook 
2009, from 1980 to 2007 total world primary energy demand grew by 66%, with the 
increase in Asia most ‘dramatic’.75 Nuclear energy as one of the cleanest sources of 
energy is expected to respond to this surge. As nuclear power does not emit carbon 
dioxide in the electricity generation process it is seen as a far more attractive solution.76 
At present nuclear energy accounts for only 15% of the world’s energy.77 By 2005-06, 
according to the IAEA more than sixty countries were considering nuclear power78 with 
56 operating civil research reactors, 65 more could be built by 2020. 79   
 
ASEAN has been especially interested in nuclear power with Vietnam said to hold the 
‘most aggressive’ ambitions. Hanoi announced in 2010 plans to build eight plants by 
2030 and hopes to sign contracts with Japan. In September 2010 Japan and Vietnam 
launched their first negotiations in Vienna towards a bilateral treaty through a joint 
                                                            
74 Author’s interview with senior official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division, MOFA 23 
June 2010. This official has many years of experience on nuclear issues, having worked in Vienna at the 
Permanent Mission, at CTBT Secretariat and Intelligence and Analysis Division before moving to current 
Division in 2006.  
75 This is estimated to average 4.7% per year to 2030. ‘World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power,’ World 
Nuclear Association, June 2010, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf16.html  
76 Whilst natural gas plants produce 30% less than oil, this is still 22 times higher than nuclear according 
to METI. ‘The Challenges and Directions for Nuclear Energy Policy in Japan: Japan’s Nuclear Energy 
National Plan’ Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division, METI, (December, 2006), 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/report/rikkoku.pdf, p. 18 
77 This figure has been declining from 17% in 1993 and 16% in 2003. Gavan McCormack, ‘Japan as a 
Plutonium Superpower,’ Japan Focus, 9 December, 2007,  http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-
McCormack/2602  
78 ‘World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power’  
79 Archana Chaudary, ‘Nuclear Accident Forces China Policy Review as India Sees Safety Backlash’,  
Bloomberg, 14 March 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-13/japan-nuclear-accident-may-
thwart-boon-to-areva-ge-in-china-india-plans.html (Accessed on 16/03/11) 
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venture between six Japanese firms; this was confirmed in late-October.80 Indonesia’s 
aspirations are a close second to Vietnam, hoping to build four plants by 2025. Thailand 
and Singapore also have plans or the intention to draft some in coming years. 
 
Following the events at Fukushima in March 2011, the replacement and expansion of 
reactors looks likely to curtail slightly but with 14% of the world’s electricity generated 
by nuclear sources and many reactors nearing retirement, nuclear will remain in states’ 
energy portfolio despite unease in some countries; such as Germany, Italy and 
Switzerland.81 China has said it would ‘review its programme’ but is unlikely to move 
away from nuclear power.  
 
VI.  India’s thirst for energy 
 
Whilst energy security is cited by Japanese officials as of considerable import, the need 
in India is far more acute. With a population expected to reach 1.5bn by 2050 India’s 
energy demand is set to escalate considerably. According to one estimate, electricity 
generation alone will need to increase to twelve times the 2001-02 level.82 In order for 
India to achieve the aspired to 10% growth, power generation needs to increase by 15% 
annually. As Pardesi and Ganguly argue, ‘Energy security is India’s Achilles’ heel in its 
economic resurgence and in its path to becoming an Asian and global player.’83 
 
                                                            
80 ‘Japan, Vietnam to begin talks on nuke pact,’ Japan Times, 25 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100925a3.html (Accessed on 25/09/10) 
81 ‘Nuclear power: When the steam clears’, The Economist, 24 March 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18441163 (Accessed on 24/03/11) France for example relies on nuclear 
power for almost 80% of its power.  
82 Janardhanan Nandakumar, ‘India and nuclear power: examining socio-political challenges to energy 
security,’ http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/2008/presentations/nandakumarpresentation.pdf p. 112 
83 Manjeet S. Pardesi, and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Energy Security and India’s Foreign/Security Policy’ in Harsh 
Pant ed., Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2008), p. 99 
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Following the Arab oil embargo of 1973, India became aware of the insecurity of 
Persian Gulf energy supplies. India relies on the Middle East for approximately 70% of 
its crude oil imports, primarily from Saudi Arabia followed by Iran.84 A consistent 
energy flow furthermore facilitates India’s other imperatives for stability, including 
environmental health and the alleviation of poverty. In 2007 nuclear energy accounted 
for only 3-4% of India’s power85 but Delhi aspires to add another 12-16 GW of nuclear 
capacity to its power grid by 2020, which in 2007 stood at 3 GW.86 According to the 
Indian official leading negotiations on a deal, whilst solar and wind sources are an 
option, ‘nuclear is tried and tested…it is also clean’.87 External challenges depend on 
the IAEA, NSG and US Congress’ actions towards the US-India deal but as with many 
of India’s troubles, domestic challenges in the form of lack of consensus, public 
scepticism or ignorance of nuclear power threaten to slow India’s ability to exploit 
foreign interest.88 
 
India offers external suppliers with an incredible opportunity. In the next decade alone, 
34 more reactors (in addition to the 19 already in operation) are predicted to open.89 
Before the India-US deal, India’s nuclear technology industry was largely home-grown 
with little participation from foreign actors. By 2010, however, several states had 
weighed in on India’s nuclear market. Japan will be a major beneficiary of this surge, 
assuming certain export conditions are met. Japan is not, however, the only state toying 
                                                            
84  ‘India’, Country Analysis Briefs, US Energy Information Administration, (August 2010), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/India/Full.html 
85 Nandakumar and Kumar, 'India-Japan Relations: Are There Prospects for Civil Nuclear Cooperation?', 
Strategic Analysis, 31:6, (2007) p. 975 
86 Ibid. 
87 Author’s interview with Senior Indian MEA official 
88 Nandakumar, ‘India and nuclear power: examining socio-political challenges to energy security’   
89 Russia has announced its intention to build up to 16 of these new nuclear reactors in India as part of its 
plan to capture at least a quarter of the new nuclear power business worldwide. Peter J Brown, ‘IAEA 
faces mushrooming Asia challenge,’ Asia Times, 8 June, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF08Ak02.html (Accessed on 08/06/10)  
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with how to balance non-proliferation efforts with the economic implications, providing 
Japan with intense competition. Other states whose approaches are detailed below, place 
pressure on Japan and influence policymaking. However they also provide some 
justification for Japan’s adjusted export policy.  
 
VII. External pressures – competition from Australia, Canada and ROK  
 
Japan has been accompanied in its firm stance towards India by Australia, particularly 
under the Labor government of Kevin Rudd. Japan’s more amicable position hastened 
predictions that Australia with the world’s largest reserves of uranium ore would also 
seek a slice of India’s market. Until late 2011, Canberra maintained a ban on selling 
uranium to India. 
 
Canada with large uranium resources concluded a deal with India in 2010.90 Canada felt 
in many ways responsible for India’s 1974 test since in the 1950s and 1960s Canada 
sold India a CIRUC research reactor and two CANDU power reactors. Plutonium from 
the CANDU was used to make the fissile material for India’s bomb.91 Yet when Canada 
broke off such cooperation, India continued to develop its own equipment, leaving out 
Canadian industry. According to the Indian diplomat Arundhati Ghose, the 2010 
agreement was ‘a win-win situation on nuclear trade and commerce.’92 Strategically 
India also considers Canada significant as one of the major country [sic] among ‘non-
                                                            
90 The deal was signed during Prime Minister Singh's visit to Canada for the 2010 G-20 summit. ‘Canada 
and India sign nuclear co-operation deal,’ BBC News, 28 June, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10430904 (Accessed on 28/06/10) 
91 The Cirus reactor is still in fact operating although it is thought to be demolished in the near future. 
According to Perkovich, the US was also involved in this sale under the understanding that the reactors 
were for peaceful purposes. Author’s interview with Kaneko. 
92 Arundhati Ghose, ‘India would like to access large uranium reserves of Canada, and they would like to 
have our technologies on Candu reactors,’ cited in Suresh Jaura, ‘Canada-India: The Nuclear Bonanza,’ 
Global Perspectives, January 2010, http://www.global-
perspectives.info/download/2010/pdf/What_After_Copenhagen_January_2010.pdf  
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nuclear [weapon] nation states’ supporting non-proliferation. Interestingly Japan did not 
fall into this category.  
 
The deal between India and Canada whilst heightening the pressure on Japan also 
provided some justification for Japan’s activism. Japanese diplomats and businessmen 
could argue that Japan was not simply following US policy but responding to the 
‘international realities’ which Singh articulated following the India-Canada deal.93  
 
ROK has also shown itself bullish in the Indian nuclear market, posing another systemic 
external pressure on Japanese policy. Commentators in India certainly point to the 
influence which losing lucrative contracts had on Japan’s behaviour.94 The victory over 
Japan (and France) in 2009 to win a $20bn contract to build and operate the UAE’s first 
nuclear power plants came as an uncomfortable surprise to Japan.95 The contract also 
represented ROK’s first overseas order96 and according to a senior Japanese diplomat in 
Delhi, ‘influenced thinking on how government should play a role in the winning of 
large contracts’. The announcement that Seoul would host the next Nuclear Security 
Summit in 2012 further supported the ROK’s arrival in the nuclear export market. 97 
The ROK aspires to hold 20% of the global industry by 2030 and export 80 nuclear 
                                                            
93 According to Prime Minister Singh, the agreement ‘reflects the change in international realities’, 
‘Canada and India sign nuclear co-operation deal,’ BBC News, 28 June, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10430904 (Accessed on 28/06/10) 
94 Archis Mohan, ‘Japan softens on nuke deal,’ Telegraph of India, 10 June, 2010, 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100611/jsp/frontpage/story_12553396.jsp (Accessed on 10/06/10) 
95 It is thought that the ROK’s offer undercut Japan’s bid by 20% and offered to guarantee the operation 
of the plant for sixty years. Kiyohide Inada and Tetsuya Hakoda, ‘ROK bets on nuke exports to power 
economy’, Asahi Shimbun, July 5, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201005060259.html 
(Accessed on 07/07/10) 
96 ‘Korea Electric, Doosan Jump on U.A.E. Nuclear Order,’ Bloomberg, 28 December, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=034020:KS&sid=a5KcLXrcxixE 
(Accessed on 28/12/09)  
97 Weitz, Richard, ‘Asia Steps Up at Nuclear Meet,’ The Diplomat, 19 April, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/2010/04/19/asia-steps-up/ (Accessed on 28/12/09) 
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reactors. Currently there are 21 plants in operation and seven planned, with the 
objective of 50% of energy sourced from nuclear by 2030.98  
 
For years Japan has relied on its advanced technology to compete against rival foreign 
firms. In the nuclear field, however, technological skill might not prove as beneficial as 
first assumed. As the consultancy IHS Global Insight warned in mid-2010, Japan’s 
‘perhaps overcomplicated’ designs could prove difficult to sell in emerging markets. 99 
Where the ROK holds advantage is in ‘cost efficiency’ and ‘less popular pressure for 
the massive security measures incorporated in the latest US, European and Japanese 
reactor designs.’ 100  The ROK’s relatively distant political role in the region was a 
significant benefit. For example Korea’s Minister of Knowledge Economy has stated 
that ‘India being not a member of the NPT does not pose any problem’.101  
 
The personal efforts of ROK’s premier Lee Myung-bak were also significant. Lee called 
to personally petition the negotiators, including the UAE Prince102 and made a good 
impression in India when he visited for the 61st Republic Day in January 2010. Lee was 
chosen as the ‘chief guest of honour’ for the event.103 ROK is an appealing client for 
India; economically, the ROK has invested heavily in India with bilateral trade totalling 
                                                            
98 Inada and Hakoda, ‘ROK bets on nuke exports to power economy’  
99 Soble, ‘Japan feels the heat from emerging nuclear energy rivals,’ Financial Times, 28 June, 2010, 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/28/japan-feels-the-heat-from-emerging-nuclear-energy-rivals/ 
(Accessed on 28/06/10) 
100 Japan Steel Works also previously held a monopoly on manufacturing the vessel for reactors which 
reduced the risk of leakages but Doosan, the Korean company now shows signs of entering the market. 
Indrani Bagchi, ‘India, Japan to hold talks on civil nuclear cooperation today’, Times of India, 21 August, 
2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Japan-to-hold-talks-on-civil-nuclear-cooperation-
today/articleshow/6383218.cms (Accessed on 03/10/10) 
101 Y J Ji, ‘India-S Korea Nuclear Cooperation: Strategic Convergence?’ IPCS, No. 3187, 8 July 2010, 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/india-s-korea-nuclear-cooperation-strategic-convergence-3187.html 
(Accessed on 16/07/10) 
102 Mohan, ‘Japan softens on nuke deal’ 
103 President Lee told the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April: ‘If (nuclear power) is 
used for peaceful purposes, it will become a new method to cope with global warming. My country has 
managed nuclear power plants thoroughly. As a result, there have been no accidents since they were put 
into operation 32 years ago.’ Inada and Hakoda, ‘ROK bets on nuke exports to power economy’  
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$15.6bn in 2009 with targets of US$30bn by 2014. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Japan keenly feels the lost market-share to ROK in automobiles and white goods and is 
therefore conscious of further pressure.104 
 
VIII. Japan Internationalises its Nuclear Industry    
 
The resurgence of nuclear technology has not been lost on Japan. Japan has for many 
years been aware of the economic potential of nuclear energy and the advanced level of 
domestic technology in the field. Japan and the US have long followed different policies 
regarding nuclear energy. As Katahara points out, during the Cold War the US allowed 
Japan to maintain active research in nuclear breeder reactions. Japan has continued to 
use a plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle at home unlike most Western democracies.105 
Until early 2011, over a third of Japan’s electricity was sourced from nuclear plants.  
 
The mid-2000s saw a surge in governmental efforts to overhaul nuclear policy in 
response to the ‘nuclear renaissance.’ For years the government, utilities companies and 
plant-makers didn’t take the initiative for a long-term strategy but in October 2005 
METI introduced a ‘Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy’, followed in August 2006 
by a ‘Nuclear Power Nation Plan’.106 This former policy, led by Japan’s Atomic Energy 
                                                            
104 Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan’s nuclear pact with India,’ East Asia Forum, 7 September, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/07/japans-nuclear-pact-with-india/ (Accessed on 07/09/10) 
105 Some differences in the fuel cycle deserve attention here. In a complete fuel cycle, unlike that for 
civilian power which is known as the ‘once through fuel cycle,’ spent fuel is reprocessed and plutonium 
separated from the used fuel. Here lies the potential for proliferation. As Katahara points out, several 
countries including Japan use the complete cycle. Eiichi Katahara, ‘Japan’s plutonium policy: 
Consequences for non-proliferation,’ The Non-proliferation Review, Volume 5, Issue 1, (Autumn, 1997), 
p. 54 
106 Taisuke Abiru, ‘Japan, Russia and the Future of Nuclear Energy,’ Tokyo Foundation, 20 August, 2010, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2010/japan-russia-and-the-future-of-nuclear-energy-
1(Accessed on 20/08/10) 
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Commission and adopted by the Cabinet, hoped to increase Japan’s electricity capacity 
sourced from nuclear power by ‘between 30 and 40%’ by 2030.107 
 
As McCormack writes, Japan’s has long-invested heavily in nuclear research and 
projects which may promise Japan a ‘plutonium economy’ through greater energy self-
sufficiency and less dependence on volatile regions such as the Middle East.108 Japan’s 
energy self-sufficiency levels without nuclear power, are perilously low at just 4%.109  
By early 2011 55 nuclear power plants were activated, holding an estimated 47 tons of 
spent nuclear waste in the form of plutonium. 110  Following fourteen years out of 
operation after a fire and unsavoury cover-up, the Monju fast breeder reactor (FBR) in 
Tsuruga reopened in May 2010 (coinciding awkwardly with the NPT Review 
Conference in New York). The controversial and much-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing 
plant was also set to open in October 2010 but was further delayed until 2012. 111 
Japan’s commercial nuclear power reactors have long been in need of repair thus 
accelerating the need to expand abroad.112 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
107 McCormack, ‘Japan as a Plutonium Superpower’  
108 Ibid. 
109 This figure is lower even than Japan’s food self-sufficiency which stands at 40%. ‘The Challenges and 
Directions for Nuclear Energy Policy in Japan: Japan’s Nuclear Energy National Plan,’ p. 12 
110 Brown, ‘IAEA faces mushrooming Asia challenge’  
111 Eric Johnston, ‘Rhetoric belies atomic policy,’ Japan Times, 7 August, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100807a2.html (Accessed on 07/08/10) 
According Nandakumar and Kumar, Rokkasho is one of the largest civilian reprocessing facilities in a 
non-nuclear state. Nandakumar and Kumar, 'India-Japan Relations: Are There Prospects for Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation?' p. 976 
112 In June 2010 a report by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency concluded that whilst the majority 
were of ‘tolerable’ standard, greater inspection was needed in the future. ‘Half of Japan’s reactors in 
trouble,’ Japan Times, 15 June, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100615a3.html 
(Accessed on 15/06/10) 
310 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
i. Using nuclear technology as an export 
 
Japan has come to realise that such technology could not only benefit Japan at home but 
also act as an export, offering strategic, as well as economic advantages. 2010 saw 
particularly increased efforts to promote nuclear technology for export as well as 
domestic use. In June 2010 Japan and Jordan agreed on a draft for Diet ratification 
which would allow Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI) and Areva to sell nuclear 
reactors113 whilst negotiations were underway with the UAE and South Africa.114 Tepco 
(Tokyo Electric Power Co.) announced in May 2010 that it would be investing in 
nuclear power abroad in a deal with the US115 and METI agreed to facilitate the creation 
of a firm incorporating the Tokyo, Chubu and Kansai electric power companies with 
Toshiba, Hitachi and MHI to support Japanese nuclear exports.116  Japan also pushed its 
nuclear exports as chairman of the APEC meetings in late 2010.  
 
METI views the nuclear market as ‘globalised rather than concentrated’117 and is hence 
adapting to this shift. ‘International cooperation on nuclear energy policy is necessary in 
order to combat such business risks as nuclear non-proliferation’. The number of new 
nuclear power plants in Japan has fallen sharply since the 1990s so firms are looking 
abroad for expansion potential. As METI argues; ‘only international alliances survive 
                                                            
113 Nayla Razzouk, ‘Japan, Jordan Agree to Allow Nuclear Sales by Areva, Mitsubishi,’ Bloomberg, 14 
June, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-14/japan-jordan-agree-to-allow-nuclear-sales-
by-areva-mitsubishi.html (Accessed on 15/06/10) 
114 In July 2010, Japan also proposed to jointly build quake-resistant nuclear power plants with Iran. 
‘Iran, Japan to Jointly Build Quake-resistant Nuclear Power Plants,’ Xinhua, 20 July 2010, 
http://english.cri.cn/6966/2010/07/20/1461s583865.htm (Accessed on 20/07/10) 
115 ‘Breaking new ground, Tepco to invest in US nuclear business,’ Japan Times, 11 May, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100511a4.html (Accessed on 11/05/10) 
116 Stephen Blank, ‘China puts down marker in nuclear power race,’ Asia Times, 16 June, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LF16Cb01.html (Accessed on 16/06/10) In August 2010 
METI’s budget report committed to ‘actively promote nuclear energy’ with ‘safety as the primary 
prerequisite’. ‘FY 2011 Budget Request, August 2010, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,’ 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/policy/2011budget.pdf  p. 4 
117 ‘The Challenges and Directions for Nuclear Energy Policy in Japan: Japan’s Nuclear Energy National 
Plan’ 
311 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
from now’ unlike in the 1980s when independent reactor producers could operate on a 
country-by-country basis. Following a number of mergers, Japan has embarked on an 
active programme of information sharing. Japan also needs contracts with developing 
nations to complete a full nuclear fuel cycle.118 METI defends developing abroad as a 
means to ‘maintain sufficient robustness in the field of [Japan’s] industry’s technologies 
and personnel during the lull in domestic construction until large-scale replacement 
works begin from around 2030’. Japan officially concurs with President Obama’s vision 
for a nuclear-free world but in the meantime does not want to miss out on the strategic 
and commercial opportunities of nuclear technology. 
 
IX. The US-India Nuclear Deal  
 
The next important external structural change was the US-India nuclear deal. This, the 
most significant recent change to the export regime, 119 provided a major condition 
under which Japan could engage with India.  
 
The foundations for greater US-India dialogue were carved out in the latter half of the 
Clinton administration. The possibility of nuclear exports was first announced, however, 
by Secretary of State Rice during a visit to India in March 2005. In an ‘Action Agenda’ 
subsequently released in the Washington Times, the administration proposed forwarding 
geo-strategic cooperation between the two countries rooted strongly in US defence and 
military sales to India as a way to counter China's influence. Robert Blackwill, US 
Ambassador to India clearly articulated the role of China in Washington’s decision-
                                                            
118 For more detail on Japan’s limited capability in this area, see Abiru, ‘Japan, Russia and the Future of 
Nuclear Energy’  
119 William C Potter, 'India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy,’ The Non-proliferation 
Review, 12: 2, (2005), p. 344 
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making, stating that there are ‘no two [other] countries which share equally the 
challenge of trying to shape the rise of Chinese power.’120 
 
The announcement came on July 18 2005. President Bush and Prime Minister Singh 
revealed their intention to jointly develop India’s civilian nuclear energy programme. In 
return, India promised to ‘voluntarily…separate civilian nuclear facilities in a phased 
manner and to file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the 
IAEA.’121 India would also receive US defence technology.122 US nuclear trade with 
India had been terminated in 1974 following India’s first nuclear test but the Bush 
administration claimed that by bringing India into the ‘mainstream’ of non-proliferation 
efforts, the global cause would be improved. Yet the diplomatic community and elites in 
India believe the deal had little to do with electricity (even optimistic estimates place the 
increase at only 8%). 123  For India, the deal invited them to the high table of 
international diplomacy.  
 
i. Commercial interests 
 
Within the American strategic rationale, hedging against China was not the only or even 
primary purpose. The Bush administration’s actual policy towards China was not as 
openly hostile as often assumed. In fact Rice and Bush whilst cautious were keen to 
                                                            
120 Robert Blackwill cited in Ibid. p. 346 
121 ‘Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’ White 
House Press Statement, 18 July, 2005, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html. According to IAEA guidelines a 
safeguard agreement obliges a state to declare all nuclear material and facilities subject to the agreement 
and update information when necessary. ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ 5 March, 
1970 
122 A US official confirmed in March 2005 that the goal of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) 
was 'to help India become a major world power in the 21st century'...'We understand fully the 
implications, including military implications, of that statement’. 'US Unveils Plans To Make India 'Major 
World Power', AFP, 26 March, 2005 
123 Author’s interview with Latif 
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continue engagement whilst also strengthening relations with China’s neighbours.124 
Commercial gains were also at the forefront of Washington’s mind. In comparison with 
Japan’s 2010 rhetoric, the US was more candid with regards the industrial benefits of a 
deal. In 2006 Rice admitted, ‘At its core, our initiative with India is not simply a 
government-to-government effort. It was crafted with the private sector firmly in mind.’ 
Rice also claimed that with the building of just two Indian reactors, 3000-3500 direct 
and 10-15000 indirect jobs would be created for the US. 125  Mira Kamdar, a 
commentator on Indian affairs agreed, believing 'The Bush administration hopes that 
[the nuclear deal with India] will help resuscitate the moribund US nuclear power 
industry.’126 
 
Commercial implications were not foreseen only by the US. Both Russia and France 
with nuclear industries in need of revival recognised the potential of India’s market, 
worth $100-150bn.127 Since the NSG operates by consensus, any one of the members 
could have blocked America’s plans but chose to accede, viewing relations with both 
the US and India as preferable to non-proliferation dreams.128  
 
Several states, however, resented the NSG’s preference towards India. For example 
South Africa and Ukraine, who had voluntarily abandoned their nuclear programmes to 
join the NPT and Argentina, Brazil and Egypt who had considered going nuclear but 
                                                            
124 Harsh Pant, 'The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics', Asian Security, 
Vol.5, No.3, 2009, p.275 
125 Remarks by State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 April 2006. 
126 Mira Kamdar, 'Risking Armageddon for Cold, Hard Cash', in: Washington Post, 7 September 2008 
127 According to Gupta, the ‘civil nuclear pie…is not as large as it is imagined to be.’ He believes 
estimates to have been ‘vastly exaggerated’ without taking due consideration of legal and local opposition 
to the building of sites. Peter J Brown, ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom,’ Asia Times, 19 June, 
2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LF19Dh01.html (Accessed on 20/06/10) 
128 Potter, 'India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy,’ p. 350 
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resisted.129 The question of whether the deal indirectly permitted India to channel its 
own reactor to non-peaceful purposes remained open to debate, as did calls from parties 
such as Iran and Israel for similar ‘rights’ to exemption.   
 
ii. Domestic pressures in the US 
 
An additional factor during negotiations was the greater voice of the Indian community 
within the US. As James Lindsay pointed out in 2002, ‘Not only are [Indian-Americans] 
affluent in India, but China’s rising power and India’s decision to move toward a market 
economy means their calls for a more “India friendly” foreign policy are likely to meet 
a receptive audience in Washington’.130 In 2007 there were an estimated 2.7m Indian-
Americans (or Asian Indians) living in the US, an increase of 53% from 2000. This 
ethnic group shows the most rapid growth of all minorities, constituting just less than 
1% of the total population.131  
 
The ‘Indian-American’ community has not only made inroads in US industry but 
increasingly, political circles. As Limaye notes the ‘crescendo from the India lobby’ in 
the last decade, donating considerable sums to political candidates132 is an important 
factor behind policy decisions. Most recently in 2010 State Senator Nikki Haley won 
the Republican primary for the South Carolina gubernatorial election representing the 
                                                            
129 According to Perkovich, 'at least one such state put off adoption of the [IAEA] Additional Protocol in 
reaction to the US-India deal's announcement.' George Perkovich, ‘Global implications of the US-India 
deal’, Dædalus, (Winter 2010), p. 28. This state is widely assumed to be Brazil. 
130 Quoted in Jason Kirk, ‘Indian-Americans and the US-India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation Of An 
Ethnic Lobby?’ Foreign Policy Analysis, 4, (2008), p. 281 
131 According to the American Community Survey of the US Census Bureau 
132 According to some, President Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 can also be linked with Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign for the New York Senate seat which required support from the Indian community. Author’s 
interview with US scholar, June 2010 
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first Indian-American woman to win a major state-wide election. In Japan no similar 
stakeholders exist.  
 
iii. The NSG vote 
 
Before the deal could be implemented, the US needed the approval of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group. The NSG was formed in 1975 in response to India’s first nuclear test 
to tighten the exchange of nuclear technology for both civilian and military purposes. 
The group of 46 states agreed to block trade with non-NPT states to bolster non-
proliferation.  When this informal export-cartel was pressed by Washington to grant 
India an exemption, many in Delhi expected Japan to refuse whilst assuming China and 
Australia to be certain supporters.133 China’s actual cool response deeply angered India 
as a result. 
 
Japan faced an unenviable dilemma. Should Japan admit its economic interests, reject 
the deal or the third option, quietly add its signature and muddle through the opposition 
likely to ensue? Tokyo chose the final option and signed a waiver which would allow 
nuclear technology to be transferred from the US. NSG members were permitted to 
‘transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and 
for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities.’134  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
133 Author’s interview with Y. Ishida Researcher, Intelligence and Analysis Service, MOFA 10 June 2010 
134 ‘Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India’, Final NSG Statement, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/20080906_Final_NSG_Statement.pdf 
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iv. Japan’s rationale 
 
Proliferation officials reasoned that by incorporating India into the ‘non-proliferation’ 
regime, rather than the treaty, NSG members could ‘control India through conditions’ 
and ensure India’s behaviour compiled with the international community.’ Hirabayashi 
for example argues that whilst India could use indigenous technologies to satisfy some 
of its demands, this would incur more accidents. It would be ‘counter-productive’ and 
result in a ‘negative fallout for ourselves’ therefore for Japan not to engage with India in 
its development. Japan also still holds faith in IAEA inspection but is aware of the 
potential loophole should India decide to channel its own nuclear materials to non-
peaceful uses.135 MOFA staff considered India’s Nuclear Testing Moratorium to have 
been a ‘big turning point’ which allows Japan to press for clarification on the 
‘conditions and concrete language’ in India’s nuclear commitments. 136  Bureaucrats 
admit, however, that ultimately Japan was a ‘reluctant supporter’ which only agreed to 
the waiver ‘out of necessity’.137 
 
The likelihood of Japan vetoing the deal was always negligible but Japan’s signature at 
the NSG was far more than merely support of US strategic goals. Japan also had interest 
in India engaging with NSG members. In fact discussion of possible nuclear commerce 
was raised during Abe’s 2006 visit to India, only to be quashed by public apprehension.  
 
 
 
                                                            
135 Author’s interview with senior official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division 
136 Author’s interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division, 
MOFA 14 June 2010 
137Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, Delhi, 28 February 2011 
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v. An answer to climate change? 
 
Another driver of demand is the growing concern for the dangers of climate change. 
According to scientists, nuclear energy represents a significantly lower threat to the 
environment than coal and oil. Reserves of these fuels are also finite. The issue of 
climate change is a relatively recent addition to Japan’s diplomatic profile, according to 
the current Head of the Climate Change Division in MOFA before the launch of Abe’s 
‘Cool Earth Initiative’, the department was relatively small.138 The issue has since risen 
in prominence, becoming one of the major themes of Japan’s G8 Presidency in 2008. 
 
Prior to assuming office, Hatoyama pledged to cut carbon emissions by 25% from 1990 
levels, outdoing his predecessor’s target of only 8%. Despite being one of the most 
energy-efficient societies, Japan has faced strong international pressure to lead on 
lowering emissions, especially after the government rejected extending the Kyoto 
Protocol. The DPJ is ideologically more concerned with environmental issues than the 
LDP or indeed METI but regarding a nuclear deal with India, the climate change factor 
has appeared less frequently than commercial implications.  
 
Japanese bureaucrats approach the issue of Climate Change pragmatically, viewing the 
issue a ‘space for influence...if done prudently’.139 According to a senior official in the 
Non-Proliferation Division, it would be ‘naïve’ to believe climate change was the 
driving force for Japan’s policy in this area. Instead ‘energy security is key’. 140 In 
addition for the Japanese public, the issue of the NPT is more important than climate 
change concerns.  
                                                            
138 Author’s interview with senior official, Climate Change Division, MOFA 2 June 2010 
139 Ibid. 
140 Author’s interview with senior official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division 
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vi. Japanese technology – the essential link 
 
To understand Japan’s vested interests in the US-India Deal and nuclear industry, one 
needs to look no further than the organisation of some of the world’s most powerful 
nuclear conglomerates. Nuclear reactor-makers have recently consolidated into three 
well-defined groups in response to a surge in demand. Japan plays a key role in this 
system, holding a considerable amount of leverage in expertise, technology and process-
management ability.141 
 
In 2006 a wave of deals ensured Japan’s near-inevitable acceptance of the US-India 
deal. In February Toshiba announced its acquisition of Westinghouse, the US-based 
fuelling company from its parent company British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL).142 In 
October of the same year, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Areva (a French 
industrial conglomerate) agreed to cooperate in the nuclear energy field. This deal was 
extended in December 2008.143 General Electric and Hitachi also formed a 60:40 joint 
venture in 2006.144 All these firms are keen for Japan to abandon the export controls 
which prevent them from participating in India’s boom industry and view Japan as the 
fundamental barrier to engagement. As Jeffrey Lewis states, ‘Japan is an essential party 
for US and French nuclear cooperation with India… Without Japanese involvement, 
                                                            
141 According to Acton, ‘three out of the four modern American and French reactors contain at least one 
component that can be manufactured in Japan and nowhere else.’ George Perkovich, ‘Solving Tokyo’s 
Nuclear Conundrum,’ Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2010, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40765 (Accessed on 07/05/10); 
Taisuke, ‘Japan, Russia and the Future of Nuclear Energy’  
142 ‘Toshiba Acquires Westinghouse from BNFL,’ Toshiba Press Release, February 6, 2006, 
http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2006_02/pr0601.htm; Abiru, ‘Japan, Russia and the Future of 
Nuclear Energy’  
143 According to Reuters, Areva took a 30% stake in Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co, ‘Mitsubishi Heavy, 
Areva in nuclear fuel venture-paper,’ Reuters, 21 December  2008, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKT26475220081221 (Accessed on 05/10/10) 
144 Mohan, ‘Japan softens on nuke deal’  
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American and French nuclear businesses could be denied opportunities in the Indian 
nuclear market.’145 Areva for example needs components which only Japan can supply.  
 
X. An India-Japan Nuclear Deal 
 
Despite the above conditions for Japan-India nuclear cooperation, the aforementioned 
historical memories led most commentators to discount even the possibility of Japan 
striking an independent deal with India. In the first years of the new millennium 
officials claim it was ‘difficult to imagine’ nuclear cooperation but following the US-
India deal, which itself came as a ‘surprise’ to some, the path was set. In order to ‘open 
the valve’ on the Indian market, Japan requires a formal treaty permitting nuclear trade. 
Whilst as Kaneko notes, Japan could theoretically sell materials and technology to the 
US who could then pass this onto India, such a ploy would soon be discovered. Rather 
than enter through the ‘uraguchi’ (back door), Japan entered formal negotiations in 
2010.  
 
The prospect of cooperation first emerged in late 2006 when PM Singh visited Japan. In 
the ‘Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership’, passing 
comment was made to investment in nuclear energy but little concrete action was taken. 
Domestic apathy was a factor but more precisely with the US-India nuclear deal not yet 
confirmed, Tokyo felt unable to take the initiative and decided to bide its time. A 
rumour picked up by the Yomiuri Shimbun that Abe intended to allow Japanese 
cooperation in Indian nuclear energy projects, prevented Abe’s government from 
                                                            
145 Brown, ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom’  
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introducing even the suggestion of a deal but a Japanese Ambassador admits 
discussions took place ‘behind closed doors’.146  
 
Once begun, the Japan-India nuclear deal progressed at remarkable speed and 
accelerated particularly following METI Minister Naoshima’s April 2010 visit to 
Delhi.147 The visit was at first under-reported but on the final page of the communiqué 
subsequently released, one sentence pricked the attention of onlookers; ‘The two 
Ministers decided to establish a Nuclear Energy Working Group under the Energy 
Dialogue to exchange views and information on their respective nuclear energy policies 
from the energy, economic and industrial perspectives.’ Their first meeting was held 
that afternoon.148 The announcement of talks beginning the following Monday, came as 
a surprise to the majority of the academic community. The Japanese government were 
intensely cautious to describe talks as ‘exploratory in nature,’ well aware that talks 
between the US and India took three years to come to fruition. According to MOFA the 
discussions were premised on ‘how to conduct talks in the future, and in the contents of 
the Agreement.’ 149  The ‘first round’ was more talks about talks than substantial 
deliberation which were resumed in October 2010.  
 
A nuclear deal holds immense strategic implications. By showing itself willing to 
engage with India, given Japan’s sensitive view of nuclear technology, the negotiations 
                                                            
146 Amid reaction to the Yomiuri’s leak, Shiozaki, the Chief Cabinet Secretary was forced to again call 
publicly for India to join the NPT.  
147 Naoshima’s visit was overshadowed, however, by former Prime Minister Hatoyama making a trip to 
Okinawa in the midst of the Futenma dispute at the same time.  
148 As Gupta noted, it was hence evident why the presidents of Hitachi, Toshiba and MHI accompanied 
Naoshima on this visit. Brown, ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom’  
149 ‘Negotiations on a Japan-India Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy,’ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2010/6/0625_01.html  
The talks were held between Mr. Mitsuru Kitano, Deputy-Director General, Southeast and Southwest 
Asian Affairs Department, MOFA (Special Representative in charge of Japan-India Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation Agreement) and officials concerned from relevant ministries with from the Indian side Mr. 
Gautam Bambawale, Joint Secretary, East Asia, MOEA and other officials. 
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signal the importance Tokyo now affords Delhi. This about-turn was not lost on India’s 
press who described Japan’s initiation as an ‘historic U-turn’, ‘softening’ or ‘relenting’ 
on their previous hard line. But India too is keen to conclude an agreement. India needs 
more than rhetoric, it needs tangible assistance. The rumour in July 2010 that India was 
considering sending Shyam Saran, the diplomat who negotiated India’s US deal, to 
Japan to allay the public’s concerns, demonstrated the importance Delhi places on the 
deal.150  
 
XI. Intervening variables and actors 
 
Japan’s decision to ‘relent’ cannot be explained by just one issue. Instead, a culmination 
of factors with differing influential weight drew negotiations to an inevitable beginning. 
In line with this thesis’ adherence to NCR, the primary motivation can be seen from 
structural factors. However within Japan there exists a number of actors whose 
intervening influence shaped the timing and nature of Japanese policymaking. The role 
of public opinion, politicians and bureaucrats will form the focus of the following 
section. 
 
i. Role of public opinion 
 
Japan’s unique experience of nuclear attack is often cited as a key determinant in 
Japanese foreign policy. Certainly as noted above, public abhorrence towards India’s 
nuclear tests in 1998 largely shaped Japan’s official reaction. The NPT and ‘regime’ 
which evolved as a result has been described as akin to a ‘religion’ and following the 
                                                            
150  ‘India may send envoy to pitch nuclear pact to Japanese public,’ Japan Times, 7 July, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100707b1.html (Accessed on 07/07/10) Saran was Deputy 
Chief of Mission in Tokyo in the late-1980s.  
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announcement of Tokyo’s signature to the NSG authorisation of the US-India nuclear 
deal hundreds of letters were sent to MOFA condemning the decision. For many critics 
the deal mortally threatened the entire NPT regime.  
 
In 1998 anti-nuclear sentiment provided the major impetus for the actions bureaucrats 
took. Hashimoto and some elements of the political hierarchy (eg Diet Member Suzuki) 
led the charge against India but it was public opinion which drove policy. As one Indian 
diplomat notes, Hashimoto had to ‘play to the anti-nuclear gallery.’ The reaction in 
1998 was not driven by bureaucrats but rather a ‘chain reaction’ from the mass media 
who stirred domestic opposition.151  
 
The immediate aftermath of the announcement for Japan itself to launch civil nuclear 
cooperation negotiations, encouraged a more muted response. Hibakusha organisations 
protested against news of negotiations, especially around the August 8th anniversary.152 
The usual lobbies of the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center,153 mayors of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki as well as editorials from anti-nuclear media such as the Asahi Shimbun 
voiced strong opposition.  
 
Public opinion has historically acted as a barrier and important intervening actor on 
Japanese foreign policy towards India. At several junctures the influence of public 
opinion has made itself felt in policymaking and on occasion impeded government 
positions. However the role public sentiment has played in more modern relations is on 
                                                            
151 Such a reading would fit Japan’s later behaviour which breathed a sigh of relief when eventually a 
convivial excuse the lift sanctions was found with the ‘War on Terror’ and heightened terrorism threat. 
152 Johnston, ‘Rhetoric belies atomic policy’  
153Ibid. ‘If Japan concludes a nuclear cooperation agreement with India on the grounds that other 
countries, including the US, Russia and France, have done so, or because it is in Japan's commercial 
interest, it will become impossible to prevent nuclear proliferation,’ said the Tokyo-based Citizens' 
Nuclear Information Center. Eric Johnston, ‘Rhetoric belies atomic policy,’ Japan Times, 7 August, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100807a2.html (Accessed on 07/08/10) 
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the decline due to the overwhelming structural factors which encourage Japan-India 
cooperation. Concerted and widespread public dissatisfaction with a Japan-India nuclear 
treaty did not materialise and officials were able to progress with negotiations without 
substantial domestic pressure.  
 
As one non-governmental official noted, Japan’s anti-nuclear feeling is ‘time 
dependent’, changing constantly with generational shifts. 154 The threat, perceived or 
genuine, from North Korea has also served to harden opinion eroding some of the 
traditionally anti-nuclear feeling towards a more pragmatic and realistic view. 
Bureaucrats now say that Japan needs to ‘placate the domestic debate’ and reassure 
people through public education.155 
 
Public understanding of the differences between nuclear weaponry and energy has also 
improved. According to Cabinet Office surveys whilst in 2005 only 25% of people 
thought nuclear energy safe, this rose to over 40% by 2010.156 The build-up to the 
Copenhagen Climate Talks in December 2009, despite their limited progress, 
encouraged the media and public opinion at large to engage in debate over how best to 
secure the world’s energy demands. In the post-war decades Japan understandably 
viewed anything related to ‘nuclear’ in a negative light. The nuance between kaku heiki 
and kaku enerugi (nuclear weapons and nuclear energy) has often caused confusion. Yet 
whilst opposition numbers are small they are vocal. Residents living near reactors often 
protest against their expansion for fear of leaks and object to government funds being 
channelled not to residents themselves but rather the prefecture as a whole. Japanese 
                                                            
154 Author’s interview with Takaya Suto, Senior Advisor, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation 29 June 2010 
155 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
156 ‘Nuclear power: When the steam clears’  
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public opinion is not opposed to nuclear energy exports per se, but rather cooperation 
with India specifically, as a non-NPT signatory.157 
 
The Fukushima nuclear meltdown had a profound impact on Japan’s nuclear policy as 
this chapter will later address. The line between nuclear weapons being ‘bad’ and 
energy ‘good’ was broken when radiation began leaking from the Dai-ichi power plant 
causing mass evacuation from the area resulting in public pressure playing a 
considerable role in adjusting Japan’s energy policy to rely less on nuclear energy. 
Regarding the export of nuclear technology to third parties, however, domestic opinion 
might not prove as influential. Even if Japan’s dependence lessens, the sale of expertise 
abroad might well continue. Public opinion therefore plays an intervening role but in the 
case of Japan’s nuclear policy towards India, one which is decreasing in influence. 
 
ii. Bureaucrats 
 
A more important consideration is how policymakers have interpreted public opinion. 
At the strategic elite-level, India is recognised as a ‘de facto’ nuclear power with 
relatively understandable disaffection with the current nuclear membership system.158 
The schism between elite and grass roots opinion on the utility of nuclear technology 
was evident in 2009 when the ‘tacit agreement’ between Japan and the US to allow 
American nuclear-armed vessels to dock in Japanese ports, was revealed.  
 
                                                            
157 Furthermore as one official notes, whilst on the whole, the Japanese people support nuclear energy as a 
viable domestic power source, they oppose the building of reactors near their homes. Author’s interview 
with senior official and former Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA 25 June 2010 
158 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 24 June 2010 
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As officials, academics and Abe told the author, emotions on this issue have often 
outweighed pragmatic reasoning. Bureaucrats recognise their obligation and ‘did our 
effort’ in 1998 but many since appreciate the limitations of Japan’s response. MOFA is 
not ‘immune’ from strong feelings159 and accepts that Japan’s response may have gone 
too far, especially by halting ODA. One Ambassador describes the country’s reaction as 
‘hysteria’160 in which bureaucrats accepted populist demands even at the expense of 
future strategic interests. Even the Chief of the India desk at the time disagreed with the 
government’s action. The now-Consul General in Kolkata told the author that it was a 
‘political decision’ motivated by public opinion whilst the bureaucracy were keen for 
relations to be normalised.161 Director of the South West Asia Division in 1998 also 
noted that the ‘economic measures’ were a ‘big handicap’ for Japanese industry.162 
 
Bureaucrats now widely admit that their reaction in 1998 ‘may not have been logical’163 
and speak of increased realism in how to deal with India. Japan realises that repeated 
pleads for India to sign the NPT or CTBT are ineffective. Japan’s encouragement for 
India to fund a CTBT organisation as a sign of their intentions was also recently 
rejected.164 A new approach based on solid relations is required.  
 
Neither Japan nor India fully understands the nuclear postures of the other but Japanese 
bureaucrats have shown an increased awareness of the strategic implications, which 
have moderated their willingness to succumb to anti-nuclear lobbies. At the time when 
                                                            
159 Author’s interview with Kaneko 
160 Author’s interview with Noda 
161 Author’s interview with senior official, Japan Consulate, Kolkata, 3 March 2011. This official had a 
long professional association with India having served twice as Chief of the India desk and undertaking 
four postings in India (two in both Delhi and Kolkata). He has also worked on Nepal and Sri Lanka 
162 Author’s interview with senior official and former Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA 
25 June 2010 
163 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
164 Author’s interview with Gupta, 21 June 2011  
326 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Japan decided to include its signature at the NSG, opinion within MOFA was divided. 
In one camp, particularly the functionalists such as those who oversaw non-proliferation 
thought the US deal fundamentally contradicted the nuclear regime.165 For regionalists 
the deal whilst not perfect, offered the best chance to rein in one of the world’s largest 
future power-emitters and once public opinion could be assuaged, open the prospect for 
exports. Usually area-offices take precedent but on such a sensitive issue,the decisive 
move was made when senior-level bureaucrats and politicians gave their support to 
opening negotiations.166 As one official admitted, they knew ‘eventually it will be in our 
interests.’ This latter acceptance of India’s strategic importance has gained greater 
ground within the bureaucracy since. 
 
The evolution of the bureaucracy’s attention to India, nuclear exports and proliferation 
can be seen in the distribution of staff to the issue. As one senior MOFA official 
remarked, ten years ago one would ‘never imagined’ that Japan would have so many 
bilateral agreements on nuclear technology. Indeed until recently, MOFA did not 
contain a Non-Proliferation Division. Previously three officials from one section of 
another division dealt with non-proliferation issues whilst today approximately fifteen 
hold this brief.167 One additional official was recruited to the Division to work solely on 
the nuclear deal with India.168  
 
A further change identifiable in Japan’s nuclear policy comes from the internal 
cooperation between METI and MOFA on an energy deal. The two ministries have had 
                                                            
165 The Disarmament Division for example sought further conditions of use and commitments by India 
and strongly opposed the lifting of sanctions on India in 2002. 
166 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
167 Author’s interview with senior official, Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division 
168 According to one senior official in the Division, since India is a non-signatory to the NPT the issue 
cannot solely be handled by his division. Instead, as an ‘exceptional case’, the Southwest Asia Division is 
primarily responsible. Author’s interview with senior official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation 
Division 
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an occasionally antagonistic history which has been held culpable for Japanese inaction. 
For a nuclear agreement with India, however, resources have been pooled to accelerate 
negotiations. When they began in the summer of 2010, officials from MOFA, METI 
and the Cabinet attended. This was quite a rare example of cross-ministry coordination. 
 
iii. Politicians  
 
Politicians are dependent on their constituents for their position so can be expected to 
take a keen interest in public opinion. However as is noted throughout this thesis, 
politician-interest has been meagre. Yet as the prospect of nuclear cooperation has 
surfaced, politicians from anti-nuclear lobbies have intervened. The LDP had previously 
been enthusiastic but when the DPJ assumed power in August 2009, Indian 
policymakers feared a reversal. As a party associated with the Left it was feared any 
nuclear cooperation would be shunned. Furthermore Kasuo Okada, Foreign Minister 
from August 2009 to September 2010, had led the Diet debate against the LDP 
administration over the US-India deal 169  and claimed the NPT regime to be his 
‘philosophy’. The decision to then open negotiations with India on a nuclear agreement 
was in his own words, one of the toughest he ever made.170  
 
The DPJ decided to support negotiations. Following Hatoyama’s attempt to separate 
domestic issues from security concerns, Kan was said to be particularly cautious.171 At 
one time it was thought Kan might seek to maintain a ‘liberal’ image by promoting 
                                                            
169 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
170 ‘Japan and India in nuclear co-operation talks,’ BBC News, August 22, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11050615 
171 Professor Kazuto Suzuki quoted in Brown, ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom’  
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nuclear disarmament172 but commercial and strategic interests soon took precedence. As 
members of DPJ staff told the author, without the economic benefit Japan would not 
spend such political capital on nuclear energy.  It was assumed that Kan would be more 
able to push through such an agreement due to his background as a ‘non-government 
man in mentality’ and less in the pockets of big business. 173  
 
A Japan-India nuclear deal also suited Kan’s domestic economic objectives. Upon 
assuming the premiership, Kan announced a 10-year growth strategy in which priority 
was given to the promotion of nuclear power exports and infrastructure. As India looks 
to manufacture fast-breeder reactors (FBRs), officials in Japan consider Japanese 
expertise to provide an ‘easy complementarity.’ 174  Prior to the DPJ administration, 
however, METI was laying the groundwork for such an approach, identifying emerging 
markets for Japanese exports and investment in an ‘Industrial Structure Vision.’  
 
METI Minister Naoshima proved particularly keen to promote the sale of Japan’s 
highly-prized nuclear expertise. He defended India’s peaceful use of nuclear technology 
as ‘already…internationally accepted.’ Other significant individuals behind the deal 
were Shunsuke Kondo, Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and Yoshito 
Sengoku, Chief Secretary General of the Cabinet and so-called ‘go-to guy’ on major 
policy issues.175 In the Cabinet reshuffle following Kan’s victory over Ozawa in 2010 in 
a leadership challenge, Okada was also replaced by Seiji Maehara. 
 
                                                            
172 Professor Nobumasa Akiyama quoted in Ibid. 
173 Author’s interview with Inoguchi 
174 Bagchi, ‘India, Japan to hold talks on civil nuclear cooperation today’ 
175 Brown, ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom’  
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Overall, support for a deal has received cross-party support, except when the SDPJ were 
in coalition with the DPJ. According to officials, the SDPJ ‘don’t like India’176 due to 
their opposition to the use of nuclear energy177 and represented a ‘major impediment to 
diplomatic strategy’. 178  In an indirect way therefore, the Futenma episode which 
relieved the DPJ of the SDPJ accelerated the speed of negotiations. Another official also 
told the other that bureaucrats knew whilst the Komeito party were in coalition with the 
LDP, no negotiations could begin. This then shows, as NCR holds, how intervening 
unit-level variables dictate the pace of policy development within structural conditions.  
 
iv. Japanese industry 
 
Business strategy has played a fundamental role in Japanese policymaking for decades. 
Recently this has coincided with structural changes in the nuclear industry and 
international system to encourage a few powerful conglomerates to convince 
policymakers to adapt Japan’s nuclear policy.  
 
Japan’s decision to endorse the US-India deal angered many in Japan and abroad and 
indeed welcoming India into the international nuclear market was one of Japan’s most 
controversial foreign policy decisions. Yet behind Japan’s rhetoric of bringing India out 
of the self-imposed diplomatic cold, commercial interests were at play. Officials did not 
state their intentions publicly but events since prove at least part of Japan’s justification 
to be economic. Indeed according to Nandakumar ‘It would not be wrong to say that 
Japanese companies would be the maximum beneficiaries of the Indo–US nuclear 
                                                            
176 Author’s interview with senior official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division 
177 According to Kaneko, the leader of the Social Democrats, Ms Fukushima’s husband works for an anti-
Monju (nuclear plant restarted in 2010) lobby group 
178 Author’s interview with two junior MOFA officials, Southwest Asia Division, Tokyo, 19 May 2010 
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agreement.’179 As the economic downturn afflicting the West and Japan continued, the 
rationale for economic diplomacy has also become more acceptable to the public.  
 
Japan’s nuclear industry is considered a key area for economic development as other 
production fields are subjected to falling global demand. With such an objective, the 
government and financial institutions such as Nippon Export and Investment Insurance 
and JBIC have supported the industry’s expansion.180 India could still go elsewhere, 
namely Russia or ROK but Japan’s technology gives Tokyo the competitive edge. In 
particular Japan holds a near-monopoly in the production of seamless nuclear furnaces. 
Yet Japan appreciates that whilst they currently hold superior technology this will not 
last indefinitely. As Alagappa points out, Japan has learnt from the experience of high-
speed rail when Japan refused to export technology to China, forcing Beijing to go to 
Germany instead.181  
 
Japan’s business community has been fairly astute in reading Japan and India’s 
economic compatibility. When domestic and political support for cooperation was low, 
little effort was made to persuade the government, in stark comparison with present-day 
efforts. Following the conclusion of the US-India deal, Japanese companies awoke. 
According to Nayan there was in fact a Japanese delegation visiting the Department of 
Atomic Energy opposite the Taj Hotel in Mumbai when it was attacked in November 
2008. In early July 2010 the ban on technology transfers to several Indian firms and 
government bodies was lifted, just two weeks after the first round of talks was held in 
                                                            
179 Author’s interview with Nanda Kumar Janardhanan, Energy Policy Researcher, Institute for Global 
Environmental Strategies, Japan, 27 May 2010  
180 Nandakumar and Kumar, 'India-Japan Relations: Are There Prospects for Civil Nuclear Cooperation?', 
p. 976 
181 Author’s interview with Alagappa 
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Tokyo.182 Japan Steel Works (JSW) has already established an office in India through a 
subsidiary in the hope of expanding supply of specialist nuclear components.183  
 
XII. A nuclear case of Jekyll and Hyde184 
 
The conclusion of a nuclear deal, however, is not certain. Japan’s nuclear policy 
remains plagued by fears over security and safety, prior even to Fukushima. Whilst the 
government appreciates the economic and political dividends of energy cooperation, 
policymakers and the Japanese public are acutely aware of the potential damage of 
nuclear technology. Japan fears theft of material, use of stolen material to build 
explosives as well as ‘dirty bombs’ and damage to peaceful nuclear power facilities. As 
Endo has identified, nuclear power resembles aspects of ‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’ if 
employed for military purposes under peaceful auspices.185 
 
Before Japan agrees to any deal with India, the ‘three Ss’ of ‘safeguards, safety and 
security’ are guiding principles.  Despite the financial incentives, Japan doesn’t want to 
be considering another ‘Khan’ referring to the infamous Pakistani scientist who leaked 
                                                            
182 Mohan, ‘Japan softens on nuke deal’. Some of the 11 companies removed from the list, called the end-
users’ list, include the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Indian Space 
Research Organisation, PSU Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd and private firm Godrej & Boyce. 
‘Japan moves to mend nuke fences,’ Telegraph, Calcutta, 7 July, 2010, 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100707/jsp/nation/story_12655015.jsp (Accessed on 07/07/10) 
183 Anil Sasi, ‘Japan Steel Works bullish on Indian N-reactor parts market,’ Hindu Business Line, 7 July, 
2010, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/07/08/stories/2010070852460400.htm (Accessed on 
07/07/10); Takenori Horimoto, ‘The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Relations?’ 
Asia Pacific Bulletin, Number 107, 15 April, 2011, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb107.pdf  
184 Author’s interview with Endo 
185 Tetsuya Endo, ‘Two Sides of the Same Coin: Nuclear Disarmament and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear 
Energy,’ East Asia Forum, June 12, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/12/two-sides-of-the-
same-coin-nuclear-disarmament-and-the-peaceful-use-of-nuclear-energy/ (Accessed on 12/06/10). Endo 
was Director of the Southwest Asia Division at the time (1974). According to one academic speaking on 
condition of anonymity, Japan explored the possibility of India diverting material for weapons use prior 
to starting negotiations. Doing this would also lower India’s ability to produce electricity which is said to 
be the major objective.  
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technology to Iran and most frighteningly for Japan, North Korea. Japan is keen to 
maintain its international pacifist image and reliability as a promoter of non-
proliferation. Japan is also keen to avoid any similar behaviour to the Toshiba CoCom 
scandal of the 1980s.186  
 
As a further means to achieve a reliable image, Japan has continued to place pressure on 
India to ensure export controls and mechanisms are tight and eventually sign the CTBT. 
Progress has, however, been beset by internal political disputes. Some commentators 
and scientists question the success of India’s Pokhran tests 187 and argue that India 
should at least leave the door ajar for another test. According to Nayan the CTBT is 
opposed for three reasons; it is not comprehensive, not linked to nuclear disarmament 
and challenges sovereign rights. When during Hatoyama’s visit to India in December 
2009 the chattering classes were alive with debate over Singh’s apparent admittance that 
India would not obstruct the CTBT. The caveat still remains however, that unless the 
US188 and China sign, bringing the number of signatories closer to the required 65, India 
would continue to resist ‘showing its hand’.189  
 
                                                            
186 Author’s interview with senior official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division. In 1987 it 
emerged that Toshiba Machine Co., a subsidiary of Toshiba Corporation, had exported screw-milling 
machines to the Soviet Union, which it was supposed by the US, made Soviet submarines quieter and 
therefore harder to detect. It emerged that Toshiba Machine Co had supplied the Soviet Union with eight 
computer-guided propeller milling machines between 1982 and 1984. The company had also falsified 
documents to obtain a licence from the Japanese government. This trade was also in violation of the 
CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) embargo, set up in the immediate 
post-war years. Relations with the US were placed under considerable strain as Congress voted for 
sanctions against the company and two senior executives were arrested. Takei has likened the Japanese 
government’s response as one of ‘a parent confining a trouble-making child at home’ in order not to 
further anger the US who might push for measures against Toshiba Corporation or Japanese industry as a 
whole. Teruyoshi Takei ‘CoCom and the Japanese Regulation of Exports – The Response of Japanese 
Companies’ in Hiroshi Oda, ‘Law and Politics of West-East technology transfer’, Volume 1988 by 
Hiroshi Oda, pp. 119-131 
187 Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’  
188 The chance of the US signing has weakened since Obama took office with the majority of the Senate 
and Foreign Affairs Committee opposed. 
189 Author’s interview with Roy-Chaudhury 
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Yet even if India did agree to sign the CTBT, officials are hesitant to say whether this 
would change Japan’s position. Such a decision by India would at least send a ‘positive 
sign’ that India is committed to non-proliferation principles. The question of whether 
the Treaty is ratified, however, remains.190  
 
A more feasible manoeuvre than pushing for the CTBT would be to incorporate a test-
ban into Japan’s cooperation,191 threatening to withdraw material and equipment. The 
technology shared will be impossible to reclaim, however, which is why policymakers 
in Japan are acting with particular caution. This suggestion was made in May 2010 by 
Perkovich and several years earlier by Kaneko.192 The likelihood of India launching 
another test has been dismissed by many since India can conduct 
atmospheric/simulation tests but appreciate that to satisfy Japan’s domestic opinion, 
such a clause would be attractive.  
 
The reason for the ‘positive stalemate’ according to Kondapalli is thus over the issue of 
a test ban. ‘India thinks incorporating such a clause in the nuclear pact would violate its 
sovereignty and Japan will not likely achieve what the US failed to do’.193 Despite 
                                                            
190 Bagchi, ‘India, Japan to hold talks on civil nuclear cooperation today’  
As Gupta foresaw, ‘The main issue that will require finessing within the working group will be the 
strength of India's recommitment to core global non-proliferation principles. While new language on 
adhering to the CTBT will almost certainly not be forthcoming, the Japanese side will press heavily for 
strong export control/non-diversion clauses.’ Brown, ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom’  
191 Before leaving for his two-day visit to India, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said any 
civilian nuclear deal between the two countries needed a clause to define how Tokyo would respond to 
any nuclear test by Delhi. ‘Japan will have no option but to suspend our cooperation’. Rupam Jain Nair, 
‘Japan warns India against nuclear tests,’ AFP, 21 August, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gidySTRElq0qbJnTK9pBYeB1m5Cg. (Accessed 
on 21/08/10) 
192 The threat of withdrawing cooperation originated in the Hyde Pact passed by the US Senate in 
December 2006, which allows for the clarified some of India’s promises and stated that under US law 
another test would result in the cessation of trade. The Act does not, however, stipulate the introduction of 
further sanctions on India. Then-Senator Obama voiced concern that should India test again; nuclear 
cooperation should not continue and pushed for several ‘killer amendments’ according to India in the 
final Hyde Act. 
193  Maya Kaneko, ‘Uncertainty over tests stymies India nuclear plant’, Japan Times, 26 October 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20101026a7.html (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
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stating that ‘we are ready when they are ready for it,’ India is still playing a hard 
diplomatic hand.194 India’s moratorium remains a non-legal commitment.   
 
XIII. The fallout from Fukushima 
 
Japan’s faith in nuclear energy was shaken on March 11 2011 when a 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake struck Tohoku. Within hours a tsunami hit the east coast of Japan, killing 
over 15 000 civilians. The government of Japan and international attention, however 
soon moved to an emerging disaster at the Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima. 
In the ensuing days and weeks, Japan’s entire energy policy, introduced just the summer 
before came into question. At first the government was praised for its disaster efforts 
but as the close relationship between utility companies and the state became evident195 
and officials, including Kan sent confusing messages to the public, greater faith was 
lost.196 In an attempt to show decisive leadership, Kan called for the closure of facilities 
such as Hamaoka in Japan’s industrial zone, despite protestations from the operator, 
Chubu Electric and manufacturers reliant on the plant. By May Kan announced plans to 
‘start from scratch’ with Japan’s energy mix plan. Forced to reword his comments as 
‘personal opinion’ following criticism for not consulting his Cabinet, a statement was 
made soon after confirmed the reassessment.197 However as evidence of differing views 
between the political and bureaucratic wings in Japan has surfaced, METI initially at 
                                                            
194 P.S. Suryanarayana, ‘India, Japan focus on strategic ties’, 4 July, 2009, 
http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/04/stories/2009070460941200.htm (Accessed on 04/07/09) 
195 David P. Aldrich, ‘With A Mighty Hand’, The New Republic, 19 March 2011, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/85463/japan-nuclear-power-regulation (Accessed on 19/03/11) 
196 By July, according to one poll, just 16% of the population thought Kan was doing a good job. ‘Japan 
PM Naoto Kan urges nuclear-free future’, BBC News, 13 July 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-14137186 (Accessed on 13/07/11) 
197 Masami Ito, ‘Interim report sets new course in light of disaster, Energy policy revised to cut nuclear 
role’, Japan Times, 30 July 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110730a1.html (Accessed on 
30/07/11) 
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least reconfirmed Japan’s intention to use nuclear power as a key energy source.198 
Toshiba and Hitachi announced that plans to win new orders would be pushed back but 
remained committed to promoting nuclear power. The Tohoku earthquake therefore 
represents an additional structural influence over Japanese policy but not one able to 
overturn other conditions and obstacles previously in place.  
 
XIV. India’s security concerns 
 
The Indian government has long faced pressure to ensure safety and distance their 
actions from US influence. The US deal came at significant political cost to the ruling 
Congress Party199 and still stirs disapproval among some groups.200 Within India the 
introduction of legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents has caused particular 
controversy.201 In ‘The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill’ brought before the 
Indian Parliament in May 2010, any damages resulting from a nuclear accident lie 
solely on the operator (ie. the Indian government)202 rather than the supplier (often 
                                                            
198 ‘Nuke power to remain key energy source: METI’, Japan Times, 23 June 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110623a8.html (Accessed on 23/06/11) 
199 The opposition accused the Indian government of having bribed lawmakers. Apparently, several 
seriously ill members were transported from hospitals, and some jailed lawmakers were granted 
temporary releases. See: 'Indian Leader Wins Confidence Vote; Nuclear Deal on Track', in: NTI Global 
Security Newswire, 22 July 2008, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/GSN_20080722_0CC129A8.php (Accessed on 
15/03/11) Bardhan, the head of India's Communist Party, claimed that the rate was more than $ 5.5 
million for a vote in favour of the deal. Mira Kamdar, 'Risking Armageddon for Cold, Hard Cash', in: 
Washington Post, 7 September 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090502659.html  (Accessed on 15/03/11) 
200 According to Nayan there exists a strong (though weakening) Russia lobby in India which opposes 
India working too closely with the ‘West’. Author’s interview with Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research 
Associate, IDSA, 18 February 2011 
201 Vikhas Kumar, ‘Should India sign the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage?’ East Asia Forum, 15 June, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/15/should-india-sign-
the-convention-on-supplementary-compensation-for-nuclear-damage/ (Accessed on 16/02/11) 
202 Or more precisely critics say the legislation places liability for accidents on the government-run 
operator, the Nuclear Power Corp. of India, not private suppliers and contractors. Rama Lakshmi, ‘India 
introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents,’ Washington Post, 8 May, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050705057.html 
(Accessed on 04/07/11) 
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foreign companies).203 Washington insisted that such assurance was passed before US 
reactor firms enter the Indian market. 204 
 
The timing of the bill, overlapping with the sentences of those responsible for the 
Bhopal disaster in 1984, heightened public anger that supplier’s liability would be 
weakened.205 Eventually in late August 2010 the Lower House approved the law despite 
left-wing lawmakers calling the bill ‘illegal’, ‘unconstitutional’ and walking out of the 
chamber in protest. The government did, however, agree to triple the amount of 
compensation offered for accidents.206  Nevertheless the issue of liability continues to 
delay implementation. 
 
Following the Fukushima disaster, PM Singh immediately called for a ‘special safety 
review’  and proposed sites like Jaitapur in Maharashtra were given extra safeguards 
after protests called for relocation of the planned reactor away from an earthquake-
prone region. 207  However as Tellis argues, ‘India does not have the luxury of 
renouncing nuclear power’. What India can do is ensure locations and safeguards are 
revised but with rising oil prices impacting food prices, the urgency for alternative 
energy sources remains. 208 Furthermore Fukushima was built in 1972 so cannot be 
compared with contemporary models. According to some Indian officials, recent events 
have made Japan ‘even more suitable’ given how well the majority of Japanese reactors 
                                                            
203 The bill places a compensation cap of $100 million on the operator and allows up to $450 million in 
direct damages from the Indian government.  
204 N.V. Subramanian, ‘Nuclear Deal in Trouble?’, The Diplomat, June 18, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/indian-decade/page/12/ (Accessed on 18/06/10) 
205 Rama Lakshmi, ‘India introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear accidents,’ 
Washington Post, May 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050705057.html (Accessed on 04/07/11) 
206 ‘India parliament passes civil nuclear power bill,’ BBC News, August 25 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11084256 (Accessed on 04/01/11) 
207 ‘India to tighten nuclear safeguards at Jaitapur plant’, BBC News, 27 April 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13204923 (Accessed on 27/04/11) 
208 Chidanand Rajghatta,  ‘US experts say Japan tragedy should not stop India from pursuing nuke energy 
options’, Times of India, 15 March 2011, (Accessed on 15/03/11) 
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fared in light of the earthquake and tsunami. Also unlike the Three Mile Incident, the 
cause of the crisis was due to a natural disaster. When the Indian Foreign Secretary 
visited Tokyo in April 2011, the nuclear deal was not raised out of good taste but Indian 
officials are still enthusiastic about the proposal.  
 
XV. Additional costs of nuclear cooperation – both financial and institutional 
 
Nuclear power generation comes at a substantial financial cost. The initial capital 
investment is considerable and often presents an insurmountable barrier to developing 
countries.209 According to estimates, the capital costs alone span from $2000 to over 
$8000 per kilowatt.210 In comparison that of electricity is approximately 12-16 cents 
and wind power only 8-12. There are also fears that post-Fukushima the price of 
reactors (between $6-9bn each)211 will increase as security provisions are heightened. 
The cost to non-proliferation goals is not yet known.  
 
Japan’s initial talks with India in April 2010 also coincided with an unsettling 
announcement from Beijing. In addition to the two nuclear reactors, Chashmas-1 and 2 
already built or in process, China revealed it would lend Pakistan a further $207m to 
build another two on what Pakistan has termed ‘extremely concessional’ terms. 212 
Beijing and Islamabad claimed the deal did not violate any international rules since it 
was decided prior to China joining the NSG.  Pakistan also refuses to sign the NPT and 
accept IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities. The majority of NSG members, 
                                                            
209 Author’s interview with Endo 
210 Arjun Makhijani, ‘The Unacceptable Cost of the Nuclear Power Option for Japan,’ Japan Focus, 
March 13, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-Endo-Tetsuya/2697 (Accessed on 25/06/10) 
211 Author’s interview with Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, IISS, London, 15 
November 2010 
212 Geoff Dyer and Farhan Bokhari, ‘China-Pakistan reactor deal to open fresh US rift,’ Financial Times, 
23 September 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83db2ac8-c72d-11df-aeb1-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1XDJwasdp (Accessed on 25/10/10) 
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however, feared it not only breached the guidelines but was against the ‘spirit if not the 
letter’ of the NPT.213 China made no attempt to quell unease over the deal at a NSG 
meeting in New Zealand in June 2010, despite heavy criticism.  
 
With Tokyo-Delhi talks running in parallel, Japan found it difficult to call China to 
account for reinterpreting the very rules that its ally and now own government were 
pursuing. The argument therefore becomes one of nuclear records. Japan’s defence of a 
deal with India is based on India’s ‘immaculate’ or ‘impeccable’ non-proliferation 
record which compared with that of either China (a NPT member)214 or Pakistan (a non-
signatory), permits special treatment. India has also advocated no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons, unlike Pakistan.215 Tensions between Washington and Beijing continued to 
complicate the US willingness to stand firm against China as sanctions on Iran were due 
for debate at the UN Security Council and unease over the value of China’s currency 
simmered. India was understandably concerned by this development which highlights 
China’s ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan, despite efforts to ameliorate Beijing-
Delhi relations. Analysts believe that should the China-Pakistan deal go through, it 
would mark the death knell of the NPT, yet this development has not delayed progress 
on Japan’s own negotiations with India. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
213 Blank, ‘China puts down marker in nuclear power race’ 
214 China is reported to have supplied Pakistan with both uranium and plutonium and passed onto 
Islamabad designs for a warhead which may have subsequently been passed onto Libya and Iran. 
‘Pakistan, India and the anti-nuclear rules: Clouds of hypocrisy,’ The Economist, June 24th, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16425914  (Accessed on 24/06/10) 
215 Pakistan argues that it has felt before the full force of the Indian military and can therefore not commit 
to such a promise. 
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i. Future of the NPT 
 
India has made little or no progress in signing further agreements to ban tests or cut-off 
material trade whilst other states have increased the volume on their demands for 
similar treatment. Indeed no one during elite-level interviews told the author they 
thought India would sign the NPT. Instead India continues to argue for membership ‘as 
a package’ and to not be expected to different obligations from NSG members. 216 
Encouraging India to sign the NPT has long been a central goal of Japan’s India-agenda. 
However in recent years Japanese bureaucrats have grown to appreciate that whilst 
India also wants a nuclear-free world, they differ in their means. The NPT was 
established under different structural conditions and whilst India considers Japan to be 
almost ‘obsessed’ with the NPT, Japan is keen to work pragmatically around the current 
regime.217  
 
XVI. Conclusions 
 
It is somewhat ironic that the issue which once stood as the principal barrier to closer 
cooperation now signifies the drive behind a bilateral relationship on an upward 
trajectory. Historically the international structure of the nuclear market, the security of 
the US umbrella and Japan’s unique experience of nuclear warfare placed India’s 
nuclear development on the opposing end of the engagement spectrum.  
 
                                                            
216 In June 2011 it was also anticipated that India’s membership of the NSG would be debated. Rajiv 
Nayan, ‘Accepting a Nuclear India’, The Diplomat, 5 June 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/06/05/accepting-a-nuclear-india/ (Accessed on 05/06/11) 
217 Author’s interview with Chellaney 
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Japan holds a complex history with its own nuclear capability, plagued by 
inconsistencies. In 2010, however, Japan was unprepared to be left out of the global 
conversation with India. The nuclear energy context has become another arena for 
power politics demonstrating the importance of neo-realist power-seeking. The 
behaviour of states to leverage their power or more importantly, perceptions of their 
own power in the nuclear energy market, can be seen in how states in the region have 
approached India’s nuclear demands. 
 
The potential deal is significant not just for its symbolism for Japan-India relations but 
moreover as an example of how Japan’s foreign policy strategy is evolving. As officials 
admit, it represents the ‘fundamental changes in the way Japan looks at India. India’s 
strategic significance now outweighs other concerns.’ Japan’s interests are ‘multifaceted 
and conflicted’ but demonstrate a shift in priorities wherein strategic and economic 
incentives override lofty principles. By ‘opening the value for trade with India’218 Japan 
hopes other Japanese industries will thrive in India’s booming economy, facilitating 
greater political amity thereafter. According to one official, MOFA would have 
preferred to wait longer before starting talks but were forced by external actors to 
respond.219  As officials admit, forging such a deal would bring about an ‘unbreakable 
alliance’ reliant on ‘trust.’220  
 
Policymakers will continue negotiations on their terms, particularly regarding safety to 
avoid accusations of double standards.221 But as India’s diplomatic hand strengthens, it 
is possible Japan will relinquish further on previously held principles. ROK’s activism 
                                                            
218 George Perkovich, ‘Solving Tokyo’s Nuclear Conundrum’ 
219 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
220 Ibid. 
221 This charge is often made against the US for its policy towards diplomatic ‘friends’ such as India and 
Israel 
341 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
in the Indian market and concerning signals from Beijing provide further impetus. It is 
interesting to note how India is in fact placing little direct pressure on Japan, relying 
instead on that from other states. Yet importantly China has played a minimal role in 
explaining the development of Japan’s response in this case, compared to US and 
domestic pressures demonstrating how structural influences vary according to policy. 
 
Following events in 2011, Japan’s current Ambassador Saiki acknowledged that  
‘Our talks on civil nuclear cooperation did slow down to some extent, I must 
admit….But we do recognize that we are becoming more and more dependent on 
nuclear energy….I do not see that there is an insurmountable problem in making 
progress in the talks on the Japan-India civil nuclear cooperation. I think we can do 
it.’222 
 
Key-informants overall believe Japan will eventually create some ‘clever wording’ to 
push through an agreement. Whether or not a deal is signed is not disputed; it is the 
timing which is open to debate. Speaking to the author just three days before the 
tsunami, Chellaney believed a deal would be signed during the autumn summit meeting. 
China’s belligerent behaviour necessitated a speeding up of action. However until a 
strong government is able to explain effectively to the general public the benefits, to 
placate domestic concern, the deal will remain under negotiation. The government also 
needs to demonstrate its efforts to place conditions on India. As Kondapalli argues, ‘it is 
in Japan’s interests to make negotiations sound difficult’.  
 
Tokyo’s response is not solely shaped by external structural factors. The intervening 
variables at play suggest that whilst politicians face a delicate balance between the 
domestic constituencies of big business and anti-nuclear ideologies, bureaucrats are 
firmly behind a nuclear deal. The extent to which Japan is prepared to savour the moral 
                                                            
222 Bhaumik, ‘Fukushima fallout: Japan to go slow on nuke talks with India’ 
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high ground is called into question by Japan’s unwillingness and inability to defend the 
NPT alone. The gap between Japan’s non-proliferation rhetoric and practice seemed as 
distant as that seen in the US. 
 
What remains mysterious is how the inevitability of Japan’s cooperation has not been 
discussed earlier. Nevertheless the subject of Japan-India nuclear cooperation currently 
stands as the centre-piece of a broader strategy to incorporate India into Japan’s 
diplomatic fold. In the process Japanese behaviour clarifies important drivers behind 
Japanese policymaking. 
 
 
In the following and final case study of this thesis, the political/security aspect of 
current bilateral ties will be examined to answer whether increased economic and 
technology-transfer interaction will have little impact on strategic compatibility or 
whether stronger economic ties run in tandem to a close diplomatic partnership. 
Analysis of Japan’s policy towards India has been dominated by a narrative of ‘China-
hedging’ or ‘following the US lead’ in security strategy; the hypothesis the subsequent 
chapter will address, considering both these structural realities and unit-level influences. 
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8. Security Cooperation 
 
Analysis of Japan’s engagement with India has thus far concentrated on economic and 
nuclear fields. Yet according to the majority of literature Japan’s primary interest in 
India lies in security strategy. The common understanding of the relationship centres on 
an attempt to incorporate India into regional efforts to ‘contain’ China or at least 
‘balance’ its looming power. This chapter sets out to explore deeper into Japan’s 
rationale by considering both systemic and unit-level influence on Japan’s security 
policymaking.  
 
After establishing formal diplomatic relations in 1952, Japan and India shared little to 
no military exchange. Yet a decade into the twenty-first century, exchanges of personnel 
are frequent and information-sharing growing. Rhetoric of shared and ambitious ideas is 
gradually evolving into practical, implementable policies. In contrast to Sino-US 
military relations, which have lagged behind other areas of cooperation, Indo-Japanese 
interaction has often been denser than others. 
 
China is not considered the sole rationale for Japan’s increased defence and security 
relationship with India. What will be demonstrated, however, is how China has 
accelerated efforts already in place from the turn of the century when incidents of piracy 
encouraged Japan’s Defense Ministry to seek a more collaborative approach to the issue 
of maritime and energy security. Without the structural obligations for Japan to 
diversify its security strategy with concerns over US commitment and India’s own 
rising profile, India’s inclusion would not have occurred at the same speed. As a 
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secondary stream the chapter will look at the political areas of Japan’s approach, 
primarily through the establishment of dialogues to ease communication flows, inspire 
trust and promote cooperation. 
 
Hurdles facing Japan in the security field have been greater than other spheres due to 
the inherently wider implications that such a partnership entails. Whilst economic links 
can be forged with relatively little outside impact, defence cooperation invariably draws 
in an outside party. In addition, in the economic sphere internal factors based on 
business interests play a dominant role in policy but the existence of external threats and 
perceived threats and China’s assertive presence, drive military cooperation. 
 
Japan’s security decisions are not only made because of structural realities. In fact it is 
the reading of these realities by policymakers in Tokyo and Delhi which explain how 
policies have reached current levels. The environment has been favourable for several 
years yet as officials and scholars frequently lament, cooperation remains in its early 
stages. The following section, which pays attention to unit-level factors and their 
relationship with structure, will demonstrate that among the ‘intervening’ variables, 
each state holds a unique perspective, which does not always converge and domestic 
actors who hold differing influential weight.  
  
In security policy the number of actors who influence procedure is narrower than for 
other areas of policy such as economic strategy, which as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, involved several parties. The limited role which Japan’s Defense 
Ministry is able to play is evident, as is the importance of political will and political 
perceptions.  
345 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
i. Organisation 
 
The chapter opens with an assessment of the structural security issues which have 
largely dictated Japan’s security policy towards India. The four principal systemic 
changes are; 1) the end of the Cold War bipolar structure and reawakening of the Indian 
Ocean’s regional import, 2) growing threats to energy security, particularly as a result of 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, 3) Chinese maritime assertiveness and 4) the parallel rise in 
India’s military and diplomatic profile in addition to defence cooperation with Japan’s 
close ally the US.  
 
To follow the chapter will analyse the means through which Japan has sought to include 
India as a viable security partner, namely through declarations, dialogues and maritime 
exercises. Attention will then turn to the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ (AFP) 
initiative of PM Abe, paying attention to the intervening factor of elite ideology and 
political leadership. The NCR belief in the complicating role of internal dynamics but 
ultimate victory of systemic conditions will be seen since promoting relations through 
an ideological vision were unsuited to the regional environment. Following a lacuna of 
fresh ideas following the AFP’s demise, a new trilateral initiative is appraised as the 
latest approach.   
 
The chapter then moves to intervening variables which explain in more detail the timing 
and nature of Japanese policy. To begin the perceptual shift in elite opinions is 
explored, assessing changes in India’s position within the minds of Japanese strategists. 
Japan’s 2010 NDPG are included since their release provides an opportune window into 
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Japanese policy-making. Whilst in security matters domestic variables are considered 
less significant, the role of Japan’s Constitution, politicians and defence officials and 
importantly India’s view of Japanese endeavours are appraised. The chapter then turns 
to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is identified as an area of defence 
cooperation unable to be agreed upon before the next section of the chapter looks at the 
potential for further defence cooperation through the sales of arms by Japan. This option 
has not yet been raised in official discussions but by its very absence, deserves 
attention. Throughout the analysis will make evident the essential nature of structural 
imperatives in driving Japan’s defence policy towards India whilst highlighting the 
limitations and obstacles which domestic-level influences play.  
 
ii. Theoretical considerations 
 
In the tradition of realism, systemic necessities provide the primary window through 
which policy decisions are made. However in a move aside from pure structural realism, 
NCR upholds the importance of domestic actors in determining the application of policy 
goals within this environment. In security policy structural realities play a larger role 
than other areas but the perception of a state’s relative capability and how these 
‘realities’ affect a state remains an important qualifier for how policy is formulated. 
Unit-level impulses alone could not bring relations to their current state and on occasion 
have only delayed the prevalence of structural forces. 
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I. Early years of cooperation 
 
Much of the military distance between Japan and India during the twentieth century can 
be explained by the Cold War structure. Following Japan’s post-war adoption of 
pacifism, Japan’s armed forces were drastically reduced.1 Japan’s security strategy was 
firmly framed within US’ priorities in Asia which centred round controlling the 
perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Japan’s attention, particularly in the naval 
sphere, concentrated on the Western Pacific and the Soviet Union’s East Fleet at 
Vladivostok. In order to monitor and detect submarines in the Sea of Japan, Japan 
focused resources on developing highly capable surveillance ships.2 The JSMF were 
aware of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean but were limited in their 
capacity.3 Until 1971 the British Navy in Singapore was also a reliable supervisor of the 
waters.  
 
As the world adjusted away from bipolarity during the 1990s, Japan gradually 
reassessed the strategic value of the ‘eastern’ seas. In the 1980s some limited exchanges 
and information sharing began and in 1995 two MSDF ships visited India, followed 
later the same year by two Indian Naval warships.4 However it was only after several 
high-profile pirate-hijackings of Japanese vessels that Tokyo began to look specifically 
to India for cooperation. Though ‘piracy’ itself is not a structural condition, the issue 
has provided a constructive means through which to identify potential cooperation 
should larger-scale emergencies develop.  
                                                            
1 Under the newly adopted Constitution, Japan agreed to renounce war and to not maintain ‘land, sea and 
air forces’. However, the Jieitai (Japan Self-Defence Forces) were formed soon after the end of US 
Occupation (in 1954) and have since become one of the more advanced forces in the world.  
2 Author’s interview with Tetsuo Kotani, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation 10 June 
2010 
3 Ibid.  
4 Vijay Sakhuja, 'Indo-Japanese maritime security cooperation', Strategic Analysis, 24: 1, (2000), p. 189 
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II. Threats at sea 
 
The initial motivation for Japan-India defence cooperation can be sourced from a threat 
shared by virtually all sea-faring states; piracy.5 The turn of the twenty-first century 
witnessed a sharp increase in the number of cases, particularly in Southeast and 
Southwest Asia. According to MOFA in 2000 65% of cases were in these regions with 
the overall number rising from 188 in 1995 through to 300 in 1999 and 469 in 2000. 
The number involving armed pirates also rose6 and Japan itself experienced several 
hijackings.7  
 
India’s potential role in combating this threat was first realised in 1999. In October the 
Japanese-owned ‘MV Alondra Rainbow’, flying a Panama flag 8 went missing after 
leaving the Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjong. The ship was renamed, given a new flag 
and half the cargo of aluminium ingots valued at over $14m was lost. 9 Following 
international appeals to locate the vessel, the Indian Coast Guard and Navy coordinated 
                                                            
5 Piracy, according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea involves ‘any illegal acts of violence or 
detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends…directed: (i) on the high seas, against 
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft, (ii) against a ship, 
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.’ ‘Definition of piracy’, 
Preamble to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part VII, Article 101, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm 
6 ‘Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan’s Efforts’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, December 
2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html  
7 These included Alondra Rainbow (1999), Tenyu (1998), Global Mars (2000) and Arbey Jaya (2001) 
Pranamita Baruah, ‘Japan’s Response to Sea Piracy’, 30 March, 2009, IDSA Strategic Comment, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/JapansResponsetoSeaPiracy_PBaruah_300309 (Accessed on 
30/04/09) 
8 The majority of Japanese ships fly the Panama flag as a ‘flag of convenience’ to avoid Japanese 
regulations. 
9 Commodore RS Vasan IN(Retd), ‘Alondra Rainbow revisited, A Study of related issues in the light of 
the recent judgment of Mumbai High Court’, South Asia Analysis, Paper No. 1379, 13 May 2005, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers14%5Cpaper1379.html (Accessed on 30/04/09) 
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efforts to apprehend the ship and tow it to Mumbai.10 The crew were later rescued in 
Thailand. 
 
As the first such case in Indian waters, the Indian authorities received international 
praise for their actions. Japan echoed this admiration and quickly began to seek ways of 
engaging with their Indian counterparts. Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the US and 
awakening of the world to terrorism threats therefore the MSDF asked MOFA to 
contact India to initiate discussions on sea-lane protection and invited the Indian Coast 
Guard to participate in ‘search and rescue’ operations.11 It has often been assumed that 
Japan’s actions came as a direct result of US pressure following the Al Qaeda attacks. 
But in fact as a result of an atmosphere of anti-piracy collaboration, after forty-eight 
years of relations, the first official exchange of perspectives between Japan and India 
was held in January 2001 when India’s Defence Minister Fernandes visited Tokyo. Both 
Japan and India realised their structurally shared interests in securing the seas. 
 
i. Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) 
 
Sea lanes are vital arteries for world trade with 90% of global commerce transported via 
the sea.12 The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in particular is an arena of great significance. 
The world economy depends on the security of these passageways as approximately two 
                                                            
10 The Indonesian pirates were later acquitted in 2005 by the Mumbai High Court. 
11 ‘Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan’s Efforts.’ Soon after hosting two international anti-
piracy conferences, Japan signed a number of agreements to conduct anti-piracy training with foreign 
partners. In November 2000 deals were closed with India and Malaysia, with the Philippines and Thailand 
in 2001 and with Brunei and Indonesia and India again in 2002, with the Philippines and Singapore in 
2003 and with Thailand once more in 2004. Baruah, ‘Japan’s Response to Sea Piracy’ 
12 Author’s interview with Kazumine, Akimoto, Rtd. Rear Admiral JMSDF, Senior Research Fellow, 
Ocean Policy Research Foundation 22 June 2010. OPRI is a think tank supported by the Nippon 
Foundation and under the direction of the Transportation Ministry. The focus is primarily around 
maritime security issues.  
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thirds of world trade and 60% of global oil and gas transits through the region, mostly 
from the Persian Gulf.  
 
As maritime terrorism/insurgency has increased and awareness of depleting resources 
has grown, energy security has become a central objective of several states. In 2000 the 
USS Cole was subjected to maritime attack13 and in 2002 Al Qaeda threatened to target 
the ‘economic lifelines of the US and its allies, most of whom are major industrialised 
economies.14 At the time few deemed the group capable of implementing such a strike 
but concern grew as to the vulnerability of the shipping industry to attack. When India 
was attacked by insurgents who came from the sea in the port-city of Mumbai in 
November 2009, awareness of the threat from the sea was confirmed. The utility of 
greater state interaction rose in policymakers’ perceptions.  
 
ii. Japan’s maritime concerns 
 
As a maritime nation dependent on naval trade, Japan is acutely aware of the imperative 
of energy and maritime security. Indeed Japan relies on the surrounding waters for its 
very survival. With little arable land, mineral resources and a reliable energy supply, 
Japan is reliant on imports, which necessitates safe shipping. More than 70% of supplies 
are imported via the sea, a figure expected to rise to 85% by 2025. 15  Oil (99%), 
                                                            
13 On 12 October 2000, the US destroyer was attacked when visiting the port of Aden in Yemen for a 
route fuel-stop. A total of 17 sailors were killed and another 39 injured. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility 
for the attack but the Sudanese government was also accused. The event came as a wake-up call to the US 
administration of the threat of terrorism, prior to 9/11 a year later.  
14 Gurpreet S Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’, Strategic 
Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2007,  
http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/SecurityofSeaLinesProspectsforIndiaJapanCooperation_gskhurana_0
107 (Accessed on 18/02/11)  
15 Ibid.  
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liquefied natural gas (96%), iron ore (100%) and copper (96%) are all sourced abroad.16 
Japan also dominates the global ship-owning market with, according to 2009 figures, 
30% of world tonnage.17 The Indian Ocean as Kaplan describes, is therefore ‘a vast web 
of energy trade’, which necessitates Japanese attention. In December 2004 within a 
review of defence policy, Tokyo officially recognised that ‘securing the sea lanes is 
crucial to [Japan’s] prosperity and development’.18 As Graham argues, an ‘ingrained 
perception’ of vulnerability and dependency regarding access to vital resources 
pervades policymaking. The ‘war of the maru’ during the Pacific War also resonates 
strongly with officials.19 
 
iii. Indian maritime unease 
 
India too has a far-reaching history with the ocean given its geographical location and 
long border with the sea to the east, west and south. India holds almost 8000km of 
coastline, an EEZ of over two million square kilometres and maritime boundaries with 
seven countries. Whilst India has some natural resources, the majority of India’s trade 
(97%) is conducted via the sea.20 Attention to these waters has thus been a feature of 
Indian defence strategy for centuries.  
 
 
 
                                                            
16 Euan Graham, ‘Japan's sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?’ (London: Routledge, 
2006), p. 1 
17 ‘Shipping fleets: Reviewing the fleets, Greece and Japan dominate shipping, but not under their own 
flags’, The Economist, 9 December 2009,  
http://www.economist.com/node/15060106?fsrc=rss&story_id=15060106 (Accessed on 09/12/09)  
18 Graham, ‘Japan's sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?’, p. 1 
19 Ibid. p. 4 
20 This is due to topographical issues as well as political tensions with bordering states according to Gupta 
and Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ 
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iv. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden – Japanese and Indian responses 
 
For many years littoral states have faced the challenge from piracy, particularly around 
the Strait of Malacca, seen as one of the world’s primary ‘choke-points’.21 Japan has 
proactively engaged in countering piracy in the region with notable success.22 The new 
concern, however, emanates geographically far from Japan in the Horn of Africa.  
 
Piracy around the Gulf of Aden is a relatively new phenomenon. However its 
reappearance as an international threat capable of causing financial and humanitarian 
costs on states across the world was brought into focus in 2008.23 During the course of 
this year there were 111 attacks, including 42 successful hijackings, a figure which rose 
sharply in 2009. 24  As the proliferation of incidents came to the attention of 
governments, both Japan and India as seafaring states joined international efforts.25 
 
                                                            
21 There are five chokepoints in the Eurasian maritime world: Malacca/Singapore, Sunda, Lombok and 
Makassar, South China and East China. The four major hub ports are Singapore, Hong Kong, Kaohsing 
and Pusan, Kazumine Akimoto, ‘The Current State of Maritime Security – Structural Weaknesses and 
Threats in the Sea Lanes’, The South China Sea, Paper prepared for the conference on ‘Maritime 
Security in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia’, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, 11-13 
December 2001, http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Akimoto_paper-Sealanes%20and%20security.pdf, p. 
3 As the shortest sea route between the Persian Gulf and Asia the Strait carries a significant proportion of 
the world’s seaborne trade. Approximately 50 000 ships (a quarter of the world’s shipments) are said to 
travel through the Strait representing the ‘Achilles’ tendon’ of the world economy. VADM Hideaki 
Kaneda, ‘Trilateral Maritime Security Partnership for Broad Maritime Security Coalition’ CSIS, (2008), 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090201_bsa_kaneda.pdf p. 2 
22 In 2006 Japan donated a training vessel to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) 
before in June 2006 donating three patrol boats to Indonesia. Two years later Japan provided a grant of 
$4.2 million to Malaysia to modernise its surveillance system in the Malacca Strait and by 2011 had 
donated over $16 million in ODA for this purpose. ‘Handover of Equipment for Maritime Security 
Enhancement’, Embassy of Japan in Malaysia, (2011), http://www.my.emb-
japan.go.jp/English/ODA/grant%20aid%20maritime/21032011.htm 
23 The International Maritime Bureau recorded 34 attempted and successful acts of piracy in the region in 
2007, compared to only 2 in 2004. ‘Piracy: Peril on the high seas’, The Economist, 23 April 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7933596&story_id=1
1079332 (Accessed on 23/04/08) 
24 ‘Pirates Hijack Two Tankers Within 24 Hours off Somali Shore’, Associated Press, 26 March, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,510766,00.html (Accessed on 26/03/09) 
25 China had also temporarily abandoned pledges not to interfere in the affairs of other countries by 
deploying two navy destroyers and a supply vessel to protect Chinese ships and deliver humanitarian aid 
in December 2008. Rear Admiral Du Jingcheng, noted in the China Daily that the deployment marked a 
new chapter for the PLA Navy, which had previously concentrated on coastal waters. 
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The first order from Japan to dispatch ships to the Gulf of Aden came after months of 
debate and three shootings by pirates on Japanese vessels.26 In March 2009 Japan sent 
the Sasanami and Samidare destroyers to defend Japanese ships but this was soon 
extended to defend any nationality and be able to use arms as a precaution against pirate 
boats approaching their vessels. 27  Despite some internal disagreement over Japan’s 
constitutional ability to deploy the SDF, the two dominant ruling parties agreed on the 
necessity of counter-piracy measures along Japan’s trade routes. 
 
India’s turning point came in September 2008 when an incidentally Japanese tanker,28 
Stolt Valor carrying eighteen Indian crew-members, was attacked and taken to the 
Somali coast.29 Another attack two months later resulted in INS Tabar intervening.An 
Indian warship has remained in the Gulf of Aden ever since. According to the Indian 
Navy between October 2008 and January 2011, 1603 ships with both Indian and foreign 
flags were aided by Indian maritime forces.30 India ships $50bn of imports and $460bn 
of exports through the route and with a seafaring community of 100 000 representing 
6% of global mariners, also has a direct stake in the safety of the region.31  
 
Patrolling waters has been problematic for states. Whilst trans-border threats have 
grown, what has been termed a ‘barrier of sovereignty’ has dissuaded coastal states 
from collaborating in fear of threatening their own sovereignty. Thus as Akimoto notes, 
since the seas are an ‘international space’ with no overarching security architecture no 
                                                            
26 ‘Japan to deploy ships off Somalia’, BBC News, 28 January 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7855120.stm (Accessed on 28/01/09) 
27 Baruah, ‘Japan’s Response to Sea Piracy’; Masami Ito, ‘Antipiracy, gift tax bills enacted’, Japan 
Times, 20 June 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090620a2.html (Accessed on 20/06/09)  
28 Many of these Japanese ships employ an Indian crew, further uniting interests.    
29 Nitin Gokhale, ‘India Takes Fight to Pirates’, The Diplomat, 19 April, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/04/19/india-takes-fight-to-pirates/ (Accessed on 20/04/11)  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
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state alone can fully monitor activity and the area becomes vulnerable to geopolitical 
competition.32 Indeed the issue of piracy points to a wider development which has seen 
the maritime sphere become another arena for states to demonstrate their power to 
others.  
 
v. An excuse for power-posturing? 
 
The sea-lanes are vital channels for both Japan and India. Chellaney has gone so far as 
to say that they are the ‘most vulnerable to any disruption of oil supplies from the 
Persian Gulf region’.33 However this has not fed into competition, rather cooperation. 
As the maritime, not continental field has become the centre of power dynamics in 
Asia,34 both states have used the piracy issue as a means through which to improve their 
military profile. Japan’s Coastguard for example has pointed to the need to secure the 
Japanese archipelago to push for increased budgets and policy influence. 35  This 
argument is particularly associated with Samuels who points to the expansion of the 
JCG budget as an indirect way to strengthen Japan’s capabilities.36 Emmott also noted 
that the 2001 law granting the JCG permission to use force to prevent maritime 
intrusions was ‘not just because of the risk of piracy, or because Japan is comprised of a 
large archipelago. It is because the ownership of some of the most distant of its islands 
is disputed with China and because naval power is expected by defence planners to be 
                                                            
32 Kazumine Akimoto, ‘Japan’s Contribution to the Safety of Sea Lanes’, Dispatches from Japan, MOFA, 
Vol. 5, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/dispatches/vol05/perspectives.html   
33 Chellaney and Horimoto, ‘Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability’ 
34 Evan Feigenbaum, ‘Continental and maritime in US-India relations’, East Asia Forum, 21 November 
2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/21/continental-and-maritime-in-us-india-relations/ 
(Accessed on 21/11/10) 
35 Under current strategy, the JMSDF can defend SLOCs to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles (nm) from 
Japanese land but this extends no further than Taiwan in the southwest direction. Khurana, ‘Security of 
Sea Lanes: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ 
36 For a detailed analysis of the expansion of the JCG, see Richard Samuels, ‘New Fighting Power! 
Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security’, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 
(Winter 2007/08), pp. 84-112. 
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the principal conventional means by which Asia’s great powers compete and flex their 
muscles.’ 37  For Graham, ‘piracy is more of an “irritant” to the global maritime 
transportation system than a system threat’. However its prevalence has stirred 
considerable elite attention in Japan and provided some rationale, enabling pro-naval 
advocates to defend their budgetary claims. The sea around Japan is also its ‘strategic 
shield’ which in the face of other regional threats discussed below, requires 
policymakers’ attention.  
 
Given the shared interests in the security of SLOC, Japan and India have begun to work 
closely together. In 2006 the two coastguards signed a Memorandum on Cooperation 
after Minister Ishikawa’s visit38 which was upgraded in November 2009 when Defence 
Ministers Antony and Kitazawa met in Tokyo. Efforts to establish the Defence Action 
Plan suggested the previous year were also hastened. According to the joint statement 
issued, both governments were determined ‘to take forward bilateral defence exchanges 
and cooperation in a meaningful way.’ 39 A month earlier the India-Japan Maritime 
Security Dialogue was inaugurated and before the close of the year, during Hatoyama’s 
December visit the two countries agreed on a ‘2+2 dialogue’ between both Foreign and 
Defence Ministers.40 By 2010 relations had intensified further. Previously both India 
and Japan operated independent missions along the Gulf of Aden to avert the piracy 
threat but from 2010 agreed to ‘exchange…information on the escorting schedules’ to 
                                                            
37 Emmott, Rivals, p. 12 
38 Manasi Kakatkar-Kulkarni, ‘Japan-India to increase cooperation in anti-piracy operations’, Foreign 
Policy Blogs, 9 November, 2009, http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/09/japan-india-to-increase-
cooperation-in-anti-piracy-operations/ (Accessed on 09/11/09) 
39  ‘Joint Statement’, Ministry of Defence, 9 November 2009, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/pdf/india03e.pdf 
40 ‘India and Japan talk terror and piracy’, Neptune Maritime Security, 6 July 2010, 
http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/india-japan-talk-terror-and-piracy (Accessed on 06/07/10) 
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improve efficiency.41 This move demonstrated the deepened trust between navies, to 
which the piracy factor had contributed. 
 
III. The role of China 
 
Transnational threats by non-state actors aside, China’s military capabilities have also 
influenced the formation of policy. In security matters India’s utility to Japan is framed 
in the structural reality that China’s increasingly aggressive diplomacy compromises 
Japan’s interests. According to some more hawkish commentary, Japan’s interest 
stemmed purely as a result of China’s rise. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, 
however, Japan’s engagement with India has been multifaceted. Nevertheless in the 
security domain, China’s structural existence has represented a key determinant.  
 
i. China’s growing presence at sea 
 
The threat or ‘perceived’ threat from China’s military has been a relatively recent 
addition to the complicated Sino-Japanese relationship. As Chapter 3b detailed, China’s 
armed forces have modernised considerably so that China’s navy is considered the third 
largest in the world after Russia and the US. China recognises the strategic value of a 
skilled maritime force so has dedicated considerable amounts of their modernisation 
programme to this aim. In addition according to Kaplan, China is more able to exert its 
naval strength due to the relative security of its land borders.42 When China paraded for 
                                                            
41 P.S. Suryanarayana, ‘Quiet approach’, Frontline, Vol 27, Issue 12, June 2010, 
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2712/stories/20100618271205300.htm (Accessed on 22/06/10) 
42 Robert Kaplan, ‘Q&A with Robert Kaplan on China’, Foreign Affairs, 7 May 2010, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-china?src=tw (Accessed 
on 07/05/10)   
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this first time their nuclear-powered submarines during 60th anniversary celebrations in 
2009, China’s neighbours were delivered a strong message.  
 
ii. China’s willingness to exert its power 
 
Chapter 3b recounted a number of instances of assertiveness on the part of China, 
including those directed towards Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Among the 
first awakenings by Japan of the military implications of China’s economic growth, 
however, came in 1992 when China claimed the East China Sea as part of their 
territorial waters, which could thus host maritime research. In 2000, Japan noted with 
alarm the Chinese Haibing-723 crossing through the Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits, 
ostensibly investigating the Japanese military.43 Japan’s Defense White Papers have 
hence made increasingly frequent mention to China. In 2004 Japan criticised China’s 
lack of transparency and in 2006 raised concerns about airpower development, 
especially in intelligence operations.44  
 
The dispute over the exploration of the Chunxiao/Shirakaba oil and gas fields in the 
East China Sea has also continued to rumble.45 In 2008 the two governments agreed to 
joint exploration but since 2003 China has allegedly begun unilaterally extracting oil.46 
                                                            
43 ‘East Asia Security Review’, National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo, (2001) pp. 153-155 cited in 
Rajaram Panda, Shamshad A.Khan and Pranamita Baruah, ‘As Dragon flexes muscle, the Rising Sun 
goes defensive’, Issue Brief, IDSA, 9 September 2010, 
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/AsDragonflexesmuscletheRisingSungoesdefensive  (Accessed on 10/09/10) 
44 Ibid.  
45 Bijoy Das, ‘Relevance of an East China Sea dispute to India’, IDSA Comment, 24 March, 2011, 
http://www.idsa.in/node/7088/2650 (Accessed on 24/03/11). Chinese estimates put the size of Chunxiao 
at 22,000 square km2 and its net reserves at 70 bn cubic metres3 of oil and natural gas. Other, more 
liberal, estimates provide a much higher range.  
46 Chunxiao lies just halfway between the two countries, dividing their exclusive economic zones in the 
East China Sea. Despite Japan’s protests that China is taking Japanese oil, China’s defends itself saying it 
has just been conducting maintenance.   
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According to reports, China has already laid a seabed pipeline connecting an 
exploration site at Chunxiao.  
 
A number of more recent provocative incidents have also unsettled policymakers. 
Chapter 3b noted the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands but before then in early 
April during Chinese training exercises, Japan claimed a Chinese helicopter flew to an 
altitude of 30 metres nearby the MSDF destroyer Suzunami.47 Two days later a fleet of 
ten Chinese naval ships, including two submarines, three frigates and three destroyers 
sailed between the Okinawa and Miyako islands.48 On April 13 a Chinese destroyer 
aimed its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane, assumedly to demonstrate 
China’s ability to shoot down such aircraft.49 Once again in July 2010 a Chinese flotilla 
passed close by Okinawa. 50 By August 2011 Japan again warned of China’s naval 
activities ‘beyond its neighbouring waters’,51 followed by a Chinese response of ‘strong 
dissatisfaction’ with the ‘irresponsible’ defence report.52  
 
iii. India’s response 
 
In part fortuitously for Japan, India has also been unsettled by China’s actions. Since 
China represents a structural influence on Japanese policymaking according to NCR, 
this influence is also felt by others in the region, including India. Whereas previously 
                                                            
47 ‘NIDS China Strategy Report’, The National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan, (March, 2011), 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_4C_A01.pdf p. 22  
48 Kakatkar-Kulkarni, ‘Japan-India to increase cooperation in anti-piracy operations’ 
49 James Kraska, ‘China Set for Naval Hegemony’, The Diplomat, 6 May, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/ (Accessed on 06/05/10) 
50 ‘Chinese flotilla slips by Okinawa’, Japan Times, 5 July 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20100705a5.html (Accessed on 05/07/10) 
51 ‘Japan warns of rise in China’s naval activities’, BBC News, 2 August 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14368665 (Accessed on 02/08/11) 
52 ‘China angered by Japan’s defence paper warnings’, BBC News, 4 August 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14398647 (Accessed on 04/08/11) 
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similar security concerns have been minor, India’s apprehensions have coincided with 
those of Japan, opening the possibility for greater relations. Common threats have 
therefore made policymakers deem it ‘logical’ for Japan and India to work together. 
Japan and India’s ‘strategic geography’ has dictated in large part the policies each state 
adopts to ensure its own security thus again demonstrating the primary of structure, 
which NCR proposes. 53  India and Japan do not share operational theatres, with India 
concerned primarily with the Indian Ocean whilst Japan looks at Northeast Asia. 54 
However as Patalano states, ‘they [both] might not like what they’ve both got in 
between each other’.55 Japan is particularly keen to work with India as after years in the 
‘international cold’, India has made substantial inroads into the global community, 
particularly in the field of defence.  
 
IV. India’s widening defence profile 
 
Japan is already an established naval power, considered the best operating in the region 
after the US. India’s maritime capability is still developing but increasingly strategists 
are noting the potential utility of India’s geographic location. In 2003 India provided 
naval escorts to commercial ships travelling through the Strait of Malacca and following 
the Asian tsunami on December 26 2004, India deployed its largest humanitarian relief 
operation outside territorial waters.56 India’s strategic consequence has also increased 
with India’s accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East 
                                                            
53 Strategic geography is defined by Graham as the influence on a nation’s defence and foreign policy, as 
well as its threat perceptions, results from its geographic location relative to the global distribution of 
resources and military capabilities. Graham, ‘Japan's sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and 
death?’ 
54 As Nishihara told the author, ‘Af/Pak’ is also a concern for Japan who fears the time and money 
invested in the region rather than the Korean Peninsula. Author’s interview with Masahi Nishihara, 
President RIPS, former President of National Defense Academy 26 May 2010 
55 Author’s interview with Patalano 
56 Chellaney and Horimoto, ‘Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace and Stability’  
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Asia in 2003 and participation in the ARF. By 2009 India succeeded in building INS 
Arihant, the nation’s first nuclear-powered submarine, a possession only held by five 
other countries.57 These developments are not considered a threat to Japan but rather an 
opportunity, which has been evident to Indian defence personnel who have noted a 
change in the manner of their reception abroad.58  
 
After years of non-alignment, India has become aware of the urgency in modernising its 
military and begun to heavily invest. In 2010 India’s defence spending fell to its lowest 
level since 1962 after years of corruption scandals and bureaucratic under-spending but 
expenditure remains moderately high at 3% GDP.59 In 2001, no doubt in part due to 
China’s more threatening behaviour the previous year, India’s spending rose by 11.6%60 
and in 2004 India published its first ‘maritime doctrine’. 61  This was welcomed by 
India’s strategic community who have long lamented India’s declining budget as its 
economy and prowess has grown.  India’s military has for many years been thwarted by 
continued inter-service rivalry and poor communication. According to one strategist, 
‘With policymakers in Delhi far removed from the nation’s sea frontiers there is a poor 
understanding of maritime issues’.62 In addition to military spending, however, Delhi 
has sought to tentatively expand its relations with other states, acquire ‘longer-legs’ and 
pay greater attention to more distant neighbours, including Japan. 
                                                            
57 Harsh V. Pant, ‘Who will rule the waves?’ Japan Times, 9 August 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090807a1.html (Accessed on 09/08/09) 
58 As one example when a delegation from IDSA visited Japan in March 2011 they were met by the Rear 
Admiral, when visiting a ship in Yokohama. This was interpreted as evidence of the importance Japan’s 
Defence Ministry places on relations with India. In 1989 when the Indian Defence Minister visited Japan 
he was not permitted to meet his counterpart, but rather the Japanese Permanent Secretary. Author’s 
interview with Sisodia 
59 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India's defence policy arrives at the crossroads for best buys’, Japan Times, 20 
December, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101220a1.html (Accessed on 20/12/10) 
60 Sanjeev Miglani, ‘With an eye on China, India steps up defence spending’, Reuters, 28 February 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/28/india-budget-military-idUSSGE71R02Y20110228 (Accessed 
on 28/02/11) 
61 Harsh V Pant, China’s Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition, (Eastbourne: Sussex 
Academic, 2011), p. 63 
62 Ibid. 
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Japan is not the only country with whom the Indian Navy is expanding activities. In 
2004 warships visited ports in Australia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam,63 several 
African maritime countries in August 2010 64  and now holds Defence Cooperation 
Agreements with over thirty countries. In addition India is also engaging in dialogues 
with ROK. In recent years Beijing and Seoul have enjoyed healthy relations but China’s 
lukewarm response to North Korean belligerence has encouraged Seoul to look 
elsewhere. India according to Pant, has long been interested in ROK’s advanced ship-
building technology65 and in 2010 Defence Minister Antony made the first-ever visit of 
this level to sign two MOUs. 66  These encompassed the exchange of information, 
experience and personnel. The decision to pen these five-year agreements cannot 
entirely be attributed to short-term message-making towards China since such measures 
take a considerable amount of bureaucratic energy to conclude but momentum certainly 
hastened the process.67 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
63 According to Gokhale, ‘There are two main reasons for ‘India’s courting of Vietnam. One is that both 
India and Vietnam have had experience bearing the brunt of Chinese aggression – India in 1962, and 
Vietnam in 1979. More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Union – long a security guarantor for both 
India and Vietnam in Asia – left Delhi and Hanoi without their all-weather, all-powerful friend…This 
shared experience, and the fact that they both have longstanding territorial disputes with China, has 
nudged them together to unite against their common adversary.’ Nitin Gokhale, ‘India’s Quiet Counter-
China Strategy’, The Diplomat, 16 March, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/03/16/india%E2%80%99s-quiet-counter-china-strategy-2/ (Accessed on 18/04/10) 
64 ‘Indian warships on goodwill visit to Africa’, The Hindu, 20 August, 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article583972.ece (Accessed on 20/08/10) 
65 Pant, ‘Rise of China prods India-ROK ties’ 
66 ‘India, ROK ink two MOUs to boost defence cooperation’, Economic Times, 3 September, 2010, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-09-03/news/27603226_1_defence-products-defence-
cooperation-mous (Accessed on 03/09/10) 
67 Author’s interview with Kondapalli  
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V. Impact on Japanese policy 
 
Japan’s response to these developments can clearly be seen in Japan’s defence policy. 
Japan’s NDPG in particular shows how China’s presence has altered Japanese security 
policy and where India is positioned.  
 
Japan’s military posture has gradually adjusted since the 1990s due in large part to 
changes in the structure of the security environment. The initial impetus to reassess 
defensive thinking came following the first Gulf War when Japan was internationally 
criticised for offering merely ‘chequebook diplomacy.’ China and North Korea’s 
missile development, hardening positions towards Pyongyang after uncovering of the 
Japanese abductees’ story and post 9/11 US-led ‘war on terror’ have all contributed to 
an increased realism on the part of the Japanese public and policymaking circles. 
Following petitioning from Washington, Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to send ground 
troops abroad as part of the Iraq reconstruction project in 2003, despite considerable 
domestic opposition. The Japanese Diet also enacted a law in May 2008 to explore the 
potential of defensive space equipment such as satellites.68 This move departed from 
Japan’s former ‘non-military’ approach following a 1969 Diet resolution to simply 
‘non-aggressive’ missions. 
 
The impact of China’s military modernisation, particularly over limited transparency, 
has encouraged perception-guided policy in Japan. 69  With the additional structural 
                                                            
68 Maeda Sawako, ‘Transformation of Japanese Space Policy: From the 'Peaceful Use of space' to 'the 
Basic Law on Space,'’ The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 44-1-09, 2 (November, 2009), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maeda-Sawako/3243  
69 Shubhajit Roy, ‘India, Japan share notes on China Army build-up’, Indian Express, 14 September 
2010,  http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-japan-share-notes-on-china-army-build/681228/ 
(Accessed on 15/09/10) 
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factor of a perceived declining US presence, heightened interest in India has followed. 
According to scholars, Japan’s MSDF are overstretched and need a new partner beyond 
the Malacca Strait.70 For decades Japan has depended on the US but with ongoing calls 
on the US military in Afghanistan and the Middle East and pressures on the US defence 
budget, Japan has begun to question the US’ long-term commitment. Even US Defense 
Secretary Gates noted in May 2010 that ‘the virtual monopoly the US has enjoyed with 
precision guided weapons is eroding — especially with [the Chinese development of] 
long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike 
from over the horizon.’71 Japan has already established cooperation with Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia along the Malacca Straits but in the Indian Ocean, India is 
considered ‘the only country with a reliable navy’.72  
 
Diplomats and politicians admit openly that Japan’s biggest diplomatic challenge is 
‘how to deal with China’s rise’. With this in mind, the influence which China exudes on 
policy towards India is understandable. Successive Prime Ministers make early claims 
to seek engagement but soon position China as a key foreign policy concern.73 As one 
Ambassador to India noted, as the sixtieth anniversary of the end of hostility drew near, 
officials and political leaders became increasingly keen to draw a line under previously 
deferential relations and take a more proactive stance.  
 
 
 
                                                            
70 Author’s interviews with Kotani and Izuyama 
71 Secretary Robert Gates’ comments cited in Michael Richardson, ‘China’s navy changing the game’, 
Japan Times, 13 May, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100513mr.html (Accessed on 
13/05/10) 
72 Former Ambassador Enoki cited in Satu Limaye, ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, p. 225 
73 Furthermore, as Dujarric argues, ‘every minister since Koizumi wanted to engage with China’. 
Author’s interview with Dujarric  
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VI. The development of defence dialogue 
 
Shared concerns with piracy initiated defence dialogue and subsequently accelerated 
cooperation from 2009 but the two have embarked on more traditional military-to-
military consultations for over a decade. Following Defence Minister Fernandes’ 2000 
visit, gradual steps have been taken to improve trust and understanding with some 
speed.74  
 
After a delay at the turn of the century, primarily due to domestic upheaval in India,75 
Japan participated in the International Fleet Review in February 2001 in Mumbai and a 
Japanese training squadron of the MSDF visited Chennai in May. India reciprocated in 
October 2002, attending the Japanese International Fleet Review in Tokyo. In 
December Koizumi and Vajpayee signed a Joint Declaration which pledged cooperation 
in the ‘war on terror’, battle against the proliferation of WMDs and security of sea-
lanes. The hope for greater defence exchange was also mooted. Over two years later 
Koizumi and the new Indian Prime Minister Singh emphasised security dialogue 
through greater consultation and cooperation.76  
 
By 2007 cooperation had reached new heights. Japan and India held their first Defence 
Policy Dialogue at the Vice-Ministerial level, soon followed by a trilateral maritime 
exercise with the US off the Boso Peninsula of Japan on April 16. Defence Ministers 
Antony and Koike also met before Prime Minister Abe paid a visit to India on the eve of 
                                                            
74 Even academics have been surprised by the speed at which relations and exchanges have developed. 
Author’s interview with Izuyama. 
75 Wataru Nishigahiro, ‘Political and Defence Aspects of India-Japan Relations’, CSA Chennai Speech, 
21 January 2004, http://www.csa-chennai.org/Files/indojapan.pdf. According to former Ambassador 
Hirabayashi, the Japan Embassy was almost evacuated as tension between India and Pakistan heightened 
in May/June 2002 as 500 000 Indian troops were sent to the border. Author’s interview with Hirabayashi 
76 Pranmita Baruah, ‘Changing Contours of the Japan-India Defence Relations’, Global Politician, 3 
April, 2010, http://globalpolitician.com/26267-japan-india (Accessed on 03/04/10) 
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the Malabar 2007 exercises in August of that year, to jointly issue the ‘Roadmap for 
New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan’.77 
This agreement established more practical means through which Japan and India could 
cooperate and articulated the shared ‘common interests in such fields as maintaining the 
safety and security of sea lanes in the Asia-Pacific and IOR and fighting against 
transnational crimes, terrorism, piracy and proliferation of the WMD.’78 More recently 
in late-September 2010 Air Chief Marshal P V Naik, chairman of India's Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, visited Japan to participate in the first military-to-military talks.79  
 
i. Malabar Exercises 
 
For many years maritime cooperation was confined to port calls, senior-level visits and 
training exchanges but recent years have witnessed more practical applications of paper 
agreements, key of which has been the Malabar initiative.  
 
The ‘Malabar exercises’ are considered a flagship example of military cooperation 
between Japan and India. According to Green the exercises send a message of 
transparency and reassure others of US presence in the region. Initiated in 1992, then 
suspended in 1998 following India’s nuclear tests, they are primarily a US-India 
endeavour. Following the attacks on 9/11 they were reinvigorated but in 2007 
Singapore, Australia and Japan also participated in the manoeuvres in the Bay of 
Bengal. 80  Despite the success of these events, however, China’s reaction was less 
                                                            
77 Ibid.  
78 ‘Joint Statement: On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership 
between Japan and India’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 22 August 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/joint-2.html   
79 Gokhale, ‘India’s Quiet Counter-China Strategy’ 
80 These involved over 20,000 personnel, 28 ships, 150 aircraft, and 3 aircraft carriers. As…details, ‘The 
navies together practiced maritime interdiction, surface and antisubmarine warfare, and air combat 
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complimentary. Beijing criticised the exercises, suggesting they signalled the formation 
of an ‘Asian NATO’, 81 issuing a demarche at the sidelines of the ARF. 82 The US 
insisted they were not directed against a third country, as did Yachi who more explicitly 
said ‘China need not worry about the maneuvers…which are a goodwill exercise.’83  
 
The greatest distance was given by Australia and India. The Australian Defence 
Minister, Brendan Nelson flatly stated that Canberra was disinterested in creating a new 
security grouping and even though the Indian Navy, according to an interview with a 
senior US Defense official, ‘spearheaded the initiative’,84 India encouraged the US to 
resist inviting a third party to subsequent training in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless in 
2011, amid greater assertiveness on the part of China, Japan was once again invited to 
attend. Malabar exercises between the Indian and US Navy and JMSDF were scheduled 
to take place off Okinawa in April 2011,85 however, following the devastation wrought 
by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, Japan’s participation was postponed.  
 
After the success of Malabar 2007, Japan and India agreed to deepen relations by 
concluding a Security Declaration in October 2008. As only the second such document 
Tokyo had signed, the two governments agreed to upgrade ministerial-level 
consultations and among other measures, initiate further joint defence exercises, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
exercises.’ Chanlett-Avery, ‘Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and 
Multilateral Ties Among the US, Japan, Australia and India’  
81 Ibid. 
82 Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Joint naval exercises begin today’, The Hindu, 4 September 2007,  
http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/04/stories/2007090460941000.htm (Accessed 04/09/07) 
83 Michael J. Green, ‘Towards Greater US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue and Coordination’, CSIS, 
February 2009 
84 Author’s interview with James Clad, Former US Dep Ass Secretary of Defence for Asia Pacific 
Security, DoD, Senior Research Fellow, National Defence University, 20 June 2011  
85 ‘India, Japan, US Navies to Hold Military Exercises Off Okinawa Coast, Japan’, India Defence, 16 
February, 2011, http://www.india-defence.com/reports-5023 (Accessed on 16/02/11) 
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policing of the Indian Ocean and military-to-military exchanges on counter-terrorism.86 
Until this agreement was made cooperation was fragmented but with the agreement, a 
framework was established.87 At present India only holds basic exercises with China 
and neither Japanese nor Indian military experts believe China will be invited to join 
more advanced exercises in the near future.88  
 
ii. Appraisal of the Defence Dialogue 
 
Maritime cooperation has provided the strategic ‘high-point’ of Japan’s military 
engagement with India.89 Of particular significance is that Japan’s recent dialogue with 
India has graduated to the stage which explicitly includes consideration of a third party; 
China. During a visit by Defense Minister Kitazawa in April 2010, views for the first 
time regarding Japan’s concerns over China’s military activity were raised.90 Japan-
India dialogue is no longer solely a bilateral issue. China is now firmly on the agenda of 
Japan-India defence cooperation, despite earlier hesitancy to state so publicly.  
 
Scholars have nonetheless been critical of the content and progress made in forging 
closer defence ties. On paper the objectives are ambitious but the ability of either state 
to fully exploit the document’s intentions is questioned, particularly in comparison to 
Japan’s similar agreement with Australia in 2007.91 For one the Security Declaration 
                                                            
86 Baruah, ‘Changing Contours of the Japan-India Defence Relations’ 
87  Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Japanese energy security is dependent on the Indian Navy’, The Hindu, 1 October 
2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/01/stories/2007100155871300.htm (01/10/07) 
88 Yet whilst China’s participation in PKO might be permissible,, no interviewees envisaged China soon 
joining exercises. Author’s interview with Parmar, Kotani and Satoh 
89 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, London, served in Delhi 1993-96, 2006-09 
20 April 2010 
90 Suryanarayana, ‘Quiet approach’ 
91 Sourabh Gupta, ‘Japan-India Maritime security cooperation: Floating on inflated expectations?’, East 
Asia Forum, 11 May, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/11/japan-india-maritime-security-
cooperation-floating-on-inflated-expectations/ (Accessed on 11/05/10) For an interesting comparison 
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document, considered a template for Japan’s later agreement with India, refers to 
‘shared security interests,’ which in the Indian statement refers only to ‘similar 
perceptions of the evolving environment’ (emphasis added).92 The Canberra agreement 
also refers to a geographical sphere for cooperation, unlike Japan’s India counterpart. 
 
Furthermore in May 2010 Tokyo agreed a logistics support pact with Australia.93 The 
likelihood of India agreeing to a similar agreement regarding the mutual provision of 
services and supplies are slim, despite Japan’s enthusiasm for such an addition to 
defence cooperation. Kitazawa made the proposal during his April visit to India but 
again, Indian caution held back the development. For Canberra, Beijing is a more 
distant neighbour, which may explain such differences in sentiment. As Gupta notes, 
‘the omissions and dilutions in the Japan-India security framework are unlikely to 
significantly raise the currently shallow operational ceiling to such cooperation.’94  
 
The limitations of defence interaction have been noted above. This chapter will now 
turn to a political initiative of Japan to improve cooperation, principally with India and 
the trajectory of the policy approach.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
between the Japan-India and Japan-Australia agreements, see, Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Asia’s new 
strategic partnerships’, East Asia Forum, 20 January, 2010 and http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/australia/joint0912.html; http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0912/action.html 
(Accessed on 20/01/10) 
92 Sourabh Gupta, ‘Japan-India Joint Security Declaration: Towards an Asia-wide Security Architecture?’ 
Japan Focus, 10 November, 2008, http://old.japanfocus.org/_Sourabh_Gupta-
Japan_India_Joint_Security_Declaration__Towards_an_Asia_wide_Security_Architecture_ (Accessed on 
17/06/10) 
93 ‘Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement [ACSA]’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Japan, 19 May 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/5/0519_02.html 
94 Gupta, ‘Japan-India Maritime security cooperation: Floating on inflated expectations?’  
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VII. ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ 
 
Under NCR domestic factors are occasionally able to overpower systemic constraints 
since as a variation from pure neo-realism, structure alone does not translate into policy. 
However, eventually NCR holds that structure will triumph and bring policy in line with 
the environment. In the context of Japanese strategy towards India, Prime Ministerial 
ideology has previously been overly ambitious regarding the pace at which Japan-India 
ties could flourish, most evident through the failed ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ 
proposed by PM Abe.  
 
In 2000 Mori argued that Japan and India had a responsibility in ‘defending and 
spreading the values of democracy and freedom’ but little was done until the 
premiership of Abe. In Chapter 4 Abe’s aspiration for a ‘new Asian order’ which valued 
‘freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’ was noted. With Aso as 
Foreign Minister and advised by Yachi, the initiative entitled, ‘Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons’ was launched.95 The geographical 
reach was envisioned to emanate from North Europe, through the Baltic Sea across the 
Middle East and Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, ending in North East Asia.96 By 
adding a ‘new pillar’, the vision aspired to place Japan as an ‘escort runner’, supporting 
nascent democracies in their development and improve Japan’s unprincipled 
international image.  
 
                                                            
95 ‘Breaking the US-Japan jinx’, Sentaku Magazine, Japan Times, 11 February, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090211a1.html (Accessed on 11/ 02/09) 
Some in MOFA in fact attribute the AFP to Yachi (Author’s interview with Kanehara). As Yachi himself 
recounts, he shared President Bush’s concerns with the ‘arc of instability’ but wanted to be more positive 
in the implications with alternative choice of terminology. He sought a more dynamic diplomacy for 
Japan. 
96 Xu Meng, ‘Re-Exploring on Japanese Values Diplomacy,’ Asian Social Science, (January 2009), pp. 
70-74 
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Origins of the policy are open to dispute. Some suggest Japan needed a new framework 
through which to guide its future strategy.97 Others point squarely at China as Japan 
sought to differentiate itself from Beijing’s un-democratic credentials. Tokyo certainly 
wanted to make the distinction and demonstrate how other countries in the region 
shared its views.98 It was also thought such efforts were required to secure membership 
to the UNSC.  
 
An additional structural influence often neglected was the still-evolving post-Cold War 
world in which Eastern European countries continued to struggle against Russian 
influence. Indeed whilst China was no doubt a factor in the formation of the Arc, for 
Yachi at least, the focus was on Russia. 99 As Aso stated in November 2006, ‘it is 
essential to bring stability to the so-called “GUAM” nations - that is, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova.’100  
 
According to an Indian Ambassador, the concept appealed to the Right who like to 
project values whilst the Left favour promoting democracy. It was thought therefore that 
Abe could ‘beat two drums at the same time’.101 For revisionists the concept was also 
                                                            
97 For a full explanation from Abe and Aso’s primary speechwriter Taniguchi Tomohiko on the origins of 
the AFP, see Tomohiko Taniguchi ‘Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”: Debating Universal 
Values in Japanese Grand Strategy’, Asia Paper Series, (October 2010), pp. 1-5. Taniguchi believes the 
AFP to have been an exercise of branding whereby Japan sough to clarify its identity, articulate its 
regional role independent of the US and provide great ‘breathing space’ by embarking on other strands of 
diplomacy from the US alliance.  
98 Author’s interview with Abe 
99 According to former MOFA speechwriter, Taniguchi, it was during Yachi’s visits to Eastern Europe 
that Yachi came to appreciate the lingering fear of the Russia’s influence in this region; from which the 
idea of using Japan’s democracy as a diplomatic asset to entice these countries was considered. 
According to Taniguchi, Yachi was particularly concerned by the Northern Territories issue and whilst a 
‘hawk’ in terms of policy towards China, formulated the ‘arc’ idea to send a message to Moscow rather 
than Beijing. Author’s interview with Taniguchi.  
100 Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs Seminar, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic 
Horizons’ 
30 November , 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html  
101 Author’s interview with Seth 
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seen as a vehicle for expanding Japan’s military. Indeed during Abe’s tenure the 
Defense Agency was upgraded to Ministry. However despite Yachi’s appointment of a 
journalist-speechwriter to relate Japan’s new strategy to lay audiences, comprehension 
at both elite and public level was low. In particular, ‘values-driven diplomacy’ was 
never accepted by MOFA who thought ‘it was too obvious whilst good in theory’.102 
One senior diplomat admitted he ‘hoped the idea would die quietly’.  
 
Nevertheless despite MOFA’s discomfort they were unable to change the reorientation. 
Indeed the shelving of the policy was due to external factors. The concept was relatively 
well-received in Eastern Europe, especially by states like Turkey. However the number 
of uneasy states outweighed those supportive. Russia and China were particularly 
offended.  
 
The greatest flaw in the approach was Japan’s misreading of ‘democracy’ and grouping 
of countries according to political systems. Not only did such an approach encourage 
‘allegiance for allegiance’s sake,’ 103 it also flagged contradictions in Japan’s wider 
diplomatic approach. The norm of democracy-promotion has never been strong in Japan 
so when elites attempted to ignite such a view it found little traction. As a remnant of 
Japan’s militarist past, MOFA in particular thought Japan should never again impose 
‘values’ on others.104 Japan’s relations with Myanmar, Vietnam and Persian Gulf states 
also contradict the ‘democratic partnerships’ the Arc supported. 105  In addition the 
concept was damaged by the timing in which it was launched. Since the era of Bush, 
                                                            
102 Author’s interview with senior official, Policy Planning and International Security Division 
103 Author’s interview with Hirose 
104 Author’s interview with Kanehara 
105 Fault-lines in Abe’s approach had already become evident in May went he toured the Middle East 
where Japan depends for three-quarters of its oil, and moderated his pro-democracy position in light of 
pragmatic concerns. ‘Abe blows Japan's trumpet, cautiously’, The Economist, 3 May 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/node/9116791 (Accessed on 11/08/11) 
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democracy-promotion is maligned by association with unilateralism and ‘with or 
without us’ psychologies.  
 
i. From ARF to ‘Quad’ 
 
Japan’s AFP did not exist in isolation and was in fact part of a wider effort by several 
regional governments to adjust to changing structural conditions as well as fulfil 
individual ideological preferences. Some would argue that Abe’s AFP emerged 
following the ‘green light’ provided by the US neo-conservative politics but as 
demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis, Japan does not solely react to US initiatives 
though they certainly play a supportive role. As Gupta correctly notes, Abe’s tenure 
coincided with several right-wing conservative administrations which at the time helped 
avoid the image of Japan breaking out alone to ‘contain’ China.  
 
As Chapter 3a addressed, with PM Singh already favourable towards Japan and 
supportive at first of Abe’s proposal for a quadrilateral grouping and positive signals 
from the Australian government of John Howard, the first meeting was held in Manila 
in 2007. 106  Yet despite initial enthusiasm, the short-lived nature of the ‘Quad’ 
demonstrates how domestic factors can intervene with structural forces. Between 2006 
and 2008 no dramatic structural change emerged but pressure at home to retract from 
the initiative ultimately brought its demise. In the US whilst support had been strong, 
the imperative of securing the US-India nuclear deal before leaving office was 
                                                            
106 Anirudh Suri, ‘India and Japan: Congruence, at Last’, Asia Times Online, 9 June, 2007 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IF09Df03.html (Accessed on 10/12/08) 
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prioritised. The Australian Foreign Ministry was always uneasy107 and with the election 
of a noted ‘Sinophile’ Kevin Rudd in late 2007, their support was swiftly removed. The 
greatest challenge, however, came from India.   
 
Many of India’s elite had been uncomfortable with Abe’s ‘values-driven diplomacy’. 
As Hirose argues, India wants ‘issue-based cooperation’. Gupta echoes this, suggesting 
Japan and India have undergone a role reversal (as was noted in Chapter 5’s historical 
discussion) in which India increasingly favours China’s ‘values-free’ diplomacy. 
Remnants of Delhi’s non-alignment strategy persist (for example in individuals such as 
Defence Minister AK Antony) in addition to fears of the reaction from Beijing.108 As 
one senior Indian official told the author, all proposals regarding Japan are viewed 
‘through the Chinese prism’. 109  Following Malabar 2007 for example the Indian 
spokesman stressed the purpose being to boost ‘the friendly relationship’ among the 
countries110 and that exercises with China, Russia and Vietnam were also scheduled.111  
 
Abe, the lead-proponent of what Twining calls ‘more of a vision than a policy’, lost the 
Upper House elections in 2007 bringing the concept to a close. 112 Tanino Sakutaro, 
Ambassador to both Beijing and Delhi was a classmate of PM Fukuda who took over 
from Abe and is thought by some to have convinced Fukuda to abandon Yachi’s idea.113 
                                                            
107 Ken Jimbo, ‘Long-term Outlook for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies’, Tokyo Foundation, 8 May 
2009, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2009/long-term-outlook-for-japan2019s-foreign-and-
security-policies (Accessed on 09/05/09) 
108 Author’s interview with Clad 
109 During the mid-1990s there was a short-lived experiment to have a separate Japan and South Korea 
desk but this was soon removed so attention continues to focus on China in this division.  
110 ‘Japan, US and India Hold Naval Drills’, Agence-France Presse, Navy News, 16 April, 2007, 
http://www.defencetalk.com/japan-us-and-india-hold-naval-drills-11261/ (Accessed on 02/02/10) 
111 Ibid.  
112 Abe’s resignation also marked the end to hopes for a reinterpretation of Japan’s Constitution to allow 
for self-defence, which was the expected recommendation by a commission established by Abe. His 
successor, Fukuda was less supportive. Chanlett-Avery, ‘Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in 
Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the US, Japan, Australia and India’ 
113 Author’s interview with Taniguchi 
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However as officials note, whilst the ‘logo’ of AFP might have disappeared, its essence 
remains in the minds of policymakers keen to reconfigure Japan’s diplomatic profile in 
a more ‘subtle’ guise.114 
 
The attempt to break the mould and launch a new direction was nevertheless 
noteworthy. As an exercise in ‘branding’ and ‘attempt for Japan to define itself’ in 
Aso’s words, 115  Japan can be compared with both China and India who are also 
defining themselves. Ultimately proponents of AFP and India’s role in the strategy, 
however, misread structure. By moving too fast and employing rhetoric unsuitable for 
the Indian audience and Japan’s own diplomatic culture and norms, the policy was 
unable to prosper. The effort does, however, demonstrate how elements of agency 
interact with the international system to shape the formation of policy but also how 
structure supercedes domestic forces.  
 
ii. Subtle shift back to a trilateral 
 
As early as June 2010 a senior MOFA official told the author they had ‘unofficially 
floated the idea’ of a trilateral but were still in the process of gaining approval. India’s 
non-alignment policy and preference for a ‘step-by-step approach which starts from a 
lower base’ was again seen as the potential obstacle.116 The US also appreciates that as 
neo-conservative rhetoric has become obsolete, some ‘soul-searching’ according to 
Alagappa, is required. Washington believes relations between the US, India and Japan 
                                                            
114 Author’s interview with senior official, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA 20 May 2010 
115 ‘Middle East Policy As I See It, An Address by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Organized by the Middle East Research Institute of Japan’ Hotel Okura, Tokyo, 28 February, 2007, 
http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/070228Middle%20East.htm (Accessed on 
05/08/11) 
116 Author’s interview with senior official, Policy Planning and International Security Division 
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cannot be ‘premised on the China threat’ since ‘it’s neither in India’s and Japan’s, nor in 
the US’ interests…it has to be based on something much more than that.117  
 
By January 2011 Secretary Clinton spoke on the future architecture of the region, 
calling for small dialogues following some frustration with larger multi-laterals. The 
idea of a US-Japan-China trilateral was raised but quickly opposed by Beijing.  Yet as 
Green argues, there remains a need for ‘caucusing like-minded states’ who as well as 
sharing democratic values, seek an Asia where China plays a constructive but not 
dominant role. The US is eager to promote multipolarity within Asia and avoid a 
unipolar system wherein China holds veto power. Furthermore in a fiscally restrained 
environment the US is keen to share the burden of securing the region. An exploratory 
meeting was held in July 2011 with the first official meeting held in December 2011.118  
Indian hesitancy remains, however, for example talks are only at the Director-
General/Assistant Secretary level and have not yet been elevated to the Ministerial like 
those with Australia and the ROK. 
 
In order to understand further why relations did not develop like those with other states, 
despite similar structural conditions, analysis needs to turn to alternative unit-level 
factors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
117 Nirav Patel, ‘The Elephant and the Rising Sun: Alliance for the Future’, South Asia Analysis, Paper, 
Paper 2345, 24 August 2007, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers24%5Cpaper2345.html 
(Accessed on 06/04/10) 
118 Sandeep Dikshit, ‘India, Japan to firm up strategic ties despite nuclear stalemate’, The Hindu, 7 
August 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2331478.ece (Accessed on 08/08/11) 
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VIII. Role of intervening variables  
 
Structural conditions provide the dominant rationale behind Japan’s present day 
security/defence policy. However in keeping with NCR, structure alone cannot explain 
Japan’s diplomacy. Domestic factors must be considered. The culpability for the limited 
progress in the security field can be shared between the unadvisable rhetoric within 
which Japan-India partnership was framed, the hesitancy of Indian policymakers to 
commit to potential infringements on their autonomy, relative weakness of the MOD 
and Japanese official adherence to both the letter and spirit of the Constitution. At times 
structural forces supercede domestic pressures, as will be seen in Japan’s final 
recommendations over Defense Strategy in late 2009 but even in this case, domestic-
level variables have only restrained purely structuralist policy. In the section which 
follows, domestic-level factors, primarily elite perceptions are seen to have been 
important in shaping Japan’s policy through an AFP initiative, which nonetheless failed 
due to its conflict with both internal norms and structural conditions.  
 
According to Desch, the absence or weakness of international pressures allows domestic 
factors greater leverage in the policy-making process but when structural imperatives 
overwhelm, the influence of the domestic arena can be compromised. This is not, 
however, always the case and in fact NCR appreciates that since external factors are 
translated through elite perceptions, they can at times override structural factors. Thus 
whilst the reality of structure dictates a stronger military relationship between Japan and 
India, domestic factors have frequently prevented this congruence from resulting in 
policy. However this is only a temporary delay before structure overrides.  
 
377 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
i. Elite perceptions 
 
Now the structural forces at play have been identified, it is necessary to look internally 
at policymaker perceptions as an intervening variable on foreign policy decisions. As 
the following passage will explain, India has only gradually entered the strategic 
imagination of Japan’s elites, shifting from the periphery to a position as an 
‘indispensable partner’. 
 
MOFA’s classification of India as part of ‘Asia’ has taken time.119 According to one 
official, the increase in ASEAN’s links with India played an important role in 
developing this idea.120 The dual events of the Asian Financial Crisis and Pokhran Tests 
also ‘systemically…broadened [Japan’s] horizons of its own concept of Asia’.121 Whilst 
senior and younger-generation officials now consider India a priority, this opinion is 
relatively recent.  As discussed in Chapter 4, perceptions of ‘Asia’ have traditionally 
excluded South Asia. Even today according to a senior MOFA strategist, India occupies 
the ‘second circle’ of interests after the US, Australia and ROK. Rhetoric in India often 
                                                            
119 Definitions for the region of Asia are complex and controversial. As Fareed Zakaria claims there is ‘no 
such thing as Asia…it is a Western concept. There is India, China and Japan’. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Post 
American World, LSE Public Lecture, (30 June 2008), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/events/2008/20080602t1155z001.htm 
This understanding is shared by Camroux who says that Asia did not exist until the first few post-war and 
post-colonial decades. This understanding is shared by Camroux who says that Asia did not exist until the 
first few post-war and post-colonial decades. Camroux, 'Asia … whose Asia? A 'return to the future' of a 
Sino-Indic Asian Community'. Without clear geographical, political or ethnic boundaries, and no single 
dominant religion to act as a unifier,(Emmott, Rivals, p. 33) the term has at times constituted ‘narrow’ 
understandings of Southeast Asia plus Northeast Asia, as well as ASEAN plus China, Japan and ROK 
and even broader conceptions. The people of ‘Asia’ themselves, excluding pan-Asianists, have been 
largely indifferent to the grouping. For Breslin this latter wide definition ‘might simply be a pragmatic 
strategic move to prevent the emergence of a Sino-centric Asian Asia, or an ‘anti-region’ designed to 
prevent a region from forming rather than creating a real alternative. Shaun Breslin, ‘Supplying Demand 
or Demanding Supply? An Alternative Look at the Forces Driving East Asian Community Building’ 
Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, (November 2007).  
120 Author’s interview with Mita  
121 KV Kesavan. ‘Indo-Japanese Partnership: The Security Factor’, Observer Research Foundation Issue 
Brief,No. 19,(May 2009) 
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ORF_Indo-
Japan_1243494779320.pdf, p. 3 
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refers to Japan as a ‘life-long friend’ but this is rarely in the strategic context. 
Perceptually Japan is hyphenated to the US.  
 
Of course the actual borders of ‘Asia’ have not changed but the perception of 
policymakers has expanded. Due to external pushes and pulls, elites have been forced to 
reassess their assumptions about tools at their disposal. As Ambassador Enoki notes, 
‘Asia no longer stops at Myanmar, we now realise we need to go further’. In ever-
greater numbers, officials are also seeing India as an Asian country that ‘gets Japan’122 
and is, in one retired official’s words, ‘one of the few pro-Japan countries in Asia. Japan 
needs as many Asian friends as possible.’123  
 
Even though US presence in Asia is likely to remain strong in the future, policymakers 
have increasingly perceived a ‘relative change’.124 Furthermore as China’s presence has 
grown, Japan has felt the need to ‘think outside of the box’ and approach new potential 
partners. As the ‘hub and spoke’ system appears ‘no longer tenable’. Strategists are 
looking to create a ‘network’ of partners which might dilute China’s influence.125 
 
ii. The Japanese Constitution 
 
Despite the structurally hospitable environment for closer cooperation, another major 
domestic limitation has been Japan’s Constitution. More specifically Japan’s 
Constitution itself has not proved the obstacle but rather the perception among 
                                                            
122 Author’s interview with David Leheny, Professor of East Asian Studies, Princeton University 8 June 
2010 
123 Author’s interview with Kaneko 
124 Senior Official, MOFA, ‘The Security Environment in East Asia,’ Chatham House, London, February, 
2011 
125 Ibid. 
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policymakers as to the legal barriers emanating from the text. As Sterling-Folker and 
Waltz assert, elites might be aware of structural pressures, which should dictate policy 
but since these realities are read through the ‘prism’ of their subjective outlooks they 
might not respond as effectively as might be assumed.126  
 
Japan’s adherence to both the spirit and letter of Article IX of the Constitution has been 
described as akin to ‘religion’. According to Japanese officials, despite Indian petitions 
for joint exercises the Constitution prevents Japan engaging in substantial defence 
exercises or trade with any other country other than an ally.127 At the present time this is 
limited to the US but with no prospect of India becoming an ally, this point serves as a 
useful limitation for bureaucrats uneasy about upgrading relations. Scholars in Japan 
believe defence cooperation is unable to deepen further due to constitutional 
restraints 128  but within the Defense Ministry there exists enthusiasm for expanding 
collaborative projects.  
 
iii. Ministry of Defense 
 
The defence community has been one of the most eager supporters of working with 
India.129 Ever since the 1990s when a Japanese sailor was taken ill whilst sailing past 
India and the Indian navy came to the ship’s assistance, feelings of goodwill have 
grown.130  
 
                                                            
126 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (McGraw Hill; New York, 1979), p. 71 
127 Author’s interview with Senior Indian MEA official 
128 Author’s interview with Toru Ito, Associate Professor of Security Studies, South Asia, National 
Defense Academy of Japan 26 June 2010 and Izuyama  
129 Author’s interview with Sahdev 
130 Ibid. 
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The Defense Ministry, graduated from Agency-status in January 2007. According to the 
then-Minister of State for Defense Fumio Kyuma, ‘the security environment 
surrounding Japan has undergone many significant changes’131 necessitating change. 
Yet the Ministry continues to be dogged by the past and holds less influence over 
foreign policy than other nations such as the US or UK. 132  The military remains 
stigmatised and among the least popular establishments to join.133 Domestically the 
military is afforded considerably less admiration in Japan than it is India,134 which with 
an increasingly aged and risk-averse society is likely to continue to restrict defence 
spending. 135  Political leadership (with rarely military experience themselves) takes 
precedence according to Ministry officials.136 
 
iv. Politicians 
 
Politicians have played a significant role preventing Japan’s more proactive wings from 
engaging further through reference to the Constitution. This document has often been 
employed by politicians to limit action, particularly by the DPJ137 who consider Article 
IX integral to Japan’s national identity as well as a ‘shield from US pressure.’138 Whilst 
                                                            
131 ‘Defence of Japan’, Ministry of Defence, Tokyo (2007) cited in Panda et al. ‘As Dragon flexes muscle, 
the Rising Sun goes defensive’  
132 Author’s interview with senior official, International Policy Division, Ministry of Defense 30 June 
2010  
133 Brad Glosserman and Tomoko Tsunoda, ‘Older, smaller population to impact Japan’s choices’, Japan 
Times, 30 June, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090630a1.html (Accessed on 30/06/09) 
and author’s interview with Imaizumi 
134 This observation has also been made by the author following several interviews. According to 
Glosserman and Tsunoda, by 2024 Japan’s household wealth will have returned to 1997 levels.  
135 The earthquake and subsequent tsunami in March 2011, however, improved the reputation of Japan’s 
SDF when the forces were deployed for their largest mission to date in search and rescue operations in 
Japan’s north-eastern region.  
136 Author’s interview with senior official, International Policy Division, Ministry of Defense 30 June 
2010 
137 The former leader of the DPJ, Ichiro Ozawa’s opposition to Japan’s refuelling mission in the Indian 
Ocean as a violation of the Constitution is but one example of the pressure placed on domestic debate.  
138 Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani & Aki Mori, ‘Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining 
Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan’ Asia Policy, 9, January 2010, p. 56 
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the LDP held power and several members vocally supported revision, 139  certain 
reinterpretations were permitted. Yet the DPJ have shown caution over broadening out 
from the Pacific theatre. When for example, the NDPG advisory panel recommended 
revising interpretation of Japan’s ban on collective self-defence, Prime Minister 
Hatoyama denied the possibility.140 Without political support behind reading Japan’s 
Constitution in a light favourable to deepening defence relations with India, 
encouragement from the Defense Ministry is too weak a force to factor in policymaking.  
 
v. Impact of the new DPJ administration 
 
Domestic politics are not often employed in analysis of Japanese diplomacy despite 
Japan’s adherence to democratic governance.141 According to some scholars this is due 
to Japan’s relatively stable political landscape whilst the LDP held power.142 In 2009 
this tranquillity was upset by the election of the DPJ.  
 
The election of a new government in August 2009 hastened debate over Japan’s 
defence-only posture. The DPJ placed far greater emphasis on economic and social 
policy in their election manifesto and suggested a reorientation away from primarily 
US-led initiatives to a more regional focus on Asia.143 The effectiveness of missile 
defence spending was also called into question. The DPJ avoided lofty rhetoric in 
favour of references to improving relations with near-neighbours ROK, China and 
                                                            
139 The LDP has drafted a revision of the Japanese Constitution, amending the Article, but to be enacted 
the bill needs approval by two-thirds majorities in the two Houses and a majority of the popular vote in a 
referendum. 
140 Easley et al., ‘Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? p. 62 
141 Ibid. p. 3 
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid. p. 8 
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Taiwan in addition to regionalism objectives.144 In the early months relations with the 
US were strained over the relocation of an American army base in Futenma. Yet once 
Kan succeeded Hatoyama, a more realist approach to defence policy became apparent, 
particularly evident in Japan’s NDPG.   
 
vi. The 2010 National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG) 
 
Japan’s proactive foreign policy stance was evident when in late 2010 the Defense 
Ministry released their eagerly awaited NDPG. As the first statement on Japan’s 
security priorities since 2004 and only fourth since 1976, the outline provided a gauge 
to measure Japan’s security priorities.  
 
Following the 2009 election deliberations were elevated to ministerial level for the first 
time and the publication of the NDPG were delayed in order to allow greater time for 
discussion. However Japan’s defence policy altered little to accommodate the new 
political regime. Domestic politics as an intervening domestic factor played a limited 
role whilst structural external threats dominated. This is not to suggest that unit-level 
factors were inconsequential but rather that in the light of such strong geopolitical 
imperatives, their influencing power was weakened. 
 
The nature and tone of the Guidelines was not always assumed to take its final form. 
When the DPJ first came into government there were suggestions that missile defence 
for example would be scaled back, particularly with Okada as Foreign Minister. The 
LDP formerly exempted Japan’s missile defence programmes from the ‘three 
principles’ and went further in 2005 by entering into advanced development with the 
                                                            
144 Ibid. p. 16 
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US in missile interceptors. The DPJ’s centre-left leanings and Secretary-General 
Ozawa’s own misgivings, encouraged anticipation that defence spending would 
distinctly decrease. 
 
Japan defence budget for 2011 onwards remained less than 1% of GDP at ¥23.39 
trillion with an additional ¥100bn for unforeseen events.145 For a time it was expected 
that the Ground Self-Defense Force would increase its numbers146 but eventually troops 
were downsized so that the total number of personnel fell to 154 000, the lowest ever, 
continuing the 1996 onwards declining trend.147  
 
The overall budget did not increase substantially. However what was significant was the 
refocusing of forces and resources to account for structural developments. According to 
Gupta, Japan’s defence budget in 2010 was the same as it was in 1984. Yet a subtle yet 
tangible repositioning was evident, particularly around China’s naval presence. This 
was described by some as an ‘unequivocal doctrinal departure’ from Cold War 
assumptions. 148  Whereas in 2004 guidelines only recommended Japan ‘remain 
attentive’ to China’s actions, the 2010 paper outlines the lack of transparency, 149 
                                                            
145 Masami Ito, ‘Defence focus shifts from Russia to China’, Japan Times, 18 December, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101218a1.html  (Accessed on 18/12/10) This converts to 
approximately $40 bn, which according to Hughes represents a fall in nominal yen from the 1990s. 
Christopher W. Hughes, ‘The Slow Death of Japanese Techno-Nationalism? Emerging Comparative 
Lessons for China’s Defense Production’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, (June, 2011), 
p. 460 
146  ‘Defence Ministry eyes boosting GSDF by 13,000’, Japan Times, 21 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100921a2.html (Accessed on 21/09/10) 
147 Under the first Defence guidelines in 1976 Japan had maintained 180,000 GSDF troops but this move 
is largely in keeping with a global trend to reduce ground troops in preference for naval and air forces. 
Shamshad A. Khan, ‘China threat propels a new defence thinking in Japan’, IDSA Comments, 20 
December, 2010, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinathreatpropelsanewdefencethinkinginJapan_sakhan_201210 
(Accessed on 20/12/10) 
148 Preeti Nalwa, ‘Japan’s Revised Defence Guidelines: Proactive Dynamism Pervades “Reluctant 
Realism”, IDSA Comments, 27 December, 2010, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/JapansRevisedDefenceGuidelines_pnalwa_271210  
149 For the first time in order to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to transparency, an appendix to the 
guidelines was also included. 
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increased activities and expanded budget as being ‘a concern for the region and 
international community.’150 
 
Figure 14151 
 
 
The intention to increase the number of submarines to 22 from 16 and cut the number of 
tanks by more than half from 830 to 400 demonstrated a refocus from land to sea. In 
this regard China’s maritime presence can be inferred as the primary concern. Currently 
the majority of tanks are stationed in Japan’s northern region of Hokkaido as a 
consequence of Japan’s military posturing towards Russia. Yet despite continued 
                                                            
150  ‘Japan defence review warns of China’s military might’, BBC News, 17 December 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12015362 (Accessed on 17/12/10) 
151Patrick Barta, Gordon Fairclough and Chester Dawson, ‘Japan’s Crisis Bolsters Its Military’, Wall 
Street Journal, 2 April 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576236472271896458.html?KEYWORDS=
%22center+for+strategic+and+international+studies%22 (Accessed on 05/04/11) 
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antagonism between Tokyo and Moscow,152 Japan’s military have taken the decision to 
concentrate on China’s potential threat. 
 
Without increasing expenditure Japan is seeking ever-more partners to ensure security. 
Interestingly whilst strengthening cooperation with ROK and Australia were explicitly 
encouraged as states who ‘share fundamental values and many security interests’ with 
Japan, India was not included. Japan’s previous set of guidelines neglected to mention 
states other than the US as important for security relations 153  but Tokyo’s actions 
suggest a reappraisal and resolve to diversify security partners.154  
 
Japan’s central policy remains centred on a ‘defensive defence policy’ but the addition 
of references to a ‘Dynamic Defense Force’ 155  suppose a more proactive stance. 
Structural factors provided the environment in which Japan’s defence policy has been 
formulated and assisted the government’s ability to explain this stance to Japan’s 
military-averse population. As international security has become a more popular-level 
concern, the ideological reservations which might have altered the guidelines became 
secondary to structural pressures such as China’s more confrontational diplomacy. 
 
vii. India’s view 
 
In order to cooperate, Japan depends on India’s equal commitment. To explain Japanese 
policy, it is therefore also necessary to consider this intervening factor. The Indian 
                                                            
152 This was particularly acute when Russian President Medvedev visited the disputed Kuril Islands in 
February 2011 
153 Kei Koga, ‘Japan’s New Policy Defence Program Guideline and Japan-India Security Cooperation’, 
IPCS, 13 January, 2011, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/japans-new-policy-defence-program-guideline-
and-japan-india-security-3315.html  
154 Gupta, ‘Japan-India Joint Security Declaration: Towards an Asia-wide Security Architecture?’  
155 Koga, ‘Japan’s New Policy Defence Program Guideline and Japan-India Security Cooperation’  
386 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
military establishment’s view of Japan is largely complimentary. The 1905 Japanese 
victory over Russia engrained admiration for the ‘Asian’ defeat of a Western state and 
Japan’s modern naval capabilities have afforded the MSDF respect. However over the 
past decade or so, as India’s military has begun to gradually modernise and confidence 
has grown, India’s eagerness to work with Japan has lessened.  
 
One of the major issues centres round divergent approaches to handle China’s rise. 
Whereas Japan has been relatively explicit in its suspicion of China, India’s 
establishment has shown reserve in how to define defence cooperation. India to a far 
greater extent than Japan (for reasons explained in Chapter 3b) is cautious about 
provoking China. Whereas states can economically interact without much effect on 
neighbours, in security the reaction of others plays a critical role. When for example, 
Kitazawa visited India in 2010 he officially raised the issue of China. On the Indian 
side, however, there was no mention suggesting a clear difference in policy objectives. 
Even Indian scholars are reticent about pointing to China ‘on the record’. Yet whilst 
Indian strategists have been cautious, Indian elites welcome Japan’s greater willingness 
to identify China as a security concern. Japan therefore has to negotiate its policy 
around this implicit understanding.  
 
India also has its own ‘alliance’ limitations 156  and holds an ‘extreme aversion’ to 
alliance-making. Strategic autonomy is one of India’s leading tactical principles. India’s 
antipathy originates from India’s post-independence ‘non-aligned’ policy but continues 
to this day. The consequences were evident in India’s reluctance to accept foreign 
intervention following the 2004 tsunami, hesitancy to sign the 123 Agreement with the 
                                                            
156 Author’s interview with senior official, International Policy Division, Ministry of Defense 30 June 
2010 
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US in 2008 and continued caution at the UN, recently evident following uprising in 
Libya and across the Arab world.  
 
The question of how to view the Indian Ocean is a further area of divergence. Whilst 
there remains the understanding that the Indian Ocean cannot be controlled alone, its 
strategic value is deemed greater for India than Japan who can avoid the passage (at a 
cost) should the need arise.157 Furthermore India more than Japan, views the Indian 
Ocean in ‘Mahanite’ terms based on Admiral A.T. Mahan’s seminal theory in 1890158 
which highlighted the relationship between geography, control of the seas and foreign 
policy. Whilst Mahan’s dictum that ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates 
Asia’ should not in fact be attributed to Mahan, 159  the belief that this area is of 
paramount importance shapes policy formation, particularly in India and China. The 
Indian Ocean is viewed as ‘the emerging centre of gravity in the strategic world.’160  
 
Within some corners of opinion in India, there is also a belief that India has little to gain 
from working with Japan. According to some military scholars, Japan would get a ‘free 
ride’ from India like it does with the US if/when defence cooperation is deepened. 
Tokyo’s slow decision-making has contributed to this perception but also the realisation 
that given Japan’s strict adherence to its Constitution, the scope for cooperation is 
limited, especially compared with other potential partners. As one scholar told the 
author, whilst India has made 117 revisions to its Constitution as of March 2011, 
                                                            
157 Author’s interview with Brig. Rumel Dahiya, 8th March, 2011 and Parmar 
158 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890) 
159 ‘Chasing ghosts’, The Economist, 11 June, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13825154 
(Accessed on 11/06/09) and James Holmes, Andrew C. Winner, Toshi Yoshihara, Indian naval strategy 
in the twenty-first century, (London; Taylor Francis, 2009), p. 132 
160 P.K. Ghosh, ‘Indian Ocean dynamics: An Indian perspective’, East Asia Forum, 5 April, 2011, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/05/indian-ocean-dynamics-an-indian-perspective/ (Accessed on 
05/04/11) 
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retaining its spirit, Japan is yet to make even one.161 In a similar situation to the fields of 
nuclear and economic cooperation, Japan has also faced competition for India’s 
attention from alternative partners, in particular Singapore.  
 
IX. Limitations in Defence Cooperation 
 
i. The ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’ (PSI) 
 
In May 2006 discussions between Defence Ministers expanded to encompass concerns 
over the use of the seas to transport WMDs. This was seen as a signal from Japan of its 
appreciation for India’s non-proliferation aspirations and shaking off of some of the 
critical feeling in 1998.162  Yet the extent to which Tokyo and Delhi’s security strategies 
converge has been since called into question over divergent stances on the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI). Whilst Japan and India share a ‘common commitment in 
pursuing disarmament and non-proliferation as partners seeking a peaceful nuclear-
weapon free world’,163 their means differ. This case demonstrates how, despite some 
structural complementarities, domestic attitudes in India and Japan’s constitutional 
alliance with US security policy, prevents defence policy from reaching its potential. 
 
The PSI is a US-led scheme which aims to interdict third-country vessels transporting 
WMDs and illicit drugs.164 The idea emerged as a result of the discovery of 15 Scud 
missiles on a North Korean freighter which it was found could not be confiscated under 
                                                            
161 Author’s interview with Chellaney 
162 Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ 
163 ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Japan, 22 October 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html 
164 ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’, US State Department, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm 
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international law.165 According to Bolton who initiated the idea in 2003, the PSI is the 
new channel for interdiction cooperation outside multilateral export control regimes.166 
 
In August 2005 the PSI’s first multi-state maritime interdiction exercise was completed 
in the South China Sea.167 Thirteen countries participated including Japan and the US to 
practise procedures. At first eleven nations agreed to cooperate but at present, 
approximately ninety nations ‘support’ the PSI. Japan was among the first to join and 
has since played a relatively active role. Bolton has praised Japan for ‘demonstrat[ing] 
clearly the leadership role it is prepared to take in stopping the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction.’ 168  Japan’s participation has not been without controversy, 
particularly over the extent to which the initiative requires further reinterpretation of the 
Constitution yet in this instance with US pressure relatively high and the perceived 
threat among policymakers acutely aware of WMD threats, such unease was overcome. 
To many, the PSI represents the realisation by states of the importance of transnational 
threats which are now ‘up a notch on the security agenda’.169 
 
As membership numbers shows, the initiative has not received universal global 
support. 170  India particularly opposes the PSI since among other reasons, its 
                                                            
165 John R. Bolton, former US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
proposed a solution ‘to reinforce not replace’ traditional efforts by exchanging information, strengthening 
legal authorities’ ability to interdict and operationally searching suspected ships and aircraft. Sharon 
Squassoni, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)’, CRS Report for Congress, 14 September 2006, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf 
166 Ibid. p. 1 
167 The PSI announced in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003 during a G8 meeting ran in parallel with the 
more activist approach the Bush Administration suggested in their National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation in December 2002. 
168 John R. Bolton, ‘Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: 
The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative’, Tokyo American Center, Field Program Design, Tokyo, 
Japan, 27 October, 2004, http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/wmd/State/37480.pdf  
169 Author’s interview with Patalano  
170 The primary objection stemming from questions over its legality, since the PSI operates outside of the 
United Nations the charge has been made that the PSI violates international law. Yumi, Hiwatari, 
‘Transformations of Japanese Security’, N.S. Sisodia and GVC Naidu (eds.), India-Japan Relations: 
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independence from the UN feeds perceptions that it is simply ‘an extension of existing 
US-headed military alliances’171 and represents a dangerous application of US power. 
The apparent targeting of Iran also unnerves India who does not want to jeopardise 
relations with Tehran.172 Others question the US’ own proliferation record and object to 
the US ‘silence’ on whether Pakistan should be a member or target. Of central 
significance, India does not want to be intercepted itself.  
 
The US has petitioned India hard to join the PSI stating that the PSI is ‘an activity, not 
an organisation.’173 Some voices are growing in support of India’s membership, arguing 
that India would benefit from the intelligence-sharing 174  and that India’s rising 
international profile necessitates participation, yet the majority remain resistant. Once 
again India’s own perceptions of how their actions are read abroad in relation to the US 
and other partners, contributes heavily to policy decisions. The ability of Japan and 
India to work together in this field to combat the spread of WMDs is thus obstructed.  
 
ii. Arms sales 
 
Defence cooperation between Japan and India has escalated substantially to incorporate 
maritime exercises, sharing of information and increased dialogues between high-
                                                                                                                                                                              
Partnership for Peace and Security in Asia, (Delhi: Promilla & Co. and Bibliphile South Asia, 2006), p. 
20. Under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ships have the right of free passage on the high seas. Yet 
under the PSI, ships following the initiative are able to stop and search any vessels. China, North Korea, 
Iran and Indonesia are among the states also objecting to the initiative.  
171 Subhash Kapila, ‘India Should Not Join Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): A View Point’, South 
Asia Analysis, Paper No. 969, 1 April, 2004, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper969.html 
172 Reshmi Kazi, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative and India’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
Delhi, No. 1511, 28 September 2004, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/proliferation-security-initiative-
and-india-1511.html (Accessed on 04/04/11) 
173 During US Secretary of State, Colin Powell’s March 2004 visit to India, he strongly encouraged India 
to join the PSI 
174 Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’ 
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ranking officials. Despite assertions that collaboration has reached its limits, there are 
some voices eager to embark on additional fields of defence cooperation such as arms 
exports. This issue has yet to be raised in official dialogues but through its very absence, 
policymaking implications in Japan can be analysed. 
 
In 1967 Japan initiated the ‘three principles’ of arms exports.175 Later in 1976 these 
principles were upgraded to a virtual ban on all defence exports with the sole exception 
of sales to the US under the guardianship of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1983. 
During Koizumi’s premiership arms exports were decided on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, 
only once wavering to allow for the sale of armoured patrol boats to Indonesia to fight 
piracy in June 2006.176 
 
Rumours that Japan would consider adjusting these principles further began in early 
2009 with newspaper reports of an imminent relaxation.177 No such lift was made, 
however, due to domestic variables which intercepted structurally amenable 
conditions.178 In line with NCR’s understanding of policymaking, the important role 
that unit-level factors play is clear. As NCR postulates, a favourable structural 
environment does not always result in expected policy since the ‘transmission belt’ 
through which decisions are made involves unit-level interpretation and in this case 
political goals can sometimes trump strategic calculations. Whilst the Defense Ministry, 
                                                            
175 For background on the arms export bans, see Andrew Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and 
the Evolution of Security Practice, (Stanford University Press; New York, 2008) pp. 90–122. 
176 Mure Dickie, ‘Fresh push to lift Japan arms export ban’, Financial Times, 13 December 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e0f951c8-05d8-11e0-976b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1KL7QBPWH (Accessed 
on 13/12/10) 
177  ‘Japan to relax arms export ban: report’, Japan Today, 23 May, 2009, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/japan-to-relax-arms-export-ban-nikkei-reports 
(Accessed on 23/05/09) 
178 For a detailed overview of Japan’s internal debate over lifting the export ban, see Hughes, ‘The Slow 
Death of Japanese Techno-Nationalism? Emerging Comparative Lessons for China’s Defense 
Production’, pp. 451-479 
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business and a number of politicians have championed reform, this has been prevented 
due to a lack of consensus. 
 
The Defense Ministry has been among the strongest backers of reviewing the principles. 
The Ministry is keen for Japan to broaden current policy to a comprehensive basis.179 
They claim that the inability to participate in international projects such as that to 
develop the Lockheed Martin Corp.'s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, weakens Japan’s 
international competitiveness, increases the price of weapons and limits Japan’s ability 
to upgrade its forces. Speaking prior to the release of Japan’s NDPG in 2010, the Vice 
Minister for Defense Jun Azumi stated, ‘The merits and demerits of our current system 
of export controls…must be written about clearly in the defence guidelines.’ ‘We 
reckon the demerits are far greater than the merits.’180 
 
The business lobby are also keen to expand their operations into international weapons 
projects, protesting that current restrictions are even a security risk as companies 
abandon production. 181  Defence contractors argue for Japan to maintain kokusanka 
(indigenous production).182  With rising procurement costs, few countries are able to 
launch projects alone, necessitating cooperation. According to a defence committee 
member at the Keidanren, Japan will become a ‘closed nation’ in military technology if 
                                                            
179‘Defence Ministry moves to enter global weapons trade’, Japan Times, 1 November 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101101a3.html (Accessed on 01/11/10) 
180 Dickie, ‘Fresh push to lift Japan arms export ban’ 
181 According to a Defence Ministry document published in April 2010, twenty-one fighter jet-related 
firms and 35 combat vehicle- related firms stopped production or have gone bankrupt since 2003 and 
Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd., which supplies parts for Japanese fighters, ‘decided not to seek 
contracts for the next generation of planes because of the industry’s poor outlook’ Sachiko Sakamaki, 
‘Japan Arms Ban Hurts Security as Firms Quit Industry, Business Lobby Says’, Bloomberg, 13 August, 
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-13/japan-arms-export-ban-hurting-security-as-firms-
quit-industry-group-says.html (Accessed on 13/08/10) 
182 Jun Hongo, ‘Defence-only posture needs revisiting: panel’, Japan Times, 5 August 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090805a1.html (Accessed on 05/08/09) 
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the ban is not lifted.183 Government statistics show Japan’s defence budget has shrunk 
by 3.4% over the past eight years and weapons procurement has fallen by 36% in two 
decades to ¥684bn.184  
 
Domestic opinion remains divided with conservative voices such as the Yomiuri 
Shimbun saying, ‘The government should face the facts and recognise that the decline of 
the defence industry will damage the national interest.’ Adding, ‘Such relaxation of the 
three principles does not contradict Japan's philosophy of a peaceful country.’ In 
opposition the Mainichi argues, ‘We cannot agree to the abandonment of the 
principles—which have been regarded as the core of the philosophy of Japan as a 
country committed to peace—in return for the development of the defence industry.’185 
Among the majority of the public, hesitation and caution still prevails.  
 
Of greater significance for the formation of policy within the ruling DPJ, lack of 
consensus has damaged ability to reform. Several Cabinet ministers including Ministers 
Kitazawa, Maehara, and Ohata concurred with calls to overhaul the implicit ban. Prime 
Minister Kan also appeared in 2010 to be willing to contemplate the move, establishing 
a Committee to investigate the possibility. An expert panel recommended: ‘With a 
careful design to contribute to international peace and improvement of Japan's security 
environment, it should revise the current arms export prohibition policy.’186 The US 
                                                            
183 Sakamaki, ‘Japan Arms Ban Hurts Security as Firms Quit Industry, Business Lobby Says. ’Author’s 
interview with Asrani. According to Asrani most of Japan’s manufacturing has been duplicated by 
neighbours. Asrani first served in Japan in 1988 and has continued to be involved in relations between 
Japan and India 
184 Ibid. 
185 Andy Sharp, ‘Japan to Rethink Arms Exports’, The Diplomat, 12 October, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/tokyo-notes/2010/10/12/japan-to-rethink-arms-exports/ (Accessed on 12/10/10) 
186 Masako Toki, ‘Japan's Defence Guidelines: New Conventional Strategy, Same Old Nuclear Dilemma’, 
Issue Brief, 1 March, 2011, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_japan.html (Accessed on 01/03/11)  
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also placed pressure on bureaucrats and consistently advocated lifting restrictions to 
expand cooperation.187  
 
iii. Implications for India 
 
In India there is strong support for Japan to open up its market. Whilst India does not 
‘expect’ arms or munitions188 and the issue has yet to be officially discussed, key-
informants told the author of India’s interest in Japanese technology transfer, 
particularly high-tech surveillance equipment. 189  A number of defence analysts 
interviewed, voiced interest in Japanese weaponry especially if the quality matches that 
of Japan’s navy which is widely admired. According to Commander Parmar, the 
Japanese are ‘great ship builders.’190  According to Chellaney, India could be Japan’s 
‘biggest buyer’ should the market be opened.191 Politicians and bureaucrats in Japan 
often refer to the Constitution as the prohibitive factor yet reinterpreting the ‘three 
principles’ would not require revision. At the present time the DPJ remains divided but 
a revoking of the ban might provide the logical next step in relations. As Chellaney 
argues, whilst nuclear technology sales provide a relatively short-term fix, ‘arms sales 
are forever’.192 
 
                                                            
187 In December 2004 this successfully allowed permitted joint development of BMD. In March 2011 it 
was reported that the US Missile Defence Agency was again petitioning Japan to ease the ban to allow the 
SM-3 Block II A, co-developed by MHI and Raytheon to be available to third countries, such as Europe. 
Toki, ‘Japan's Defence Guidelines: New Conventional Strategy, Same Old Nuclear Dilemma’. In June 
2011, Defence Minister Kitazawa agreed. ‘Japan goes along with US missile exports’, Japan Times, 5 
June 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110605a6.html (Accessed on 05/06/11) 
188 Author’s interview with Hirabayashi 
189 Author’s interview with Dahiya. Furthermore, according to Dahiya, India is known for keeping its 
contract obligations.  
190 Author’s correspondence with SS Parmar, July 19, 2011  
191 Author’s interview with Chellaney 
192 Ibid. 
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India would certainly provide a good market for Japan. In March 2011 SIPRI reported 
that India had overtaken China has the world’s largest importer of arms, representing 
9% of global trade between 2006 and 2010.193 In 2010 India’s defence budget amounted 
to £32.5bn194 with 70% of arms sourced from overseas.195 
 
India’s military infrastructure needs, particularly ports, have also attracted the attention 
of Japanese business.196 In line with economic growth and a rising international profile, 
India has expressed the desire to graduate from a ‘Buyers Navy to Builders Navy’. To 
meet this objective India would benefit greatly from Japanese infrastructure and 
technological advice. Japan cannot engage in such cooperation at present, however, 
since as Gupta highlights, ‘the majority of India’s shipyards are clustered under the 
administrative control of its Defense Ministry [so] Tokyo’s arms sales-restraint 
provisions will need revisiting.’197 
 
Pressure to lift the ban has brewed for years. For example in 2004 the then-Deputy 
Head of Mission in Delhi’s noted the increased pressure on the government to liberalise 
export policy in arms sales.198 Momentum behind revision, however, increased in 2009 
as the structural environment created more favourable conditions. The increased 
assertiveness of China, alerted strategists to the potential of upgrading Japan’s defence 
posture. Continued economic stagnation in Japan also brought proposals to broaden 
                                                            
193 ‘India is world's 'largest importer' of arms, says study’, BBC News, 14 March, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12729363 (Accessed on 14/03/11) India currently imports 
the majority of its technology from the US, U.K., Russia, France and Israel. 
194 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India's defence policy arrives at the crossroads for best buys’, Japan Times, 20 
December, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101220a1.html (Accessed on 20/12/10) 
According to a recent report by KPMG, India will be spending around $100 bn on defence purchases over 
the next decade 
195 ‘India is world's 'largest importer' of arms, says study.’ Incidentally, China has dropped to second place with 6% 
of the global weapons as it develops its domestic arms industry. 
196 According to Patalano there are fourteen ports in India which need Japanese investments. Author’s 
interview with Patalano 
197 Gupta, ‘Japan-India Maritime security cooperation: Floating on inflated expectations?’ 
198 Nishigahiro, ‘Political and Defence Aspects of India-Japan Relations’ 
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Japan’s export portfolio, as was seen in Chapter 7. Indeed the debate surrounding 
relinquishing the export ban emerged on the tails of the announcement to enter into 
nuclear trade talks with India from mid-2010. 
 
Proposals were restrained, however, by domestic politics.199 Despite Hatoyama’s warm 
feelings towards India, he proved one of the staunchest critics of revision. With a 
delicate budget due for approval in the Lower House and threats from the SDP, Kan 
opted for the status quo.200  
 
Despite the elevation of elite perceptions to strategic levels, the ability of policymakers 
to wield the tools of state to match these desires has not yet been achieved. Lack of 
domestic political consensus remains a limiting factor in Japan’s defence policy, 
demonstrating how NCR’s framework considers structure to be not the only factor in 
policy formation, despite its overarching significance. Given the DPJ’s willingness to 
consider compromising previously held principles over the sale of nuclear technology, 
the prospect of adjusting Japan’s ‘three principles’ is not entirely unforeseeable but 
without a major external event necessitating change, such a move is unlikely to 
materialise in the near future. India remains interested in working with Japan but 
regarding wider defence cooperation as Gupta argues, until ‘logistic support, supplies 
and services’ are incorporated into reciprocal exchanges, Delhi is likely to continue 
deeming security cooperation a one-sided endeavour.201  
                                                            
199  ‘Arms export ban to stand; budget bills Kan's priority’, Japan Times, 8 December, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101208a7.html (Accessed on 08/12/10) 
200 As the publication of the NDPG approached, the DPJ needed a two-thirds majority in the Lower 
House to pass several pieces of legislation, securing short-term political goals rather than longer-term 
political aims. According to reports, prior to Kan meeting with SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima, Kitazawa 
remarked, ‘Clinch the two-thirds even if an important matter should be sacrificed.’ Kentaro Kawaguchi, 
‘Review of arms export ban shelved in bid to woo SDP’, Asahi Shimbun, 9 December 2010, 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012080329.html (Accessed on 09/12/10) 
201 Gupta, ‘Japan-India Maritime security cooperation: Floating on inflated expectations?’ 
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X. Conclusion 
 
Japan’s defence and security cooperation with India has continued to deepen. Measuring 
progress is problematic but since frequency in exchanges and levels of rank are 
escalating, the trajectory is positive. Exchanges of personnel remain minor compared to 
the volume between Japan and the US but have improved trust. The structural 
environment for both states to engage more actively exists but domestic intervening 
factors continue to act as obstacles.   
 
Security planning rotates around preparation for unforeseen events so Japan’s ability to 
utilise the relationship with India to deal with future challenges will be a key qualifier of 
the success of recent dialogues. Japan appreciates that they cannot have an ‘ordinary 
alliance’ with India and that if India is attacked Japan will be unable to come to India’s 
assistance.202 The expansion has been incremental but no less significant as a means 
through which to analyse Japan’s policymaking options and priorities.  
 
A reassessment of India’s strategic and practical value has coincided with China’s more 
assertive foreign policy which existing in parallel has encouraged policymakers to 
actively engage with India’s armed forces. Shared concerns at sea would likely have 
resulted in greater cooperation without China’s presence but Beijing’s actions have 
undoubtedly hastened progress. Rather than ‘shared values’, a greater focus is now 
placed on ‘shared interests’ most strikingly in the common uncertainty over China. 
Maritime security represents an important ‘third pillar’ which provides Japan’s military 
                                                            
202 Author’s interview with Akimoto and Imaizumi 
398 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
the opportunity to test out the potential for future interactions in the form of port 
sharing203 or defence infrastructure transfer. 
 
Structure was essential but once this condition was made, the manner in which Tokyo 
shaped its approach was open to adjustment by domestic factors. This study has paid 
consistent attention to the role which policymakers’ perceptions play yet in security 
policy dissecting attitudes is more complex since diplomats in particular are especially 
cautious with their use of language. By collecting primary data, the author has 
accumulated a broad picture of where foreign policy priorities lie, demonstrating that 
whilst officially India hesitates from attributing interest in Japan within a China-context, 
this is in reality a major factor. This bodes well for Japan and its own policymaking 
since even though officials must accept India’s resistance to open ‘hedging’ rhetoric as 
was seen during Abe and Aso’s tenure, India is prepared to engage with Japan to deal 
with the ‘China question’.  
 
Strategic dialogue and trust-building measures characterise cooperation.204 Sea Power 
Dialogues for example provide an opportunity to share concerns and bring India into 
discussions. 205  Given the prevalence of outdated images for each other’s military 
establishments, this is a necessary stage of development. International naval 
cooperation, where the majority of work is being done also benefits from a quasi-
apolitical character in that its benefits are to the advantage of all states in some form, if 
not directly then through safer passages for trade. Collaboration does not openly 
antagonise a third party (except of course pirates). Furthermore whilst topics such as 
‘disaster management’ might have appeared weak or ‘woolly’ prior to 2004, the Asian 
                                                            
203 The political sensitivities attached mean such cooperation remains only a possibility.  
204 Author’s interview with Sahdev 
205 Author’s interview with Murata 
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tsunami and 3/11 earthquake and tsunami have highlighted the practical advantage 
which coordination can bring. In the immediate term Japan is concerned by piracy off 
the Horn of Africa but in the longer term the South China EEZ and East of Malacca 
dominate strategic planning. By adopting this rhetorically scaled-back and less overt 
form of cooperation, Japan hopes to build a more lasting relationship with India, which 
accommodates Delhi’s alliance-phobic attitude.  
 
Japan has learnt most notably through the AFP initiative, that India will never be an 
‘ally’ but can still provide an important partner for leverage. Before the millennium 
military contact was sparse but today regular meetings, joint exercises, cooperation in 
anti-piracy missions and nascent Track II security dialogue improves strategic 
understanding. Questions still remain regarding India’s ability to act as a genuine 
counterbalance to Chinese power206 and Delhi’s aversion to alliances and caution in 
antagonising other states, restrain the depth of cooperation. Much of the scholarship 
related to Japan-India cooperation continues to speak of ‘prospects’ rather than ‘actions’ 
but as an exercise in analysis of Japanese policymaking, the case of Japan’s defence 
policy towards India highlights several important trends. 
 
 
                                                            
206 Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘As India “Looks East”, a little problem of economics, East Asia Forum, 26 
September, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/26/as-india-looks-east-a-little-problem-of-
economics/ (Accessed on 26/09/10) 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
The central hypothesis of this study is that the structure of the international system, 
most notably the India’s economic growth, the rise of China and facilitation provided by 
the US, initiated interest in India and continues to shape the development of policy. The 
constraints on relations can be attributed to domestic political factors and norms as well 
as perceptions of elites to their material and relative power. Both domestic and systemic 
variables can therefore be employed to explain the foreign policy behaviour of Japan 
towards India, whilst placing primacy on the role of structure.  
 
This concluding chapter has four aims. The first is to provide an overview of the 
conclusions reached in the case studies. The second is to address each of the research 
questions posed in the Introduction, before 3) possible caveats and 4) future research 
avenues are identified.  
 
I. Overview of findings 
 
The first case-study demonstrated how the foundation of cooperation and source of all 
other streams has been economic. Only once India’s economic potential was assured did 
India prominently enter Japan’s diplomatic radar, evidencing how India’s booming 
economy has provided the primary rationale. The empirical analysis detailed the 
opportunities which have attracted Japan and how Japan has responded. The chapter 
was broken into roughly two halves to analyse the role of ODA; government initiatives 
and private efforts by Japanese companies. The political structure of the Cold War 
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certainly served as a barrier to Japan but it was India’s adherence to a command-
economy which ultimately deterred Japan. Today, Japan’s urgent need to recover from 
economic stagnation following low growth in the 1990s and 2000s, the desire to 
diversify from the Chinese market and competitive lesson of ROK, all contribute to 
Japanese policy. Adhering to NCR methodology domestic variables were analysed as 
dictating the speed and nature of Japan’s economic approach. Whilst the efforts of the 
Japanese government were instrumental in alerting the business community, for genuine 
progress, a bottom-up, business-led approach has been required.  
 
The second case study focused on nuclear policy; once the major irritant in relations and 
today a central field for cooperation. The evolution of Japan’s nuclear posture was 
charted from severe condemnation of India’s 1998 nuclear tests to the launch of 
technology-trade negotiations in 2010. In perhaps no other example can the dramatic 
evolution of Japan’s stance towards India be seen. The importance of structural 
incentives was evidenced through the developments of a ‘nuclear renaissance’, 
internationalisation of Japan’s nuclear industry and the US-India nuclear deal. 
Historically the international structure of the nuclear market, the security of the US 
umbrella and Japan’s unique history placed India’s nuclear development on the 
opposing end of the engagement spectrum.  
 
NCR necessitates, however, the process of ‘opening the black box’ to identify which 
unit-level variables have proved particularly decisive.  Pressure from the business 
community was shown to be more influential than domestic unease, whilst the latter has 
shaped the language and speed of negotiations. Japan is often considered one of the 
staunchest defenders of the NPT, but this analysis showed growing realism among elites 
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of its limitations. North Korean provocations as well as growing awareness of the 
environmental damage of fossil fuels added useful momentum. Furthermore, it was 
noted that as India’s diplomatic hand strengthens, ROK’s activism in the Indian market 
continues and Beijing sends further unsettling signals; Japan might compromise further 
on ‘anti-nuclear’ norms.  
 
The final case study concentrated on security interests. In this chapter it was noted how 
defence cooperation has forged ahead of other aspects of relations, primarily in the 
maritime sphere due to shared concerns over the security of sea lanes. The structural 
inducements to stronger security relations were identified as the end of the Cold War, 
importance of energy security, China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness, India’s rising 
military profile and growing strains on US unipolarity.  
 
The chapter noted the heightened importance of structure in security issues, which by 
their nature are dependent on external conditions. However, once this condition was 
made, the manner in which Tokyo shaped its approach was open to adjustment by 
domestic factors. In particular, the role of Japan’s Constitution, Japanese politicians and 
defence officials and importantly the view of India were appraised. 
 
An area given particular attention was the nature of political drives to engage with 
India, most enthusiastically during Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister. Through the 
initiative of creating an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,’ the intervening role of elite 
ideology in forming a policy, despite its unsuitability to structure was demonstrated. 
The eventual ‘righting’ of the system through the dismantling of the ‘Arc’, subsequent 
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‘Quad’ grouping and recent launch of informal trilateral dialogues adheres to NCR’s 
preference for structure as the ultimate force in dictating policy.  
 
II. Responses to research questions 
 
This thesis’ analytical objective has been to identify which factors at the systemic and 
domestic-level have guided Japanese foreign policy. In reference to the research 
questions posed, the following section will identify how the preceding analysis has 
provided tentative answers.  
 
1) What attracts Japan to improving relations with India? 
 
Structural conditions, orientated around India’s economic profile have provided Japan’s 
dominant rationale. Through the previous three case studies, the economic advantages 
Japan seeks from India’s growing market have been a priority. India’s global presence is 
premised on economic growth and opportunity, in which Japan as a trading nation, is 
keen to participate. The US, Japan’s principal ally has also made this conclusion which 
has facilitated Japan’s interest in India. The additional structural concern with the 
stability of the Chinese market has acted as further impetus. Nuclear interest feeds from 
this belief in the future of the Indian market for Japanese technology. India’s military 
and diplomatic profile has also grown, providing Japan with a useful associate in the 
region. Furthermore, with no acute historical baggage or territorial disputes, and 
generally positive (though occasionally inaccurate) perceptions among Japan’s public 
and elite, India is seen as a ‘logical’ partner. 
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2) To what extent have structural forces determined the formulation of policy? 
 
Structural factors established the parameters within which Japan could engage with 
India. Without the particular structural conditions laid out in each of the case studies in 
addition to Chapter 3a and 3b, India would not have featured in Japan’s strategy. 
Nevertheless, structure alone has been unable to completely dictate policy decisions due 
to the actuality that foreign policy, in any state, is not produced by mindless entities but 
rather individuals holding particular views independent to those provided by the 
international system.  
 
3) How have unit-level factors interacted with structural imperatives? 
 
Conditions provided depend on adequate interpretation on the part of bureaucrats, 
politicians, the business community and general public. The ‘transmission belt’ towards 
policy formulation is complex. Policymakers have to receive and digest the structure 
within which they operate before making decisions. The preceding analysis has 
highlighted the complex interplay of actors present in Japanese policymaking and 
challenging role elites face when attempting to please voices from different quarters. 
Japan’s India policy has demonstrated that neither purely politician-led, nor bureaucrat-
led government exists.  
 
Overall, unit-level variables have accounted for the majority of delays in Japan 
capitalising on the structural advantages present in engaging with India. The business 
community’s hesitation to launch into the Indian market with the same enthusiasm as 
ROK firms has delayed the realisation that India would be a viable partner in other 
405 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
fields. Engrained anti-nuclearism also contributed to the postponement of nuclear 
cooperation talks. 
 
Norms such as non-proliferation and adherence to the US alliance still influence 
policymaking but this study suggests that Berger overstates their role. Interviewees 
pointed to constraints with anti-nuclear sentiments among the Japanese public but this 
served only to caution policymakers over the means through which to frame Japan’s 
stance. Politicians in particular are keen to conform to domestic norms, given that they 
depend for their survival on electoral approval whilst elites are more likely to challenge 
norms based on the international system. This analysis of the constraints and influences 
on the process has required of this study considerable interview evidence in addition to 
academic literature.  
 
4) Specifically, which actors/determinants have proved decisive in bringing 
relations from their minimal contact just two decades ago to their expanding 
‘strategic partnership’ of today; does this differ according to the policy in 
question? 
 
This study has shed light on the machinery of Japanese policymaking to highlight the 
multiple actors involved. Consistent with NCR the importance of perceptions among 
Japan’s various policy-influencing bodies, reconceptualising India’s role in Japanese 
diplomatic strategy has been evident. As Rose and Sterling-Folker argue, it is the 
‘fuzzy’ lens of elites which ultimately decide on policy options.1 Power among elites is 
not equally distributed and differs at different stages of the policymaking process.  
 
MOFA and METI play influential, complementary roles formulating policies based on 
the international system but have also depended on political support to provide final 
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momentum such as when Foreign Minister Okada consented to opening nuclear trade 
negotiations. Top-down policy initiation has not suited Japan’s objectives overall, 
however, due to elite ideology misreading other states’ goals. Such an approach is 
usually only successful in crisis or high-profile situations which require strong, decisive 
leadership. In more incremental shifts in policy, the bureaucracy and business 
community are better suited to fulfilling policy objectives.  
 
Japan’s India policy has witnessed several stages through which different factors have 
taken precedence. During the early period of post-1998 rapprochement, the US provided 
the major external impetus, to be following in the mid-2000s by China’s ever-growing 
presence in the region. This has been followed by increasing concern among Japanese 
policymakers to the business potential, yet to be exploited but that hampers efforts to 
push forward more strategic elements of policy. 
 
Influential weight has also differed depending on the issue. Unsurprisingly, METI had 
played an important role in economic and nuclear strategy whilst the MOD has led on 
defence issues. MOFA, however, has contributed to virtually all streams as the central 
office through which Japan’s policy is channelled. As was identified on several 
occasions, particularly regarding nuclear energy negotiations discussed in Chapter 7, the 
collaboration between MOFA and METI has been a rare instance of shared objectives. 
The number of politicians actively promoting Japan-India relations is small but their 
influential voice has encouraged the business community and improved understanding 
between governments. On occasion, overly-enthusiastic overtures by individuals such as 
Abe have unsettled progress by implanting uncomfortable ideology and rhetoric into 
relations which benefit from a more pragmatic focus.  
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5) What can analysis of Japan’s economic, nuclear and security strategy towards 
India identify about the nature of Japanese diplomacy? 
 
This thesis largely agrees with Green in that Japan has been compelled to adapt a realist 
approach of engaging with India due to the international system. Some bureaucrats 
admit they are ‘reluctant partners brought together by circumstance’, ‘structural logic’ 
and ‘necessity’. 2  This research illustrates how changing regional dynamics have 
translated into foreign policy with important implications for Japanese diplomacy. 
Japan’s foreign policy remains largely ‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive,’ responding to 
changing structural dynamics. Regarding India, however, Japan’s response has been 
delayed due to domestic constraints and is now playing ‘catch up’. The nature of 
Japan’s interest is not limited to political or economic objectives; in reality, the two 
countries are forming a ‘comprehensive’ partnership which encompasses a number of 
fields. 
 
In keeping with Japan’s diplomatic history, economic relations drive Japanese policy. 
India is viewed not only as a market, destination for technology (including nuclear) and 
potential manufacturing hub; its cooperation in the maritime sphere is essential for 
energy security. This study has also illuminated Japan’s efforts towards free trade as 
well as ODA policy development, which under the ‘exceptional’ case of India has taken 
an untraditional direction.  
 
A second, correlated conclusion, therefore is that whilst it has become commonplace to 
associate Japanese foreign policy with anti-China hedging, regarding India the 
                                                            
2 Author’s interview with senior official and former Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA 
25 June 2010 
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predominant concern is how to lift Japan out of economic stagnation. Unease with the 
stability of the Chinese market has accelerated interest in India but sole rationale cannot 
be laid at Chinese actions. China nonetheless occupies a prominent position in the 
strategic thinking of Japanese elites. Virtually all those interviewed, identified China’s 
rise as Japan’s greater diplomatic challenge. As Sino-Japanese relations have faltered, 
those with India have strengthened, particularly in the maritime defence field.  
 
Third, this thesis has shown that the US has played a pivotal role in steering Tokyo 
towards Delhi. Concerted US efforts to incorporate India into top international forums 
has significantly helped Japan and opened new possibilities. Other studies of Japan’s 
bilateral relations have concluded that the US represents the single most important 
factor but this research deviates from this thinking. The ‘green light’ provided by the 
US has been insufficient in itself due to constraints at the domestic-level, particularly 
over the issue of India’s nuclear status.  
 
Finally, ROK’s activism and success in the Indian market as well as through diplomatic 
channels have spurred Japan to follow suit. In almost every field of Japanese interest, 
the ROK has carved an influence. The role of the ROK on Japan’s foreign policy to 
another state is rarely considered but as this thesis demonstrates, it has played an 
important role.  
 
6) Does NCR offer a viable framework for this question? 
 
This study’s aim was never to carve out a new theoretical paradigm or provide a 
universal defence of one IR theory. Instead, this thesis’ objective was to operationalise 
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the ‘third-generation’ branch of realism; NCR to the case of Japanese policy towards 
India. By so doing, the task set for the model was to assist in framing the empirical 
questions established in the Introduction.  
 
NCR has proven an effective means to consider the imperative of structural conditions 
on foreign policy decisions whilst leaving room for unit-level variables. In each case 
study the thesis has demonstrated how these have interacted to shape policy. By giving 
primacy to structure, however, NCR avoids the overly hospitable analytical eclecticism 
whilst also giving greater scope than pure Waltzian neo-realism. 
 
The limitations of a purely systemic analysis are clear since India’s economic rise and 
assertiveness from China have emerged in the years prior to concerted efforts by Tokyo 
to engage with India. Furthermore, the head-start gained by ROK demonstrates the slow 
realisation by Japanese policymakers, guided by their own perceptions and domestic 
constraints. Conversely, a unit-focused analysis would not provide adequate explanation 
for policy decisions and this thesis has demonstrated on several instances when 
domestic norms, such as anti-nuclearism, should have prevented Japan launching 
negotiations.  
 
The objectives of this thesis were thus met by the application of the relatively simple 
model of NCR. By combining structuralism with elements of constructivist thought 
such as the role of norms and perception, added value was given. The choice of case 
studies and author’s accumulation of interview-material also contributed to drawing 
conclusions which satisfy the questions posed.  
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In Chapter 2 it was noted that NCR has been applied to other East Asian cases and 
indeed others could benefit from the model. Comparative research of Japan’s bilateral 
policy to other states would provide useful clarification of NCR’s benefits, as would 
research from the Indian perspective of relations with Japan. However, given the 
paucity of literature on Japan’s India policy, there are few studies adopting differing 
theoretical models, which could be compared with the present analysis.  
 
III. Caveats 
 
As with any study there are certain caveats which should be identified. Within the 
confines of this thesis it was not possible to cover the whole gamut of areas in which 
Japan is now working with India. This is indeed testament to the progress made. One 
example is Japan’s attempts to incorporate India into regional and global architecture 
such as the East Asia Summit. This case represented a clear differentiation from China’s 
preferences for an ASEAN+3 framework rather than one including India, Australia and 
New Zealand (ASEAN+6). The issue was also an example where the structural factor of 
China played a more influential role than the US, ROK or domestic-level concerns. 
Stalled joint efforts of Japan, India, Brazil and Germany to gain a UNSC seat as a ‘G4’ 
could also be assessed. Unfortunately it was outside the scope and spatial constraints of 
this thesis to pay adequate attention to these important topics.  
 
Due to the contemporary and fast-moving pace of Japan’s policy, some of the 
conclusions made might well require adjustment following implementation. Officials 
currently engaged in policymaking were also likely to have been tentative in their 
responses. In order to overcome this limitation, the author gathered opinions from both 
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present-day and retired participants to balance responses but some guarded opinions 
were expected. Overall, key-informant interviews provided detailed and often candid 
responses to questions posed but as the Introduction stipulated this differed dependent 
on the policy under discussion. The author also amassed limited political source 
material, other than Abe Shinzo and staff of the DPJ, which prevented in-depth political 
analysis being other than inferred from government statements and actions.3  
 
Since this topic was a study of Japanese policy towards India and not of Indian policy or 
the bilateral relationship, limited space was devoted to India’s view. This would 
augment the value of understanding as to the nature of the bilateral but not necessary the 
lessons for Japanese policymaking; the analytical objective of the study. 
 
IV. Where next? 
 
Opinion as to the future trajectory of policy remains mixed with some scholars fearing 
any future initiative framed in Abe-style ideological grounds will similarly disappoint. 
However, given the DPJ’s more pragmatic record to date, this is unlikely. Thinking is 
beginning to ‘synchronise’ or ‘converge’, forming an ‘unstoppable upward trajectory’.4 
None of the elites interviewed foresaw a reversal in relations, except should India again 
test a nuclear weapon. Space and anti-terrorism measures are future areas for 
cooperation and Chellaney even predicts a defence treaty at some point in the future 
should Chinese assertiveness continue.5  
 
                                                            
3 Possible reasons stem from the timing of the author’s fieldwork in the months preceding Upper House 
elections in July 2010 and relatively few politicians who have made a stake in the relationship. 
4 Author’s interview with Chellaney 
5 This study’s conclusions, however, reject such a move in the near to medium term.  
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The biggest hurdle undoubtedly comes in the nuclear field following global nervousness 
over nuclear energy even as few other viable options exist for economies such as India 
and Japan. Japan has no realistic alternative but to continue negotiations and develop 
nuclear energy for domestic use. As NCR understands, whilst domestic unease might 
delay the conclusion of an agreement, ultimately the structural necessity and influence 
of powerful actors such as the US and Japanese business will push the deal through. 
Furthermore, Japan has demonstrated its commitment to nuclear exports by passing 
accords with Jordan, Russia, ROK and Vietnam in August 2011.6 A new energy policy 
due by the end of 2011 will shed more light on the issue and the new Prime Minister 
Noda, in power since September 2, 2011 has suggested a more pro-nuclear approach 
than his predecessor. 
 
Poor levels of understanding between the population and government and Indian 
hesitancy to antagonise China represent additional constraints. India’s patience with 
Japan’s slow decision-making process is already wearing thin. Trade and investment 
remain a fraction of their potential and whilst CEPA has sent positive messages, it is 
unlikely this will accelerate substantially due to the limitations identified in Chapter 6. 
The weakness of the domestic political climate is also a restraint on bold new 
initiatives.7 Should Japan turn inward as a result of the March earthquake, elites may 
well face continued challenges bringing India to the priority list of politicians and senior 
policymakers.  
 
                                                            
6 Dikshit, ‘India, Japan to firm up strategic ties despite nuclear stalemate.’ Talks are also underway with 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia who have not ratified a protocol allowed IAEA inspections. ‘Nuke deals eyed 
with Egypt, Saudi Arabia’, Japan Times, 26 December 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20101226a3.html (Accessed on 27/12/10) 
7 Weaknesses in the governments of India and the US are also a present challenge. 
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Japan has been humbled by the experience of working with India and appreciate Japan 
is ‘not currently winning the beauty contest’. 8  Japan’s diplomatic clout has not 
necessarily reduced but is being reassessed. As the relationship with India reaches its 
sixtieth anniversary, bureaucrats are preparing to reflect and tighten current avenues of 
cooperation. For most of the past twenty years, relations have been predominantly 
economic but today this stream represents just one (though prominent) of many.  
 
Returning to this thesis’ opening question, Japan today has a direction, which as seen 
through its policy towards India is looking outward. Japanese policy has evolved from 
grandiose rhetoric to a more transactional relationship. Despite much talk of Japan 
‘turning inward,’ through a number of means explored in this study, elites from the 
‘land of the rising sun’ are actively reaching out for the ‘star of India’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 Author’s interview with senior official, Embassy of Japan, Delhi, 28 February 2011. As another 
diplomat in Delhi analogised, Japan feels like the boy who no one loves, despite being kind and generous. 
Taking the analogy further, states prefer to work with the ‘bad boy’ (China). 
414 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
References 
 
 
Journal articles and book-length publications 
  
Berger, Thomas U., ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism’, 
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 119-150 
 
Berger, Thomas U. ‘The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State’ in Thomas U. Berger, 
Mike M. Mochizuki, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign 
Policies of an Adaptive State, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2007), pp. 259-300 
 
Bitzinger, Richard A., ‘A Paper Tiger No More?: The US Debate over China’s Military 
Modernization’ in Satu Limaye ed. Special Assessment: Asia’s China Debate, (Honolulu: Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 1-8 
 
Bjorkdahl, A., ‘Norms in international relations: some conceptual and methodological 
reflections’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, Issue 1, (2002), pp. 9-23 
 
Brook, Timothy, ‘The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking,’ Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 60, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 673-700 
 
Brooks, Stephen, ‘Dueling Realisms,’ International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 
1997), pp. 445-477 
 
Brown, Peter J., ‘China Looks Beyond India-Japan Space Alliance to the US Connection,’ The 
Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 48-1-08, November 24, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-peter_j_-
brown/2959 (Accessed on 05/12/08) 
 
Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Brining the 
Statesman Back In’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-146 
 
Calder, Kent, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,’ 
World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July 1988), pp. 517-541 
 
Calder, Kent, ‘The Institutions of Japanese Foreign Policy’, in Richard Grant ed., The Process 
of Japanese Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 1-24 
 
Campbell, John, ‘Media and Policy Change in Japan’, Pharr, S. and E. Krauss (ed.), Media and 
Politics in Japan (Hawaii; University of Hawaii, 1996), pp. 187-212 
 
Camroux, David, 'Asia … whose Asia? A 'return to the future' of a Sino-Indic Asian 
Community', The Pacific Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, (2007), pp. 551-575 
 
Cha, Victor, ‘Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The US, Japan, and 
Korea’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June, 2000), pp. 261-291 
 
Cha, Victor, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford, 
CA, Stanford University Press, 1999) 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. ‘The constructivist turn in international relations theory’, World Politics, 
Volume 50, Number 2, (January 1998), pp. 324-348 
415 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Colingdon, Richard and Chikaku Usui, ‘The Resilience of Japan’s Iron Triangle: Amakudari’ 
Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. Sept-Oct 2001, pp. 865-895 
 
Cossa, Ralph, ‘Northeast Asian Regionalism: A (Possible) Means to an End for Washington’, 
Council on Foreign Relations, (December 2009), pp. 1-10 
 
Dadwal, Shebonti Ray, 'The Sino-Japanese Rare Earths Row: Will China's Loss be India's 
Gain?' Strategic Analysis, 35: 2, (2011) 181-185 
 
Davidson, Jason, ‘From Harmony to Hard Times: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of 
Transatlantic Burden-sharing in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Paper presented at ISA 50th Annual 
Convention 'Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future, New York, (February 2009), pp. 1-31 
 
Davidson, Jason, ‘The China Puzzle: A Neoclassical-Realist Solution’, Paper prepared for 
presentation at the 2002 International Studies Association Annual Conference in New Orleans, 
(March 14, 2002) 
 
Davidson, Jason, America’s Allies and War; Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 
 
Deng, Yong, ‘Chinese Relations with Japan: Implications for Asia-Pacific Regionalism’, Pacific 
Affairs, 70, No. 3 (1997), pp. 373-391 
 
Desch, Michael, ‘Culture-Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, 
International Security, 23, (1) (Summer, 1998), pp. 141-170 
 
Deshingkar, Giri, ‘The Construction of Asia in India’, Asian Studies Review, Volume 23 
Number 2 (June 1999), pp. 173-180 
 
Drifte, Reinhard, Japanese-Chinese territorial disputes in the East China Sea – between 
military confrontation and economic cooperation. Working paper, Asia Research Centre, 
(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20881/1/Japanese-
Chinese_territorial_disputes_in_the_East_China_Sea_%28LSERO%29.pdf (Accessed on 
04/07/11) 
 
Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 
 
Easley, Leif-Eric, Tetsuo Kotani, & Aki Mori, ‘Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? 
Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan’ Asia Policy, 9, 
January 2010, pp. 45-66 
 
Edström, Bert, ‘The Success of a Successor: Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Foreign Policy’, Silk Road 
Paper, (May, 2007), pp. 1-82 
 
Emmott, Bill ‘The Economic Sources of Japan’s Foreign Policy,’ Survival, The IISS Quarterly, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (1992), pp. 50-70 
 
Emmott, Bill, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan will Shape Out 
Next Decade, (London: Allen Lane, 2008)  
  
Endo, Tetsuya, ‘Countries Planning to Introduce Nuclear Power Generation and the 3Ss - 
Making the 3Ss an International Standard,’ ICNND Research Paper, June 2009, pp. 1-12 
416 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Evera, Stephen Van, Guide to Methods of Students of Political Science, (Ithaca, NY; Cornell 
University Press, 1997) 
 
Feaver, Peter D., Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. 
Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo, Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or 
Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)’ International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000), pp. 165-
193 
 
Finnemore, Martha, ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s 
Institutionalism’, International Organization, 50:2 (1996), pp. 325–47 
 
Fukui, Haruhiro, ‘Bureaucratic power in Japan’, P. Drysdale and Kitaoji eds., Japan and 
Australia: two societies and their interaction, (Canberra; Australian National University Press, 
1981), pp. 275-303 
 
Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions 
and Political Change, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993) 
 
Gourevitch, Keohane, Krasner, Laitin, Pempel, Streech, Tarrow, ‘The Political Science of Peter 
J Katzenstein’, Political Science and Politics, (October, 2008), pp. 893-899 
 
Graham, Euan ‘Japan's sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?’ (London: 
Routledge, 2006) 
 
Green, Michael, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 
 
Haber, Deborah L. ‘The Death of Hegemony: Why “Pax Nipponica” Is Impossible’, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 30, No. 9 (September, 1990), pp. 892-907 
 
Hagerty, David T., ‘India and the Global Balance of Power: A Neorealist Snapshot’ in Harsh 
Pant (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates its 
Rise in the International System, (London, Palgrave Macmillan; 2008), pp. 23-43 
 
Hagström, Linus, ‘Diverging Accounts of Japanese Policymaking’, The European Institute of 
Japanese Studies, Working paper No. 102, (September 2000), pp. 1-20 
 
Haley, J., ‘Governance by Negotiation: a Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan’ in Pyle, 
The Trade Crisis, in Maurice Wright, ‘Who Governs Japan? Politicians and Bureaucrats in the 
Policy-Making Processes’, Political Studies, XLVII, (1999), pp. 177-91 
 
Halperin, Morton, Priscilla Clapp, Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics And Foreign Policy, 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2007) 
 
Heginbotham, Eric and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,’ 
International Security 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171–203 
 
Heginbothan, Eric and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Japan’s Dual Hedge’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 
5, (September/October, 2002), pp. 110-121 
 
Hill, Christopher, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002) 
 
Hirata, Keiko, Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, (London, Palgrave 
417 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Macmillan; 2008) 
 
Hirose, Takako, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Self-Defense Forces’ in N.S. Sisodia and G.V.C. 
Naidu eds., Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia: Focus on Japan, (Delhi: Promilla, 
2007), pp. 278-298 
 
Hiwatari, Yumi, ‘Transformations of Japanese Security’, N.S. Sisodia and GVC Naidu (eds.), 
India-Japan Relations: Partnership for Peace and Security in Asia, (Delhi: Promilla & Co. and 
Bibliphile South Asia, 2006), pp. 10-24 
 
Holmes, James, Andrew C. Winner, Toshi Yoshihara, Indian naval strategy in the twenty-first 
century, (London; Taylor Francis, 2009) 
 
Hook, Glenn D., Hugo Dobson, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes eds. Japan’s International 
Relations: Politics, economics and security, (London: Routledge, 2001) 
 
Horimoto, Takenori  ‘The Japan-India Nuclear Agreement: Enhancing Bilateral Relations?’ 
Asia Pacific Bulletin, Number 107, 15 April, 2011, 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb107.pdf  
 
Hughes, Christopher W., ‘Japan’s Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine’, Book Review 
Roundtable, Asia policy, No. 4 (July 2007), pp. 199-204 
 
Hughes, Christopher W., ‘The Slow Death of Japanese Techno-Nationalism? Emerging 
Comparative Lessons for China’s Defense Production’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 
34, No. 3, (June, 2011), pp. 451-479 
 
Hughes, Llewelyn, ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic 
Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan’, International Security, Vol. 31, Issue 4, pp. 67-96 
 
Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today, (New York; 
Palgrave, 2000) 
 
Inoguchi, Takahashi, ‘Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase’, Japanese Studies, 
Vol. 28, No. 1 (2008), pp. 3-13 
 
Jain, Purnendra,(ed.) Distant Asian Neighbours: Japan and South Asia, (New Delhi; Sterling 
Publishers; 1996) 
 
Jain, Purnendra, 'India's Calculus of Japan's Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia', in T. Inoguchi (ed.), 
Japan's Asia Policy: Revival and Response, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 211-236 
 
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (New Jersey; Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 
 
Johnson, Chalmers, ‘The People Who Invented the Mechanical Nightingale’, Daedalus, Vol. 
119, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 71-90 
 
Johnson, Chalmers, D’A Tyson and J. Zysman eds., Politics and Productivity: How Japan’s 
Development Strategy Work, (New York; Ballinger, 1989) 
 
Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975, 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1982) 
 
Kagan, Robert, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, (Atlantic Books: London, 2008) 
418 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Kalam, Abul, Japan and South Asia, Subsystematic Linkages and Developing Relationships, 
(Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 1996) 
 
Kang, David C., ‘Why China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asian 
Region’, Perspectives on Politics, 3, (2005), pp. 551-554 
 
Kanwar, Kamlendra ed., India-Japan, Towards a New Era, (Delhi: USBPD, 1992) 
 
Katahara, Eiichi, ‘Japan’s plutonium policy: Consequences for non-proliferation,’ The Non-
proliferation Review, Volume 5, Issue 1, (Autumn, 1997), pp. 53-61 
 
Katzenstein, Peter J., ‘Japanese security in perspective’, Rethinking Japanese Security, 
(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-31 
 
Katzenstein, Peter, J., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
(New York; Columbia University Press, 1996) 
 
Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi, ‘Postclassical realism and Japanese Security Policy’ Pacific Review, Vol. 
14, No. 2 (2001), pp. 221-240 
 
Kesavapany, K., A. Mani and P. Ramasamy, Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia, 
(Delhi: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009) 
 
Khong, Yuen Foong, ‘Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia Pacific?’ Pacific Review Vol. 
10, No. 2, (1997) pp. 289-300 
 
Khurana, Gurpreet S. ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation’, Strategic 
Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 1, Jan-Feb 
2007, http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/SecurityofSeaLinesProspectsforIndiaJapanCooperati
on_gskhurana_0107 (Accessed on 18/02/11)  
 
Kirk, Jason, ‘Indian-Americans and the US-India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation Of An 
Ethnic Lobby?’ Foreign Policy Analysis, 4, (2008), pp. 275-300 
 
Kitchen, Nicholas, ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of 
grand strategy formation,’ Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pp. 117–143  
 
Kliman, Daniel M., Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9-11 World, Embracing a New 
Realpolitik, (Westport, CT; Praeger Publishers, 2006) 
 
Korhonen, Pekka, ‘The Geography of Okakura Tenshin’, Japan Review, Vol. 13 (2001), pp. 
107-128 
 
Langdon, Frank C., ‘Japanese Reactions to India's Nuclear Explosion’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, 
No. 2 (Summer, 1975), pp. 173-180 
 
Lebra, Joyce Chapman, The Indian National Army and Japan, (Singapore; Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2008) 
 
Leheny, David and Kay Warren eds., Japanese Aid and the Construction of 
Global Development, Inescapable Solutions, (London: Routledge, 2009) 
 
Lehmann, Jean-Pierre ‘Japanese Attitudes towards Foreign Policy,’ Richard L. Grant, (ed.), The 
Process of Japanese Foreign Policy: Focus on Asia, (London; Royal Institute for International 
419 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Affairs, 1997), pp. 123-141 
 
Limaye, Satu, ‘Tokyo's Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 322-339 
 
Limaye, Satu ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, in Yochiro Sato and Satu Limaye eds., 
Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges, (Lanham; Lexington 
Books, 2006), pp. 225-247 
 
Mahbubani, Kishore, The New Asian Hemisphere: the irresistible shift of global power to the 
East, (New York: Public Affairs, 2008) 
 
Malik, Ahmad Rashid, Pakistan-Japan Relations: Continuity and Change in Economic 
Relations and Security Interests, (London; Routledge, 2008)  
 
McNabb, David E., Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches, 2nd edition, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2009) 
 
Meng, Xu ‘Re-Exploring on Japanese Values Diplomacy,’ Asian Social Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 
(January 2009), pp. 70-74 
 
Midford, Paul ‘China views the revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines: popping the cork?’ 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4 (2004), pp. 113-45 
 
Midford, Paul, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)  
 
Minear, Richard, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971) 
 
Miyagi, Yukiko, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases, (London: Routledge, 
2008) 
 
Mochizuki, Mike M., ‘China-Japan Relations,’ David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and 
Asia’s New Dynamics (California: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 135-150 
 
Moni, Monir Hossain, ‘Japan and South Asia: Toward a Strengthened Economic Cooperation’, 
Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, (2007) 
http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/journals/apssr/pdf/200706/1_moni.pdf , p. 19 (Accessed on 
09/10/09)  
 
Mulgan, Aurelia George, ‘Japan’s Un-Westminster’ System: Impediments to Reform in a Crisis 
Economy’ Government and Opposition, Vol. 38, no. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 73-91 
 
Muramatsu and Krauss, ‘The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned 
Pluralism’, in K Yamamura and Y Yasuba, eds, The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 1: The 
Domestic Transformation (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 516-554 
 
Muramatsu, ‘Patterned Pluralism under Challenge: The Policies of the 1980s’ in Political 
Dynamics of Contemporary Japan, (Ithace NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 50-71 
 
Murthy, PA Narashimha, India and Japan: dimensions of their relations, (New Delhi: ABE 
Publishing House, 1986) 
 
Nalini Kant Jha (ed.), South Asia in Twenty-First Century: India, Her Neighbours, and the 
420 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Great Powers, (Delhi: South Asian Pub, 2003)  
 
Nandakumar and Kumar, 'India-Japan Relations: Are There Prospects for Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation?', Strategic Analysis, 31:6, (2007), pp. 973-984 
 
Nandy, Ashis ‘The Other Within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on 
Culpability’, New Literary History, 23-1, (Winter 1992), pp. 45-67 
 
Nau, Henry, ‘Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia,’ in G. J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno 
(eds.) International Relations Theory and the Asia- Pacific, (New York; Columbia University 
Press, 2003), pp. 213-241 
 
Nobayashi, Takeshi, ‘Prime Minister, Bureaucracy and Ruling Party: Leadership Characteristics 
in Japan’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, The Doshisha Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 5, (1977), 
pp. 1-32 
 
Nye, Joseph and Robert Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 1977) 
 
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, ‘International Control of Atomic Energy,’ in Morton Grodzins and 
Eugene Rabinowitch, (eds.), The Atomic Age: Scientists in National and World Affairs, (New 
York: Basic Books, 1963) 
 
O’Rourke, Ronald ‘China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, (22 April 2011) pp. 1-
71 
 
Panda, Rajaram and Kazuo Ando eds., India-Japan: Multidimensional Perspectives, (New 
Delhi: Japan Foundation, 1997) 
 
Panda, Rajaram and Yoo Fukazawa (eds.) India and Japan: In Search of Global Roles (New 
Delhi: The Japan Foundation Lancer’s Books, 2004)  
 
Pant, Harsh V. China’s Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition, (Eastbourne: Sussex 
Academic, 2011) 
 
Pant, Harsh V., 'The Emerging Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific', The RUSI Journal, 152:3, 
(2007) pp. 48-53 
 
Pant, Harsh V., ‘China's Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry,’ The 
Asia-Pacific Journal, 18-4-10, (3 May 2010) 
 
Pant, Harsh V., ‘India-Japan Relations: A Slow, But Steady, Transformation,’ in Sumit Ganguly 
ed., Indian Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
 
Pant, Harsh V., 'The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics', Asian 
Security, Vol.5, No.3, (2009), pp. 273-295 
 
Pardesi, Manjeet S. and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Energy Security and India’s Foreign/Security Policy’ 
in Harsh Pant ed., Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2008) 
 
Pempel, T.J., ‘The Pendulum Swings toward a Rising Sun’, Book Review Roundtable, Asia 
policy, No. 4 (July 2007), pp. 188-191 
 
Pempel, T.J., ed., Policymaking in Contemporary Japan, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
421 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
1997) 
 
Perkovich, George, ‘Global implications of the US-India deal’, Dædalus, (Winter 2010), pp. 20-
31  
 
Potter, William C., 'India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy,’ The Non-
proliferation Review, 12: 2, (2005), pp. 343-354 
 
Pyle, Kenneth, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York; 
Public Affairs Books, 2007) 
 
Raghavan, V.R. ed., Asian Security Dynamic: US, Japan & the Rising Powers (Delhi and 
Chicago: Promilla & Co. Publishers, 2008) 
 
Rose, Caroline, Interpreting Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-
Making, (London: Routledge, 1998) 
 
Rose, Gideon, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics, Vol. 51, 
No. 1 (October, 1998), pp. 144-172 
 
Roth, Ariel Ilan, ‘A Bold Move Forward for Neoclassical Realism’, International Studies 
Review, Number 8 (2006), pp. 486-488 
 
Samuels, Richard J., Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008) 
 
Sareen, T.R., Japanese Prisoners of War in India, 1942-1946: Bushido and Barbed Wire, 
(Global Oriental; Folkestone, 2006) 
     
Sato, Hiroshi, ‘India Japan Peace Treaty and Japan’s Post-War Asian Diplomacy’, Journal of 
the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 17, (December 2005) 
 
Sawaji, Osamu, ‘A New Era of Japan-India Relations’, The Japan Journal, (December 2007), 
http://www.japanjournal.jp/tjje/show_art.php?INDyear=07&INDmon=12&artid=ca3d183e4aa7
b102c482f80af209c56a&page=2 (Accessed on 09/10/08)  
 
Sawako, Maeda ‘Transformation of Japanese Space Policy: From the 'Peaceful Use of space' to 
'the Basic Law on Space,'’ The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 44-1-09, 2 (November, 2009), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Maeda-Sawako/3243  
 
Schweller, Randall L., ‘Unanswered Threats, A Neoclassical Realist Theory of 
Underbalancing’, International Security, Vol.. 29, Issue 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 159-201 
 
Schweller, Randall L.,‘The Progressiveness of Neo-classical Realism’, Elman and Elman eds., 
Progress in International Relations Theory, Appraising the Field, (Cambridge: MIT, 2003), pp. 
311-347 
 
Seth, Aftab, ‘India and Japan’, Indian Foreign Policy, Challenges and Opportunities, (Delhi; 
Academic Foundation, 2007), pp. 809-819 
 
Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense 
Affairs, (London; University of Washington Press, 2007) 
 
Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, Timothy Dunne eds. Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2008) 
422 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991) 
 
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, ‘Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level 
Variables’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March, 1997), pp. 1-26 
 
Suh, J.J. and Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson eds. Rethinking Security in East Asia: 
Identity, Power, and Efficiency, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 
 
Synder, Robert S., ‘Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: the Case of the 
Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War’ Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Vol. 1, Issue 1., (March, 2005), pp. 55-71 
 
Szpilman, Christopher W. A., ‘The Dream of One Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei and Japanese Pan-
Asianism’ in Fuess ed., The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Post-war Legacy, (Munich; 
Iudicium Verlag, 1998), pp. 49-63 
 
Takahashi, Sugio, ‘Transformation of Japan’s Defense Industry? Assessing the Impact of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs’, Security Challenges, vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 2008), pp. 101-115 
 
Takei, Teruyoshi ‘CoCom and the Japanese Regulation of Exports – The Response of Japanese 
Companies’ in Hiroshi Oda, ‘Law and Politics of West-East technology transfer’, Volume 1988 
by Hiroshi Oda, pp. 119-131 
 
Talbott, Strobe, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004)  
 
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., ‘Neoclassical Realism: The Psychology of Great Power Intervention’, 
Jennifer Sterling Folker (ed.) Making Sense of International Relations Theory, (Boulder; Lynne 
Rienner, 2006), pp. 38-53 
 
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M Ripsman, NCR, the State and Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)  
 
Taniguchi, Tomohiko, ‘A Cold Peace: The Changing Security Equation in Northeast Asia,’ 
Orbis, Volume 49, Number 3, (Summer, 2005), pp. 445-457 
 
Taniguchi, Tomohiko, ‘Beyond “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”: Debating Universal 
Values in Japanese Grand Strategy’, Asia Paper Series, (October 2010), pp. 1-5 
 
Taylor, Robert, Greater China and Japan: Prospect for an Economic Partnership in East Asia, 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1996) 
 
Varma, Lalima, ‘Japan’s Official Development Assistance to India: A Critical Appraisal’, India 
Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 3 (July/September 2009), pp. 237-250 
 
Verma, Bhushan, Indo-Japanese Relations: Challenges and Opportunities, (Kanishka; Delhi, 
2004)  
 
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, (McGraw Hill; New York, 1979) 
 
Wang, Qingxin Ken, ‘Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the US after the Cold War’, 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 353-373 
 
423 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power 
Politics’, International Organization (46:2, Spring 1992), pp. 399-403 
  
Wight, Colin, ‘Incommensurability and Cross Paradigm Communication in International 
Relations Theory: “What’s the Frequency Kenneth”’, Millennium. 25, (1996), pp. 291-319 
 
Wilson, D., and R. Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050’, Goldman 
Sachs, Global Economics Paper No, 99, (October 1, 2003), pp. 1-4 
 
Wolferen, Karel van, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, 
(New York; Vintage Books, 1987, 1992) 
 
Xinbo, Wu, ‘The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US-Japanese Alliance’, The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), pp. 119-130 
 
Yahuda, Michael, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, (London; 
Routledge, 1996) 
 
Yuzawa, Takeshi, Japan’s Security Policy and The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for 
Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific, (London; Routledge, 2007) 
 
Zakaria, Fareed, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’ on Myths of Empire: 
Domestic Politics and International Ambition by Jack Snyder, International Security, Vol. 17, 
No. 1 (Summer, 1992), pp. 177-198 
 
Zhao, Quansheng, Japanese Policymaking: The Politics behind Politics: Informal Mechanisms 
and the Making of China Policy, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1995) 
 
Online articles 
 
Abiru, Taisuke, ‘Japan, Russia and the Future of Nuclear Energy,’ Tokyo Foundation, 20 
August, 2010, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2010/japan-russia-and-the-future-of-
nuclear-energy-1(Accessed on 20/08/10) 
 
Akimoto, Kazumine, ‘Japan’s Contribution to the Safety of Sea Lanes’, Dispatches from Japan, 
MOFA, Vol. 5, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/dispatches/vol05/perspectives.html   
 
Akimoto, Kazumine, ‘The Current State of Maritime Security – Structural Weaknesses and 
Threats in the Sea Lanes’, The South China Sea, Paper prepared for the conference on 
‘Maritime Security in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia’, Institute for International Policy 
Studies, Tokyo, 11-13 December 2001, http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Akimoto_paper-
Sealanes%20and%20security.pdf 
 
Auslin, Michael, ‘Japan Learns to Accept the Military’, Wall Street Journal, 15 April, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703983104576262362763256644.html 
(Accessed on 15/04/110 
 
Auslin, Michael, ‘Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward A Regional Strategy’, AEI, 
December 2010, http://www.aei.org/docLib/AuslinReportWedDec152010.pdf (Accessed on 
03/01/11) 
 
Aydin, Cemil, ‘Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931–1945’ 
Japan Focus, 12 March, 2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Cemil-Aydin/2695 (Accessed on 
15/08/09) 
 
424 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Bajpaee, Chietigj, ‘The Samurai and the Swami Rediscover Each Other’, IPCS Issue Brief, No. 
51 (September 2007), http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/512858895IPCS-IssueBrief-No51.pdf 
(Accessed on 19/05/09) 
 
Barkin, Samuel, ‘Realist Constructivism’ International Studies Review 5 (2003)  
 
Barnett, Yikiko Sumi, ‘India in Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei’s Pan-Asian Thought and His Idea of 
India in Early Twentieth-Century Japan’, Journal of the Oxford University History Society, 
(2004) 
 
Baruah, Pranamita ‘Japan’s Response to Sea Piracy’, 30 March, 2009, IDSA Strategic 
Comment, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/JapansResponsetoSeaPiracy_PBaruah_300309 
(Accessed on 30/04/09) 
 
Baruah, Pranmita ‘Changing Contours of the Japan-India Defense Relations’, Global Politician, 
3 April, 2010, http://globalpolitician.com/26267-japan-india (Accessed on 03/04/10) 
 
Bolton, John R. ‘Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific 
Region: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative’, Tokyo American Center, Field 
Program Design, Tokyo, Japan, 27 October, 2004, 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/wmd/State/37480.pdf  
 
Borra, Ranjan, ‘Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian National Army and the War of India’s 
Liberation’, The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1982 (Vol. 3, No. 4), 
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v03/v03p407_Borra.html pages 407-439 
 
‘Breakthrough in Japan-India trade talks, including pharma, look set to see signing of FTA 
this year’, The Pharma Letter, 12 April, 2010, 
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/27146/breakthrough-in-japan-india-trade-talks-including-
pharma-look-set-to-see-signing-of-fta-this-year.html (Accessed on 12/04/10) 
 
Breslin, Shaun, ‘Supplying Demand or Demanding Supply? An Alternative Look at the Forces 
Driving East Asian Community Building’ Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, 
(November 2007) 
 
Chellaney, Brahma and Takenori Horimoto, ‘Japan-India Links Critical for Asia-Pacific Peace 
and Stability’, Gaiko Forum, Fall 2007, Volume 7, Number 2, 
http://chellaney.net/2007/11/10/japans-leading-foreign-affairs-journal-interviews-brahma-
chellaney/ (Accessed on 02/02/09)  
 
Chellaney, Brahma, ‘Security and Strategic Challenges in Asia – Prospects of Japan-India 
Cooperation’, Proceedings from Observer Research Foundation, Chennai India Symposium, 
August 2008 
 
Das, Bijoy, ‘Relevance of an East China Sea dispute to India’, IDSA Comment, 24 March, 2011, 
http://www.idsa.in/node/7088/2650 (Accessed on 24/03/11) 
 
Deshingkar, PA Narashimha, ‘The Construction of Asia in India’, p. 175 citing Jawaharlal 
Nehru, ‘Letter No. 117,’ Glimpses of World History, Vol. 2, Allahabad, Kitabistan, (1934) 
 
Dobell, Graeme, ‘White Paper: China nightmare, Indonesian dream’, Lowy Interpreter, May 4, 
2009, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/05/04/Defence-White-Paper-China-nightmare-
Indonesian-dream.aspx 
 
425 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
‘Doing Business 2010, Making a difference for entrepreneurs’, Doing Business, 4 November, 
2010, http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/annual-
reports/english/db11-fullreport.pdf p. 4 (Accessed 18/02/11) 
 
Etsuro Ishigami, ‘Competition and Corporate Strategy in the Indian Automobile Industry with 
special reference to Maruti Udyog Limited and Suzuki Motor Corporation,’ Paper presented at 
‘2004 International Conference: A Comparison of Japanese Firms and Korean Firms in Indian 
Automobile Market’, November 5, 2004, Gyeongsang National University, Korea. 
http://www.adm.fukuoka-u.ac.jp/fu844/home2/Ronso/Shogaku/C49-3+4/C4934_0291.pdf 
 
‘Face to Face Interview: Interview with Mr. Osamu Watanabe: JETRO Focusing on Business 
Match-Making Programme’, India One Stop, 23 June, 2003, 
http://www.indiaonestop.com/face2face/osamu.htm (Accessed on 15/06/09) 
 
Funabashi, Yoichi, ‘The Future of the Sino-Japanese Relationship’, Seminar at The Daiwa 
Anglo-Japanese Foundation, London, 1 June, 2011  
 
Ganguly, Sumit and S. Paul Kapur, ‘The End of the Affair? Washington’s Cooling Passion for 
Delhi’, Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65141/sumit-
ganguly-and-s-paul-kapur/the-end-of-the-affair (Accessed on 16/06/09) 
 
Ghosh, Arunabha, ‘Pathways Through Financial Crisis: India’, Global Governance 12 (2006) 
 
Goh, Evelyn, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the US in the East Asian Security Order’, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8:3, September 2008 
 
Green, Michael J. ‘Towards Greater US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue and Coordination’, 
CSIS, February 2009 
 
Green, Michael J., ‘Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo’s New Assertiveness Is Good for Washington’, 
Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2007). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62460/michael-j-
green/japan-is-back-why-tokyo-s-new-assertiveness-is-good-for-washingto (Accessed on 
06/07/09) 
 
‘Gross Bilateral ODA 2008-09’, OCED, DAC, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/5/44285062.gif    
 
Gupta, Sourabh, ‘Japan-India Joint Security Declaration: Towards an Asia-wide Security 
Architecture?’ Japan Focus, 10 November, 2008, http://old.japanfocus.org/_Sourabh_Gupta-
Japan_India_Joint_Security_Declaration__Towards_an_Asia_wide_Security_Architecture_ 
(Accessed on 17/06/10) 
 
‘History of the Japan-India Association’, Japan-India Association website, http://www.japan-
india.com/english/news/view/5 (Accessed on 16/06/09)  
  
‘India & Japan to Strengthen Economic and Trade Ties JETRO Chennai Office Inaugurated’, 
CII Press Release, 1 May, 2010, http://www.cii.in/PressreleasesDetail.aspx?id=2746 (Accessed 
on 02/05/10) 
 
‘India and Japan talk terror and piracy’, Neptune Maritime Security, 6 July 2010, 
http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/india-japan-talk-terror-and-piracy (Accessed on 
06/07/10) 
 
‘India and Japan’, India Brand Equity Foundation, June 2010, 
426 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
http://www.ibef.org/india/indiajapan.aspx 
 
‘India, Japan, US Navies to Hold Military Exercises Off Okinawa Coast, Japan’, India Defence, 
16 February, 2011, http://www.india-defence.com/reports-5023 (Accessed on 16/02/11) 
 
‘India’, Country Analysis Briefs, US Energy Information Administration, (August 2010), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/India/Full.html 
 
‘India’s Economic Prospects & India-Japan Partnership’, Address by H.E. Mr H.K. Singh, 
Ambassador of India at  Special Breakfast Meeting for Japan Center of Economic Research, 
November 12, 2009, p. 58 
 
India-China Trade, Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India, 
http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp  
 
'Indian Leader Wins Confidence Vote; Nuclear Deal on Track', in: NTI Global Security 
Newswire, 22 July 2008, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/GSN_20080722_0CC129A8.php (Accessed on 
15/03/11)  
 
'Issues in Promising Countries and Regions’, Survey Report On Overseas Business Operations 
by Japanese Manufacturing Companies - Results of JBIC FY 2006 Survey: Outlook for 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (18th Annual Survey), November 2006, 
http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/about/press/2006/1122-01/houkokusyo.pdf 
 
Izuyama, Marie and Shinichi Ogawa, ‘The Nuclear Policy of India and Pakistan,’ NIDS Security 
Reports, No.4 (March 2003) 
 
Jain, Purnendra, ‘New roadmap for Japan-India ties,’ Japan Focus, 4 September, 2007, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Purnendra-Jain/2514 (Accessed on 11/11/08) 
 
Jain, Purnendra, ‘From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan's Changing View of India-
1998-2007’, Institute of South Asian Studies Working Paper, National University of Singapore, 
No. 41, (March 2008) 
 
‘Japan to relax arms export ban: report’, Japan Today, 23 May, 2009, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/japan-to-relax-arms-export-ban-nikkei-
reports (Accessed on 23/05/09) 
 
‘Japanese Loan Assistance to India’, Government of India Portal on Development Assistance, 
http://www.externalaid.gov.in/portal/index.jsp?sid=1&id=321&pid=317  
 
'Japan's Renewed Interest in India: An “Upward Trajectory”’, India Knowledge at Wharton, 22 
January, 2009, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4347 (Accessed 
on 19/03/11) 
 
‘JETRO Seminar in India: Investment Opportunities – Japanese Pharmaceutical Market "Case 
Studies of Alliances and M&As between India and Japan”’, Press Release, JETRO, 20 
November, 2009 
 
Ji, YJ., ‘India-S Korea Nuclear Cooperation: Strategic Convergence?’ IPCS, No. 3187, 8 July 
2010, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/india-s-korea-nuclear-cooperation-strategic-
convergence-3187.html (Accessed on 16/07/10) 
 
Jimbo, Ken ‘Long-term Outlook for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies’, Tokyo Foundation, 
8 May 2009, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2009/long-term-outlook-for-
427 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
japan2019s-foreign-and-security-policies (Accessed on 09/05/09) 
 
‘Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’ 
White House Press Statement, 18 July, 2005, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html 
 
Joshi, Yogesh, ‘The Bandwagoning-Balancing Game: Contradictions of the India-US 
Partnership’, IDSA Comment, 5 August, 2011, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheBandwagoningBalancingGameContradictionsoftheIndiaU
SPartnership_yjoshi_050811 (Accessed on 06/08/11) 
 
Kakatkar-Kulkarni, Manasi, ‘Japan-India to increase cooperation in anti-piracy operations’, 
Foreign Policy Blogs, 9 November, 2009, 
http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/11/09/japan-india-to-increase-cooperation-in-anti-
piracy-operations/ (Accessed on 09/11/09) 
 
Kaneda, Hideaki, ‘Trilateral Maritime Security Partnership for Broad Maritime Security 
Coalition’ CSIS, (2008), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090201_bsa_kaneda.pdf p. 2 
 
Kapila, Subhash, ‘India Should Not Join Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): A View Point’, 
South Asia Analysis, Paper No. 969, 1 April, 2004, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper969.html 
 
Kaplan, Robert, ‘Q&A with Robert Kaplan on China’, Foreign Affairs, 7 May 2010, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-china?src=tw 
(Accessed on 07/05/10)   
 
Kapur, Paul interview with Kamla Bhatt, ‘Obama’s South Asian Policy’, Kamla Show, 17 June, 
2009, http://kamlashow.com/podcast/2009/06/17/prof-paul-kapur-obamas-south-asian-policy/ 
(Accessed on 14/07/09) 
 
Katz, Richard, ‘Why Is Korea More Able to Reach FTAs Than Japan?’ SSJ Discussion Forum, 
14 December, 2010, http://ssj.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/archives/2010/12/ssj_6455_why_is.html 
(Accessed on 15/12/10)  
 
Katzenstein and Sil, ‘Rethinking Japanese Security: A Case for Analytical Ecclectism’ (2004) 
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/tmpphp/publications/Katzenstein-ch1.pdf p. 16 
 
Kawai, Masahiro and Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, ‘Forging a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership between Japan and India: Prospects and Challenges,’ India-Japan Economic 
Corporation Seminar, ICRIER, July 14, 2008 
 
Kazi, Reshimi, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative and India’, IPCS, Delhi, No. 1511, 28 
September 2004, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/proliferation-security-initiative-and-india-
1511.html (Accessed on 04/04/11) 
 
Kesavan, K.V., ‘India and Japan: Changing Dimensions of Partnership in the post-Cold War 
Period’, ORF Occasional Paper No. 14, May 2010, 
http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/occasionalpaper/attachments/india_japa
n_1275545633112.pdf (Accessed on 26/06/10) 
 
Kesavan, KV, ‘Indo-Japanese Partnership: The Security Factor’, Observer Research 
Foundation Issue Brief, No. 19, (May 2009) 
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ORF_Indo
-Japan_1243494779320.pdf 
428 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Khalilzad, Zalmay et al., The US and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001) 
 
Khan, Haider A.,‘Japanese Aid to South and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis’, April-
May 2001 
 
Khan, Shamshad A., ‘China threat propels a new defence thinking in Japan’, IDSA Comments, 
20 December, 2010, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinathreatpropelsanewdefencethinkinginJapan_sakhan_201
210 (Accessed on 20/12/10) 
 
Kinoshita, Toshihiko, ‘How to promote FDI in India through lessons in East Asia?’ Paper 
presented at seminar on FDI in India, cosponsored by FICCI and JETRO, December 20, 2000, 
http://homepage3.nifty.com/tkinoshita/research/pdf/NewDelhi.pdf p. 8 
 
Kiyota, Tomoko, ‘Japan’s Non-nuclear Principles: Change in the Offing?’ IPCS Article No. 
2948, 17 August, 2009, http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2948  
 
Koga, Kei ‘Japan’s New Policy Defence Program Guideline and Japan-India Security 
Cooperation’, IPCS, 13 January, 2011, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/japans-new-policy-
defence-program-guideline-and-japan-india-security-3315.html  
 
Koike, Yuriko, ‘Suzuki and strategic alliance’, Project Syndicate, 15 February, 2010, 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/koike2/English (Accessed on 16/05/10) 
 
Kooroshy, Jaakko, ‘The Rare Earths Supply Crisis’, Chatham House, 8 July 2011, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/176701  
 
Limaye, Satu, ‘India-East Asia Relations: The Weakest Link but Not Goodbye’, Comparative 
Connections, CSIS, Vol. 4, No. 4, (January 2003) 
(Accessed on 05/08/11) 
 
Makhijani, Arjun, ‘The Unacceptable Cost of the Nuclear Power Option for Japan,’ Japan 
Focus, March 13, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-Endo-Tetsuya/2697 (Accessed on 25/06/10) 
 
Mathur, Arpita, ‘Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in India: A Weak Link in Ties’, RSIS 
Policy Belief, Issue No. 1, 19 March, 2010, 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_brief/RSIS%20-%20PB%20-Issue%20no%201%20-
%202010%20%28pdf%29.pdf (Accessed on 06/10/10)  
 
McCormack, Gavan, ‘Japan as a Plutonium Superpower,’ Japan Focus, 9 December, 2007, 
http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/2602  
 
‘Middle East Policy As I See It, An Address by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Organized by the Middle East Research Institute of Japan’ Hotel Okura, Tokyo, 28 
February, 2007, http://www.disarm.emb-
japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/070228Middle%20East.htm 
 
Miyagi, Taizo, ‘Looking Beyond Cold War History in Asia’, Tokyo Foundation, 1 July 2008, 
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2008/foreign-and-security-policy/looking-beyond-
cold-war-history-in-asia (Accessed on 08/08/09)  
 
Mochizuki, Mike M., ‘Change in Japan’s Grand Strategy: Why and How Much?’ Book Review 
Roundtable, Asia policy, No. 4 (July 2007) 
429 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Nakajima, Pal Hanji, Tokyo Saiban Hihan to Zettai Heiwa-shugi (Judge Pal: His Criticism of 
the Tokyo Trial and His Absolute Pacifism) (Hakusui-sha, 2007) Review by Fumiko Halloran, 
The Japan Society Review, Issue 14 Volume 3 Number 2 (2008) 
http://www.japansociety.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/review_volume_3_number_1_2008_Issue_14.pdf  (Accessed on 
15/08/09) 
 
Nalwa, Preeti, ‘Japan’s Revised Defence Guidelines: Proactive Dynamism Pervades “Reluctant 
Realism”, IDSA Comments, 27 December, 2010, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/JapansRevisedDefenceGuidelines_pnalwa_271210  
 
Nandakumar, Janardhanan, ‘India and nuclear power: examining socio-political challenges to 
energy security,’ http://www.world-
nuclear.org/sym/2008/presentations/nandakumarpresentation.pdf 
 
Nataraj, Geethanjali, ‘India-Japan Investment Relations: Trends and Prospects’, ICREIR, 
Working Paper No. 245, January 2010 
 
‘National Security Strategy’, US White House, May 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 
(Accessed on 02/04/11) 
 
‘Network’s Final Edition’, Network Magazine, Volume 41, September 2008, 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/network/vol41/vol_41_1.html  
 
‘NIDS China Strategy Report’, The National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan, (March, 2011), 
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_4C_A01.pdf p. 22  
 
Nishigahiro, Wataru, ‘Political and Defence Aspects of India-Japan Relations’, CSA Chennai 
Speech, 21 January 2004, http://www.csa-chennai.org/Files/indojapan.pdf 
 
Panda, Rajaram, ‘DPJ’s Duplicity on Futenma Base Relocation in 2009’, IDSA Comment, 9 
May, 2011, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DPJsDuplicityonFutenmaBaseRelocationin2009_rpanda_090
511 (Accessed on 10/05/11)  
 
Panda, Rajaram, ‘India and Japan: Strengthening Defence Cooperation’, IDSA Comment, 22 
December, 2009, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaandJapanStrengtheningDefenceCooperation_rpanda_221
209 (Accessed on 28/12/09)  
 
Panda, Rajaram, ‘India-Japan Economic Relations: Focus on the DMIC, IDSA Fellows Seminar, 
25 March 2011, http://www.idsa.in/event/IndiaJapanEconomicRelationsFocusonDMIC 
(Accessed on 27/03/11)  
 
Panda, Rajaram, Shamshad A.Khan and Pranamita Baruah, ‘As Dragon flexes muscle, the 
Rising Sun goes defensive’, Issue Brief, IDSA, 9 September 2010, 
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/AsDragonflexesmuscletheRisingSungoesdefensive  (Accessed on 
10/09/10) 
 
Patel, Nirav, ‘The Elephant and the Rising Sun: Alliance for the Future’, South Asia Analysis, 
Paper, Paper 2345, 24 August 2007, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers24%5Cpaper2345.html (Accessed on 06/04/10) 
 
430 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
‘Proliferation Security Initiative’, US State Department, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm 
 
Rajagopalan, Rajesh, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy,’ Major Powers’ Nuclear Policies and 
International Order in the 21st Century, (Conference) National Institute for Defence Studies, 
Tokyo, 18 November, 2009 
 
Raman, B., ‘Hatoyama as Japanese PM: Implications for India’, South Asia Analysis, Paper no. 
3381, 31 August 2009, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers34%5Cpaper3381.html 
(Accessed on 03/09/09) 
 
Rathbun, Brian, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: NCR as the Logical and Necessary Extension of 
Structural Realism’, Security Studies, 17:2, (April, 2008) 
 
Rynning, Sten, ‘The High Cost of Theory in Neoclassical Realism’, H-Diplo, (July, 2009) 
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24339  
 
‘SIPRI Yearbook 2010 – Military Expenditure’, 
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2010/pressreleasetranslations/storypackage_milex, p. 
8 
 
‘Special Feature: The Defence Agency's Transition to the Ministry of Defence’, Japan Defence 
Focus, Japan Ministry of Defence, No. 4, 2007, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no04/special.html  
 
‘Speech concerning Information Technology by Prime Minister Mori at the meeting with the 
leaders from Indian IT companies, hosted by Honourable Mr. S. M. Krishna, Chief Minister of 
Karnataka, ‘IT Cooperation between Japan and India in the 21st Century’, 22 August, 2000, 
Bangalore, India   
 
‘Suggestions for Government of India by Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in India 
(JCCII), India Embassy of Japan, April 5, 2010, http://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-
Relations/2010_.pdf  
 
Sachs, Goldman, ‘The N-11: More Than An Acronym’, BRICS and Beyond, (November 2007) 
 
Sakhuja, Vijay, 'Indo-Japanese maritime security cooperation', Strategic Analysis, 24: 1, (2000) 
 
Sako, Kojo ‘Japanese Companies Venturing into the Indian Market: India requires different 
marketing strategies from ASEAN and China’, Mizhuo Economic Outlook and Analysis, 23 
May, 2008, http://www.mizuho-ri.co.jp/research/economics/pdf/eo/MEA080513.pdf 
 
Samuels, Richard, ‘Japan’s Grand Strategy’, LSE Public Lecture, London (13 October 2008), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/events/2008/20080819t1316z00
1.htm 
 
Shimizu, Hiroshi, ‘The Indian merchants of Kobe and Japan's trade expansion into Southeast 
Asia before the Asian-Pacific War’, Japan Forum, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 25 – 48.  
 
Sikri, Rajiv, ‘Foreign Policy Challenges Facing India’s New Government’, Chatham House 
Lecture, 1 July, 2009 
 
Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs Seminar, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic 
Horizons’, 30 November , 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html  
 
Squassoni, Sharon, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)’, CRS Report for Congress, 14 
431 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
September 2006, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf 
 
Suresh Jaura, ‘Canada-India: The Nuclear Bonanza,’ Global Perspectives, January 2010, 
http://www.global-
perspectives.info/download/2010/pdf/What_After_Copenhagen_January_2010.pdf  
 
Tagore, Rabindranath, ‘The message of India to Japan: a Lecture’, Delivered at the Imperial 
University of Tokyo, (1916) 
 
Terada, Takashi, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6: Japan’s Initiatives and the Agent-Structure 
Framework’, Working Paper, Waseda University Global COE Program Global Institute for 
Asian Regional Integration (GIARI), (August 2009) 
 
‘Text of Policy Speech to the Diet’, Japan Times, 3 October, 2006, p. 3 quoted in Vivek Pinto, 
‘A Strategic Partnership Between Japan and India?’ Japan Focus, 11 January 2007, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Vivek-Pinto/2321 (Accessed on 19/05/09) 
 
Toki, Masako, ‘Japan's Defence Guidelines: New Conventional Strategy, Same Old Nuclear 
Dilemma’, Issue Brief, 1 March, 2011, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_japan.html (Accessed 
on 01/03/11)  
 
‘Toshiba Acquires Westinghouse from BNFL,’ Toshiba Press Release, February 6, 2006, 
http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2006_02/pr0601.htm 
 
Urata, Shujiro, ‘How India’s Dynamism Can Energize Japan – Cooperating on Infrastructure 
and Environment to Clear the Way for Growth’, Asian Research Report 2009, Japan Center for 
Economic Research, March 2010, http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/nikkei100115.pdf, pp. 1-5 
 
Urata, Shujiro, ‘The Indian Economy: Growth, Challenges and Regional Cooperation’, Asia 
Research Report 2009, Japan Center for Economic Research, March 2010, 
http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/asia09intro.pdf, pp. 1-18 
 
‘US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue: February 27 –March 1, 2009’, Japan Institute for 
International Affairs, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Confederation of 
Indian Industries, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/report/090301e-us-j-india_strategic_dialogue.pdf 
(Accessed on 07/06/09) 
 
US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue, CSIS, September 22-24, 2010, Washington, D.C., 
http://csis.org/publication/us-japan-india-strategic-dialogue-1 (Accessed on 26/09/10) 
 
Vasan, RS. (Retd Commodore), ‘Alondra Rainbow revisited, A Study of related issues in the 
light of the recent judgment of Mumbai High Court’, South Asia Analysis, Paper No. 1379, 13 
May 2005, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers14%5Cpaper1379.html (Accessed on 
30/04/09) 
 
Warren, David, ‘Lecture by David Warren, British Ambassador to Tokyo’, Embassy of Japan, 
London, January 21, 2010 
 
 ‘What Does The Film Pride—The Fateful Moment Describe?’Akahata, (Official newspaper of 
the Japanese Communist Party), 8 July 1998 
 
Williams, Brad, ‘Why give? Japan’s response to the Asian tsunami crisis’, Japan Forum 18 (3) 
2006, http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/polwb/RJFO_A_194647_O.pdf 
 
‘World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power,’ World Nuclear Association, June 2010, 
432 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf16.html  
 
‘World Investment Prospects to 2011: Foreign direct investment and the challenge of political 
risk’ 
http://www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=eiu_world_investment_prospects_2007&rf=0  
 
‘World Reaction to the Indian Nuclear Tests’, James Martin Center for Non-proliferation 
Studies Archives, http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/reaction.htm (Accessed on 04/05/11) 
 
Newspaper articles 
 
BBC News 
 
‘Canada and India sign nuclear co-operation deal,’ BBC News, 28 June, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10430904 (Accessed on 28/06/10) 
‘China “will not match” US military power – general’, BBC News, 19 May, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13450316, (Accessed on 19/05/11) 
‘China aircraft carrier confirmed by general’, BBC News, 8 June, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13692558 (Accessed on 08/06/11) 
‘China angered by Japan’s defence paper warnings’, BBC News, 4 August 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14398647 (Accessed on 04/08/11) 
'China fury at US military report’, BBC News, 26 March, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7965084.stm (Accessed on 26/04/09) 
‘China hits out at US on navy row’, BBC News, 10 March 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7934138.stm (Accessed on 10/03/09) 
 ‘China says it will boost its defence spending in 2011’, BBC News, 4 March, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12631357 (Accessed on 08/06/11) 
‘China’s first aircraft carrier “starts sea trials”, BBC News, 10 August, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14470882 (Accessed on 10/08/11) 
‘Clinton stresses key China goals’, BBC News, September 11, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8249824.stm (Accessed on 11/09/09) 
‘Corruption 'threatens India's economic growth' BBC News, 15 March 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12740213 (Accessed on 15/03/11) 
‘India gives final okay to $12bn Posco steel plant’, BBC News, 3 May 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13263586 Accessed on 04/05/11) 
‘India is world's 'largest importer' of arms, says study’, BBC News, 14 March, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12729363 (Accessed on 14/03/11) 
‘India parliament passes civil nuclear power bill,’ BBC News, August 25 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11084256 (Accessed on 04/01/11) 
‘India to tighten nuclear safeguards at Jaitapur plant’, BBC News, 27 April 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13204923 (Accessed on 27/04/11) 
‘India: Strike at Maruti Suzuki called off’, BBC News, 17 June 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13804415 (Accessed on 17/06/11) 
‘Japan and India in nuclear co-operation talks,’ BBC News, August 22, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11050615 (Accessed on 22/08/10) 
‘Japan defence review warns of China’s military might’, BBC News, 17 December 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12015362 (Accessed on 17/12/10) 
‘Japan finds rare earths in Pacific seabed’ BBC News, 4 July 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14009910 (Accessed on 04/07/11)  
‘Japan PM Naoto Kan urges nuclear-free future’, BBC News, 13 July 2011 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14137186 (Accessed on 13/07/11) 
‘Japan to deploy ships off Somalia’, BBC News, 28 January 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7855120.stm (Accessed on 28/01/09) 
‘Japan warns of rise in China’s naval activities’, BBC News, 2 August 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14368665 (Accessed on 02/08/11) 
433 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
'Light goes out in India as Nehru died’, BBC News, 27 May 1964 (Accessed on 12/10/10) 
‘Rare earths supply deal between Japan and Vietnam’, BBC News, 31 October, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11661330 (Accessed on 31/10/10) 
‘US says China's navy has been less aggressive in 2011’, BBC News, 13 April, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13059006 (Accessed on 13/04/11) 
Majumder, Sanjoy, ‘India's new face as Asia's car industry hub’, BBC News,13 June 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13735511 (Accessed on 13/06/11) 
Vaswani, Karishma, 'Arms drive' in South East Asia’, BBC News, 15 March, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8567750.stm  
 
‘The Diplomat’ 
 
Ching, Frank ‘Why China Needed Bin Laden’, The Diplomat, 26 May, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/05/26/why-china-needed-bin-laden/ (Accessed on 26/05/11) 
Ganguly, Sumit ‘India’s Nuclear Free Dream’, The Diplomat, April 22 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/2010/04/22/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-free-dream/  (Accessed on 22/04/10)  
Gokhale, Nitin ‘India Takes Fight to Pirates’, The Diplomat, 19 April, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/04/19/india-takes-fight-to-pirates/ (Accessed on 20/04/11)  
Helmke, Belinda ‘China’s Military Spending’, The Diplomat, June 8, 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/06/08/chinas-military-spending/ (Accessed on 08/06/11) 
Holmes, James R., ‘How to Track China’s Naval Dreams’, The Diplomat, 31 May, 2011, 
http://the-diplomat.com/2011/05/31/how-to-track-china%e2%80%99s-naval-dreams/ (Accessed 
on 31/05/11) 
Kraska, James ‘China Set for Naval Hegemony’, The Diplomat, 6 May, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/ (Accessed on 06/05/10) 
Medcalf, Rory and Raoul Heinrichs, ‘Asia’s Maritime Confidence Crisis’, The Diplomat, 27 
June, 2011,  http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/27/asia%E2%80%99s-maritime-confidence-crisis/ 
(Accessed on 27/06/11) 
Nayan, Rajiv, ‘Accepting a Nuclear India’, The Diplomat, 5 June 2011, http://the-
diplomat.com/2011/06/05/accepting-a-nuclear-india/ (Accessed on 05/06/11) 
Sharma, Rajeev, ‘An Indian Cover-up?’ The Diplomat, 23 April 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/indian-decade/2010/04/23/india-cover-up/ (Accessed on 23/04/10) 
Sharp, Andy, ‘Japan to Rethink Arms Exports’, The Diplomat, 12 October, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/tokyo-notes/2010/10/12/japan-to-rethink-arms-exports/ (Accessed on 12/10/10) 
Subramanian, N.V., ‘Nuclear Deal in Trouble?’ The Diplomat, June 18, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/indian-decade/page/12/ (Accessed on 18/06/10) 
Weitz, Richard, ‘Asia Steps Up at Nuclear Meet,’ The Diplomat, 19 April, 2010, http://the-
diplomat.com/2010/04/19/asia-steps-up/ (Accessed on 19/04/10) 
 
East Asia Forum 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, ‘Indian growth has lifted all boats’, East Asia Forum, 16 January, 2011, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/16/indian-growth-has-lifted-all-boats/ (Accessed on 
16/01/11) 
Brewster, David, ‘Political fallout from Japanese nuclear crisis hits India’, East Asia Forum, 23 
April 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/23/political-fallout-from-japanese-nuclear-
crisis-hits-india/ (Accessed on 23/04/11) 
Choorikkadan, Veeramani, ‘India gearing up for growth’, East Asia Forum, August 8, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/08/india-gearing-up-for-growth/ (Accessed on 08/08/10) 
Endo, Tetsuya, ‘Two Sides of the Same Coin: Nuclear Disarmament and the Peaceful Use of 
Nuclear Energy,’ East Asia Forum, 12 June, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/12/two-sides-of-the-same-coin-nuclear-disarmament-
and-the-peaceful-use-of-nuclear-energy/ (Accessed on 12/06/10) 
Feigenbaum, Evan, ‘As India “Looks East”, a little problem of economics, East Asia Forum, 26 
September, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/26/as-india-looks-east-a-little-
434 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
problem-of-economics/ (Accessed on 26/09/10) 
Feigenbaum, Evan, ‘Continental and maritime in US-India relations’, East Asia Forum, 21 
November 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/21/continental-and-maritime-in-us-
india-relations/ (Accessed on 21/11/10) 
Ghosh, PK. ‘Indian Ocean dynamics: An Indian perspective’, East Asia Forum, 5 April, 2011, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/05/indian-ocean-dynamics-an-indian-perspective/ 
(Accessed on 05/04/11) 
Gupta, Sourabh ,‘Japan-India Maritime security cooperation: Floating on inflated 
expectations?’, East Asia Forum, 11 May, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/11/japan-india-maritime-security-cooperation-floating-
on-inflated-expectations/ (Accessed on 11/05/10)  
Gupta, Sourabh, ‘Japan-India economic ties and the promise of the Delhi-Mumbai industrial 
corridor’, East Asia Forum, 4 November, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/04/japan-india-economic-ties-and-the-promise-of-the-
delhi-mumbai-industrial-corridor/ (Accessed on 04/11/10) 
Hale, Thomas ‘The de facto ‘free trade area’ in East Asia’, East Asia Forum, 29 December, 
2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/29/the-de-facto-free-trade-area-in-east-asia/ 
(Accessed on 29/12/10) 
Hemmings, John, ‘Japan, the headless polity’, East Asia Forum, 8 June, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/08/japan-the-headless-polity/ (Accessed on 09/06/10) 
Jain, Purnendra, ‘Japan’s nuclear pact with India,’ East Asia Forum, 7 September, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/07/japans-nuclear-pact-with-india/ (Accessed on 
07/09/10) 
Kumar, Vikhas, ‘Should India sign the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage?’ East Asia Forum, 15 June, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/15/should-india-sign-the-convention-on-supplementary-
compensation-for-nuclear-damage/ (Accessed on 16/02/11) 
Mancheri, Nabeek, ‘Investment by Japanese automobile manufacturers in India – a win-win 
situation’, East Asia Forum, 21 July, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/21/investment-by-japanese-automobile-manufacturers-
in-india-a-win-win-situation/ (Accessed on 21/07/10) 
Mulgan, Aurelia George, ‘Asia’s new strategic partnerships’, East Asia Forum, 20 January, 
2010 and http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0912.html; 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0912/action.html (Accessed on 20/01/10) 
Mulgan, Aurelia George, ‘Japan’s early decision on the TPP: Pie in the sky or credible 
commitment’, East Asian Forum, 2 June 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/02/japan-
s-early-decision-on-the-tpp-pie-in-the-sky-or-credible-commitment/ (Accessed on 02/06/11) 
Nataraj, Geethanjali, ‘India and Japan: Increasing interest, declining inflows’, East Asia Forum, 
9 September 2009,  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/09/09/india-and-japan-increasing-
interest-declining-inflows/  (Accessed on 09/09/09) 
Nishihara, Masahi, ‘How the earthquake strengthened the Japan-US alliance’, East Asia Forum, 
29 June 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/29/how-the-earthquake-strengthened-the-
japan-us-alliance/ (Accessed on 30/06/11) 
Rathus, Joel, ‘Australia and Japan: Emerging partnerships in the shadow of China’, East Asia 
Forum, 29 November, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/29/australia-and-japan-
emerging-partnerships-in-the-shadow-of-china/  (Accessed on 29/10/10) 
Rathus, Joel, ‘Japan’s Foreign Ministry reforms: Shifting priorities?’ East Asia Forum, 4 
September, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/04/japans-foreign-ministry-reforms-
shifting-priorities/ (Accessed on 04/09/10) 
Rathus, Joel, ‘Japan’s Foreign Ministry reforms: Shifting priorities?’ East Asia Forum, 4 
September, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/04/japans-foreign-ministry-reforms-
shifting-priorities/ (Accessed on 04/09/10) 
Sahoo, Pravakar, ‘India-Japan CEPA: A strategic move’, East Asia Forum, November 12, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/11/12/india-japan-cepa-a-strategic-move/ (Accessed on 
12/11/10) 
435 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
The Economist 
 
‘A homespun elixir: Japan’s drug firms on the move’, The Economist, 20 May, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16168270 (Accessed on 20/05/10) 
‘Abe blows Japan's trumpet, cautiously’, The Economist, 3 May 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/node/9116791 (Accessed on 11/08/11) 
‘Asian alliances: VW, GM and Peugeot-Citroën’, The Economist, 9 December, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15063005 (Accessed on 09/12/09) 
‘Asian security co-operation: Lost horizon’, The Economist, June 10th, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16321702 (Accessed on 10/06/10) 
‘Asian trade: The noodle bowl’, The Economist, 3 September, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14384384 (Accessed on 03/09/09) 
‘Base drubbing: A deal over a marine base mends a rift between the two allies–but opens a new 
one within Japan’, The Economist, 28 May 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16248757?story_id=E1_TGNQRSVS (Accessed on 28/05/10) 
‘Business in India: The price of graft’, The Economist, 24 March 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18441135 (Accessed on 24/03/11)  
‘Business in Japan under the DPJ’, The Economist, 3 September 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14376289 (Accessed on 04/09/09) 
‘Carrefour in India, A wholesale invasion’, The Economist, 20 May 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16168260 (Accessed on 20/05/10) 
‘Chasing ghosts’, The Economist, 11 June, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13825154 
(Accessed on 11/06/09)  
‘China and Japan: Getting their goat’, The Economist, 17 September, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17049121?story_id=17049121  (Accessed on 17/09/10) 
‘China's assertiveness at sea: Choppy waters’, The Economist, 21 January 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15331153 (Accessed on 21/01/10)  
‘Chinese foreign policy: Discord’, The Economist, January 13th, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17902953 (Accessed on 13/01/11) 
‘Corporate euthanasia’, A special report on Japan, The Economist, 18 November, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17492760 (Accessed on 18/11/10) 
‘Culture shock: Chinese labour unrest is forcing Japanese bosses to change’, The Economist, 8 
July, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16542339 (Accessed on 08/07/10) 
‘Doing Doha down: Trade agreements’, The Economist, 3 September, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14363297 (Accessed on 03/09/09) 
‘Giving more generously: Which rich countries gave in foreign aid last year’, The Economist, 
31 March 31, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13400406&fsrc=nwl 
(Accessed on 20/06/10)  
‘Global trade disputes: Trading blows’, The Economist, December 1, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15006195 (Accessed on 01/12/09) 
‘In the balance: A special report on China’s place in the world’, The Economist, December 2, 
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17601463 (Accessed on 05/12/10) 
‘India v China: The X factor’, The Economist,  20 April 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18586836 (Accessed on 20/04/11)  
‘India’s economy: One more push’, The Economist, July 21, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18988536 (Accessed on 21/07/11) 
‘India’s economy: the half-finished revolution’, The Economist, 21 July 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18986387?story_id=18986387 (Accessed on 21/07/11) 
‘India’s trade deal with Japan: Exporting yoga’, The Economist, 17 February 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/02/indias_trade_deal_japan (Accessed on 
17/02/11) 
‘India's economy: Calling on the gods’, The Economist, 3 March 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18291557 (Accessed on 03/03/11)  
436 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
‘Innovation through regulation: Why America’s corporate innovation beats Japan’s’, 
Business.view, The Economist, 2 June, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13766329 
(Accessed on 02/06/09) 
‘Japan and its unfree trade: Paddies vs. Prius’, The Economist, 11 November, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17472720?story_id=17472720 (Accessed on 11/11/10) 
‘Japan as number three: Watching China whiz by’, The Economist, 19 August 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16847828 (Accessed on 19/08/10) 
‘Japan’s ailing economy’, The Economist, 20 November, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14943913 (Accessed on 20/11/09) 
‘Japanese firms push into emerging markets’, The Economist, August 5, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16743435 (Accessed on 05/08/10)  
‘Land of Eastern promise’, The Economist, 19 November 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14915094 (Accessed on 19/11/09) 
‘Leaving home: Japan’s big companies are shipping production abroad’, The Economist, 18 
November, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17527225 (Accessed on 18/11/10) 
‘New Silk Roads’ The Economist,, 8 April, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15872888 
(Accessed on 08/04/10)  
‘No country is an island: Japan is reluctantly embracing globalisation’, The Economist, 29 
November, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/10169924 (Accessed on 29/11/07) 
‘Nuclear power: When the steam clears’, The Economist, 24 March 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18441163 (Accessed on 24/03/11)  
‘Pakistan, India and the anti-nuclear rules: Clouds of hypocrisy,’ The Economist, June 24th, 
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16425914  (Accessed on 24/06/10) 
‘Piracy: Peril on the high seas’, The Economist, 23 April 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7933596&st
ory_id=11079332 (Accessed on 23/04/08) 
‘POSCO’s Indian steep project: Greens vs jobs’, The Economist, 6 January 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17860057, (Accessed on 06/01/11) 
‘Rare action, Corporate Japan adjusts quickly to a shortage of rare earths’, The Economist, 20 
January 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/17967046 (Accessed on 20/01/11)  
‘Rocky relations between China and Japan’, The Economist, 4 November, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17416850 (Accessed on 04/11/10) 
‘Shipping fleets: Reviewing the fleets, Greece and Japan dominate shipping, but not under their 
own flags’, The Economist, 9 December 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15060106?fsrc=rss&story_id=15060106 (Accessed on 
09/12/09)  
‘The export trap: Asia’s failing export-led growth model’, Asia.View, The Economist, 25 March 
2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13356518 (Accessed on 25/03/09) 
‘The Hindu rate of self-deprecation’, Economist, 20 April 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18586958 (Accessed on 20/04/11)  
‘They have returned’, The Economist, 12 August, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16791842 (Accessed on 12/08/10) 
‘Three Asian giants, Forecasting foreign investment in China, Japan and India’, The Economist, 
6 September, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9769084 (Accessed on 19/12/08) 
 
Japan Times 
 
‘Arms export ban to stand; budget bills Kan's priority’, Japan Times, 8 December, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101208a7.html (Accessed on 08/12/10) 
‘Beijing hits Aso for threat rhetoric,’ The Japan Times, May 8, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090508a5.html (Accessed on 08/05/09) 
‘Breaking new ground, Tepco to invest in US nuclear business,’ Japan Times, 11 May, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100511a4.html (Accessed on 11/05/10) 
‘Breaking the US-Japan jinx’, Sentaku Magazine, Japan Times, 11 February, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090211a1.html (Accessed on 11/ 02/09) 
437 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
‘Broad agreement is reached to forge free-trade pact with India’, Japan Times, 10 September, 
2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100910a4.html (Accessed on 10/09/10) 
Chellaney, Brahma, ‘Dancing with the dragon’, Japan Times, 25 June, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090625bc.html (Accessed on 26/06/09) 
Chellaney, Brahma, ‘The Japan-India partnership to power a multipolar Asia’, Japan Times, 30 
December 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20091230bc.html (Accessed on 
02/01/10) 
‘China delays gas talks over collision’, The Japan Times, 12 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100912a1.html (Accessed on 12/09/10) 
‘China’s IT certification not a threat: Naoshima’, Japan Times, 24 March, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100324a3.html (Accessed on 24/03/10) 
‘China's ambitious defence plan’, The Japan Times, 28 January, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20090128a1.html (Accessed on 28/01/09) 
‘Chinese flotilla slips by Okinawa’, Japan Times, 5 July 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100705a5.html (Accessed on 05/07/10) 
‘Civil service recruits slashed 39%’, Japan Times, 22 May 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100522a6.html (Accessed on 22/05/10) 
Clarke, Trevor ‘Japan’s own Indian tech boom’, Japan Times, 9 January, 2007, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20070109zg.html (Accessed on 09/01/07) 
‘Defence Ministry eyes boosting GSDF by 13,000’, Japan Times, 21 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100921a2.html (Accessed on 21/09/10) 
‘Defence Ministry moves to enter global weapons trade’, Japan Times, 1 November 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101101a3.html (Accessed on 01/11/10) 
‘Defense pact with Australia eyed’, Japan Times, 21 September, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090921a1.html (Accessed on 21/09/09) 
Dujarric, Robert and Weston S. Konishi, ‘Incoming ambassador Roos is right for the job’, 
Japan Times, 17 June, 2009 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090617a1.html 
(Accessed on 17/06/09)  
Glosserman, Brad and Tomoko Tsunoda, ‘Older, smaller population to impact Japan’s choices’, 
Japan Times, 30 June, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090630a1.html 
(Accessed on 30/06/09) 
‘Half of Japan’s reactors in trouble,’ Japan Times, 15 June, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100615a3.html (Accessed on 15/06/10) 
Hirose, Keiichi, ‘Firms eye Hyderabad, India’s newest star’, Japan Times, 16 October 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101016f2.html. (Accessed on 16/10/10)  
‘Honda to build second cycle plant in India’, Japan Times, 10 March, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100310a2.html (Accessed on 10/03/10)  
‘Honda to up India motorcycle output’, Japan Times, 27 May 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20110527a2.html (Accessed on 27/05/11) 
Hongo, Jun, ‘Defence-only posture needs revisiting: panel’, Japan Times, 5 August 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090805a1.html (Accessed on 05/08/09) 
Hongo, Jun, ‘Press club faithful fight change’, The Japan Times, 7 October 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091007f1.html (Accessed on 07/09/09) 
‘India may send envoy to pitch nuclear pact to Japanese public,’ Japan Times, 7 July, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100707b1.html (Accessed on 07/07/10) 
‘Indians aid Japan’s IT industry’, Japan Times, 14 November, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091114f5.html (Accessed on 14/11/09) 
Ito, Masami, ‘Antipiracy, gift tax bills enacted’, Japan Times, 20 June 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090620a2.html (Accessed on 20/06/09)  
Ito, Masami, ‘Defence focus shifts from Russia to China’, Japan Times, 18 December 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101218a1.html  (Accessed on 18/12/10) 
Ito, Masami, ‘India, Japan agree on broad trade deal’, Japan Times, 26 October 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20101026a1.html (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
Ito, Masami, ‘Interim report sets new course in light of disaster, Energy policy revised to cut 
nuclear role’, Japan Times, 30 July 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
438 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
bin/nn20110730a1.html (Accessed on 30/07/11) 
Ito, Masami, ‘Japan avoiding initiative in non-nuclear movement,’ Japan Times, May 12, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100512f1.html (Accessed on 13/05/10) 
‘Japan freezes economic grants to India,’ Japan Times, May 13, 1998, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19980513a1.html (Accessed on 04/05/11) 
‘Japan goes along with US missile exports’, Japan Times, 5 June 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110605a6.html (Accessed on 05/06/11) 
‘Japan off Rumsfeld itinerary due to base impasse’, Japan Times, 7 October, 2005, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20051007a1.html (Accessed on 15/09/09) 
‘Japan Tobacco eyes India to offset shrinking market at home’, Japan Times, 18 March, 2010 
(expired story) 
‘Japan, Peru conclude FTA talks, eye market for autos’, Japan Times, 15 November, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20101115a2.html, (Accessed on 15/11/10) 
‘Japan, Vietnam to begin talks on nuke pact,’ Japan Times, 25 September, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100925a3.html (Accessed on 25/09/10) 
Johnston, Eric, ‘Rhetoric belies atomic policy,’ Japan Times, 7 August, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100807a2.html (Accessed on 07/08/10) 
Johnston, Eric, ‘Rhetoric belies atomic policy,’ Japan Times, 7 August, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100807a2.html (Accessed on 07/08/10) 
Kaneko, Maya ‘Uncertainty over tests stymies India nuclear plant’, Japan Times, 26 October 
2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20101026a7.html (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
Kim, Chung-Ho and Barun Mitra, ‘Choosing the slow lane en route to free trade’, Japan Times, 
7 August, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090807a2.html (Accessed on 
07/08/09) 
Kotani, Tetsuo, ‘Let China launch its flattop’ The Japan Times, 9 May, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090509a1.html (Accessed on 09/05/09) 
Lawson, Kede, ‘Hatoyama good for Australia ties: experts’, Japan Time, 16 September , 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090916a4.html (Accessed on 10/09/09) 
Martin, Alex, ‘Japan and Peru sign free-trade agreement’, Japan Times, 1 June 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20110601a4.html (Accessed on 01/06/11) 
Matsutani, Minori, ‘Newspapers here soldiering on’, Japan Times, 3 March 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090303i1.html (Accessed on 28/05/09) 
‘Mizhuo, JGC to push Indian urban property project’, Japan Times, 18 November, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20101118a1.html (Accessed on 18/11/10) 
Nakata, Hiroko, ‘State Bank of India bullish on Japan business’ Japan Times, 21 January 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100121a3.html (Accessed on 21/01/10) 
Okada cited in ‘Foreign Ministry seeks aid-policy revision to enhance efficiency’, Japan Times, 
30 June, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100630a9.html (Accessed on 
30/06/10)  
‘Nuke deals eyed with Egypt, Saudi Arabia’, Japan Times, 26 December 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101226a3.html (Accessed on 27/12/10) 
‘Nuke deterrence still vital: Kan,’ Japan Times, 7 August, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100807a5.html (Accessed on 07/08/10)  
‘Nuke power to remain key energy source: METI’, Japan Times, 23 June 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110623a8.html (Accessed on 23/06/11) 
Pant, Harsh V. ‘India's defence policy arrives at the crossroads for best buys’, Japan Times, 20 
December, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101220a1.html (Accessed on 
20/12/10) 
Pant, Harsh V. ‘Singh’s Japan stop was first step to shoring up regional security’, Japan Times, 
1 November 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101101a2.html (Accessed on 
01/11/10) 
Pant, Harsh V. ‘Who will rule the waves?’ Japan Times, 9 August 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090807a1.html (Accessed on 09/08/09) 
Pant, Harsh V., ‘India moving to pole position for Security Council challenge’, Japan Times, 6 
December 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101206a1.html (Accessed on 
439 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
06/12/10) 
Pant, Harsh V., ‘India’s newfound irrelevance to Washington’, Japan Times, 20 March, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090320a1.html (Accessed on 20/03/09)  
Pant, Harsh V., ‘India's defence policy arrives at the crossroads for best buys’, Japan Times, 20 
December, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20101220a1.html (Accessed on 
20/12/10)  
Pant, Harsh V., ‘Obama magic unlikely to work with India’, Japan Times, 1 February, 2009, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090201a2.html (Accessed on 01/02/09) 
Pant, Harsh V., ‘Rise of China prods India-ROK ties’, Japan Times, 7 September 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100907a1.html (Accessed on 07/09/10) 
Pulvers, Roger, ‘Words of wisdom from beyond the grave of Japan’s secret pacts,’ Japan 
Times, March 28, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100328rp.html (Accessed 
28/04/10)  
‘Political hazards follow the dissing of bureaucrats’, Sentaku Magazine, Japan Times, 17 May 
2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100517a1.html (Accessed on 17/05/10) 
Rafferty, Kevin, ‘Failings of Indian infrastructure’, Japan Times, September 3, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100903a1.html (Accessed on 03/09/10) 
Rafferty, Kevin, ‘Indian elephant too slow for the Chinese dragon’, Japan Times, January 4, 
2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110104a1.html (Accessed on 04/01/11)  
Richardson, Michael ‘China’s navy changing the game’, Japan Times, 13 May, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100513mr.html (Accessed on 13/05/10) 
Richardson, Michael, ‘Another “pearl” in Beijing’s string of ports’, The Japan Times, 19 
August, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100819mr.html (Accessed on 
19/08/10) 
‘Suzuki makes million cars in India’, Japan Times, 25 March, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20100325a3.html (Accessed on 25/03/10) 
Tanaka, Miya, ‘Japan-India pact may help exports’, Japan Times, 26 October 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nb20101026a1.html (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
‘Tokyo sought out Bonn on going nuclear in ‘69’, Japan Times, 30 November 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20101130a3.html (Accessed on 02/12/10) 
‘Toshiba looks for better India sales’ Japan Times, 23 July 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nb20110723a4.html (Accessed on 23/07/11) 
‘Toyota: Advance Indian orders strong for Etios’, Japan Times, 17 December, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20101217a7.html (Accessed on 17/12/10) 
‘US Warned Japan about Hatoyama’s Foreign Policies: NYT,’ Japan Times, 6 May, 2011, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20110506a6.html (Accessed on 06/05/11) 
 
Government of Japan documents 
 
‘Basic Policies’, DPJ, (April, 2008), http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html  
‘Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships’, Ministerial Committee on 
Comprehensive Economic Partnerships, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November 6, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/policy20101106.html 
‘Country Assistance Evaluation of India: Summary’, Third Party Evaluation, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, March 2010 
‘DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House of Representatives Election’, 30 August, 2005, 
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/pdf/manifesto_05.pdf (Accessed on 12/09/09)  
‘Enhancing Enlightened National Interest: Living in harmony with the world and promoting 
peace and prosperity’, ODA Review Final Report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 
2010 
‘FY 2011 Budget Request, August 2010, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,’ 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/policy/2011budget.pdf 
‘Government of Japan extended ¥787 million Grant Aid to India for the project for 
Strengthening of Electronic Media Production Center in Indira Gandhi National Open 
University (IGNOU)’, Press Release, Japanese Embassy in India, 26 July, 2010, 
440 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
http://www.in.emb-japan.go.jp/Press_Releases_Embassy/PR13-2010.html (Accessed on 
26/07/10) 
‘Japan’s Country Assistance Program for India’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2006, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/sw_asia/india.pdf 
‘Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html 
‘Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement [ACSA]’, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan, 19 May 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/5/0519_02.html 
‘Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global 
Partnership’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/india/partner0504.html#eight (Accessed on 10/11/10) 
‘Japan-India Relations’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/india/index.html  
‘Joint Declaration between the Leaders of Japan and the Republic of India on the Conclusion of 
the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement  between Japan and the Republic of 
India’, Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister of Japan, 25 October, 2010, 
http://www.Kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201010/25sengen_india_e.html  
‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India’, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan, 22 October 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html 
‘Joint Statement on the Conclusion of Negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement 
between Japan and Peru’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November 14, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/peru/epa1011/joint1011.html 
‘Joint Statement: On the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership 
between Japan and India’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 22 August 2007, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/joint-2.html   
‘Joint Statement’, Ministry of Defence, 9 November 2009, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/pdf/india03e.pdf 
‘Negotiations on a Japan-India Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy,’ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2010/6/0625_01.html  
‘ODA Review, Summary of the Final Report’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 29 June, 
2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/pdfs/review1006_summary.pdf  
‘On the New Growth Strategy’, Cabinet Decision, DPJ Government, 18 June, 2010, p. 51 
‘Philosophy: Objectives, Policies, and Priorities’, Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
Charter, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 29, 2003, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf 
‘Present State of the Piracy Problem and Japan’s Efforts’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 
December 2001, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html  
‘Statement by Mr. Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, on Agreement in 
Principle on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the 
Republic of India’, 9 September, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/9/0909_03.html 
‘The Challenges and Directions for Nuclear Energy Policy in Japan: Japan’s Nuclear Energy 
National Plan’ Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division, METI, (December, 2006), 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/report/rikkoku.pdf 
‘The Establishment of the “NGO Advisory Group on the State of International Cooperation by 
Japan” (Proposal), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 May, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/5/0525_01.html 
‘The ODA Charter clarifies the philosophies of Japan's ODA, 1992-2002’, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/cooperation/anniv50/pamphlet/progress3.html  
 
Other newspaper articles  
 
Aldrich, David P., ‘With A Mighty Hand’, The New Republic, 19 March 2011, 
441 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/85463/japan-nuclear-power-regulation (Accessed on 
19/03/11) 
Auslin, Michael, ‘Billiards in the South China Sea’, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450604576417500592116010.html?KEY
WORDS=auslin (Accessed on 30/06/11) 
Bagchi, Indrani, ‘India, Japan to hold talks on civil nuclear cooperation today’, Times of India, 
21 August, 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Japan-to-hold-talks-on-civil-
nuclear-cooperation-today/articleshow/6383218.cms (Accessed on 03/10/10) 
Banerjee, Ronojoy, ‘Slowdown blues make Japan favour India over China as investment hub’, 
Financial Express, India, 31 March, 2010, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/slowdown-
blues-make-japan-favour-india-over-china-as-investment-hub/597748/ (Accessed on 31/03/10) 
Barta, Patrick, Gordon Fairclough and Chester Dawson, ‘Japan’s Crisis Bolsters Its Military’, 
Wall Street Journal, 2 April 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576236472271896458.html?KEY
WORDS=%22center+for+strategic+and+international+studies%22 (Accessed on 05/04/11) 
Bhaumik, Anirban, ‘Fukushima fallout: Japan to go slow on nuke talks with India’, Deccan 
Herald, 14 June 2011, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/168694/fukushima-fallout-japan-
go-slow.html (Accessed on 05/06/11) 
Blank, Stephen, ‘China puts down marker in nuclear power race,’ Asia Times, 16 June, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LF16Cb01.html (Accessed on 16/06/10) 
Brown, Peter J., ‘IAEA faces mushrooming Asia challenge,’ Asia Times, 8 June, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF08Ak02.html (Accessed on 08/06/10)  
Brown, Peter J., ‘Japan weighs role in India’s nuclear boom,’ Asia Times, 19 June, 2010, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LF19Dh01.html (Accessed on 20/06/10) 
‘Can out N-plants survive Japan quake, PM wants to know’, Indian Express, 14 March, 2011, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/can-our-nplants-survive-japan-quake-pm-wan/762244/ 
(Accessed on 15/03/11) 
Chaudary, Archana, ‘Nuclear Accident Forces China Policy Review as India Sees Safety 
Backlash’,  Bloomberg, 14 March 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-13/japan-
nuclear-accident-may-thwart-boon-to-areva-ge-in-china-india-plans.html (Accessed on 
16/03/11) 
Chaudhuri, Pramit Pal, ‘Why Japan tilted towards India’, Hindustan Times25 October, 2010, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/617444.aspx (Accessed on 25/10/10) 
Chauhan, Chanchal Pal and Lijee Philip, ‘Suzuki chief to visit India as Maruiti gears up to make 
VW brands’, Economic Times, 23 November, 2010, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/auto/automobiles/Suzuki-chief-to-
visit-India-as-Maruti-gears-up-to-make-VW-brands/articleshow/6973444.cms (Accessed on 
23/11/10) 
‘China and Japan agree on joint gas exploration of East China Sea’, Guardian, 18 June, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/18/china.japan (Accessed on 12/09/10)  
‘China cuts rare earth exports for 2011’, Economic Times, 28 December, 2010, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-12-28/news/27577746_1_rare-earth-exports-
yao-jian (Accessed on 03/01/11) 
‘Chinese Navy urged to go from coastal waters to the oceans,’ Xinhua, 3 March 2009, available 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/07/content_10963412.htm (Accessed on 
05/03/09)  
Demetriou, Danielle, ‘Japan “should develop nuclear weapons” to counter North Korea threat’, 
Telegraph, 20 April 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/5187269/Japan-should-develop-
nuclear-weapons-to-counter-North-Korea-threat.html (Accessed on 18/07/11) 
Dickie, Murie ‘Fresh push to lift Japan arms export ban’, Financial Times, 13 December 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e0f951c8-05d8-11e0-976b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1KL7QBPWH 
(Accessed on 13/12/10) 
Dikshit, Sandeep ‘Japanese energy security is dependent on the Indian Navy’, The Hindu, 1 
October 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/01/stories/2007100155871300.htm (01/10/07) 
442 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Dikshit, Sandeep ‘Joint naval exercises begin today’, The Hindu, 4 September 2007, 
http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/04/stories/2007090460941000.htm (Accessed 04/09/07) 
Dikshit, Sandeep, ‘India, Japan to firm up strategic ties despite nuclear stalemate’, The Hindu, 7 
August 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2331478.ece (Accessed on 
08/08/11) 
Dixit, J.N., ‘Yoshiro Mori’s visit to India: A yen for change’ Indian Express, 4 September 2000, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000914/dixit.htm (Accessed on 04/05/09) 
Dyer, Geoff and Farhan Bokhari, ‘China-Pakistan reactor deal to open fresh US rift,’ Financial 
Times, 23 September 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83db2ac8-c72d-11df-aeb1-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1XDJwasdp (Accessed on 25/10/10)  
‘Face to Face Interview: Interview with Mr. Osamu Watanabe: JETRO Focusing on Business 
Match-Making Programme’, India One Stop, 
http://www.indiaonestop.com/face2face/osamu.htm  
‘Govt bans FDI in cigarette manufacturing’, Business Standard, 9 April, 2010, 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/govt-bans-fdi-in-cigarette-
manufacturing/391345/ (Accessed on 09/04/10) 
Hiddleston, Sarah, ‘How the “stars aligned” for closer trilateral relations’, The Hindu, 23 April 
2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1718474.ece. (Accessed on 
25/04/11) 
Hille, Kathrin and Mure Dickie, ‘China’s military budget rise alarms Tokyo’, Financial Times, 
4 March 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6525224c-462f-11e0-aebf-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1KL7QBPWH (Accessed on 04/04/11) 
‘How Ireland sowed seeds for nuclear disarmament’ Irish Times, 14 April, 2010, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2010/0414/1224268296428.html (Accessed on 
05/10/10) 
Inada, Kiyohide and Tetsuya Hakoda, ‘ROK bets on nuke exports to power economy’, Asahi 
Shimbun, July 5, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201005060259.html (Accessed on 
07/07/10) 
‘India Needs $500bn In Infrastructure: Think Tank Chief’, Nikkei, 20 May, 2010, 
http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20100520D20SS921.htm (Accessed on 21/05/10) 
‘India PM Seeks Japan Help In Rare Earths’, Nikkei, 24 October, 2010, 
http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20101023D23JFF02.htm (Accessed on 05/05/11)  
‘India still tops ODA list’, Rediff News, 3 January, 2008, 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/jan/03japan.htm (Accessed on 28/07/10) 
‘India to be world's fastest growing economy by 2012: Report’, Indian Express, 15 November. 
2010, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-to-be-worlds-fastest-growing-
economy/711629/ (Accessed on 15/11/10) 
‘India, Japan look to ease visa rules to boost trade’, Daily Times, Pakistan, December 30, 2009, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\12\30\story_30-12-2009_pg5_35 
(Accessed on 02/01/10) 
‘India, Japan target $25-bn trade by ‘14’ Business, Standard, 17 February 2011, 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-japan-target-25-bn-trade-by-/14/425494/ 
(Accessed on 17/02/11) 
‘India, Japan target -bn trade by '14,’  Rediff News 17 February, 2011, 
http://www.samachar.com/India-Japan-target-25bn-trade-by-14-lcrqNKacicj.html (Accessed on 
17/02/11) 
‘India, ROK ink two MOUs to boost defence cooperation’, Economic Times, 3 September, 
2010, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-09-03/news/27603226_1_defence-
products-defence-cooperation-mous (Accessed on 03/09/10) 
‘India-Japan Global Partnership Summit (IJGPS)’ 5-7 September 2011, 
http://www.indiajapansummit.org/en/  
‘Indian warships on goodwill visit to Africa’, The Hindu, 20 August, 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article583972.ece (Accessed on 20/08/10) 
‘Infrastructure development key to attracting investments: Japan Envoy Akitaka Saiki,’ 
Economic Times, 11 July 2011, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-
443 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
trade/infrastructure-development-key-to-attracting-investments-japan-envoy-akitaka-
saiki/articleshow/9184042.cms (Accessed on 12.07/11) 
‘Interview: President Sadako Ogata’, Network Magazine, Volume 41, September 2008, 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/network/vol41/vol_41_1.html 
‘Iran, Japan to Jointly Build Quake-resistant Nuclear Power Plants,’ Xinhua, 20 July 2010, 
http://english.cri.cn/6966/2010/07/20/1461s583865.htm (Accessed on 20/07/10) 
‘JA to introduce Pakistani mangoes in Japan’, AAJ News, 23 November, 2010, 
http://www.aaj.tv/2010/11/ja-to-introduce-pakistani-mangoes-in-japan/ (Accessed on 23/11/10) 
‘Japan does not recognise India, Pak as N-weapon states,’ Rediff News, July 3, 1998, 
http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/jul/03bomb.htm (Accessed on 13/10/10) 
‘Japan moves to mend nuke fences,’ Telegraph, Calcutta, 7 July, 2010, 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100707/jsp/nation/story_12655015.jsp (Accessed on 07/07/10) 
‘Japan to provide ODA of Rs 10,500 crore to India in FY 2009’, NetIndian News Network, 
Delhi, 29 March, 2010, http://netindian.in/news/2010/03/29/0005940/japan-provide-oda-rs-
10500-crore-india-fy-2009 (accessed on 05/02/11) 
‘Japan, India To Nix 90% Of Tariffs In 10 Years’, Nikkei, 26 October 2010, 
http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20101025D25JFF05.htm (Accessed on 26/10/10) 
‘Japan, US and India Hold Naval Drills’, Agence-France Presse, Navy News, 16 April, 2007, 
http://www.defencetalk.com/japan-us-and-india-hold-naval-drills-11261/ (Accessed on 
02/02/10) 
‘Japan’s role in China’s economic reforms’, Xinhua, 20 October, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/20/content_10224098.htm (Accessed on 04/04/11) 
‘Japanese financial firms develop a yen for India’, Business Rediff, 3 August, 2009, 
http://business.rediff.com/report/2009/aug/03/japanese-financial-firms-develop-a-yen-for-
india.htm (Accessed on 03/08/09) 
‘Japanese journalist refused visa extension’, Sify News, 12 July, 2010, 
http://www.sify.com/news/japanese-journalist-refused-visa-extension-news-national-
khmtOdcchib.html (Accessed on 20/02/10) 
‘Japanese Manufacturers in the Indian Market Move to Secure Their Lead’, Nikkei Business, 
April 20, 2010, http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/eng/20100420/214079/ (Accessed on 
19/03/11)  
‘Japanese Manufacturers in the Indian Market Move to Secure Their Lead’, Nikkei Business, 20 
April, 2010, http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/eng/20100420/214079/ (Accessed on 
20/04/10) 
‘Japanese retailers want India to remove FDI restrictions’, Hindustan Times, 2 April, 2010,  
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Japanese-retailers-want-India-to-remove-FDI-
restrictions/Article1-526217.aspx  
‘JETRO sets up shop in Chennai’, ENS Economic Bureau, 3 May, 2010, 
http://expressbuzz.com/finance/jetro-sets-up-shop-in-chennai/170248.html (Accessed on 
03.05/10) 
Johnson, Chalmers ‘The real “China threat”’, Asia Times, March 19, 2005, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC19Ad05.html (Accessed on 22/05/11) 
Kamdar, Mira, 'Risking Armageddon for Cold, Hard Cash', in: Washington Post, 7 September 
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/05/AR2008090502659.html  (Accessed on 15/03/11) 
Karmakar, Rahul, ‘China seeks bigger role in SAARC’, Hindustan Times, 23 May, 2008, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-seeks-bigger-role-in-Saarc/Article1-312557.aspx 
(Accessed on 04/06/11) 
Kate, Daniel Ten and Nicole Gaouette, ‘Clinton Signals US Role in China Territorial Disputes 
After Asean Talks’, Bloomberg, 23 July, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/u-
s-says-settling-south-china-sea-disputes-leading-diplomatic-priority-.html (Accessed on 
27/07/11) 
Kawaguchi, Kentaro, ‘Review of arms export ban shelved in bid to woo SDP’, Asahi Shimbun, 
9 December 2010, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012080329.html (Accessed on 
09/12/10) 
444 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
Krishnan, Ananth, ‘India, China ironing out problems: Beijing’, The Hindu, 29 June, 2011, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2145099.ece (Accessed on 29/06/11)  
‘Korea Electric, Doosan Jump on U.A.E. Nuclear Order,’ Bloomberg, 28 December, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=034020:KS&sid=a5KcLXrcxix
E (Accessed on 28/12/09)  
Kulkarni, Sudheendra, ‘Friend of India, Shinzo Abe to be Japan’s youngest PM’, Indian 
Express, 21 September 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/friend-of-india-shinzo-abe-
to-be-japans-yo/13123/ (Accessed on 04/06/11)  
Lakshmi, Rama, ‘India introduces controversial legislation on compensation for nuclear 
accidents,’ Washington Post, 8 May, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050705057.html (Accessed on 04/07/11) 
‘Mahatma’s teachings echo in Japanese Parliament,’ The Hindu, 2 February 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article98837.ece (Accessed on 03/08/10) 
McCain, John and Joseph Liberman, ‘Renewing America's Asia Policy’, Wall Street Journal 
Asia, 27 May, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121183670827020887.html (Accessed on 
14/07/09)  
Miglani, Sanjeev ‘With an eye on China, India steps up defence spending’, Reuters, 28 
February 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/28/india-budget-military-
idUSSGE71R02Y20110228 (Accessed on 28/02/11) 
‘Mitsubishi Heavy, Areva in nuclear fuel venture-paper,’ Reuters, 21 December 2008, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKT26475220081221 (Accessed on 05/10/10) 
Mohan, Archis, ‘Japan softens on nuke deal,’ Telegraph of India, 10 June, 2010, 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100611/jsp/frontpage/story_12553396.jsp (Accessed on 
10/06/10) 
Mohanty, Hrusikesh, ‘Toyota plans processing plant for rare earth chloride,’ 26 January, 2010, 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/toyota-plans-processing-plant-for-rare-earth-
chloride/383640/  (Accessed on 12/08/11) 
‘More Japanese firms planning foray into State’, The Hindu, 1 May, 2010, 
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article419420.ece (Accessed on 01/05/10) 
Naik, S. D., ‘India–Japan Ties – Moving to the Next Level,’ The Hindu Business Line, 2 
January 2007 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article1645326.ece 
(Accessed on 05/11/08) 
Nair, Rupam Jain, ‘Japan warns India against nuclear tests,’ AFP, 21 August, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gidySTRElq0qbJnTK9pBYeB1m5Cg. 
(Accessed on 21/08/10) 
Noorani, A.G., ‘The Yasukuni “hero”’, Frontline, The Hindu, Vol. 24, Issue 21, Oct 20-Nov 02, 
2007, http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2421/stories/20071102503906000.htm (Accessed on 
17/08/09)  
Onishi, Norimitsu, ‘Decades After War Trials, Japan Still Honors a Dissenting Judge’ New York 
Times, 31 August, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/world/asia/31memo.html 
(Accessed on 19/08/09) 
‘Panasonic planning factory in India’ 7 October 2010, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/10/07/idINIndia-52036220101007 (Accessed on 08/10/10) 
‘Pirates Hijack Two Tankers Within 24 Hours off Somali Shore’, Associated Press, 26 March, 
2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,510766,00.html (Accessed on 26/03/09) 
Perkovich, George, ‘Solving Tokyo’s Nuclear Conundrum,’ Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2010, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40765 (Accessed on 
07/05/10) 
Popa, Bogdan, ‘Suzuki to Use India as Key Export Market’, Auto Evolution, 30 November, 
2010, http://www.autoevolution.com/news/suzuki-to-use-india-as-key-export-market-
27342.html (Accessed on 01/12/10)  
Rajghatta, Chidanand, ‘US experts say Japan tragedy should not stop India from pursuing nuke 
energy options’, Times of India, 15 March 2011, (Accessed on 15/03/11) 
Razzouk, Nayla ‘Japan, Jordan Agree to Allow Nuclear Sales by Areva, Mitsubishi,’ 
Bloomberg, 14 June, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-14/japan-jordan-
445 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
agree-to-allow-nuclear-sales-by-areva-mitsubishi.html (Accessed on 15/06/10) 
Roy, Shubhajit, ‘India, Japan share notes on China Army build-up’, Indian Express, 14 
September 2010, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-japan-share-notes-on-china-army-
build/681228/ (Accessed on 15/09/10) 
Sakamaki, Sachiko, ‘Japan Arms Ban Hurts Security as Firms Quit Industry, Business Lobby 
Says’, Bloomberg, 13 August, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-13/japan-arms-
export-ban-hurting-security-as-firms-quit-industry-group-says.html (Accessed on 13/08/10) 
Samanta, Pranab Dhal, ‘China says no but US, Japan help ADB clear India’s plan’, Indian 
Express, June 16, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-says-no-but-us-japan-help-
adb-clear-indias-plan/477252/ (Accessed on 18/06/09) 
Sasi, Anil, ‘Japan Steel Works bullish on Indian N-reactor parts market,’ Hindu Business Line, 
7 July, 2010, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/07/08/stories/2010070852460400.htm 
(Accessed on 07/07/10)  
Sharma, Amit, ‘India as export hub; to spend $5 mn on marketing: LG India’, Economic Times, 
5 April, 2010, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/India-as-export-hub-to-
spend-5-mn-on-marketing-LG-India/articleshow/5761263.cms (Accessed on 05/04/10) 
Sharma, Subramaniam, ‘Yamaha to Double India Showrooms to Tap Rural Demand’, Business 
Week, 18 June, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-18/yamaha-to-double-india-
showrooms-to-tap-rural-demand-update2-.html (Accessed on 18/06/10) 
Singh, Jayant, ‘Unresolved issues aplenty before India-Japan FTA’, Indian Express, August 7, 
2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/unresolved-issues-aplenty-before-
indiajapan/345670/ (Accessed on 12/11/10) 
Singh, Madhur, ‘Clinton’s Trip to India: What’s the Takeaway?’ Time Magazine, 21 July, 2009 
Soble, Jonathan, ‘Japan feels the heat from emerging nuclear energy rivals,’ Financial Times, 
28 June, 2010, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/28/japan-feels-the-heat-from-
emerging-nuclear-energy-rivals/ (Accessed on 28/06/10) 
Stephens, Philip, ‘Diplomatic feint that looks to leave Japan in the cold’, Financial Times, 
February 26, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2124278c-0437-11de-845b-000077b07658.html 
(Accessed on 27/02/09) 
Suri, Anirudh. ‘India and Japan: Congruence, at Last’, Asia Times Online, 9 June, 2007 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IF09Df03.html (Accessed on 10/12/08) 
Suryanarayana, P.S., ‘India, Japan focus on strategic ties’, The Hindu, 4 July, 2009, 
http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/04/stories/2009070460941200.htm (Accessed on 04/07/09) 
Suryanarayana, P.S., ‘Quiet approach’, Frontline, Vol 27, Issue 12, June 2010, 
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2712/stories/20100618271205300.htm (Accessed on 22/06/10) 
Takano, Yuzuru, ‘Manufacturers flee China for Vietnam’, Asahi Shimbun, 26 June, 2010, 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006250440.html (Accessed on 27/06/10) 
Topping, Seymour, ‘China Tests Atomic Bomb, Asks Summit Talk On Ban; Johnson 
Minimizes Peril’, New York Times, 16 October 1964 (Accessed on 12/10/10) 
Twining, Daniel, ‘America’s Grand Design in Asia’, Washington Quarterly, 31 May, 2007, 
http://www.twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer_twining.pdf, p. 82 (Accessed on 16/05/11)  
Twining, Daniel, ‘Not a Chinese Century, An Indo-American One’, Global Asia, March 2011, 
http://www.globalasia.org/V6N1_Spring_2011/Daniel_Twining.html (Accessed on 01/04/11)  
Twining, Daniel, ‘The New Great Game: Why the Bush administration has embraced India’, 
The Weekly Standard, Vol. 12, Issue 15, 25 December, 2006, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/094gntoy.asp?pg=1 
(Accessed on 02/09/09) 
'US Unveils Plans To Make India 'Major World Power', AFP, 26 March, 2005 
Varadarajan, Siddharth, ‘India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China’, The 
Hindu, 23 October, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/10/23/stories/2008102355661200.htm 
(Accessed on 27/11/08) 
Walsh, Bryan, ‘Why Japan Is Cozying Up to India’, Time, 13 December, 2006, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1569557,00.html (Accessed on 04/05/09) 
‘When 80,000 Japanese said Namaste India,’ Indian Express, 24 September 2006, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/when-80-000-japanese-said-namaste-india/13340/  
446 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
(Accessed on 08/11/08) 
‘You can’t ignore us anymore: PC to World,’ Express India, 30 January, 2006, 
http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=62204 (Accessed on 04/05/09) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
447 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
 
Phase One (June 2009) Tokyo, Japan 
 
Academia 
 
HIROSE, Takao, Professor of South Asian Politics, Senshu University, 13 June 2009 
 
HORIMOTO, Takenori, Professor of South Asian Studies, Shobi University, 26 June 2009 
 
Business community 
 
MANI, APS President, India IT Club Japan, 18 June 2009 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
 
YACHI, Shotaro, Former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, 26 June 2009 
 
 
Phase Two (August 2009 – July 2011) London, UK 
 
Academia 
 
EMMOTT, Bill, Former Editor, The Economist 1993-2006, 27 August 2009 
 
FITZPATRICK, Mark, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, IISS, London, 15 November 2010 
 
GREEN, Michael, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, CSIS, Washington DC, 11 July 2011 (via 
telephone) 
 
LIMAYE, Satu, Director, East-West Center, Washington DC, former South Asia Analyst, JIIA, 
25 August 2009  
 
PANT, Harsh, Lecturer, Asia-Pacific Security and Nuclear Proliferation, King’s College 
London, 12 April 2010 
 
PATALANO, Alessio, Lecturer, Japanese Military and Naval Policy, King’s College London, 
21 April 2010 
 
ROY-CHAUDHURY, Rahul, Senior Fellow, South Asia, IISS, London, 3 March 2010 
 
 
Phase Three (May – June 2010) Tokyo, Japan 
 
Political Parties 
 
ABE, Shinzo, Former Prime Minister of Japan, LDP 2006-07, 2 June 2010 (via interpreter) 
 
SASAKI, Kenji, Deputy Secretary, DPJ and Special Researcher, Cabinet Secretariat, GOJ, 28 
June 2010 
 
UCHIDA, Yuka, Assistant General Manager, International Department, DPJ, 28 June 2010  
448 
Victoria Tuke 
Candidate No: 0415703 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
 
DAIKUHARA, Aya, Official, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 19 May 2010  
 
ENDO, Tetsuya, Former Governor, International Atomic Energy Association and Vice 
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, 30 June 2010  
 
ENOKI, Yasukuni, Former Ambassador to India, 2004-07, 15 June 2010   
 
HARA, Shohei, Director, South Asia Division, JICA, 18 June 2010 
 
HIRABAYASHI, Hiroshi, Former Ambassador to India 1998-02, 21 June 2010 
 
HIKIHARA, Takeshi, Ambassador/Secretary-General for the Japan APEC Meetings in 2010, 
former Director of Southwest Asia Division, 2000-02, MOFA, 25 June 2010 
 
ISHIDA, Y., Researcher, Intelligence and Analysis Service, MOFA, 10 June 2010 
 
ISHII, Masafumi, Ambassador for Policy Planning and International Security Policy, 18 May 
2010  
 
KANEHARA, Nobukatsu, Deputy Director-General, European Affairs Bureau, MOFA, 24 June 
2010 
 
KANEKO, Kumao, Founding Director of Nuclear Energy Division, 1978-82, Ambassador of 
Japan at IAEA and NPT Conferences, Founding President, Japan Council on Nuclear Energy, 
Environment & Security, 10 May 2010, 25 June 2010  
 
KANO, Takehiro, Director, Climate Change Division, MOFA, 2 June 2010 
 
KIYOTA, Tomoko, Researcher, Intelligence and Analysis Service, MOFA, 12 May 2010   
 
NAGANUMA, Zentaro, Principal Deputy Director, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation 
Division, MOFA, 23 June 2010 
 
NAKAHARA, Naoto, Principal Deputy Director, Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear 
Energy Division, MOFA, 14 June 2010 
 
NODA, Eijiro, Former Ambassador to India 1985-89, 25 June 2010 
 
SATOH, Yukio Vice Chairman, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 29 June 2010 
 
SUTO, Takaya. Senior Adviser, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation, 29 June 2010,  
 
SATO, Hitomi, Deputy Director, Special Assistant for Southwest Asia Issues, International 
Cooperation Bureau, MOFA, 15 June 2010 
 
SHINDO, Yusuke, Director, Southwest Asia Division, 2009-10 MOFA, 20 May 2010  
 
SUZUKI, Yukio, Official, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 19 May 2010 
 
TAJIMA, Hiroshi, Director, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 24 June 2010  
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TANAKA, Hitoshi, Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, 14 May 2010   
 
TANINO, Sakutaro, Former Ambassador to India 1995-8, 1 July 2010 
 
YACHI, Shotaro, Former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, 12 May 2010 
 
YAMADA, Takio Ambassador to ASEAN, former Political Minister, New Delhi Embassy 17 
May 2010 (via email) 
 
YOKOTE, Fuminori, First Secretary Political, Embassy of Japan, London, served in New Delhi 
1993-96, 2006-09, 20 April 2010 
 
YOSHIDA, Aya, Principal Deputy Director, Southwest Asia Division, MOFA, 30 June 2010 
 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan 
 
TOYOFUKU, Kenichiro Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Division, International Trade 
Policy Bureau, METI, 10 June 2010 
 
Ministry of Finance, Japan 
 
SAKAKIBARA, Eisuke, President, Indian Institute for Economic Studies, Former Vice 
Minister of Finance for International Affairs, 17 May 2010 
 
KAWAI, Masahiro, Dean ADB Institute, Former Deputy Vice Minister of Finance for 
International Affairs 2001-03, 5 July 2010 
 
Ministry of External Affairs, India 
 
BHATTACHARYYA, Sanjay, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 22 June 
2010  
 
SETH, Aftab, Former Ambassador to Japan 2000-04, 21 June 2010  
 
State Department, USA 
 
OU, Andrew, First Secretary, Political Section, United States of America Embassy, Tokyo, 7 
June 2010 
 
Academia  
 
DUJARRIC, Robert, Director, Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University, 19 
May 2010 
 
GLOSSERMAN, Brad Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS, May 15 2010  
 
GUPTA, Sourabh, Senior Research Associate, Samuels International Inc., 26 May 2010  
 
GURUMURTHY, Ramamurthy, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Institute for Economic 
Studies, 17 May 2010  
 
HIROSE, Takao, Professor of South Asian Politics, Senshu University, 11 June 2010 
 
HORIMOTO, Takenori, Professor of South Asian Studies, Shobi University, 24 June 2010 
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INOGUCHI, Tadashi, Professor Emeritus of University of Tokyo, 9 June 2010 
 
ITO, Toru, Associate Professor of Security Studies, South Asia, National Defense Academy of 
Japan, 26 June 2010  
 
IZUYAMA, Marie, Chief 6 Research Office, National Institute for Defense Studies, 13 May 
2010  
 
JANARDHANAN, Nanda Kumar, Energy Policy Researcher, Institute for Global 
Environmental Strategies, Japan, 27 May 2010  
 
KATAHARA, Eiichi, Deputy Director, Research Department, NIDS, 13 May 2010  
 
KOTANI, Tetsuo, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 10 June 2010 
 
LEHENY, David, Professor of East Asian Studies, Princeton University, 8 June 2010 
 
MALIK, Rabinder, Visiting Lecturer, Keio University, Coordinator, TERI-Japan, 26 January 
2011 (via email) 
 
MICHISHITA, Narushige, Associate Professor, GRIPS, 13 May 2010 
 
MURATA, Koji, Professor of Political Science, Doshisha University, 1 June 2010 
 
NISHIHARA, Masahi, President RIPS, former President of National Defense Academy, 26 May 
2010 
 
SOEYA, Yoshihide, Professor of Political Science, Keio University, 8 June 2010 
 
TANAKA, Akihiko, Professor of International Politics and Executive Vice President, 
University of Tokyo, 24 June 2010 
 
TANKHA, Brij, Professor of Modern Japanese History, University of Delhi and Hitotsubashi 
University, 24 May 2010  
 
Economists 
 
BASU, Dipak Professor of Economics, Nagasaki University, 22 May 2010 
 
ESHO, Hideki, Professor of Economics, Hosei University, 24 May 2010 
 
KODA, Madoka, Senior Economist, Japan Center for International Finance, 29 June 2010  
 
KONDO, Masanori, Senior Associate Professor, International Christian University, 17 May 
2010, 23 June 2010  
 
KUMAR, Rajiv, Director, Indian Council for Research and International Economic Relations, 
New Delhi, 21 May 2010 
 
KINOSHITA, Toshi, Professor of Economics, Waseda, 29 June 2010 
 
TANAKA, Naoki, President, Center for International Public Policy Studies, Tokyo, 25 June 
2010 
 
YAMADA, Go, Senior Economist, Japan Center for Economic Research, 25 June 2010  
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Journalists 
 
TANIGUCHI, Tomohiko, Former Deputy Press Secretary to MOFA and Chief Speechwriter, 6 
May 2010 
 
TAKEUCHI, Y. Teddy, Journalist, Asahi Shimbun, Former New Delhi Bureau Chief 2000-04, 
26 May 2010 
  
Ministry of Defence 
 
AKIMOTO, Kazumine, Rtd. Rear Admiral JMSDF, Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy 
Research Foundation, 22 June 2010  
 
IMAIZUMI, Takehisa, Advisor, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 22 June 2010 
 
ISHIKAWA, Takeshi, Director, International Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 
2010  
 
Business Community 
 
CHAKRAVARY, Srinivasa, President, Touzai R&D Co.(Japan-India Business) 17 May 2010  
 
CHANDRANI, Jagmohan, Community Leader, Japan, 26 June 2010  
 
DASH, Kunna, President, India-Japan Friendship Club, Osaka, 24 June 2010  
 
RUPANI, Vashdev, India Chamber of Commerce, Japan, 8 June 2010   
 
SINHA, Sanjeev, Founding President, Sun & Sands Advisors (Japan-India Business), 22 June 
2010 
 
Other 
 
OGAWA, Tadashi, Managing Director, Center for Global Partnership, Japan Foundation 
Former Director of New Delhi Office, 20 May 2010  
 
ODASHI, Masaaki, Chairperson, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation, 10 June 
2010 
 
 
Phase Four (February – March 2011) New Delhi, India 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 
 
ITO, Naoto, Minister, Political Affairs, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 28 February 2011  
 
KAWAGUCHI, Mitsuo, Consul General, Japanese Consulate, Kolkata, 3 March 2011 
 
KUBOTA, Akiko, Vice Consul, Japanese Consulate, Kolkata, 2 March 2011  
 
KURAMOCHI, Naoto, Researcher, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 28 February 2011 
 
SHIBATA, Takashi, Second Secretary, Political Section, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 28 
February 2011 
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SUZUKI, Hiroshi, Senior Representative, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
New Delhi, 21 February 2011 
 
YOSHIDA, Aya, Counselor, Embassy of Japan, New Delhi, 17 February 2011 
 
Ministry of External Affairs, India 
 
BAMBAWALE, Gautam, Joint Secretary (East Asia), Ministry of External Affairs, India, New 
Delhi, 15 March 2011  
 
SETH, Aftab, Ambassador to Japan, 2000-2003, New Delhi, 16 March 2011  
 
SAHDEV, Kulip, Ambassador to Japan, 1995-97, New Delhi, 9 March 2011 
 
ASRANI, Arjun, Ambassador to Japan, 1988-92, New Delhi, 12 March 2011 
 
Ministry of Defence, India 
 
SISODIA, N.S., Director General, IDSA, Former Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Defence, 
New Delhi, 16 March 2011  
 
Journalists 
 
ARAI, Susumu, Correspondent in Chief, Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 March 2011  
 
NAGASAWA, Rinichiro, New Delhi Bureau Chief, Nikkei Shimbun, 1 March 2011  
 
NALAPAT, Madhav, Professor, Manipal University and Former Coordinating Editor of Times 
of India, 12 March 2011 
 
SUGIO, Naoya, Correspondent in Chief, Mainichi Shimbun, New Delhi, 11 March 2011  
 
TAKEISHI, Eishiro, New Delhi Bureau Chief, Asahi Shimbun, New Delhi, 14 March 2011  
 
TAKITA, Makiko, New Delhi Bureau Chief, Sankei Shimbun, 7 March 2011  
 
Business Community 
 
NAKAJIMA, Etsuji, Chief Strategist, Mistui & Co. India Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 11 March 2011  
 
ASHTA, Ashok, General Manager, Business Development, Hitachi India Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 
16 March 2011  
 
VARGU, Ajay, Planning & Coordination Department, Mitsubishi Corporation India Pvt. Ltd., 
New Delhi, 4 March 2011 
 
TERASHIMA, Takayuki, Sojitz Corporation, India Private Ltd., Kolkata, 2 March 2011 
 
Academia 
 
CHELLANEY, Brahma, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 
8 March 2011  
 
DAHIYA, Rumel, Brigadier and Advisor, IDSA, 8 March 2011  
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KESAVAN, KV, Distinguished Fellow, Japanese Studies, Observer Research Foundation, 1 
March 2011  
 
KHAN, Shamshad A., Researcher, IDSA, 7 March 2011 
 
KONDAPALLI, Srikan, Professor of Chinese Studies, JNU, New Delhi, 1 March 2011  
 
KUBO, Ken, Researcher, South Asia, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), Indian 
Statistical Institute, 28 February 2011 
 
MISHRA, Rahul, Researcher, IDSA, New Delhi, 14 March 2011 
 
NAIDU, GVC, Professor in Southeast Asian Studies. JNU, New Delhi, 8 March 2011  
 
NAYAN, Rajiv, Senior Research Associate, IDSA, 18 February 2011 
 
PANDA, Jaganna, Research Fellow, IDSA, 11 March 2011  
 
PANDA, Rajaram, Senior Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi 15 March 2011 
 
PARMAR, SS, Commander, Indian Navy and Research Fellow, IDSA, 1 March 2011  
 
 
Phase Five (June 2011) Washington DC, USA 
 
State Department, USA 
 
CLAD, James, Former US Dep Ass Secretary of Defence for Asia Pacific Security, DoD, Senior 
Research Fellow, National Defence University, 20 June 2011  
 
PERCIVAL, Bronson, Senior Advisor on Southern Asia and Terrorism at Centre for Strategic 
Analyses and East West Center, Washington DC, Former US Official in State Department, 22 
June 2011   
 
Academia 
 
ALAGAPPA, Mutiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, Washington DC, 20 
June 2011 
 
GUPTA, Sourabh, Senior Research Associate, Samuels International Inc., 21 June 2011  
 
LATIF, S. Amer, Visiting Fellow, US-India Policy Studies, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington DC, formerly South Asia Director for Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 21 June 2011   
 
LIMAYE, Satu Director, East-West Center, Washington DC, former South Asia Analyst, 22 
June 2011 
 
YAHUDA, Michael, Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics, Visiting Scholar, 
George Washington University, 21 June 2011  
 
 
